




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SPAIN,
AND
PORTUGAL.
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1812

Common Spanish Leagues
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Local Spanish Leagues
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SPAIN,
AND
PORTUGAL.


The
HISTORY
of the
Present War
in
Spain & Portugal
with
MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE
of the
MARQUIS WELLINGTON
&c. &c.

By *Theophilus Camden Esq.*

Author of the Imperial History of England &c.

Printed for J. Stratford 112 Holborn Hill

Sept^r 18. 1812.



THE
HISTORY
OF THE
P R E S E N T W A R
IN
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL,
FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT
TO THE
Battle of Vittoria.

ILLUSTRATED WITH
Anecdotes, Civil, Military, and Political,
AND
A Geographical View of those Kingdoms.

TO WHICH WILL BE ADDED,
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LIFE OF LORD WELLINGTON,
AND
*Biographical Sketches of the most eminent Commanders who have
distinguished themselves during the War in the Peninsula.*

BY THEOPHILUS CAMDEN, ESQ.
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BRITISH REPORTER, &c.

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Printed by W. Stratford, Crown Court, Temple-Bar; for
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INTRODUCTION.

PREVIOUSLY to our entering on the History of the present War in the Peninsula, it is requisite that we give a general outline of the History of Spain and Portugal, that we may not begin our narrative abruptly, but that the work now offered to the Public may be complete in itself. We shall, therefore, in compliance with historic verity, enter on a brief account of the origin and progress of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies from the earliest times to the present eventful period, with a concise view of the geography of the two countries, and the manners and customs of the people.

Although Spain appears to have been known to the Phœnicians, nearly a thousand years before the birth of Christ, and their Tarshish to have been the little island of Tartessus, near Gades, yet it seems hardly to have been disclosed to the Greeks in the time of Herodotus. It is probable indeed that the whole country was the Tarshish of the Phœnicians and Hebrews, though the learned Huet appears rather to restrict it to Bœtica, or the southern part of Spain; which region was, it is well known, the Mexico of the Phœnicians, who from that country imported large quantities of silver. When the Greeks established a colony at Marseilles, without doubt, it was not long after that they discovered the northern part of this fertile region; which, from the noble river Iberus, now Ebro, they called Iberia; and from its extreme situation in the west it was also called Hesperia. The Romans, probably from a native term, have fixed and handed down to us the name Hispania; which has been variously adapted to the idiom of the modern languages of Europe.

With respect to the geographical situation of Spain, we may observe, that it lies between the 36th and 44th degrees of North latitude; and its Western extremity is about 9 degrees; and it is 3 degrees of East longitude from London: the greatest length from West to East being about 700 miles, and the breadth from North to South upwards of 500 miles; thus forming almost a compact square, (if we include Portugal in this general view of the country,) and surrounded on all sides by the sea, except where the Pyrenean chain of mountains form a grand natural barrier against France. But as in the present estimate we must exclude Portugal, which we shall reserve for a future consideration, it may be observed, that the boundaries betwixt these two kingdoms depend on artificial conventions, and not on rivers or mountains, or other remarkable features of separation. The kingdom of Spain in itself is supposed to contain about 148,000 square miles; and its population is estimated at 10,000,000, so that there are about sixty-eight persons to the mile square.

The kingdom of Spain is divided in the following manner:

<i>Provinces.</i>		<i>Chief Towns.</i>
Gallicia	- -	Compostella
Asturias	- -	Oviedo
Biscay	- -	Bilboa
Navarre	- -	Pampeluna
Arragon	- -	Saragossa
Catalonia	- -	Barcelona
Valencia	- -	Valencia
Murcia	- -	Murcia
Granada	- -	Granada
Andalusia	- -	Seville
Old Castile	- -	Burgos
New Castile	- -	Madrid
Leon	- -	Leon
Estremadura	- -	Merida
<i>Islands in the Mediterranean.</i>		
Majorca	- -	Majorca
Minorca	- -	Citadella & Port Mahon
Ivica	- -	Ivica

Gibraltar is a strong fort, situated in the most southerly part of Spain, and belongs to Great Britain. It has a very commodious harbour, formed by nature for commanding the passage of the Streights, or in other words, the entrance into the Mediterranean Sea. The Streights of Gibraltar are but 15 miles broad and 24 long.

The chief mountains are, the Pyrenees, the Cantabrian Mountains, Sierra Molina and Tabladas, Sierra Morena, Sierra

Sierra Nevada, and Mount Calpe that covers Gibraltar. Mount Calpe and Mount Abyla, which is opposite to it on the African shore, are the ancient Pillars of Hercules.

The most considerable rivers are, 1. The Minho, which rises in the N. E. part of Galicia, whence it runs S. W. through that province, and after passing by Lugo, Ortense, and Tay, dividing Galicia from Portugal, it falls into the Atlantic ocean at the town of Coimbra, a little to the northward of Viana.

2. The Douro, or Duero, rises in the N. E. part of Old Castile, runs from thence to Valladolid, crossing Leon; and then passing by Toro and Zamora, enters Portugal near the town of Miranda, its course being mostly between mountains. After receiving the small rivers Coa, Sabor, Tua, Tavora, Tamega, and others, having crossed Portugal, it empties itself into the Atlantic Ocean below the city of Oporto*. Near the village of St. Joan de Pesqueira it first becomes navigable. It is said that gold was formerly found among the sands of this river, and that John the Third, king of Portugal, had a sceptre made of gold that was collected from its channel.

3. The Tagus, or Tejo, is the largest river of Spain and Portugal. It rises on the confines of Arragon, whence it descends from the Sierra Molina, and running S. W. through New Castile and Estremadura, passes by Aranjuez, Toledo, and Alcantara; when crossing Portugal in the same

* Oporto, Porto, or Port-à-Port, is a well known sea-port of the province of Entre Minho e Douro, (that is, the province contained between the rivers Minho and Douro,) in Portugal. The entrance into its harbour, called Barra or Bar, is dangerous, by reason of rocks and sand-banks, except at high water, especially in the winter season; and is defended by a castle. This place is surrounded with walls and towers, and next to Lisbon is the richest city in Portugal: it is the see of a bishop. This town owes its origin to Cale, a very ancient place on the opposite side of the Douro, hence called Portucale, whence the name of Portugal. Here is a good trade, particularly in wine, to England, commonly denominated Port. The streets of this city are narrow and irregular, yet well paved, the natural rock making up part of the pavement, and in other places even the walls of the houses. The buildings are antique, but graceful, and all of stone. The churches, especially the cathedral, are stately and magnificent. Its inhabitants amount to about four thousand families in five parishes, with nine monasteries and other religious foundations. It is 36 miles S. of Braga, 70 N. of Coimbra, and 176 N. of Lisbon. Lat. 41.0 N. Long. 8.46 W.

direction

direction, it forms the harbour of Lisbon, where it is about three miles wide, falling into the Atlantic Ocean at Cascaes, eight miles below that capital.

4. The Guadiana, which rises in the middle of New Castile. It runs S. W. by Calatrava and Ciudad Real, passes on to Merida in Spanish Estremadura, and by Badajoz, entering Portugal near Elvas: after which it runs through Alentejo and Algarve, and falls into the Mediterranean near Ayamonte.

5. The Guadalquivir is another large river, which was formerly called Perca, and in still more ancient times it had the names of Bœtis and Tartessus. It takes its rise from several small streams in Mount Segurza, in the province of Andalusia, which uniting in one, form this river. It has a long course from Corduba to Seville, though very small; but, from the last mentioned city to its mouth, it is navigable for large vessels; yet there are several sand-banks in it. A few miles below Seville it forms a kind of small lake, at its issuing from which it divides itself into two branches, and at length falls into the bay of Cadiz.

6. The Xenil rises about twenty miles E. of Granada, and after a westerly course by that city, Loxa, Puente de Gouzala, and Ecija, it empties itself into the Guadalquivir opposite to Penafior.

7. The Segura, or Segra, is a river of Murcia, which is subject to frequent inundations, by reason of the vast quantities of snow that melt down from the adjacent mountains, as well as from long continued rain, which falling into it occasions much damage. In 1651, by the violence of the waters it threw down one thousand and sixty-five houses in the city of Murcia, and four monasteries, destroying a vast number of people, besides cattle, &c. The water was then observed to flow as high as the top of the great altar in the cathedral. The Segura rises in the Cerdagne mountains, in the N. of Catalonia; whence it runs S. W. through that province, when after washing Balaguer and Lerida, it empties itself into the Ebro.

8. The Xucar rises in New Castile, and after running S. E. through that province, it turns due E. and crossing Valencia, falls into the Mediterranean, about 24 miles S. of the city of Valencia.

9. The Guadalaviar, by the Romans called Durias, is a beautiful river, the banks of which are delightfully covered with flowers and woods. This river rises on the confines of Arragon and New Castile; and after a S. E. course through the province of Valencia falls into the Mediterranean below the city of that name.

10. The

10. The Ebro, called by the Romans Iberus, is a large river, which rises in a mountain of Santillana, Lat. 41. 10 N. in the North of Spain, on the border of Asturias, and in the N. W. corner of Old Castile. It rises from two springs, one of which has given its name to the village of Fuentibro, that is, the spring of the Ebro. This river runs from N. W. to S. E. quite across Arragon, washing its capital Saragossa *, and dividing the province into almost two equal parts. In its passage the Ebro receives above thirty different smaller rivers. The navigation is sometimes dangerous, by reason of innumerable rocks. It afterwards pursues a southerly course across Catalonia, and after running nearly forty miles discharges itself with great rapidity into the Mediterranean, forming at its mouth the little islands of Alfacqs. From this river Spain was anciently called Iberia : the Celts, a nation of Gaul, who sent colonies hither, had the name of Celtiberians, and the country itself that of Celtiberia.

Round the coast of Spain and Portugal are the following promontories or capes, viz. Cape de Creus, Cape Martin, Cape Palos, Cape de Gata, Mount Calpe (Gibraltar), Cape de Espichel, Cape de Mondego, Cape Finisterre, and Cape de Ortegal.

* Saragossa, or Zaragoza, is a fine large city, and the capital of the kingdom of Arragon. It has old walls with many towers and other antique fortifications, standing near the confluence of the Ebro, Gallegos, and Guersa, which running in a serpentine course through the neighbourhood, and a delightful plain, render it very fruitful. Here are four stately gates towards the four cardinal points. The city is of an oblong form, with two noble bridges over the Ebro. The inhabitants amount to about fifteen thousand families, many of which are of quality. It is divided into fourteen parishes, besides three smaller ones. Here are also twenty-three monasteries, some of them large and magnificent; thirteen nunneries; and an hospital, with a revenue sufficient for maintaining eight hundred sick persons; besides two others for orphans, and some smaller ones for decayed people. Here is a famous university, which was founded in 1474. Saragossa was made the see of an archbishop by pope John XXII. in the year 1318. Its cathedral is rich and stately, and to it belong twelve dignitaries, twenty-four canons, &c. The metropolitan's annual income is estimated at about 45,000 ducats. The tabernacle over the high altar was a magnificent piece of workmanship, of massive silver, weighing six hundred and twelve pounds. The palace where the cortes held their meetings, and the exchange are magnificent. Saragossa is 160 miles W. of Barcelona, and 170 N. E. of Madrid.

The chief bays or gulphs are those of Biscay, Ferrol, and Corunna, on the N. W. Vigo on the W. Cadiz and Gibraltar on the S. W. Carthage on the S. and Alicant, Altea, Valencia, and Rosas on the E.

As to the antiquities of Spain, scarcely any thing remains of the Carthaginians, except coins, which have been found in considerable numbers. But the Roman antiquities are so numerous, that to enter into details on the subject would be prolix, and foreign to the nature of this work. The aqueduct at Segovia, however, is one of the noblest remains of the Roman edifices. It consists of one hundred and fifty-nine arches, extending seven hundred and forty yards; and is rather more than ninety-four feet in height, where it crosses the valley. Morviedo, the ancient Saguntum, presents many curious remains of antiquity. The theatre at this place is capable of receiving nearly ten thousand people, and is hewn out of the solid rock; a labour not so great as might be imagined, as the Spanish rocks are generally gypseous, or calcareous. Tarragon, the ancient Tarraco, likewise contains many curious monuments.

Numerous and splendid are the monuments of the Moors in Spain. The mosque at Cordova was begun by Abdarrahan, the first khalif. The second khalif of that name reared the walls of Seville. But these princes were far exceeded in magnificence by Abdarrahan the Third, who built a town three miles from Cordova, which he called Zebra, after the name of one of his female favourites. The magnificent palace which he caused to be built here is supposed to have been destroyed during the barbarous and fanatic wars of the middle ages. The mosque at Cordova, however, still surprises travellers with the multitude of its columns, which are computed at eight hundred.

In Granada, the last of the Moorish kingdoms, having been subdued after the arts and sciences began to revive, there are some of the best preserved remains of Moresque antiquity. Nor will their Alhambra disappoint the expectation of the traveller, as may be judged from Mr. Swinburne's elegant drawings; but, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Townsends description shall be preferred. "You first enter, says that gentleman, into an oblong court of one hundred and fifty feet by ninety, with a bason of water in the midst, of one hundred feet in length, encompassed by a flower border. At each end is a colonade. From hence you pass into the court of the lions. It is adorned with a colonade of one hundred and forty marble pillars. The royal bed-chamber has two alcoves, adorned with columns, and a fountain between them, in the middle of the room. Adjoining to this

are two hot baths. The great hall is about forty feet square, and sixty in height, with eight windows and two doors, all in deep recesses. Between this and the oblong court is a gallery of ninety feet by sixteen. All these lower apartments have fountains, and are paved either with tiles or marble, in checkers. The idea of the ceilings is evidently taken from *stalactites*, or drop-stones, found in the roofs of natural caverns. The ornaments of the friezes are Arabesque, and perfectly accord with the Arabic inscriptions, which are here suited to the purpose for which each apartment was designed." Above is a suit of elegant apartments for the winter. This noble edifice was finished in the year 1336.

The established religion of Spain and Portugal is that of the church of Rome, which in these countries has been carried to a pitch of fanaticism unknown in the Italian states, or even in the papal territory. According to the returns made to the government, the number of the Spanish clergy amounted to one hundred and eighty-eight thousand six hundred and twenty five. There are eight archbishoprics, and forty-six bishoprics. The archbishopric of Toledo is said to yield annually about ninety thousand pounds sterling.

The government of Spain is well known to be despotic, the States, or Cortes, having hardly been assembled since the reign of Charles the Fifth. In consequence, however, of the dethronement of Ferdinand the Seventh, the Cortes have lately assembled in different parts of the nation, with a view to defend the liberty of their country against the machinations of the court of France. Dr. Robertson's History of Charles the Fifth may be read with advantage. The grantees of Spain have several privileges; among which an important one in their eyes is that of wearing their hats in the royal presence, which, however, they never do except at the nod of the sovereign.

As to the laws of Spain, they are contained in several ancient codes; and recourse is also had to the civil and canon law. The *Escrivanos* are numerous, and instead of explaining the codes, they often impede the administration of justice. A mistaken notion of mercy also frequently retains criminals in long duration, so that when at last they are led to execution their offence is forgotten, and the example of punishment becomes inefficacious.

With respect to the manners and customs of Spain, we may observe, that the Spanish character is highly respectable, for integrity and a long train of virtues. Conscious of an upright and noble mind, the respect which a Spaniard would pay to those qualities in others, is often centered in himself, as he is intimately sensible that he possesses them.

This self-respect is nearly allied to pride; but it is the pride of virtue, which certainly ought not to humble itself before vice and folly. From the same principle arises an excess of ceremony, at least as laudable as the opposite extreme of impertinence. Temperance is a virtue which the Spaniard shares with other southern nations, for wine is so inflammatory in regions exposed to the heat of the sun, that, instead of an agreeable warmth, and a flow of ideas, it would produce fever, misery, and madness. In these countries the body is so much exhausted by the influence of heat, that the *siesta*, or short sleep in the middle of the day becomes a necessary resource of nature, and is by habit continued even in the winter.

A slight shade of French manners has within the last century become blended with Spanish gravity, particularly since the accession of the house of Bourbon. But fashions here have little sway; and the prohibition of slouched hats and long cloaks led to a serious insurrection; yet the prohibition was continued, and found to be salutary, as this compleat disguise occasioned many bad customs, and even frequent assassinations. All visits are understood to be paid to the mistress of the house, the extreme gallantry of the men having reduced them to cyphers. When the Spanish ladies go to mass, which is almost the sole occasion of their being seen abroad, they attire themselves in a black silk petticoat, and a kind of mantle, which also serves as a veil, and is often arranged with singular ease and grace. The cottages and inns are, in general, miserable places; but the houses of the great, though not the most elegant and commodious buildings, are extremely large; the duke of Alba's containing four hundred bed-chambers. The dress and manners of the lower classes vary much in different provinces.

The amusements of people of rank consist chiefly in dancing and cards, and the theatre is little frequented. The combats with bulls in the amphitheatres have justly been regarded as a striking feature of Spanish and Portuguese manners.

The universities, or rather academies, in Spain are computed at upwards of twenty; of which the most noted is that of Salamanca, founded in the year 1200 by Alphonso the Ninth, king of Leon, and afterwards regulated by Alphonso the Wise. The students, have, at former periods, been computed at sixteen thousand, sufficient to darken the face of the earth; for the reign of Aristotle in logic, and Thomas Aquinas in theology, continues unviolated, so that a student of 1812 may aspire to as much ignorance as one of the year 1300; and the progeny of dunces proceeds without end!

In 1785, according to Mr. Townsend, vol. ii. 79, the number of students was computed at one thousand nine hundred and nine. The same system of education pervades the other universities.

The most remarkable edifices of Spain are the cathedrals of the several sees, and the churches belonging to opulent convents. The palace and monastery of the Escorial have been described at great length by many travellers. It is seated in a deep recess, at the foot of high mountains; and was built by that bigot Philip the Second, in the strange form of a gridiron, the instrument of the martyrdom of St. Lawrence, upon whose anniversary the Spaniards gained the victory of St. Quintin. The convent is seven hundred and forty feet by five hundred and eighty, and the palace forms the handle of this imaginary gridiron. The paintings are excellent and numerous; and the vault containing the royal tombs is grand and impressive. But the palaces of Aranjuez and St. Ildefonso were greater favourites with the court. The gardens of the former, watered by the Tagus, are laid out in a just and natural taste. St. Ildefonso is a summer residence, exposed to the north, and being built on a rocky soil, is computed to have cost six millions, five hundred thousand pounds sterling. The Pardo, another palace, stands in the midst of a large forest.

The climate of Spain has been deservedly praised, as equal, if not superior, to that of any country in Europe; but in the southern provinces the heat renders it rather unhealthy, and malignant fevers sometimes sweep off great numbers. This disaster probably originates in some degree from the neglected state of the country, from stagnant marshes, which might, if properly drained, supply running streams and verdant meadows. The S. E. wind from Africa, called *Solano*, has such inflammatory effects, that it is said more murders are committed in three days, than throughout the rest of the year*. The chains of mountains which pervade Spain at different intervals, from East to West, seem to temper the climate, and supply cooling breezes. In the South, the sea breeze, beginning about nine o'clock in the morning, and continuing till about five in the afternoon, agreeably diversifies the warmth of the summer; and in the northern provinces the severity of winter is allayed by the proximity of the ocean, which generally supplies gales rather humid than frosty.

The face of the country is in most seasons delightful, abounding with excellent and fragrant pasturage, vineyards,

* Vid. Dillon, p. 308. Townsend, &c.

and groves of orange trees; and the hills clothed with wild thyme and other odorous plants. The rivers and streams are numerous; and the chains of mountains afford a grand variety to the prospect.

The soil is generally light, and reposes on beds of gypsum or plaister of Paris, itself an excellent manure. The common course of husbandry about Barcelona begins with wheat; which being ripe in June is immediately succeeded by Indian corn, hemp, millet, cabbage, kidney beans, or lettuce. The second year these same crops succeed each other as before. The next year they take barley, beans, or vetches; which coming off the ground before Midsummer, are followed, as in the former years, by other crops, only changing them according to the season, so as to have on the same spot the greatest possible variety. In the southern provinces the land is almost equally fertile; and the sugar-cane is cultivated with success near Granada. The Spanish plough is generally light, and is drawn by oxen with the yoke over the horns; the most proper and natural mode, as the chief strength of the animal centres in the head. One great cause why agriculture is impeded in Spain, is the great attention paid to the large flocks of sheep, which are authorised by a special code, the *Mesta*, to travel from one province to another, as the season presents pasturage in the vales, or on the mountains. The Merino sheep, or flocks thus privileged, are computed at five millions; and one nobleman has sometimes forty thousand. The fleece is esteemed double in value to that of other sheep; but the checks given to agriculture by such privileges, unknown to all other countries, are incalculable.

The Spanish mountains are arranged by nature in several distinct chains. The most northern is regarded as a continuation of the Pyrenees, passing on the S. of Biscay and the Asturias into Galicia. This chain is distinguished by different names, as the mountains of Biscay, the Sierra of Asturias, and the mountains of Mondonedo in Galicia. It is also known by the names of the mountains of Santillana, of Vindo, and of the mountains of Oca*. If we except the Alps, Pyrenees, Apennines, and other chains in countries civilized at an early period, and accustomed to general and scientific views, there is scarcely a range of mountains distinguished by an uniform term, though so necessary in geographic elucidation. It must be also here observed, that the term *Sierra*, peculiar to Spain, implies a chain of mountains whose successive peaks present the resemblance of a *saw*.

* Vid. Journal des Mines, Ann. V. p. 391.

The gypseous and argillaceous mountains of this country rarely exhibiting any supreme elevation, like those in the granitic chains, naturally suggested this singular appellation.

The second chain of Spanish mountains extends from near Soria on the N. E. and pursues a S. W. direction towards Portugal. This chain is called that of Urbia, or Guádarama; and also the Montes Carpentanos. The third chain is that of Toledo, running nearly parallel with the last. These two central chains seem to contain great quantities of granite.

Next towards the S. is the Sierra Morena, or Brown Mountains; which are followed by the most southern ridge, that of the Sierra Nevada.

On the east there is a considerable chain, which connects the two central ridges, and advances towards the Mediterranean in the north of Valencia. There are also several considerable ranges of hills in this part of the kingdom, generally running from N. to S.

A remarkable solitary mountain, not far from Barcelona, must not be omitted. At a distance Montserrat appears like a sugar loaf; but, on a nearer approach, it seems jagged like a saw, with pyramidal rocks: it is composed of farsilite or pudding stone, formed of limestone gravel united by calcareous cement; and is of such a height, that from its summit may be discerned the islands of Majorca and Minorca, at the distance of a hundred and fifty miles. The circumjacent region is of argillaceous schistus, with clay and sand. As the Pyrenees are chiefly calcareous, the pebbles, even to a remote distance, are of the same nature; and this hill seems to have originated, in some unaccountable manner, from materials swept down by primeval waters from the Pyrenees. Not far from Montserrat, near the village of Cardona, is a hill three miles in circumference, which is one mass of rock salt; used in the dry climate of Spain for vases, snuff boxes, and trinkets, like our Derbyshire spar.

The Pyrenees are a vast chain of hills, the principal of which are in Spain, dividing it from France. They nearly equal the Alps in height, and extend from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean, being two hundred miles long, and about eighteen broad. They begin near Vendres in Rouissillon, now the Department of the Eastern Pyrenees, on the Mediterranean, and run across the country as far as Fontarabia in Guipuscoa, on the Bay of Biscay. Over them are five passages or roads, but they are all extremely difficult; and between them lie several fertile vallies. The Pyrenees on the side of France have been well examined by the French mineralogists, but that part which is on the side of Spain has not been hitherto explored. Mr. Townsend
informs

informs us that the northern part of the Pyrenees is chiefly calcareous, surmounted with argillaceous schistus; but that the southern is granite, and of course barren.

Spain contains many forests, partly arising from the want of cultivation, partly reserved for the royal pleasures of the chase; as that of Pardo, which extends nearly thirty miles in length. Some of the forests are haunted by smugglers, and banditti, who raise contributions from the unwary travellers; and even murders are not unfrequent.

The chief circumjacent islands belonging to Spain are Majorca, Minorca, and Iviça, or, according to Spanish orthography Mallorca, Menorca, and Ibiza.

Majorca is about fifty-five English miles in length, by forty-five in breadth. The N. W. part is hilly; the rest abounds with cultivated land, vineyards, orchards, and meadows; the air is temperate, and the honey highly esteemed. There is generally a considerable military force in the island. The capital, seated on a good bay, is an elegant city, and is supposed to contain ten thousand inhabitants.

Minorca is about thirty miles long, and twelve broad. The air is moist, and the soil rather barren, being chiefly calcareous, with lead and fine marble. The wine is praised; and the inhabitants retain a share of their ancient reputation as excellent slingers. Cittadella, the capital, has a tolerable haven, but the fortifications and population are of little consequence.

Iviça is the nearest to Spain, about fifteen miles long, and twelve broad. It is remarkable for its fruits, and abundance of excellent salt.

Spain, as before observed, was anciently called Iberia, and was the principal cause of the two Punic wars between the republics of Carthage and Rome. The event of the second Punic war, between two and three hundred years before the Christian æra, paved the way for the conquest of the southern part of the kingdom by the Romans; but the mountainous provinces of the North were not subdued till the reign of Augustus. The Roman empire in this country lasted more than four hundred years after the Christian æra; about which period the Goths, Vandals, and other northern nations, broke in upon it, and made a conquest of Spain. These again, towards the end of the seventh century, were invaded by the Moors; who conquered the whole of Spain, obliged some bodies of resolute Christians to take refuge in the mountainous parts, where they concerted measures to shake off the Mohammedan yoke. The Arabs attacked them all in their respective strong holds, which obliged the Christians

to choose different chiefs in different places, who made separate conquests upon the Moors. This circumstance gave rise to the distribution of Spain into several kingdoms. During a very long subsequent period, Spain was perpetually engaged in sanguinary wars, in which the Moors met with repeated overthrows from the bravery of the Christians, till about the middle of the fifteenth century, when all the kingdoms of Spain, which had been previously separated from it by Alphonso, about the middle of the thirteenth century, were united in Ferdinand and Isabella, who, having taken the city of Granada in the year 1491, expelled all the Moors who would not be converted to Christianity, together with their Jewish subjects from the kingdom.

In the year 1556, Charles the Fifth, after a long and turbulent reign, resigned the crown to his son Philip the Second, and shut himself up in a monastery, where he died in the year 1558. Philip the Second exercised the greatest tyranny and most unheard of cruelties against his Protestant subjects, particularly in the Low Countries; and in the year 1588, he sent out what was vainly and presumptuously called the Invincible Armada, (which was the largest hostile fleet that had ever been seen upon the ocean,) for the invasion and conquest of England: but the vigilance of queen Elizabeth, and the activity and bravery of the English, together with the assistance of stormy weather, destroyed nearly the whole of that tremendous armament.

Charles the Second, king of Spain, having no issue, the kingdoms of England and France, and the republic of Holland, formed in the year 1699, the famous treaty of partition, with a view to divide the dominions of the crown of Spain upon the death of that monarch. Charles, however, as might naturally be expected, was so highly offended at this treaty, that on his death-bed he signed a will, by which he bequeathed all his dominions to Philip duke of Anjou, grandson to Louis Fourteenth, king of France. Accordingly, on the 18th of February, 1701, after the death of Charles the Second, Louis declared his grandson Philip king of Spain, and that prince arrived at Madrid on the 14th of April following. In consequence of this step a furious and sanguinary war ensued, and Charles archduke of Austria, second son to the emperor Leopold, was set up in opposition to Philip the Fifth. The archduke's claim was supported by the maritime powers, and was at first favoured by many of the grandees of Spain. After various successes of the allies, in the course of which Philip was driven from his capital, and almost obliged to abandon the kingdom, his party at length prevailed, and at the peace of
Utrecht,

Utrecht, in the year 1713, Philip was acknowledged king of Spain, by all the confederates leagued against him, except the emperor Leopold. By the articles of this peace, Philip was left only in possession of Spain, its American colonies, and its settlements in the East Indies: but the Spanish dominions in Italy, with the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, were dismembered from the monarchy; and the island of Minorca, with the fortress of Gibraltar, were ceded to Great Britain. Philip the Fifth having thus ascended the throne of Spain, was not yet firmly seated upon it, because the inhabitants of Catalonia still refused to acknowledge him for their sovereign. At length, after a most obstinate and stubborn defence, they were reduced by the king's forces, and their country was annexed to the crown of Castile, as a conquered province. After the reduction of Catalonia, Philip turned his thoughts to the recovery of his Italian dominions. With this view he married Elizabeth Farnese, heiress of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany, and by that alliance obtained them.

In the year 1761, Charles the Third, then king of Spain, entered into a correspondence with the court of Versailles, which terminated in the famous family compact, which was ratified in September that year. This treaty contained, among other things, a mutual defensive alliance between the branches of the house of Bourbon, and a reciprocal guarantee of all the dominions they should be possessed of at the next peace. The consequence of this compact was a war between England and Spain in the year 1762; which terminated the following year greatly to the disadvantage of the Spaniards, since, beside the heavy losses they sustained in the capture of Havannah in America, and that of Manila in the East Indies, they suffered very materially in their trade, from the activity of the British navy, and were also disappointed in the only instance in which they might reasonably have expected success, their invasion of Portugal. By the treaty of peace in the year 1763, they gave up all pretensions to a right of fishing on the coast of Newfoundland; were obliged to cede both East and West Florida to Great Britain, and to allow the English to cut logwood in the bay of Honduras.

In the year 1767, a memorable event happened in Spain, namely, the expulsion of the order of Jesuits from the whole kingdom. The incident itself was not more extraordinary than the mode in which it was conducted. On the 31st of March, about midnight, troops were sent to the several houses of these fathers in Madrid, the doors and bells secured, and a centinel placed at each cell, till all the fra-
ternity

ternity could be assembled, when the king's commands were made known to them. They were then immediately conveyed to Carthagená with all their baggage, whence they were embarked and landed in Italy. The same precautions were taken throughout the kingdom, so that the total expulsion of that numerous and formidable body was completed in every part of the Spanish dominions without the least confusion or disturbance.

In the year 1779 Spain was again drawn into a war with England in consequence of the family compact above-mentioned. In this war the Spaniards seem to have had a favourite object in view, namely, the recovery of the rock of Gibraltar; which, however, notwithstanding the united efforts of the combined forces of France and Spain, they could not make the least impression upon, and their powerful and amazing exertions ended only in complete discomfiture and disgrace. Peace was concluded in 1783.

At length broke out the revolution in France, and on the dethronement and beheading of the unfortunate Louis the Sixteenth, the king of Spain engaged in a war against the French republic, in concert with several other European powers; but Spain, after various conflicts made her peace with France. This peace was, however, but of short duration; for by a concatenation of events, as strange as they were oppressive, was brought about the dethronement of the reigning family, and the imprisonment of Ferdinand the Seventh in the heart of France. The Spaniards, in consequence of the dethroning and imprisoning of the royal family of Spain, flew to arms, and nobly exerted themselves against the insidious policy and arts, as well as arms, of the emperor of the French. The following sheets will therefore contain an ample and faithful detail of the rise and progress of the present war in the Peninsula, giving an unbiassed and impartial account of the various battles that have been fought, from the commencement of hostilities till the present time.

PORTUGAL.

PORTUGAL is situated on the West of Spain, between 37 and 42 degrees of North latitude, and between 7 and 10 degrees of West longitude from London, extending about three hundred miles in length from North to South, and one hundred in breadth from East to West.

This country is divided into the following provinces:

<i>Provinces.</i>	<i>Chief Towns.</i>
Entre Minho e Douro	- Oporto, Braga, Viana
Tras os Montes	- Miranda, Villa Real
Beira	- Coimbra, Lamego, Guarda
Estremadura	- Lisbon, St. Ubes, Leira
Alentejo	- Evora, Beja
Algarve	- Tavira, Faro, Lagos.

The kingdom of Portugal is mountainous like Spain, and occasionally subject to earthquakes. The principal rivers and capes are mentioned above in the Geographical Description of Spain. The principal bays are those of St. Ube's in Estremadura, and Lagos in Algarve.

The air of Portugal is not so pure, nor the soil so fertile as they are in Spain; nor are some of their fruits so good although they be of the same kind. They have but little corn; but this, and most of their other wants have generally been supplied from the shores of Great Britain.

According to the latest calculation, Portugal contains nearly two millions of people, of whom an immoderate number are ecclesiastics. It has been asserted, that the Portuguese retain nothing of that spirit and enterprize which rendered their ancestors masters of the Indies three hundred years ago; but from a consideration of the many engagements which the Portuguese forces have had with those of France during the present war, it appears that they have been successful upon several occasions. The government of Portugal has for many years depended principally on Great Britain for protection, which renders both their fleet and army less considerable than their circumstances might seem to require.

About the middle of the sixteenth century the Portuguese were possessed of a considerable share of knowledge in several branches of learning, particularly in astronomy, geography, and navigation. The same age also produced their poet Camoens; but at present, literature and science are equally neglected among them. Their universities are those of Coimbra, founded in 1291; Evora, founded in 1559; and the college of the nobles at Lisbon.

In the reign of Alphonso the Sixth, king of Castile, Henry, born duke of Burgundy, did that monarch such eminent services in the wars against the Moors, that he gave him his daughter Theresa in marriage, created him earl of Portugal in the year 1093, and gave him, as his own absolute property, all the conquests he had made in that country. Thus Henry, without assuming the title of king, laid the first foundation of the separate sovereignty of Portugal. His son Alphonso Henriques; who succeeded him, having obtained a signal victory over the Moors in the year 1139, was proclaimed king by his army; which title was afterwards confirmed to him in the year 1179 by pope Alexander the Third, and in 1181 by the assembly of the state at Lamego. Alphonso the Third, having conquered the kingdom of Algarve from the Moors, added it to the crown of Portugal.

The succession continued in the house of Alphonso till, in the year 1383, the legitimate male line was extinct in Ferdinand; upon which John the First, his father's natural son, was admitted to the throne in 1385; in whose reign the Portuguese settled in Africa, and discovered the Madeira islands and the Azores. His great-grandson, John the Second, an enlightened prince, was the first who declared Lisbon a free port, and made the science of astronomy subservient to navigation. Under his reign, the Portuguese doubled the Cape at the extremity of Africa. It was then called the Cape of Storms; but that prince, who foresaw that it would open the passage to the East Indies, named it the Cape of Good Hope. Emanuel, his cousin, who succeeded him, pursued the views of his predecessor, and in the year 1497 sent Vasco de Gama with a fleet to India; this admiral, after a dangerous voyage of thirteen months, landed at length in the East Indies, where the Portuguese settled colonies, and became at that period the sole masters of the trade between India and Europe. In the year 1501 they possessed themselves, by means of Americus Vespucius, of the rich colony of Brazil in South America, which had been discovered fortuitously the year before by Peter Alvarez Cabral. John the Third, son of Emanuel, admitted in the year 1540, the newly-founded order of Jesuits, of which he was a member previous to any other European prince. He sent a multitude of missionaries to convert the eastern nations, and among them, the famous Francis Xavier, founder of the order, who planted the Christian religion in India, Persia, China, and Japan, as well as on the coast of Africa. This king was succeeded, in the year 1557, by his grandson Sebastian, who was then but three years old, and who,

in the year 1578, unadvisedly marched a powerful army against Muley Moluc, into Africa, where he was slain in a battle with that king, whose death in the midst of the action from illness, did not hinder his troops from obtaining a complete victory. Sebastian was succeeded by his uncle cardinal Henry, who died after a short reign of seventeen months.

After the death of Henry, Philip the Second, king of Spain, possessed himself of the crown, by means of his general, the duke of Alva, who reduced the whole kingdom of Portugal to his obedience. Portugal remained sixty years under the dominion of Spain; during which time the Dutch, having shaken off the Spanish yoke, possessed themselves of the best settlements the Portuguese had in the East Indies, Africa, and America, which they had enjoyed unrivalled upwards of a hundred years; but the Portuguese afterwards recovered the provinces which the Dutch had reduced in Brazil. The Portuguese, wearied at length with the cruelties and oppressions which they suffered under the Spanish government, revolted in 1640. They seized the opportunity of Spain being weakened by a long and unsuccessful war with France, and the rebellion of Catalonia, and by means of a conspiracy, as happily executed as it was wisely planned, placed the duke of Braganza, by the title of John the Fourth, on the throne. This prince, having taken every possible precaution to secure to himself the quiet possession of the crown, died in the year 1656, leaving two sons, Don Alphonso and Don Pedro, and a daughter named Catharine, afterwards married to Charles the Second, king of England. This alliance was the first cause of maintaining Portugal in its independency; for Philip the Fourth, of Spain, having renewed his claim to that kingdom, and invaded it, the Portuguese, supported by England and France, obtained a decisive victory over the Spaniards, at Villa Viciopin in the year 1660, and obliged Philip to renounce his pretensions. Alphonso the Sixth, when he ascended the throne in 1656, was only thirteen years of age. In the early part of his reign he was supported by the wise and prudent administration of his mother the queen dowager, who had been declared regent by the will of her husband; but being a weak prince when he took the reins of government into his own hands, he was not able to maintain himself on the throne; for his queen, the daughter of Charles Amadeus, duke of Nemours, whom he had lately married, and his brother Don Pedro, conspired against him, deposed, and sent him prisoner into the Azores. After this Don Pedro procured a dispensation from the
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the pope, and married his brother's wife. He then took the title of regent, and governed in his brother's name till the year 1683, when Alphonso died, and Don Pedro was proclaimed king.

In the year 1703, Portugal entered into the grand alliance for opposing the succession of the house of Bourbon to the crown of Spain, and for transferring it to the house of Austria; but the exertions of the house of Austria were by no means equal to their engagements. From their own inactivity, therefore, and the perpetual dissensions between the respective commanders, they suffered much during this war, in the course of which Don Pedro died, after a reign of twenty-nine years, including his regency, in the year 1706.

Don Pedro was succeeded by John the Fifth; in the second year of whose reign the battle of Almanza was lost, which totally put an end to the claims of the house of Austria, and fixed Philip the Fifth on the throne of Spain. No other material incident happened in Portugal during this prince's reign, which was long and peaceable, since he governed forty-four years, dying only in the year 1750. He was succeeded by his son Don Joseph, the late king of Portugal.

In November, 1756, that dreadful earthquake happened which laid great part of the wealthy and flourishing city of Lisbon in ashes. The shocks continued for several days, and were felt in most parts of Europe: the waters in many places were agitated in a most surprising manner: the town of Setuval, or St. Ube's, not far from Lisbon, was destroyed; and these convulsions of nature were succeeded by a conflagration, which did still more mischief to the capital than the earthquake had done. Upon receiving intelligence of this melancholy catastrophe, the parliament of England voted one hundred thousand pounds for the relief of the sufferers. Four years after, these natural commotions were succeeded by an event which renewed the alarms of the Portuguese, scarcely yet recovered from the terror with which the former had inspired them. On the 3rd of September, 1760, an attempt was made upon the life of the king, who was attacked and wounded by a number of assassins, in a solitary place on the road near Belem, on the way to Lisbon. Some of the most distinguished nobility of Portugal, suspected of having had a share in this intended assassination, were soon after condemned and executed for it. The Jesuits too, who were found to be concerned in the conspiracy, were expelled from every part of the Portuguese dominions.

In the year 1762, Spain availed herself of the natural and political distresses of this calamitous kingdom, to renew her pretensions to the empire of it; war was declared by France and Spain, jointly, against Portugal, which was invaded on many sides by large bodies of Spanish troops, assisted by eight thousand French auxiliaries. The English immediately sent eight thousand men to the succour of their allies, under the command of lord Trawley and the earl of Loudoun, while the Portuguese were commanded by the count de la Lippe Buckebourg, a German nobleman. The Spaniards gained no other advantage than the capture of Almeida, which they were afterwards obliged to evacuate; and the judicious dispositions of the count de la Lippe, joined to the vigilance and exertions of the British troops, disappointed all the efforts of the Spaniards, and obliged them to fall back into winter quarters on the frontiers of their own country. Portugal was freed from this storm by the ensuing general peace in the year 1763.

In the beginning of the year 1777, Don Joseph, the late king of Portugal died, in the sixty-third year of his age, and the twenty-seventh of his reign. In the year 1732, he had married the Infanta of Spain, by whom he had issue four daughters. The eldest of them, Maria Frances Isabella, princess of Brazil, was married in the year 1760, by virtue of a dispensation from the pope, to her uncle Don Pedro. Their son, the prince of Beira, born in the year 1761, was married just before the king's death to the princess Maria Benedicta, his mother's youngest sister. Upon the death of the king, the princess of Brazil was immediately acknowledged sovereign; she became insane, and the prince of Beira was declared regent; but upon her death, for she died without having recovered her senses, that prince in course became sovereign.

Portugal, as the ally of England, entered into the confederacy against France in 1793, but the French having entered that kingdom with a formidable army, which threatened its complete subjection, the royal family thought fit, to save falling into the hands of the invaders, to have recourse to flight, which they effected under the protection of the English, and landed in Brazil, where they have established their court; the circumstances of which will be detailed in its proper place in the course of this work.

HISTORY

OF THE

WAR IN SPAIN, &c.

CHAPTER I.

SHORTLY after the treaty of Amiens the aspect of Europe wore rather a singular appearance: all was trepidation or apathy: the Germanic body was a chimera, formed of the most jarring interests; Russia and the other powers of the north, seemed to fear the menaces of the First Consul; whilst Naples, Portugal, and Spain, alike dreaded his friendship or his hatred: the latter, aware that if a rupture took place betwixt the powers of Great Britain and France, she must be inevitably drawn into the war, began to make preparations for the worst. Naturally allied to the French, she considered their interests as congenial as their countries were contiguous; and a perpetual treaty of alliance against England, as their common enemy, could alone preserve her rich possessions from the overbearing rapacity of Napoleon. In short, it was the opinion of the Spanish monarch, that if he did not support France in its views against this country, in the event of a contest, he could expect no assistance from that power when it might be his turn to sustain the hostile attacks of England.

The strict union of two powers, who possessed such an extent of coast in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean, and who ought always to join in a common cause, it was apprehended would oblige the English to spread their maritime forces over a variety of points, by which division, it was imagined, they would be so weakened as to be incapable of offensive operations, particularly as the considerable armies that must be kept on foot to protect their own metropolis from the threatened attack of an enthusiastic enemy, would

would hinder them from attempting distant expeditions*. It, however, appeared that England would not leave to Spain the choice of peace or war, as, from the extent of her navy, she was possessed with the idea, that she was capable of attacking the whole world, and that Spain was the first upon the list of her enemies. But the extreme anxiety of France to effect a reconciliation, by every plausible method, had been of infinite service, as it had enabled the Spanish ships from the colonies to arrive with an immense quantity of specie, and afforded the means of defraying the expences of a long continued war.

It was, however, the general opinion, that Bonaparte would attempt the threatened invasion of this island towards the close of October, 1803, or the beginning of the following month. The preparations in the ports of France and Holland, for that boasted enterprize, were immense. Every ship carpenter, nay, every man that could handle an axe, was put into a state of requisition, and obliged to work night and day. Troops were marched from every quarter of France to the coast; and camps were formed at Boulogne and Calais, so that it was really thought Bonaparte intended to put his threat into immediate execution, especially as every thing he wished was at his nod: men, money, and gun-boats.

But Bonaparte's threats of invasion were not confined to this country, it was extended to our old ally Portugal. General Lasnes, the French ambassador to the court of Lisbon, had presented several notes to the Prince Regent, in which he made the most exorbitant demands in the name of his government. In these demands he assumed the most consequential language; and, as he did not conceal his enmity against the English, he insisted that the Portuguese harbours should be immediately shut against all shipping be-

* It was a favourite maxim of Bonaparte to hold out a threat of invading the coast of England, though we do not apprehend he ever seriously thought such a measure would be practicable.

longing to that nation: at the same time he exacted the most extraordinary pecuniary subsidies, and threatened, that if every requisition was not complied with, an invasion would be the immediate consequence. The Prince Regent, however, was not to be alarmed by these menaces, into any action that would have tarnished his dignity as a prince, or that would have thrown his country out of the arms of England into that of France.

In the midst of these threats of the court of France, the Spanish cabinet gave the warmest assurances of her amity for this country, and her wish to maintain all the relations of peace with the court of London; yet the Spanish captain-general of Yucatan demanded the evacuation of the English settlement on the Bay of Honduras. It was not difficult to perceive, by the tone in which this demand was delivered, that it was made at the instance of Bonaparte, whose influence in the court of Madrid had now risen to such a height, that Spain might justly be looked upon as a political province of France. The demand was, however, refused on the part of the English, nor was it ever repeated.

The following official statement (which appeared on the 16th of October, 1804,) of an engagement with a Spanish squadron, made a great public sensation, as we were at peace with Spain at the time. Captain Graham Moore, who sent the account to the Admiralty, stated, that on the morning of the 29th of September, the *Indefatigable* got off Cadiz, and on the 30th fell in with the *Medusa*: Captain Gore having informed Captain Moore, that the *Amphion* was in the Streight's mouth, that the *Triumph* was off Gibraltar, and that Sir Robert Barlow meant to go into Cadiz for the trade there, on his way to England. Captain Moore sent the *Medusa* to apprise Sir Robert Barlow of the nature of his order, that he might then judge whether or not he should go into Cadiz. He also directed Captain Gore to rejoin him with the *Amphion*, as speedily as he could, off St.

Mary's. On the 2d of October he was joined by the Lively, and the next day by the Medusa and Amphion. On the 5th, in the morning, Cape St. Mary bearing N. E. nine leagues, the Medusa made the signal for four sail W. by S. Captain Moore made the signal for a general chase; at eight A. M. they were discovered to be four large Spanish frigates which formed the line of battle a-head on our approach, and continued to steer in for Cadiz, the van ship carrying a broad pendant, and the ship next to her a rear-admiral's flag. Captain Gore's being the head-most ship, placed the Medusa on the weather beam of the commodore; the Indefatigable took a similar position along-side of the rear-admiral; the Amphion and Lively each taking an opponent in the same manner, as they came up. After hailing, to make them shorten sail, without effect, the Indefatigable fired a shot across the rear-admiral's fore foot, on which he shortened sail; lieutenant Ascot was then sent on board to inform him, that Captain Moore's orders were to detain the squadron, but that it was his wish to execute them without bloodshed, and that his determination must be made instantly. After waiting some time, a signal was made for the boat, and a shot was fired a-head at the admiral. The lieutenant returning with an unsatisfactory answer, Captain Moore fired another shot a-head at the admiral, and bore down close on his weather bow. At that moment the admiral's second a-stern fired into the Amphion, and the admiral fired into the Indefatigable, when captain Moore made signal for close battle, which was instantly commenced with all the alacrity and vigour of English sailors. In less than ten minutes La Mercedes, the admiral's second a-stern, blew up along-side the Amphion, with a tremendous explosion. Captain Sutton, having with great judgment placed himself to leeward of that ship, the escape of the Spanish admiral's ship was rendered almost impossible. In less than half an hour she struck, as did the opponent of the Lively. Perceiving
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ing at the moment that the Spanish commodore was making off, and seeming to have the heels of the Medusa, a signal was made for the Lively to join in the chase. Captain Hammond did not lose an instant, and long before sun-set the only remaining ship surrendered to the Medusa and Lively.

This Spanish fleet came from Monte Video, on the Rio de la Plata. The loss on the part of the English was very trifling, for the Indefatigable did not lose a man.

The Spanish squadron consisted of,

La Medée, (flag ship) 42 guns, 18 pounders, on the main deck, and 300 men, taken; two killed, and ten wounded.

La Fama, (commodore's ship,) 36 guns, 12 pounders, on the main deck, and 280 men, taken; no returns.

La Clara, 36 guns, 12 pounders, on the main deck, and 300 men, taken; no returns.

La Mercedes, 36 guns, twelve pounders, on the main deck, and 280 men, blew up; second captain and 40 men saved.*

It being apprehended that hostilities with Spain were

* The following contains a general statement of the goods and effects brought by the frigates of this division, commanded by Don Joseph de Bustamente y Guerra, chief of the squadron of the royal navy.

On Account of the King.

Medée—35 sacks of Vidona wool, 20 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 1627 bars of tin, 203 pigs of copper, and 521,940 dollars in silver.

Fama—300 bars of tin, 28 planks of wood, and 30,000 dollars in silver.

Mercedes—20 sacks of Vidona wool, 20 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 1139 bars of tin, 961 pigs of copper, and 221,000 dollars in silver.

Clara—20 sacks of Vidona wool, 20 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 1666 bars of tin, 571 pigs of copper, and 234,694 dollars in silver.

Total—75 sacks of Vidona wool, 60 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 4732 bars of tin, 1735 pigs of copper, 28 planks of wood, and 1,307,634 dollars in silver.

were unavoidable, our cruisers kept a sharp look-out, and were very successful in their captures. On the 27th of November, Captain Sir Richard Strachan, of the Donegal, captured a large Spanish frigate off Cape St. Vincent, after a chase of forty-eight hours, and an action which lasted sixteen minutes, in which the Spanish captain was killed. The prize was from Cadiz, with dispatches for Teneriffe and the Havannah, laden with stores. The Donegal had also captured another Spanish ship, supposed to be the richest that ever sailed from the port of Cadiz. Her cargo was judged to be worth two hundred thousand pounds. On the 29th of the same month, our squadron (nine sail of the line) on the same station, captured the following vessels:

Nostra Senora del Rosario, value	£.10,000
Il Fortuna - - -	8,000
La Virgine Assumpto - - -	6,000
San Joseph - - -	12,000
Apollo - - -	15,000
Senora del Purificatione : - - -	40,000
Fauket - - -	1,000
Gustavus Adolphus - - -	1,000
A Settee - - -	600
A ship with naval stores - - -	40,000

Total amount £.133,600

On account of the merchants.

Medéc—32 chests of ratinia, 952,616 dollars in silver, 279,502 gold, reduced into dollars, and 24,600 ingots of gold reduced into dollars.

Fama—306,597 dollars in silver, 217,756 gold, reduced into dollars, and 25,411 ingots of gold, reduced into dollars.

Mercedes—590,000 dollars in silver.

Clara—622,400 gold, reduced into dollars.

Total—32 chests of ratinia, 1,859,216 dollars in silver, 1,119,658 gold, reduced into dollars, and 150,011 ingots of gold, reduced into dollars.

On account of the marine company.

Medéc—8995 seal skins.

Fama—14,930 seal skins.

Clara—10 pipes of sea oil.

Total—2,3925 seal skins, and 10 pipes of sea oil.

From

From the above circumstances it was easy to foresee that a war with Spain would be the consequence: if the cabinet of that kingdom had been left to the freedom of its own will, matters might have been easily accommodated, perhaps on lasting terms, because, from the relative situation of the two countries it might have been founded on mutual interest. But it was well known that Spain, which at one time aspired to universal monarchy, was at that period prostrate at the feet of Bonaparte, and that she was obliged to subscribe to whatever he dictated; so that in fact Spain was a political province of France, and in that medium only our ministers were constrained to view her. The court of St. James's knew that Spain, by the treaty of Ildefonso, was obliged to furnish France with an immense sum of money; the only aid she could afford, which would enable her to continue the war with this country.

Mr. Frere, the British minister at Madrid, made all allowances for the peculiar situation of that court, consistent with the dignity of the country he had the honour to represent. The capture of the four register ships on the 5th of October, made a most public sensation even in the very heart of Spain; in the maritime towns it was, if possible, still greater; yet the merchants of both countries hoped that a reconciliation might still take place, but their hopes were fallacious. On the 14th of December, the king of Spain published a manifesto, which no doubt was manufactured in the cabinet of St. Cloud. In this state paper, as it might be expected, the Spanish monarch recapitulates the sacrifices he had made to maintain, on his part, the treaty of Amiens; and, above all, the assurances he gave to the English agent at Madrid, as well as by his minister at London, to the British government, of his decided and firm resolution to remain neutral during the war between Great Britain and France; "making no doubt that he should quickly have the satisfaction of seeing that these ingenuous assurances were well received by the court of

of London." These observations are followed by some passages that cannot be omitted in a question of such moment, in which the justice, liberality, and even generosity of the British nation, are deeply involved. "Nevertheless," says the Manifesto, "that cabinet, (St. James's,) which must have resolved in silence beforehand, and for its own particular ends, upon the renovation of the war with Spain, and which it was always able to declare, not with the forms and solemnities prescribed by the law of nations, but by means of positive aggressions, which should turn to its own profits, sought the most frivolous pretext to bring into doubt the conduct of Spain, which was truly neutral, and to give demonstrations at the same time, to the desires of his Britannic majesty, to preserve the peace, all with the intention of gaining time, cajoling the Spanish government, and holding in uncertainty the opinion of the English nation upon its own premeditated and unjust designs, which could in no manner be approved by it. Thus it is, that in London it appeared artfully to accept various reclamations from Spanish individuals, which were addressed to it, while its agents in Madrid magnified the pacific intentions of their own sovereign: but they never shewed themselves satisfied with the frankness and friendship with which all their notes were answered, rather anxious for proclaiming and magnifying armaments which had no existence, and pretending, contrary to the most positive protests on the part of Spain, that the pecuniary succours given to France were not merely an equivalent for the troops and ships which were stipulated in the treaty of 1796, but an indefinite and immense stock, which did not permit them to consider Spain in any other light than as a principal party in the war.

"Moreover, as there was not time entirely to banish the illusion under which they laboured, they exacted, as the precise condition on which they would consider Spain as neutral, the cessation of every armament in her ports, and a prohibition of
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the sale of prizes brought into them; and, notwithstanding that both of these conditions, although urged in a tone superlatively haughty and unusual in political transactions, were immediately complied with, and religiously observed; they persisted, nevertheless, to manifest their want of confidence, and they quitted Madrid with eagerness, immediately after receiving dispatches from their court, of which they did not communicate a particle of their contents.

“The context,” continues the manifesto, “which results from all this between the cabinets of London and Madrid, must be sufficient to shew clearly to all Europe, the bad faith, the secret and perverse aims of the English ministry; even if they had not manifested them by the abominable crime of the surprise, attack, and capture of the four Spanish frigates, which, navigating in the full security which peace ever feels, were fraudulently attacked in consequence of orders from the British government, signed on the very moment, in which it was faithlessly exacting conditions for the prolongation of the peace, in which every possible security was given to it, and in which its own vessels were provided with provisions and refreshments in the ports of Spain.

“Those very vessels, which were enjoying the most perfect hospitality, and were experiencing the fidelity with which Spain was proving to England the good faith of her engagements, and how firm her resolutions were to maintain her neutrality; those very ships carried, concealed in the bosom of their commanders, the unjust orders of the British cabinet for assaulting Spanish property on the seas; iniquitous orders, and profusely circulated, since all its vessels of war on the seas of America and Europe, were already detaining and carrying into its harbours, as many Spanish vessels as they met with, without respecting even the cargoes of grain, which were coming from all parts to succour a faithful nation, in a year of the greatest calamity.

“Barbarous orders, since they deserve no other
name,

name, to sink every Spanish ship under an hundred tons; to burn those which they found on shore on the coast, and to make prize of, and carry to Malta, those only which exceeded one hundred tons. 'The master of a caud,' of Valencia, of fifty-four tons, has made this declaration, that he effected his escape in his launch upon the 16th of November, on the coast of Catalonia, when his vessel was sunk by an English vessel, whose captain took from him his papers and flag; and informed him that he had received these express instructions from his court.

" In spite of such atrocious actions, which proved to perfect evidence the covetous and hostile views which the English cabinet had meditated, it was still able to carry on further its perfidious system of binding the public opinion, alledging, for this purpose, that the Spanish frigates had not been carried into the English ports, in quality of prizes, but as being detained until Spain should give the desired securities, that she would observe the strictest neutrality.

" And what greater securities could or ought Spain to give? What civilized nation, until this hour, has made use of means so unjust and violent to exact securities of another? Although England should find at last any claim to exact from Spain, in what manner should she justify it, after a similar atrocity? What satisfaction should she be able to give for the lamentable destruction of the frigate Mercedes, with all its cargo, its crew, and a great number of distinguished passengers who have perished, the innocent victims of a policy so detestable.

" Spain would not comply with what she owes to herself, nor think herself able to maintain her well known honour and dignity amongst the greatest powers of Europe, were she any longer to shew herself insensible to such manifest outrages, and did not take care to revenge them with the nobleness and energy that belong to her character.

" Animated with these sentiments, the magnanimous breast of the king, after having exhausted (in order

order to preserve the peace) all the resources compatible with the dignity of his crown, finds himself in the hard predicament of making war upon the king of England, upon his subjects and people, omitting the formalities of stile by a solemn declaration and publication, owing to the English cabinet's having begun and continued to make war without declaring it.

The king of Spain proceeded to state that he did not doubt "that all his subjects, inflamed with that just indignation with which the violent proceedings of England must inspire them, would not omit any of those means to which their valour shall prompt them, of co-operating with his majesty towards the most compleat vengeance for the insult of the Spanish flag. The Spanish subjects were then invited to arm corsairs against Great Britain, and to possess themselves, with resolution, of her ships and property, by every possible means."

In consequence of the Spanish declaration of war, it became unavoidably necessary that the British cabinet should immediately adopt such measures as the circumstances of the case suggested as the most likely to counteract the hostile preparations of the enemy, the first step was to publish the following paper:

Order of Council forwarded to the proper Officers at all the Out-ports, and to the Vice-Admirals of the maritime Counties.

"At the Court of the Queen's Palace, the 19th Dec. 1804, present, the King's most excellent Majesty in Council.

"Whereas information has been received that an embargo has been ordered to be laid on all British ships in the ports of the kingdom of Spain: it is this day ordered by his majesty, by and with the advice of his privy council, that no ships or vessels belonging to any of his majesty's subjects, be permitted to enter and clear out for any of the ports of Spain, until further orders: and his majesty is farther

ther pleased to order, that a general embargo or stop be made of all Spanish ships and vessels whatsoever, now within, or which hereafter shall come into any of the ports, harbours, or roads, within the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, together with all persons and effects on board the said ships and vessels; but that the utmost care be taken for the preservation of all and every part of the cargoes on board any of the said ships, so that no damage or embezzlement whatever be sustained.

“ S. COTTRELL.”

This was followed by a declaration of war on the part of his Britannic majesty, on the 25th of January 1805.

The policy of Bonaparte in re-establishing the Catholic religion in France had a wonderful effect, not only on his own subjects, but also on the neighbouring Catholic princes; and Spain was now more than ever attached to the interests of France. Mr. Frere, the English ambassador at the court of Madrid, had repeatedly desired an explanation of the increased naval armament which Spain was fitting out. In vain were all remonstrances: the inbecility of the king, the intrigues of the queen and the prince of Peace; and, above all, the menaces of the court of France, proved effectual in producing a rupture with Great Britain. The manifesto, or declaration of war, by the king of Spain, rested chiefly on the detention of the four register ships as the basis of hostilities being proclaimed. But the British cabinet were not to be intimidated by this hostile measures of the Spanish court. A spirit of unanimity was diffused throughout Great Britain, and the idea of a Spanish war, instead of producing despondency, had a contrary effect. The court of St. James's issued a declaration on the 25th of January, 1805, as above-mentioned, stating the grounds of the war with Spain. This paper, which was drawn up with great perspicuity, exhibited a series of interesting facts, and combined irresistible argument with all the dignity and

and energy of language. It is asserted, "That from the moment hostilities had commenced with Great Britain and France, a sufficient ground of war necessarily followed against Spain, on the part of Great Britain, from the treaty of Ildefonso, if not disclaimed by Spain." That treaty in fact identified Spain with the republican government of France, by a virtual acknowledgement of unqualified vassalage, and by specific stipulations of unconditional offence. By the articles of that treaty Spain covenanted to furnish a stated contingent of naval and military force for the prosecution of any war in which the French republic might think proper to engage.

By this treaty Spain surrendered any right or pretension to enquire into the nature, origin, or justice of the war. She stipulated in the first instance a contingent of troops and ships, which in itself comprizes no moderate proportion of the means at her disposal; but in the event of this contingent being at any time found insufficient for the purposes of France, she further bound herself to put into a state of activity the utmost force both by sea and land, that it should be in her power to collect. She covenanted, that this force should be at the disposal of France, to be employed conjointly or separately, for the annoyance of the common enemy; thus submitting her entire power and resources to be used as the instrument of French ambition and aggression, and to be supplied in whatever proportion France might think proper, for the avowed purpose of endeavouring to destroy the government, and the national existence of Great Britain.

The character of such a treaty (continues the declaration) gave Great Britain an incontestible right to declare to Spain, that unless she decidedly renounced the treaty, or gave assurances that she would not perform the obligations of it, she would not be considered as a neutral power. This right, however, for prudential reasons, and from motives of forbearance towards Spain, was not exercised in its full extent; and in consequence of assurances of

a pacific disposition on the part of the Spanish government, his majesty did not in the first instance, insist on a distinct and formal renunciation of the treaty. The declaration then proceeds to state a convention with France for a subsidy monthly; upon which it adds, "The report of some naval armaments in the ports of Spain had occasioned a fresh correspondence between his majesty's minister and the Spanish government." In one of the notes presented by the former, he declares, "that if the king was forced to begin a war, he would want no other declaration than what he had already made." The answers of the Spanish government were at first evasive: his majesty's minister closed the correspondence on his part by a note delivered on the 18th of February; in which he declares, "that all further forbearance on the part of England, must depend upon the cessation of all naval armaments, and a prohibition of the sale of prizes in their ports; and unless these points were agreed to without modification, he had orders to leave Madrid. On the second of these points a satisfactory answer was given, and orders issued accordingly: on the first a reference was made to former declarations. To the question about disclosing the treaty with France, no satisfactory answer was ever given; as, however, no naval preparations appeared to be proceeding at that period in the ports of Spain, the matter was allowed to remain for a time. In July, 1804, the government of Spain gave assurances of faithful and settled neutrality, and disavowed any orders to arm in their ports; yet, in the subsequent month, when these assurances were recent, and a confident reliance reposed in them, the British chargé des affaires received advice from the admiral commanding his majesty's ships off Ferrol, that reinforcements of soldiers and sailors had arrived through Spain, for the French fleets at Toulon and Ferrol. On this intelligence two notes were presented to the Spanish minister, but no answer was received to either of them. Towards the end of
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the month of September information was received in London from the British admiral stationed off Ferrol, that orders had actually been given by the court of Madrid for arming, without loss of time, at that port, four ships of the line, two frigates, and other smaller vessels; that (according to his intelligence, similar orders had been given at Carthage and Cadiz; and particularly that three first rate ships of the line were directed to sail from the last mentioned port; and as an additional proof of hostile intentions, that orders had been given to arm the packets as in time of war.

The declaration then animadverts in pointed terms on this direct and unequivocal violation of the agreement on which the continuance of peace had been acquiesced in. It is added "no substantial redress, no satisfactory explanation was afforded, in consequence of the repeated representations, which had been made; while under cover of his majesty's forbearance, the enemy had received considerable remittances of treasures, together with the facility of procuring other supplies. Every circumstance of the general conduct of Spain was peculiarly calculated to excite the vigilant attention of Great Britain. The removal of Spanish ships out of their docks to make room for the accommodation of the men of war of France; the march of French troops and seamen through the Spanish territory; the equipment of naval armaments at Ferrol; the consideration that the junction of this armament with the French ships already in that harbour would create a decided superiority of numbers over his majesty's squadron cruising off that port; the additional naval exertions, and the consequent increase of expence which this conduct of Spain necessarily imposed upon Great Britain; all these together required those precautions both of representation and action to which his majesty had immediate recourse. While official notice was given of his majesty's intention to adopt those necessary measures, the Spanish government was at the same time

time assured, that his majesty still felt an earnest desire to maintain a good understanding with Spain; but that the continuance of such a state of things must be subject to the condition of abstaining on their part from all hostile preparations, and on making, without hesitation or reserve, that full and explicit disclosure of the nature and extent of the subsisting engagements with France, which had hitherto been so frequently and so fruitlessly demanded. The preparations adopted by his majesty were such only as he deemed indispensably necessary to guard against the augmentation by Spain of her means of naval preparation during the discussions, and against the possible consequences of the safe arrival of the expected American treasure in the Spanish ports; an event which has more than once in former times become the epocha of the termination of discussions, and of the commencement of hostilities with Spain." This spirited memorial closes with the following words; "His majesty appeals with confidence to all Europe for the acknowledgement of his exemplary moderation in the whole course of these transactions. His majesty feels with regret the necessity which places him in a state of hostility with Spain; and would with heartfelt satisfaction observe on the part of that country the assumption of a more dignified sense of national importance, and a more independent exercise of sovereign rights. His majesty would indeed be most happy to discover in the councils of Spain a reviving sense of those ancient feelings and honourable propensities which have at all times been so congenial to the Spanish character, and which, in better times, have marked the conduct of its government. His majesty will, on his part, eagerly embrace the first opportunity that offers of resuming a state of peace and confidence with a nation which has so many ties of common interest to connect it with Great Britain, and which he has hitherto been ever disposed to regard with sentiments of the utmost consideration and esteem."

Downing-Street, Jan. 1805.

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Notwithstanding the forbearance of the court of Great Britain, that of Spain was entirely governed by French politics; but it is more than probable that the bulk of the nation were averse to a war with England. The remonstrances of Bournonville, however, and the predilection of the queen and the Prince of Peace for France, hurried the nation into a war from which Spain could derive little or no advantage; for immediately upon the issuing of the manifesto against England the most vigorous measures were pursued on the part of Spain to prosecute the war with energy. The ministers of the marine used unexampled activity. The Prince of Peace published an address to the army; several regiments of militia were raised. His Catholic majesty proposed to those of his subjects who were engaged in defending the honour of the Spanish flag, that privateers should be supplied with all the arms necessary for their equipment, that their prizes should be carried into any Spanish port, and that no deduction whatever should be made from their value. Measures were likewise taken for forming an immense camp at St. Roche, indulging, without doubt, the fond idea of again getting possession of Gibraltar. The Spanish cabinet were induced to take this step in consequence of an epidemical disorder which raged with great fury at that place. In a very short space of time this pestilential fever swept away forty-four officers, eight hundred and twenty soldiers, three thousand seven hundred and twenty inhabitants, and was still extending its cruel ravages in every direction*.

Papers

* This horrible distemper was productive of the most calamitous consequences: the affrighted inhabitants were flying in terror in every direction; and upwards of sixty vessels, crowded with passengers, left Gibraltar for various parts of the world. Many of those were admitted into different ports; but others returned, after being every where denied shelter, with the fever raging on board, which had broken out at sea. One Jew paid seven hundred pounds for the passage of himself and family, that he might escape from the contagion; and large sums were repeatedly offered for a passage in vain. Dr. Bird, physician to the naval hospital at Gibraltar,

Papers relative to the correspondence between Mr. Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, and others, which disclosed the arcana of the rupture with Spain, were laid upon the table of the house of commons, and excited much parliamentary discussion. On the 11th of February, 1805, the chancellor of the Exchequer called the attention of the house to the papers on the table. It afforded him subject of infinite pleasure, he said, that the day had at length arrived to enter fully into the important discussion of the rupture with Spain. Though even a slight perusal of the documents, he continued, must give ample satisfaction to every member, it was his earnest wish to impress upon the house a conduct which had been guided by singular forbearance and moderation. He then took a review of the relative situation in which Spain stood with France by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, made in the year 1796. That treaty, he said, guaranteed to both parties the use of succours to the other. In one article of that treaty, it was enacted, that the demand of those succours should be sufficient to have them furnished without any question being asked. M. D'Anduaga had repeatedly denied that this was a treaty offensive as well as defensive; he desired therefore to oppose to his reasoning, subtleties, and refine-

braltar, fell a sacrifice to this dreadful malady. This calamity having greatly weakened the garrison, accelerated the preparations which the Spaniards were making for its subjection. At Cadiz the British subjects were made prisoners, and their papers sealed. But some parts of the dominions of Spain were afflicted with the same dreadful disorder. In the town of Malaga alone twenty-six thousand persons were buried in the course of a month. At Carthageua, the returns of deaths from the malignant fever, amounted to fourteen thousand nine hundred and forty. Thus was the unhappy country of Spain, not only depopulated by the pestilence, but obliged to enter into a war, to promote the insatiable ambition of the French emperor. It may be almost needless to say, that the British government were unwearied in their endeavours to preserve this country from infection. Quarantine was rigidly, and properly enforced, and the Board of Health issued those orders which were necessary on such a calamitous and awful occasion.

ments, the plain letter of the treaty. A treaty whereby the whole force of Spain was put under the complete command and controul of France. Feeling, said he, the degrading situation in which Spain was thus placed, ministers knew that the ancient honour of that distinguished country was contrary to the advice of her councils, and he trusted, that both the house and the public would commend the exertions they had made to induce the Spanish government to get rid of it. At the same time it became the duty of ministers to watch vigilantly the conduct Spain, in order to prevent her filling her coffers with money, and thereby becoming a means of supplying France with materials for prosecuting the contest. There was also a wide difference between a defensive treaty and the treaty of St. Ildefonso. France had demanded seven hundred thousand pounds, and Spain had offered six hundred thousand pounds. By the treaty of St. Ildefonso, Spain had agreed to the payment. No man could contend that Spain, in granting that subsidy, did not, *de facto*, make herself a party to the war. Mr. Pitt then described many instances of forbearance on the part of the British cabinet, and concluded with moving an address to his majesty, assuring him that the house concurred in the vigorous measures adopted respecting Spain, and that they would not withhold their most zealous and cordial support in prosecuting the war.

Mr. Grey, however, differed materially from the sentiments of Mr. Pitt, and from the address itself. He admitted, that if the Spanish government had refused to renounce the treaty of St. Ildefonso as an offensive treaty, that would have furnished a justifiable ground for war; yet he thought the arguments of the Spanish ambassador by no means destitute of weight and consideration, because they shewed that Spain considered that treaty as merely defensive. Mr. Grey contended, that the principle upon which ministers had acted was diametrically opposite to all ideas of good faith and the law of nations. Notwithstanding,

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said he, all the moderation ministers cried up respecting their conduct, they had violated every principle of good faith, inasmuch as they had made that an excuse for beneficial aggression which they had virtually relinquished, or at least suspended, and which ought not to have been renewed as a legitimate cause of war, without first acquainting the contending party with the determination. He insisted, that the answer given by Spain with respect to the supposed armaments was complete and satisfactory; and said, that the order in council for the seizure of the Spanish ships must be considered in no other light than as a declaration of war. He likewise made a motion for censuring the conduct of ministers in the negociation, and subsequent rupture with Spain.

The debate on this important occasion continued with great vehemence till a late hour, when, at the motion of Mr. Windham, it was adjourned till the next day, when it being resumed,

Mr. Raine said, he viewed the seizure of the Spanish vessels as an act contrary to every idea of national honour. The perusal of the voluminous papers laid on the table, he said, led him to consider it as little less than an act of piracy. He declared that there was but one case upon record which bore any resemblance to the present, and that happened in the century before the last, namely, the nefarious attempt made on the Dutch surveyance fleet. It was well known, he said, that this was a measure advised by that cabal*, none of whose actions were transmitted to succeeding times with greater reprobation; but even here, the Dutch were not so much taken by surprise as the Spaniards had been when their frigates were seized.

At length, after vehement debates, in which se-

* The despotic cabinet of Charles the Second, composed of lord Clifford, the earl of Arlington, the duke of Buckingham, Anthony Ashley Cooper, earl of Shaftesbury, and the earl of Lauderdale. For an account of the Cabal, see Lyttleton's History of England. vol. ii. p. 603.

veral gentlemen vindicated the conduct of ministers, while others as strenuously reprobated it, the question was put, when, upon a division, there appeared for the measures of ministers three hundred and thirteen, against them one hundred and six. The consequence was, that on the 14th, the house proceeded to St. James's, and presented the address to his majesty; to which he returned the following answer:

“ Gentlemen, I return you thanks for your dutiful and loyal address: I feel the highest satisfaction in this proof of your uniform concurrence and approbation of the measures adopted with regard to Spain; and trust that your zeal and attachment will enable me to bring this new contest to a safe and honourable termination.”

The war was now carried on with vigour, and in every instance highly advantageous to the navy of Great Britain,

Although the naval history of the preceding months of this year was favourable to the interests of Great Britain, the accounts which were transmitted to the admiralty during the month of July, of the splendid efforts of the British naval force, and the victories they gained, redound greatly to the honour of the English flag.

Captain Bettesworth, of the *Curieux* sloop of war, arrived at the admiralty with dispatches from lord Nelson, on the morning of July 9. His lordship, with the fleet under his command, reached Barbadoes on the 4th of June, having made the voyage from Lagos Bay in twenty-five days. The *Curieux* did not leave him till the 13th. The French fleet had previously quitted Martinique for the northward; and his lordship, on that day, was pursuing them, with good information as to their track. So exact, indeed, was his intelligence, that he told captain Bettesworth what course of steering would give him a sight of the enemy, before his finally standing for Europe. Captain Bettesworth, by following the admiral's directions, did accordingly see them on the 20th of June: they

were then seventeen sail of the line, "sailing badly." Lord Nelson had ten sail in perfect condition. The French had lost three thousand men by sickness. Thus the enemy's fleet, after having escaped from their own ports, and reaching the West Indies, were returning to Europe, for which purpose they were endeavouring to cross the trade winds, and return by an unusual course: but his lordship aware of this, pursued the same track. In consequence of the intelligence received from captain Bettesworth, the lords of the admiralty used all due precaution to hinder the return of the enemy to any of their ports in Europe. Admiral sir Robert Calder, off Ferrol, was speedily reinforced by the Windsor Castle and Barfleur, of ninety-eight guns; and the Triumph, Raisonné, and Warrior, of seventy-four guns each; and the squadrons cruising off Rochefort and Cadiz, were likewise augmented.

But though the combined squadron escaped the vigilance of the intrepid Nelson, yet sir Robert Calder fell in with it, and a desperate engagement ensued, in which the enemy lost two ships of the line, as the following extract from sir Robert's letter to the honourable admiral Cornwallis, specifies:

"SIR, *Prince of Wales, July 23, 1805.*

"Yesterday, at noon, lat. 43 deg. 30 min. N. long. 11 deg. 17 min. W. I was favoured with a view of the combined squadrons of France and Spain, consisting of twenty sail of the line; also three large ships armed *en flute*, of about fifty guns each, with five frigates and three brigs; the force under my directions at this time consisting of fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, a cutter, and a lugger. I immediately stood towards the enemy with the squadron, making the needful signals for battle in the closest order; and on closing with them, I made the signal for attacking their centre. When I had reached their rear I tacked the squadron in succession: this brought us close up under their lee; and when our headmost ships reached
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their centre, the enemy were tacking in succession: this obliged me to make again the same manœuvre, by which I brought on an action which lasted upwards of four hours, when I found it necessary to bring to the squadron to cover the two captured ships, whose names are in the margin*. I have to observe, the enemy had every advantage of wind and weather during the whole day. The weather had been foggy at times a great part of the morning; and very soon after we had brought them to action, the fog was so very thick at intervals, that we could with great difficulty see the ship a-head or a-stern of us: this rendered it impossible to take the advantage of the enemy by signals as I could have wished to have done: had the weather been more favourable, I am led to believe the victory would have been more complete." On board the English fleet were forty-one killed, and one hundred and fifty-eight wounded. The loss on board the combined fleet could not be ascertained.

On the 13th, captain Poyntz, of the *Melampus*, captured the *Hydra*, a Spanish private ship of war, in lat. 50 deg. N. long. 20 deg. W. The Spanish ship mounted twenty-two long nines on the main deck, leaving two spare ports, and sixes on the quarter deck, with a complement of one hundred and ninety-two men, three of whom were killed, and several wounded. This ship was fitted out for four months, which would have terminated in four days after she was taken. During her cruise the *Hydra* had not taken any thing; and from her superior qualifications she was recommended to his majesty's service, and was accordingly purchased for that purpose.

The action between the fleet under sir Robert Calder, and the French and Spanish combined squadrons, was the principal event that occupied the public mind at this period. Sir R. Calder had not, even to the admiralty, given that explanation of his conduct which was thought compatible with the interests and the feel-

* San Rafael, eighty-four guns. El Firme, seventy-four guns.
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ings of the people, and which it was thought his character demanded. Sir Robert is certainly a person of courage and talents; but it cannot be supposed that the French fleet run away, as sir Robert's dispatches seemed to suggest; for, on the contrary, owing to the particular manœuvres of the action, the combined squadron may be said to have pursued the English fleet. In consequence of some observations relative to this action, sir Robert Calder addressed a letter to the secretary of the admiralty, requesting that an enquiry should be instituted with reference to his conduct on the 23rd of July last, in not renewing the engagement with the combined fleets of France and Spain; and on the 22nd of December following sir Robert was brought to trial on board his majesty's ship Prince of Wales, in Portsmouth harbour. The trial lasted some time, during which a great many witnesses were examined. When sir Robert Calder had made his defence, the court proceeded to give judgement. The substance of the sentence was: that "after duly considering the conduct of the said admiral sir Robert Calder, and hearing and deliberating fully upon all the evidence laid before us respecting the same on the days aforesaid, we are of opinion, that the charges against the conduct of the said admiral sir Robert Calder, on the above days, in presence of the enemy, in not having done his utmost to take and destroy every ship of the enemy, which it was his duty to engage, are fully proved. The court are of opinion, that such conduct on the part of sir Robert Calder was not the result of fear or cowardice, but of error in judgement; for which he deserves to be severely reprimanded, and he is hereby severely reprimanded accordingly." Notwithstanding the sentence of the court martial, the fate of this gallant officer was considered by the better informed of the public as somewhat hard. It is a singular instance of the high confidence existing in the country with respect to our naval excellence, that an admiral with a fleet of fifteen sail of the line should incur reproof for
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having obtained a partial victory over an enemy with twenty sail. After the action of the 22nd the French made their way good to Ferrol, where having formed a junction with the ships in that harbour, they again put to sea, and were discovered shortly after, amounting to a force of about twenty-seven sail of the line and five frigates, their destination excited as usual much speculation till they finally took a position in the port of Cadiz.

A considerable depression was observable in the minds of our merchants trading to the West Indies, about this period, in consequence of the number of vessels taken by the enemy: fifteen were captured by the combined fleets of France and Spain*. A French force was actually stationed to annoy our West-Indiamen, when captain Zachariah Mudge, in the *Blanche*, made a spirited attack on that force. His conduct, although his ship was lost, cannot be too highly spoken of. His own letter, which was directed to William Marsden, Esq. secretary to the admiralty, and dated on board the French national ship *Topaze*, July 22, shall describe the action, together with the force of the enemy:

“SIR,

“I am sorry to inform you of the loss of his majesty’s ship *Blanche*, which was captured by a French squadron, as per margin†; but, thank God, she
was

“Admiral Villeneuve’s letter to the minister of marine says, “I have the honour to inform you, that on the 19th instant, (Prairial, answering to our April 8,) having doubled Antigua, I got information that in the N. N. E. was a convoy of the enemy, consisting of fifteen sail. I made signal for a general chase, and at night-fall the whole of the convoy was in my power, which I sent off to Martinique. These ships which had come out from Antigua, were all laden with colonial produce, and destined for Europe. The convoy may be valued at five millions (French.)”—About one million two hundred thousand pounds sterling.

† *La Topaze*, of forty-four guns, twenty-eight eighteen-pounders on the main-deck, ten thirty-six pound carronades and six twelve-pounders on the quarter-deck and fore-castle, captain Bourdin,

was not destined to bear French colours, or to assist the fleet of the enemy. On Friday morning, July 19, in lat. $20^{\circ} 20'$ N. long. $66^{\circ} 44'$ W. (weather hazy,) at eight, four sail were seen off the weather cat-head, three ships, and a brig on the opposite tack, under easy sail. I kept to the wind until we were near enough to distinguish colours. I then made the necessary signals to ascertain whether they were enemies. At ten, when a-breast, about three miles distant, they all bore up, and hoisted English ensigns; but, from the make of the union, and colour of the bunting, with other circumstances, I concluded they were French, and therefore determined to sell the ship as dearly as possible (for sailing was out of the question, the *Blanche* having little or no copper on these last nine months, and sailed very heavy). Having brought-to, with the mainsail in the brails, at eleven the commodore ranged up within two cables' length, shifted his colours, and gave us his broadside. When within pistol-shot she received ours; the action became warm and steady, the ships never without hail of each other, running large, under easy sail; le *Département des Landes* on the starboard quarter, and the two corvettes close astern. At forty-five minutes past eleven the ship became ungovernable, and was reduced to a perfect wreck; the sails totally destroyed, ten shot in the foremast (expecting it to fall every minute), the mainmast and rigging cut to pieces,

Bourdin, commander, three hundred and forty men, ten officers and six privates, *Legion de Midi*.—(410.)

Le *Département des Landes*, of twenty guns, nine-pounders, and two six-pounders on the forecastle, captain des Mantel, two hundred men, six officers and thirty privates, *Legion de Midi*.—(236.)

La *Torche*, of eighteen guns, long twelve-pounders, captain Brunet, one hundred and ninety men, three officers and twenty privates, *Legion de Midi*.—(213.) The ship *La Torche* was afterwards taken by his majesty's ship *Goliath*, captain R. Barton. When taken she had on board fifty-two of the late *Blanche's* crew.

Le *Fanne*, of sixteen guns, nine-pounders, captain Delun, one hundred and twenty men, and three officers, *Legion de Midi*.—(123.)

seven guns dismantled, and the crew reduced to one hundred and ninety, and the rest falling fast, with no probability of escape, I called a council of officers for their opinion, who deemed it only sacrificing the lives of the remainder of as brave a crew as ever fought, to hold out longer, as there was not the smallest prospect of success; I therefore, at twelve, ordered the colours to be struck, and was immediately hurried on board the commodore. At six, the officers who had charge of the *Blanche*, returned, and reported the ship to be sinking fast, on which she was fired; and in about an hour after she sunk, for the magazine had been some time under water. Thus, sir, fell the *Blanche*; and I trust the defence made by her officers and gallant crew, will meet their lordships' approbation.—I have the honour to be, &c.

“ ZACHARY MUDGE.”

The successes of the English ships of war were amazingly great about this period. On the 12th of September captain Parker, of the *Amazon*, fell in with and captured, the *Principe de la Paz*, a Spanish corvette privateer, carrying twenty-four nine-pounders and four swivels, having on board one hundred and sixty men, principally French. On the 15th of October, captain Lavie, of the *Iris*, took the *San Pedro*, a Spanish corvette privateer, of sixteen guns, eight of which were sixteen-pounders, the rest Spanish six-pounders. She had one hundred and fifty men on board when she sailed; but part of her crew had been distributed in five vessels she had captured.

The glorious victory obtained over the French and Spanish combined fleets by the English fleet under lord viscount Nelson, off Cape Trafalgar, would suffer materially by any abridgement to give the accounts the form of a narrative: we therefore deem it proper to give such extracts from the letters of the commanding officers as shall fully describe the gallant action, stating the circumstances as they took place.

On the 6th of November a Gazette Extraordinary

No. III.

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was published, containing dispatches from vice-admiral Collingwood, commander-in-chief of his majesty's ships and vessels off Cadiz; from which the following is extracted:

*“ Euryalus, off Cape Trafalgar,
October 22, 1805.*

“ SIR,

“ The ever to be lamented death of vice-admiral lord viscount Nelson*, who, in the late conflict with the enemy, fell in the hour of victory, leaves to me the duty of informing my lords commissioners of the admiralty, that on the 19th instant it was communicated to the commander-in-chief, from the ships watching the motions of the enemy in Cadiz, that the combined fleets had put to sea; as they sailed with light winds westerly, his lordship concluded their destination was the Mediterranean, and immediately made all sail for the Streights' entrance, with the British squadron, consisting of twenty-seven ships, three of them sixty-fours, where his lordship was informed by captain Blackwood, (whose vigilance in watching, and giving notice of the enemy's movements has been highly meritorious,) that they had not yet passed the Streights.

“ On Monday the 21st instant, at day-light, when

* Horatio, late lord viscount Nelson, was the third son of the reverend Edmund Nelson, rector of Burnham Thorpe, in the county of Norfolk. He was born on the 29th of September, 1758, and after a series of transcendant and heroic services, this gallant admiral fell gloriously, in the moment of a brilliant and decisive victory over the combined fleets of France and Spain, off Cape Trafalgar, on the 21st of October, 1805.—As the life of Lord Nelson would suffer materially by an abridgement of it, we refer the reader to Lyttleton's Continuation of the History of England, p. 584, *et sequentibus*.

The day of lord Nelson's funeral was kept in a very solemn manner in London, most of the shops being shut up, with every appearance of a fast day.

So great was the respect for the memory of lord Nelson, that by a message from the crown in May, 1806, which was confirmed by parliament, earl Nelson and his heirs are to receive five thousand pounds per annum, and one hundred and twenty thousand pounds to purchase a family estate.

Cape Trafalgar bore E. by S. about seven leagues, the enemy was discovered six or seven miles to the eastward, the wind about west, and very light; the commander-in-chief immediately made the signal for the fleet to bear up in two columns, as they are formed in order of sailing; a mode of attack his lordship had previously directed, to avoid the inconvenience and delay in forming a line of battle in the usual manner. The enemy's line consisted of thirty-three ships (of which eighteen were French and fifteen Spanish), commanded in chief by admiral Villeneuve; the Spaniards, under the direction of Gravina, wore, with their heads to the northward, and formed their line of battle with great closeness and correctness; but as the mode of attack was unusual, so the structure of their line was new;—it formed a crescent convexing to leeward—so that, in leading down to their centre, I had both their van and rear abaft the beam: before the fire opened, every alternate ship was about a cable's length to the windward of her second a-head and a-stern, forming a kind of double line, and appeared, when on their beam, to leave a very little interval between them; and this without crowding their ships. Admiral Villeneuve was in the Bucentaure in the centre, and the Prince of Asturias bore Gravina's flag in the rear; but the French and Spanish ships were mixed without any apparent regard to order of national squadron.

“As the mode of our attack had been previously determined on, and communicated to the flag officers and captains, few signals were necessary, and none were made, except to direct close order as the lines bore down.

“The commander-in-chief, in the Victory, led the weather column; and the Royal Sovereign, which bore my flag, the lee.

“The action began at twelve o'clock, by the leading ships of the columns breaking through the enemy's line, the commander-in-chief about the tenth ship from the van, the second in command about the

twelfth from the rear, leaving the van of the enemy unoccupied; the succeeding ships breaking through in all parts, a-stern of their leaders, and engaging the enemy at the muzzles of their guns, the conflict was severe; the enemy's ships were fought with a gallantry highly honourable to their officers, but the attack on them was irresistible; and it pleased the Almighty Disposer of all events to grant his majesty's arms a complete and glorious victory. About three P. M. many of the enemy's ships having struck their colours, their line gave way; admiral Gravina with ten ships, joining their frigates to leeward, stood towards Cadiz. The five headmost ships in their van tacked, and standing to the southward, to windward of the British line, were engaged, and the sternmost of them taken; the others went off, leaving to his majesty's squadron nineteen ships of the line, (of which two are first-rates, the *Santissima Trinidad*, and the *Santa Anna*,) with three flag officers, viz. admiral Villeneuve, the commander-in-chief; Don Ignatio Maria d'Aliva, vice-admiral, and the Spanish rear-admiral, Don Baltazar Hidalgo Cisneros.

"After such a victory it may appear unnecessary to enter into encomiums on the particular parts taken by the several commanders; the conclusion says more on the subject than I have language to express; the spirit which animated all was the same, when all exert themselves zealously in their country's service, all deserve that their high merits should stand recorded; and never was high merit more conspicuous than in the battle I have described.

"The *Achille* (a French seventy-four), after having surrendered, by some mismanagement of the Frenchmen, took fire and blew up: two hundred of her men were saved by the tenders.

"A circumstance occurred during the action, which so strongly marks the invincible spirit of British seamen, when engaging the enemies of their country, that I cannot resist the pleasure I have in making it known to their lordships. The *Temeraire*

was

was boarded by accident or design, by a French ship on one side, and a Spaniard on the other; the contest was vigorous; but in the end, the combined ensigns were torn from the poop, and the British hoisted in their places.

“Such a battle could not be fought without sustaining a great loss of men. I have not only to lament, (in common with the British navy, and the British nation,) in the fall of the commander-in-chief, the loss of a hero, whose name will be immortal, and his memory ever dear to his country; but my heart is rent with the most poignant grief for the death of a friend, to whom by many years’ intimacy, and a perfect knowledge of the virtues of his mind, which inspired ideas superior to the common race of men, I was bound by the strongest ties of affection; a grief to which even the glorious occasion in which he fell, does not bring the consolation which perhaps it ought: his lordship received a musket ball in his left breast, about the middle of the action, and sent an officer to me immediately with his last farewell, and soon after expired.

“I have also to lament the loss of those excellent officers, captains Duff of the Mars, and Cooke of the Bellerophon; I have yet heard of none others.

“I fear the numbers that have fallen will be found very great when the returns come to me; but it having blown a gale of wind ever since the action, I have not yet had it in my power to collect any reports from the ships.

“The Royal Sovereign having lost her masts, except the tottering foremast, I called the Euryalus to me, while the action continued; which ship lying within hail, made my signals, a service captain Blackwood performed with great attention. After the action I shifted my flag to her, that I might more easily communicate my orders to, and collect the ships, and towed the Royal Sovereign out to seaward. The whole fleet were now in a very perilous situation; many dismasted; all shattered; in thirteen fathoms water,

water, off the shoals of Trafalgar; and when I made the signal to prepare for anchor, few of the ships had an anchor to let go, their cables being shot; but the same good Providence which aided us through such a day preserved us in the night, by the wind shifting a few points, and drifting the ships off the land, except four of the captured dismasted ships, which are now at anchor off Trafalgar, and I hope will ride safe until those gales are over.

“ Having thus detailed the proceedings of the fleet on this occasion, I beg to congratulate their lordships on a victory which, I hope, will add a ray to the glory of his majesty’s crown, and be attended with public benefit to our country.

“ I am, &c.

William Marsden, Esq.

“ C. COLLINGWOOD.”

The order in which the ships of the British squadron attacked the combined fleets on the 21st of October, 1805:

VAN.

Victory	Orion
Temeraire	Agamemnon
Neptune	Minotaur
Conqueror	Spartiate
Leviathan	Britannia
Ajax	Africa.
Euryalus	Naiad
Sirius	Pickle Schooner
Phœbe	Entreprenante cutter

REAR.

Royal Sovereign	Revenge
Mars	Swiftsure
Belleisle	Defence
Tonnant	Thunderer
Bellerophon	Defiance
Colossus	Prince
Achille	Dreadnought
Polyphemus	

C. COLLINGWOOD.

“ SIR,

Euryalus, off Cadiz,
October 24, 1805.

" SIR,

" In my letter of the 22d, I detailed to you, for the information of my lords commissioners of the Admiralty, the proceedings of his majesty's squadron on the day of the action, and that preceding it, since which I have had a continued series of misfortunes, but they are of a kind that human prudence could not possibly provide against, or my skill prevent.

" On the 22d, in the morning, a strong southerly wind blew, with squally weather, which however did not prevent the activity of the officers and seamen of such ships as were manageable from getting hold of many of the prizes (thirteen or fourteen), and towing them off to the westward, where I ordered them to rendezvous round the Royal Sovereign, in tow by the Neptune: but on the 23d the gale increased, and the sea ran so high, that many of them broke the tow rope, and drifted far to leeward before they were got hold of again; and some of them taking advantage of the dark and boisterous night, got before the wind, and have perhaps drifted upon the shore and sunk; on the afternoon of that day the remnant of the combined fleet, ten sail of ships, who had not been much engaged, stood up to leeward of my shattered and straggled charge, as if meaning to attack them, which obliged me to collect a force out of the least injured ships, and form to leeward for their defence; all this retarded the progress of the hulks, and the bad weather continuing, determined me to destroy all the leewardmost that could be cleared of the men, considering that keeping possession of the ships was a matter of little consequence compared with the chance of their falling again into the hands of the enemy: but even this was an arduous task in the high sea which was running. I hope, however, it has been accomplished to a considerable extent; I entrusted it to skilful officers, who would spare no pains to execute what was possible. The captains of the

the Prince and Neptune cleared the Trinidada and sunk her. Captains Hope, Bayntun, and Malcolm, who joined the fleet this moment from Gibraltar, had the charge of destroying five others. The Redoubtable sunk a-stern of the Swiftsure while in tow. The Santa Anna, I have no doubt, is sunk, as her side was almost entirely beat in; and such is the shattered condition of the whole of them, that unless the weather moderates, I doubt whether I shall be able to carry a ship of them into port. I hope their lordships will approve of what I (having only in consideration the destruction of the enemy's fleet) have thought a measure of absolute necessity.

"I have taken admiral Villeneuve into this ship; vice-admiral don Aliva is dead. Whenever the temper of the weather will permit, and I can spare a frigate, for there were only four in the action with the fleet, Euryalus, Sirius, Phœbe, and Naiad; (the Melpomene joined the 22d, and the Eurydice and Scout the 23d,) I shall collect the other flag officers, and send them to England with their flags, (if they do not go to the bottom,) to be laid at his majesty's feet.

"There were four thousand troops embarked, under the command of general Contamin, who was taken with admiral Villeneuve, in the Bucentaure.

"I am, Sir, &c.

"C. COLLINGWOOD."

NOVEMBER 16.—*Copy of a Letter from the Right Honourable Lord Collingwood, Vice-admiral of the Red, &c. &c. to William Marsden, Esq. dated on board the Euryalus, off Cadiz, Oct. 28, 1805.*

"SIR,

"Since my letter to you of the 24th, stating the proceedings of his majesty's squadron, our situation has been the most critical, and our employment the most arduous that ever a fleet was engaged in. On the 24th and 25th it blew a most violent gale of wind, which completely dispersed the ships, and drove the captured hulls in all directions.

"I have

“ I have since been employed in collecting and destroying them, where they are at anchor upon the coast between Cadiz and six leagues westward of San Lucar, without the prospect of saving one to bring into port.

“ I mentioned in my former letter the joining of the Donegal and Melpomene, after the action; I cannot sufficiently praise the activity of their commanders, in giving assistance to the squadron in destroying the enemy's ships.

“ The *Defiance*, after having stuck to the *Aigle* as long as it was possible, in hope of saving her from wreck, which separated her for some time from the squadron, was obliged to abandon her to her fate, and she went on shore.

“ Captain Durham's exertions have been very great.

“ I hope I shall get them all destroyed by to-morrow, if the weather keeps moderate.

“ In the gale the *Royal Sovereign* and *Mars* lost their foremasts, and are now rigging anew, where the body of the squadron is at anchor to the N. W. of San Lucar.

“ I find that on the return of *Gravina* to Cadiz he was immediately ordered to sea again, and came out, which made it necessary for me to form a line, to cover the disabled hulls—that night it blew hard, and his ship, the *Prince of Asturias*, was dismasted, and returned into port; the *Rayo* was also dismasted, and fell into our hands; Don Enrique M'Donel had his broad pendant in the *Rayo*, and from him I find the *Santa Anna* was driven near Cadiz, and towed in by a frigate.

“ I am, Sir, &c. &c. &c.

“ C. COLLINGWOOD.”

Copy of a Letter received Nov. 26, by the Hon. Captain Blackwood, from Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's Ships and Vessels in the Mediterranean, to William Marsden, Esq. dated on board his Majesty's Ship the Queen, off Cape Trafalgar, Nov. 4, 1805.

" SIR,

" On the 28th ultimo I informed you of the proceedings of the squadron to that time. The weather continuing very bad, the wind blowing from the S. W. the squadron not in a situation of safety, and seeing little prospect of getting the captured ships off the land, and great risk of some of them getting into port, I determined no longer to delay the destroying them, and to get the squadron out of the deep Bay.

" The extraordinary exertion of Captain Capel, however, saved the French Swiftsure; and his ship the Phœbe, together with the Donegal, captain Malcolm, afterwards brought out the Bahama. Indeed, nothing can exceed the perseverance of all the officers employed in this service. Captain Hope rigged and succeeded in bringing out the Ildefonso; all of which will, I hope, have arrived safe at Gibraltar. For, the rest, Sir, I enclose you a list of all the enemy's fleet which were in the action, and how they are disposed of, which, I believe is perfectly correct.

" I informed you, in my letter of the 28th, that the remnant of the enemy's fleet came out a second time to endeavour, in the bad weather, to cut off some of the hulks, when the Rayo was dismasted, and fell into our hands, she afterwards parted her cable, went ashore, and was wrecked. The Indomptable, one of the same squadron, was also driven on shore, wrecked, and her crew perished.

" The Santa Anna and Algesiras being driven near the shore of Cadiz, got such assistance as has enabled them to get in; but the ruin of their fleet is as complete as could be expected, under the circumstances of fighting them close to their own shore.

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Had the battle been in the ocean, still fewer would have escaped. Twenty sail of the line are taken or destroyed; and of those which got in, not more than three are in a repairable state for a length of time.

“Rear-admiral Louis, in the *Canopus*, who had been detached with the *Queen*, *Spencer*, and *Tigris*, to complete the water, &c. of these ships, and to see the convoy in safety a certain distance up the Mediterranean, joined me on the 30th.

“In clearing the captured ships of prisoners, I found so many wounded men, that to alleviate human misery as much as was in my power, I sent to the marquis de Solana, governor-general of Andalusia, to offer him the wounded to the care of their country, on receipts being given: a proposal which was received with the greatest thankfulness, not only by the governor, but the whole country resounds with expressions of gratitude. Two French frigates were sent out to receive them, with a proper officer to give receipts, bringing with them all the English who had been wrecked in several of the ships, and an offer from the marquis de Solana of the use of their hospitals for our wounded, pledging the honour of Spain for their being carefully attended.

“I have ordered most of the Spanish prisoners to be released; the officers on parole; the men for receipts given, and a condition that they do not serve in war, by sea or land, until exchanged.

“By my correspondence with the marquis, I found that the vice-admiral d’Aliva was not dead, but dangerously wounded; and I wrote to him a letter, claiming him as a prisoner of war; a copy of which I enclose, (but which is not of sufficient importance to claim insertion) together with a state of the flag officers of the combined fleet. “I am, &c.”

“C. COLLINGWOOD.”*

Thus

* The following is a list of the combined fleets of France

Thus have we given a faithful description of the battle off Cape Trafalgar; the four last ships, marked 30,

and Spain in the action of the 21st of October, 1805, off Cape Trafalgar, showing how they are disposed of :

1. Spanish ship *San Ildefonso*, of 74 guns, brigadier Don Joseph de Vargas; sent to Gibraltar.
2. Spanish ship *San Juan Nepomuceno*, of 74 guns, brigadier Don Cosme Churrueta; sent to Gibraltar.
3. Spanish ship *Bahama*, of 74 guns, brigadier Don A. D. Galiano; sent to Gibraltar.
4. French ship *Swiftsure*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Villmadrin; sent to Gibraltar.
5. Spanish ship *Monarca*, of 74 guns, Don Jeodoro Argumosa; wrecked off San Lucar.
6. French ship *Fougeux*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Beaudouin; wrecked off Trafalgar; all perished, and 30 of the *Temeraire*'s men.
7. French ship *Indomptable*, of 84 guns, Monsieur Hubert; wrecked off Rota; all perished.
8. French ship *Bucentaure*, of 80 guns, admiral Villeneuve, commander-in-chief; captains Prigny and Majendie; wrecked on the *Porques*; some of the crew saved.
9. Spanish ship *San Francisco de Asis*, of 74 guns, Don Luis de Flores; wrecked near Rota.
10. Spanish ship *El Rayo*, of 100 guns, brigadier Don Henrique Macdonel; wrecked near San Lucar.
11. Spanish ship *Neptuno*, of 84 guns, brigadier Don Cayetano Valdes; wrecked between Rota and Catolina.
12. French ship *Argonaute*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Epron; on shore in the port of Cadiz.
13. French ship *Berwick*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Camas; wrecked to the northward of San Lucar.
14. French ship *Aigle*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Courrege; wrecked near Rota.
15. French ship *Achille*, of 74 guns, Monsieur de Nieuport; burnt during the action.
16. French ship *Intrepide*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Infortet, burnt by the *Britannia*.
17. Spanish ship *San Augustin*, of 74 guns, brigadier Don Felipe X. Cagigal, burnt by the *Leviathan*.
18. Spanish ship *Santissima Trinidad*, of 140 guns, rear-admiral Don Baltazar H. Cisneros; brigadier Don F. Uriarte; sunk by the *Prince*, *Neptune*, &c.
19. French ship *Redoubtable*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Lucas; sunk astern of the *Swiftsure*: *Temeraire* lost thirteen and *Swiftsure* five men.

20. Spanish

30, 31, 32, 33, is the annexed list of the combined fleet, were afterwards taken by captain sir Richard J. Strachan, (promoted Nov. 9, to the rank of rear-admiral), whose account of the engagement we likewise insert.

20. Spanish ship, *Argonauta*, of 80 guns, Don Antonio Parejo ; sunk by the *Ajax*.

21. Spanish ship *Santa Anna*, of 112 guns, vice-admiral Don Ignatio d'Aliva, captain Don Joseph de Gardoqui; taken, but got into Cadiz in the gale, dismasted.

22. French ship *Algeziras* of 74 guns, rear-admiral Magon (killed); captain Monsieur Bruaro; taken, but got into Cadiz in the gale, dismasted.

23. French ship *Pluton*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Cosmao returned to Cadiz in a sinking state.

24. Spanish ship *San Juste* of 74 guns, Don Miguel Gaston; returned to Cadiz; has a foremast only.

25. Spanish ship *San Leandro*, of 64 guns, Don Joseph de Quevedo; returned to Cadiz dismasted.

26. French ship *Neptune*, of 84 guns, Monsieur Maistrail; returned to Cadiz, and perfect.

27. French ship *Ileros*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Poulain; returned to Cadiz, lower masts in, and admiral Rossilie's flag on board.

28. Spanish ship *Principe d'Asturias*, of 112 guns, admiral Don F. Gravina; Don Antonio Escano, &c. returned to Cadiz dismasted.

29. Spanish ship *Montanez*, of 74 guns, Don Francisco Alcedo; returned to Cadiz.

30. French ship *Formidable*, of 80 guns, rear-admiral Duma noir; hauled to the southward, and escaped.

31. French ship *Mont Blanc*, of 74 guns, Monsieur le Villegrès; hauled to the southward, and escaped.

32. French ship *Scipion*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Berenger; hauled to the southward and escaped.

33. French ship *Duguay Trouin*, of 74 guns, Monsieur Troufflet; hauled to the southward, and escaped.

N. B. The four last-mentioned ships were captured by sir Richard Strachan on the 4th of November, as mentioned in the text.

The following is a summary of the killed and wounded on board the British squadron under the command of the Right Hon. Vice-admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, in the action of the 21st of October, 1805, off Cape Trafalgar, with the combined fleets of France and Spain: 27 officers, 16 petty officers, 299 seamen, and 113 marines, killed; 43 officers, 59 petty officers, 900 seamen, and 212 marines, wounded.—Total 1663.

On the 11th of November, a Gazette Extraordinary was published, containing dispatches from sir R. J. Strachan, of which the following are copies:

“SIR, *Cæsar, Nov. 7, 1805.*

“The accompanying copy of a letter, addressed to the honourable admiral Cornwallis, I request you will be pleased to lay before the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, with my apology for the hasty manner in which it is written.

“I have the honour to be, &c.

“R. J. STRACHAN.”

Cæsar, West of Rochefort, 264 Miles

“SIR, *Nov. 4, 1805, Wind S. E.*

“Being off Ferrol, working to the eastward, with the wind westerly, on the evening of the 2d, we observed a frigate in the N. W. making signals; made all sail to join her before night, and followed by the ships named in the margin*, we came up with her at eleven at night, and at the moment she joined us, we saw six large ships near us. Captain Baker informed me he had been chased by the Rochefort squadron, then close to leeward of us. We were delighted. I desired him to tell the captains of the ships of the line astern to follow me, as I meant to engage them directly; and immediately bore away in the *Cæsar* for the purpose, making all the signals I could, to indicate our movements to our ships: the moon enabled us to see the enemy bear away in a line abreast, closely formed: but we lost sight of them when it set, and I was obliged to reduce our sails, the *Hero*, *Courageux*, and *Æolus*, being the only ships we could see. We continued steering to the E. N. E. all night, and in the morning observed the *Santa Margarita* near us; at nine we discovered the enemy of four sail of the line in the N. E. under all sail. We had also every thing set, and came up with

* *Cæsar*, *Hero*, *Courageux*, and *Namur*.—*Bellona*, *Æolus*, *Santa Margarita*, far to leeward, in the south-east.

them fast; in the evening we observed three sail astern; and the *Phoenix* spoke me at night. I found that active officer, captain Baker, had delivered my orders, and I sent him on to assist the *Santa Margarita* in leading us up to the enemy. At day-light we were near them, and the *Santa Margarita* had begun in a very gallant manner to fire upon their rear, and was soon joined by the *Phoenix*.

“ A little before noon the French finding an action unavoidable, began to take in their small sails, and form in a line, bearing on the starboard tack; we did the same, and I communicated my intentions, by hailing to the captains, “ that I should attack the centre and rear, and at noon began the battle: in a short time the van ship of the enemy tacked, which almost directly made the action close and general; the *Namur* joined soon after we tacked, which we did as soon as we could get the ships round, and I directed her by signal to engage the van; at half past three the action ceased, the enemy having fought to admiration, and not surrendering till their ships were unmanageable. I have returned thanks to the captains of the ships of the line and the frigates, and they speak in high terms of approbation of their officers and ships’ companies. If any thing could add to the good opinion I had already formed of the officers and crew of the *Cæsar*, it is their gallant conduct in this day’s battle. The enemy have suffered much, but our ships not more than is to be expected on these occasions. You may judge of my surprize, sir, when I found the ships we had taken were not the *Rochefort* squadron, but from Cadiz.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ R. J. STRACHAN.”

*Hon. Wm. Cornwallis, Admiral of the White,
and Commander-in-chief, &c. &c. &c.*

FIRST LINE—STARBOARD TACK.

British Line.

Cæsar, 80 guns.—*Hero*, 74.—*Courageux*, 74.

French

French Line.

Duguay Tronin, of 74 guns, captain Troufflet.
 Formidable, of 80 guns, rear-admiral Dumanoir.
 Mont Blanc, of 74, captain Villegrey,
 Scipion, of 74 guns, capt. Barouger.

SECOND LINE.—LARBOARD TACK.

When the Namur joined.

British Line.

Hero, of 74 guns, honourable captain Gardner.
 Namur, of 74 guns, captain Halsted.
 Cæsar, of 80 guns, sir Richard J. Strachan.
 Courageux, of 74 guns, captain Lee.

French Line.

Duguay Trouin, Formidable, Mont Blanc, Scipion.

N. B. The Duguay Trouin and Scipion totally dismasted; the Formidable and Mont Blanc have their foremasts standing.

Our frigates—Santa Margarita, Æolus, Phœnix, and Revolutionaire.

The Revolutionaire joined at the time the Namur did, but with the rest of our frigates, in consequence of the French tacking, were to leeward of the enemy.

I do not know what is become of the Bellona, or the other two sail we saw on the night of the 2d instant.

Copy of a Letter from Rear-Admiral Sir Richard John Strachan, Bart. to William Marsden, Esq. dated on board his Majesty's Ship Cæsar, off Falmouth, the 8th instant.

“ SIR,

“ Not having the returns when the Æolus left us, and now having occasion to send in the Santa Margarita to procure pilots to take the French ships into harbour, I transmit you the returns of killed and wounded in the action of the 4th; and also a copy of the thanks alluded to in my letter, which I request you will communicate to their lordships.

“ I dare

“ I dare say their lordships will be surprized that we have lost so few men. I can only account for it from the enemy firing high, and we closing suddenly.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ R. J. STRACHAN.”

I have as yet no very correct account of the loss of the enemy, or of their number of men.

The *Mont Blanc* had seven hundred; sixty-three killed, and ninety-six wounded, mostly dangerous.

The *Scipion*, one hundred and eleven killed and wounded.

The French admiral, Monsieur Dumanoire le Pelley, wounded; the captain of the *Duguay Trouin* killed, and second captain wounded.

A List of the Killed and Wounded in his Majesty's Ships under-mentioned, in Action, with a French Squadron on the 4th of November, 1805.

Cæsar; 4 killed and 25 wounded.

Hero; 10 killed and 51 wounded.

Courageux; 1 killed and 13 wounded.

Namur; 4 killed and 8 wounded.

Santa Margarita; 1 killed and 1 wounded.

Revolutionnaire; 2 killed and 6 wounded.

Phoenix; 2 killed and 4 wounded.

Æolus; 3 wounded.

Total.—24 killed and 111 wounded.—135.

The internal state of Spain was now deplorable: it continued to languish in servitude and obscurity under the debasing administration of the Prince of Peace, while that minion rose daily in power, importance, and wealth, through the favour and confidence of his sovereign, Charles the Fourth. The prince of Asturias, heir apparent to the crown, though less an object of jealousy and hatred to his mother, was still carefully excluded from any share in the government, and left without influence or authority in the nation, over which he was destined one day to sway the sceptre, unless prevented by the nefarious projects and criminal transactions of those, whom the ties of nature and

the obligations of duty ought to have made the guardians and the supporters of his rights. Men of virtue and talents lamented in solitude or retirement the degradation of their country: while the nation at large, animated with a noble emulation of its ancient glory, contemplated its fallen and degraded situation, with indignation and sorrow, and could scarcely express their sentiments of resentment against the authors and abettors of such intolerable disgrace and humiliation.

A flag of truce had been sent from France with dispatches from the court of London, proposing a negociation for the establishment of peace, which, however, terminated without producing the desired effect. But when certain intelligence of this negociation between France and England reached Madrid, the self importance of the Prince of Peace was offended, that he had not been consulted on the occasion, nor invited to become a party to the negociation; and when the secret articles transpired of the treaty concluded between France and Russia, by which it appeared that Bonaparte had transferred the Balearic Isles * to the duke of Calabria, without even communicating

* The Balearic Islands are those of Majorca, Minorca, Iviça and some other smaller ones. They were called Balearic Isles from the skill of their inhabitants in slinging, for which they were very remarkable; even at the present day they are reckoned expert at the sling.

Majorca is the largest of the Balears, and is situated between Iviça on the W. and Minorca on the E. It is about 60 miles long, and 45 broad. The air is clear and temperate, and by its situation the heat in summer is so qualified by the breezes, that it is by far the most pleasant of all the islands in the Mediterranean. There are some mountains; but the country is generally flat, and of such an excellent soil, that it produces great quantities of corn as good in its kind as any in Europe. There are no rivers, but a great many springs and wells, and likewise several good harbours. The inhabitants are robust, active, and reckoned good seamen. The principal town of the same name, is handsome, large, rich and strong, containing about 6000 houses. It is seated on the S. W. part of the island, where there is a good harbour, Lat. 39. 36. N. Lon. 2. 55. E.

Minorca

nicating his intention to the court of Madrid, his indignation became extreme.

In the first transports of his wrath, the Prince of Peace issued proclamations, on the 9th and 11th of October, calling upon the loyalty and patriotism of his countrymen, and ordering a considerable augmentation of the Spanish army and militia, while he privately opened a confidential intercourse with the court of Lisbon, preparatory, as was supposed, to a renewal of friendly communications with the court of London. But his designs of emancipating his countrymen from the yoke of France, if they ever assumed a definite form, were extinguished before they matured into action, by the disasters of Prussia. On the news of the battle of Auerstadt, the levies that had been or-

Minorca is about 33 miles long, and 10 broad. The form is very irregular, and the coasts are much indented by the sea, which forms a great number of little creeks and inlets. The surface of the island is rough and unequal. There are some pools of standing water, and but very few rivulets, so that the inhabitants have scarcely any wholesome water except what they catch from the clouds. The natural impetuosity of the temper of the inhabitants is such, that the slightest cause provokes them to anger; and they seem to be incapable of forgetting or forgiving an injury. The principal town was Cludadella, now containing about 600 houses, which, before the seat of government and the courts of justice were removed to Mahon, were fully inhabited. Mahon is the present capital of the island; it stands on an eminence on the W. side of the harbour, the ascent being pretty steep. The town is large, but the streets are winding, narrow, and ill paved. The fortress of St. Philip stands near the entrance of the harbour, which it covers, is very spacious, of great strength, with subterraneous works to protect the garrison from bombs, large magazines, and whatever else is necessary to render it a complete fortification: it has a numerous and well disposed artillery. Port Mahon is allowed to be the finest harbour in the Mediterranean, about 90 fathoms wide at its entrance, but within very large and safe, and stretching a league or more into the land. Lat. 39. 56. N. Lon. 4. 17. E.

Ivica is the smallest of these islands, and lies — miles S. W. of Majorca, and about the same distance from Cape St. Martin in Valencia. It is about 20 miles long, and 10 broad. Its capital is of the same name, which is situated on a bay on the south side of the island, and is well fortified in the modern way. It contains about 1000 families. Lat. 39. 3. N. Lon. 1. 22. E.

dered throughout Spain were hastily countermanded; and in order to conceal the real object of the armament, a ridiculous tale was fabricated, of a project said to have been entertained by the English government, of invading Andalusia with an army of Moors, to prevent which, it was pretended, these extraordinary preparations had been made. So flimsy a pretext as this was by no means calculated to impose upon the sagacity of Bonaparte; but occupied as he was, at that moment with his designs on Poland, he judged it prudent and necessary to dissemble his resentment, and wait for some more favourable opportunity of soliciting the aid of a body of Spanish troops to assist him in his wars in the North. Glad to have escaped so well from the danger, into which his rashness had nearly plunged him, the Prince of Peace acceded readily to this demand, and indifferent to the fate of his countrymen, he sent sixteen thousand men, under the command of the marquis de la Romana, to act in conjunction with the troops of Bonaparte, in completing the subjugation of the continent.

The attention of the British government was anxiously directed in the course of the summer towards the situation of Portugal. It had for a considerable time been manifest, that so soon as Bonaparte should terminate all his differences with the powers of Germany, and establish such peace in the North, as his successes entitled him to dictate, he would turn his arms against the only remaining ally of the English upon the continent; and there was but too much reason to apprehend, that he would easily succeed in dissolving that ancient connection, if not in making himself absolute master of the Portuguese dominions. This apprehension was founded upon the want of energy which had of late years been conspicuous in the courts both of Lisbon and Madrid; and the enfeebled state to which the resources of both had been reduced by a long course of the worst species of government, both civil and ecclesiastical. In the last war too, it was abundantly evident that the Spanish
cabinet,

cabinet, so far from opposing any new obstacle to the destruction of its weaker neighbour, had actively assisted France in the invasion, afforded an easy passage to the French troops, and taken the province of Olivença, as a recompence, at the peace which followed. There was no reason whatever to expect in the present instance, a better conduct on the part of the queen of Spain, and the Prince of the Peace, whose influence was become more absolute than ever, and whose views were at least as wavering, and, of consequence, as subservient to France as they had been at any former period of the war.

The predominance of the influence of the French at Lisbon, had in the mean while displaced the boldest and most upright class of Portuguese statesmen, and put into their stations a set of feeble and corrupt ministers, the mere creatures of the court, intriguers, who, with a single exception, possessed nothing like talents or capacity for government; while that one, though unquestionably a man of distinguished abilities and much experience, was greatly suspected of being lukewarm in the cause of his country, and was certainly a person of too unsteady a line of politics to render him an object of implicit confidence to any party, in so extraordinary an emergency. The Portuguese army, under such rulers, had wasted away, and could scarcely be said to be on a better footing, either in numbers, discipline, or appointment, than it was when count de la Lippe began to attempt its reformation. In this government, so administered, and so supported, the people, far from placing any confidence, took no manner of interest, and there could be little doubt, that had the French invaded the country, their progress would have been observed with perfect indifference by the great body of the inhabitants. These things were not unknown at Paris, where, except the negotiations with England and Russia, nothing now remained, since the peace of Presburg, to occupy the attention of Bonaparte, and to delay his favourite project of subduing the last ally of England.

Should

Should those negotiations fail, as there was too much reason to fear they would, then it was evident that the invasion of Portugal would be the first step of the French government. Scarcely any thing else, indeed, remained to be done; for it was the only stake remaining which England had to lose on the continent of Europe.

During the negotiation that threat was held out in the plainest terms, while authentic intelligence from different quarters proved that some advances were made in carrying the menace into execution. The British government, therefore, clearly perceived, that at all events Portugal would be invaded; that a blow would, in all probability, be struck at that defenceless ally, during the progress of the negotiation, and for the purpose of hastening its conclusion; that to a certainty, even if it were delayed so long, the rupture of the negotiation would be the signal for immediately marching an army from Bayonne to the Tagus. It became, therefore, the first care of the British ministry to provide the means of assisting our ancient ally with forces proportioned to the magnitude of the threatened danger, and with the promptitude which its eminency demanded. Orders were immediately dispatched to the earl of St. Vincent, who was then cruising off Brest, at the head of the Channel fleet, and within a little more than a week after the intelligence had been received of the threatened attack, and only ten days after the menace had been held out to the British negotiators at Paris, that famous commander rode before Lisbon, with a squadron of six sail of the line. By treaty we are restricted from keeping more than this number in the Tagus at one time: so that the admiral ordered another vessel which accompanied him to cruise off the coast, and made the other ships relieve her by turns. The rest of the Channel fleet, and the squadron off Ferrol, were in readiness to reinforce this detachment at a moment's notice, if any necessity should require it.

In the mean time, and with the same facility and dispatch

dispatch, a large and well appointed army was assembled at Plymouth, the destination of several detachments of our forces having been changed for the present, in order to afford the means of assisting the Portuguese government. Lieutenant-generals Simcoe and the earl of Rosslyn, with their staff, were immediately ordered to join lord St. Vincent in the Tagus, and to open, in conjunction with him, such a communication with the court of Lisbon, as might at once lead to a full understanding of the extent of the threatened danger, the means of resisting it, and the best mode of co-operating for that purpose. General Simcoe was taken ill on the voyage, and his malady increased so rapidly after his arrival, that he was under the necessity of speedily returning to England, where he died a few hours after he landed. The negociation was, therefore, carried on by Lord Rosslyn and the admiral. The high name of lord St. Vincent was held in particular estimation in Portugal, where he had so often commanded, had gained his greatest victory, and from which, indeed, he had even taken his title after a battle in which he was successful off Cape St. Vincent. The army collected and embarked at Plymouth, was held in readiness to sail at a moment's warning, as soon as the state of the negociation at Lisbon required it. But it was with a becoming caution, and a due tenderness for the critical circumstances of our ally, that the British government did not send it over in the first instance, but waited until the precise extent and immensity of the danger should be ascertained. Had an army been suddenly sent with the fleet to the Tagus, a pretext would have been afforded to Bonaparte for his meditated invasion; and the transaction would have borne an appearance, of all others the most to be avoided, of imposing on the Portuguese government the necessity of adopting our plan of defence. It was therefore, better on every account to delay the expedition, until the enemy should actually invade Portugal, or until our ally should require our assistance and co-operation for her defence.

In case, however, the Portuguese government should not be willing to fall in with these views of the British court, another offer was to be made on the part of England. In the event of his finding that the court of Lisbon either could not or would not defend itself, lord St. Vincent was instructed to offer the whole of his fleet, with the army already embarked, and waiting his signal to sail, as well as the most liberal supplies of money, for the purpose of securing a safe retreat for the Portuguese government in the Brazils, and establishing them there as an independent state. Thus, if the court of Lisbon either chose to defend Portugal, or was afraid to run the hazard of such a contest, or found itself unable to resist the enemy, or from whatever cause, preferred a retreat; in either case the British empire offered to place the whole resources of the empire at its disposal, without a single equivalent, except that of saving an ancient ally, without any security for the future; upon no condition or bargain whatever, except that Portugal should strenuously exert herself either to resist the enemy, or to escape from the shores of the Tagus.

There was, however, a third case highly improbable, no doubt, but still within the bounds of possibility, and to be accordingly provided for. If the court of Lisbon should, from indecision and the influence of a French party in its councils, both refuse to defend its dominions in Europe, and to retreat to those in South America; if it should persist in a resolution neither to fight nor fly, but determine to remain and be voluntarily swallowed up, with its whole resources, by the invading enemy, it then became the duty of England to hinder those resources from falling into the hands of France, and accordingly the admiral and general were instructed to declare, that should Portugal be invaded by a French force, and should the court refuse both to oppose the enemy and to escape from him, then it would become necessary to hinder the fleet from falling into his hands.

The liberal and disinterested offers of the court of
London

London were received by the royal family of Portugal with the warmest expressions of gratitude and thankfulness; and the friendly solicitude shewn by the British court, made a deep and lasting impression upon the prince regent of Portugal. When the unexpected intelligence arrived in Portugal, that hostilities were recommencing in the North, the court of Lisbon deemed it advisable no longer to request the protection of the British admiral, and it was evident, that for the present, the landing of any force in Portugal, could only serve to give umbrage at the court of Madrid, without answering any good purpose. The troops were accordingly disembarked at Plymouth, lord St. Vincent returned to his station off the Tagus, and lord Rosslyn sailed for England.

Sir Hope Popham, the naval commander successfully employed against the Cape of Good Hope, had been, with other naval officers, consulted by Mr. Pitt and lord Melville about their designs on South America, and at their desire he had conferred with general Miranda on that officer's views and projects in that quarter. The result of these communications had been his appointment to the command of the *Diadem* of 64 guns, in December 1804, for the purpose "of co-operating with general Miranda to the extent of taking advantage of any of his proceedings which might tend to our attaining a position on the continent of South America, favourable to the trade of this country*." But he had been afterwards given to understand, that all projects of that nature had been for the present abandoned, and when sent to reduce the Cape of Good Hope, no instruction, direct or implied, public or confidential, had been given to him, which could authorize his leaving that colony, and employing the force under his command, in any service unconnected with its conquest or preservation. His mind however, which had been formerly occupied with

* See Lord Melville's evidence in Sir Home Popham's trial, March 9, 1807.

schemes of conquest in South America, was after the reduction of the Cape, again turned to such speculations, in consequence of information received of the weakness of the Spanish colonies on the Rio de la Plata, and unfounded reports of the disaffection of the people towards their government. Having likewise received accounts from Europe of the dissolution of the third coalition, and of the reduced state of the French marine, he contemplated the conquest of Buenos Ayres; and having persuaded Sir David Baird to acquiesce in his plans, he obtained from that officer a small body of troops under general Beresford, to co-operate in any enterprize he should attempt. Thus assisted, he sailed from the Cape about the middle of April, 1806, leaving that settlement without an armed vessel to protect it from insult, and directed his course to St. Helena, where he procured from the governor a small reinforcement to his little army, which after all did not exceed one thousand six hundred men, including marines. With this small force he steered for the Rio de la Plata, and arrived at the mouth of that river in the beginning of June. It was now debated, whether an attack should be made on Buenos Ayres, or Monte Video, and the former being preferred, the troops were removed from the line-of-battle ships into the transports and frigate that accompanied the expedition, in which, after surmounting with great skill and perseverance the difficulties of a very intricate navigation, they arrived before Buenos Ayres on the 24th of June, and next day disembarked without resistance at the Punta de Quilmes, about twelve miles from that city. A body of Spaniards placed on a height at two miles distance, witnessed the landing of the British army without opposing it, and general Beresford having marched against them on the following morning, they fled with precipitation at the first fire, leaving their artillery behind them. No other difficulty occurred after this success, except the passage of a river, which it was necessary to cross, before getting to Buenos Ayres; but this being effected with
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the help of rafts and boats, the bridge having been burnt by the Spaniards, general Beresford entered the city on the 27th, the viceroy having previously abandoned it and fled to Cordova, with the small body of troops under his command. While the army was thus employed in the conquest of Buenos Ayres, the line-of-battle ships of the squadron made demonstrations before Monte Video and Maldonado, in order to alarm and occupy the garrisons of those places, in which were stationed the regular troops of the colony, while the defence of Buenos Ayres, supposed to be less liable to attack, from its situation, had been committed to a small body of militia. To this accident, and to the timidity of the viceroy, who was totally inexperienced in military affairs, the success of this expedition, which was undertaken not more in defiance of the rules of discipline than in opposition to the dictates of prudence, may in a great measure be attributed. In justice, however, to the British commanders it must be added, that in the execution of their enterprize, they displayed great boldness and intrepidity, and that after victory declared in their favour, they shewed a degree of forbearance and moderation to the vanquished, which reflects on them the highest honour. Though the town was defenceless when the English army advanced to it, favourable articles of capitulation were granted to the inhabitants; and not only was the private property of individuals on shore religiously respected; but the coasting vessels found in the river, which by the laws of war were good prize to the captors, though valued with their cargoes, at a million and a half of dollars, were restored by proclamation to the rightful owners. Policy had no doubt its share in this liberal conduct; for there were not seamen to spare from the fleet to navigate these vessels, and if they had been destroyed, the views of traffic, in which the expedition originated, must have been entirely frustrated; and these coasters afforded the only means of maintaining a commercial intercourse with the interior, except the ex-

pensive, and in the present state of the country, uncertain communication by caravans. About one million two hundred thousand dollars of public money were found in the town and sent to England; besides which, public property in quicksilver and Jesuit's bark, to the value of near three millions of dollars, was seized for the benefit of the captors; but, before it was secured on board of ship, the place was retaken by the enemy.

The joy and delusive expectations, which the news of the capture of Buenos Ayres diffused through every part of the British empire, was extravagant beyond example. A circular manifesto from Sir Home Popham to the principal mercantile and manufacturing cities, announcing and certainly not underrating the value of the market he had opened, spread widely and rapidly the most exaggerated notions of his conquest; and led to many rash and improvident mercantile speculations, in which the adventurers had reason afterwards to lament their credulity*.

So

* The delusion was universal, and allowing much for ignorance and want of reflection, incredibly and unaccountably great. It was forgotten, that Buenos Ayres and other parts of South America had been always supplied with English goods through Spanish or neutral bottoms: and, though a direct trade, by affording our manufactures at a cheaper rate than a circuitous one, might increase the demand for them, it was not to be supposed, that this could be in any proportion to the sanguine expectations and over-rated speculations of the public. Inexhaustible mines; fertile, salubrious plains; an innocent unoffending population, cruelly oppressed by their former masters, and gratefully repaying with submission and obedience the British valour that had rescued them from slavery; were the false and flattering images, that dazzled every eye, and banished sober and cool reflection from every bosom. It was not considered, that our new acquisition was one thousand eight hundred miles distant from the mines of Potosi; that the intermediate country was inhabited by a hardy, unsettled race, expert in the management of their horses and spears, and as invincible in defensive war as the Arabs of the desert; nor that Buenos Ayres itself owed its wealth and importance, not to its natural resources derived from the fertile but uncultivated territory that surrounds it, but to its accidental and artificial pre-eminence, as the capital of an extensive government and emporium between the mother country and

So soon as intelligence reached government of Sir Home Popham's unauthorized departure from the Cape, and meditated invasion of South America, orders were instantly dispatched to recal him, and put a stop to his expedition. These orders, however, were too late to prevent his enterprize; and when the news of his success arrived, the strong objections to his plan were absorbed in the universal joy at the fortunate result of his operations. A conquest, which the government would not have made, it had not the resolution to abandon; or possibly, deceived by the ease with which it had been gained, it gave in to the popular delusion, and supposed that South America required only to be attacked, in order to be subdued. The British government seemed as it were bewildered as to the course they should take in the present state of Spanish America; and long before the system proper to be followed with regard to Buenos Ayres came to be discussed in the British cabinet, that settlement was again in the hands of the enemy. The Spaniards had been taken by surprize and beaten by a handful of men, because attacked where they were unprepared for resistance; but no sooner had they recovered from their panic, and discovered the smallness of the number of their opponents, than, ashamed of their defeat, they concerted measures to expel the invaders. Emissaries from Buenos Ayres excited the country people to arms, and an insurrection was organized in the

and her more distant colonies. They who knew any thing of South America, were sensible that the possession of Buenos Ayres, though inconvenient to Potosi and Peru, could not lead to the subjugation of these countries. They foresaw, that our invasion, whatever might be its ultimate consequences, would in the first instance destroy the established channels of commerce, and they were confident that it would not open others in their room. They allowed, that Buenos Ayres was an excellent agricultural farm; but contended that it must first be settled and improved, before it could afford a market for our manufactures. Such reasonings, however, were few in number, and amidst the general delusion they were unattended to and unheeded. See *Lyttleton's Continuation*, page 700.

heart of the city, under the eye of the English commander-in-chief, which seems to have escaped his vigilance, till it had arrived at maturity, and was ripe for action. Liniers, a French colonel in the Spanish service, crossed the river on the 4th of August, unobserved by the English cruisers, and landed at Conchas above Buenos Ayres, bringing with him about one thousand men from Monte Video and Sacramento. Encouraged by this reinforcement, the armed levies from the country, which had been defeated by general Beresford in a sally, advanced again to the city and summoned the castle to surrender on the 10th. Nearly the whole of the inhabitants of the town were now in arms, and the danger appeared so imminent, that the English determined to evacuate the place and retire to their ships; but they were prevented by the state of the weather, and after a desperate action on the 12th in the streets and great square of the town, in which they were attacked with incredible fury, and severely annoyed by the destructive fire from the windows and balconies of the houses, they were compelled to lay down their arms. The terms on which they surrendered, became afterwards a subject of dispute and recrimination between general Beresford and Liniers, who acted as commander-in-chief of the Spaniards. This much only is certain, that contrary to the articles of capitulation signed by Liniers, the English were detained prisoners of war and marched up the country*.

Thus terminated the first expedition to Buenos Ayres, and such were the bitter fruits of an enterprize, undertaken without authority, and originating in a "breach of public duty," which, though elevated by circumstances, was adjudged by a court martial to be "highly censurable," and, for the general good of his majesty's service, deserving of a "severe reprimand †."

* The loss of the British army in the action of the 12th amounted to one hundred and sixty-five killed, wounded, and missing, besides one thousand three hundred made prisoners.

† Sentence of the court martial in the trial of sir H. Popham, March 11th, 1807.

Sir H. Popham, the origin of all these calamities, was on board of ship when the city was retaken; after which with the squadron under his command, he continued to blockade the river, till the arrival of troops from the Cape of Good Hope, on the 5th and 12th of October, enabled him to recommence offensive operations. He then attempted, in the first place, to make himself master of Monte Video, but finding it impossible for his ships to get near enough to batter the walls, he desisted from his enterprize. A body of troops was then landed at Maldonado, under colonel Vassal, and the Spaniards having been driven from that place and from the isle of Gorriti, a sufficient space was gained for the encampment of the troops, and a tolerable safe anchorage procured for the shipping. In this situation our army in South America remained at the end of the present year, receiving successive reinforcements from England and the Cape, and preparing for further, and as it turned out, still more disastrous successes.

On the 15th of December, 1806, when the subject of the expedition to Buenos Ayres was mentioned in the house of commons, lord Howick said, "As to sir Home Popham and sir David Baird, I freely confess that I was one of those who advised their recall, and this upon the ground that they did not even leave a single ship of the line to protect the Cape of Good Hope. They even obliged a frigate that had been sent out to India with money for the payment of the troops there, to desert the destination that it was intended for, and go upon this South American expedition. Such conduct as this I consider to be highly reprehensible, and were it overlooked, there would be an end to all discipline and subordination. I do not wish, said he, to dwell upon the misconduct of men in their absence; but there is one act of sir Home Popham's which I cannot hesitate to censure as particularly improper, and that is, his letter to the manufacturers. What his motives were for such conduct, I cannot say. Perhaps he wanted to court some favour

your and protection against the censure which he must be conscious of deserving from government. If such conduct as this appears to be, could not only be justified but approved of, it would then follow, that all our military governors in the West Indies, in Gibraltar, and in every other part of the world, might totally disregard the instructions they should receive from government, and turn their whole forces wherever their private opinions, or their private interests might point."

It sufficiently appears, however, from documents published in an edition of sir Home Popham's trial, authenticated by himself, that his design on Buenos Ayres was countenanced by Mr. Pitt and lord Melville.

This expedition to Rio de la Plata, appears to have originated in a spirit of rapacity and plunder. The commander of the land troops, in his expedition, (brigadier-general Beresford) displayed, in his conduct, military skill, promptitude of decision, and cool courage; and also the noblest generosity and winning affability towards the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, and all men. And, although he was not authorized to have recourse to the conciliatory measures, by which he might have united the interests of Great Britain with those of Spanish America, the lives, the property, the prejudices of the people who had fallen under his power, were respected; and the attachment of the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres to his person, was won by the many disinterested and generous acts of kindness. It was the success of the expedition, a secure and permanent footing on La Plata that was his object, not personal gain and plunder. The military eye of the general pointed to Monte Video, as the first object of attack, not Buenos Ayres; but, with too much facility, he gave way to the earnest desire of the naval commander of the armament, who was seconded by all the captains of ships to advance immediately against Buenos Ayres, the depôt of so much public and private treasure. It unfortunately happened that
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the commodore, with equal inhumanity, it must be owned, and impolicy, had sent on shore two hundred Spaniards, the crews of some vessels that had fallen into his hands, on the island of Lobos, in La Plata, several leagues distant from Maldonado, that he might not be encumbered with so many prisoners, leaving them to the danger of perishing from famine. The men subsisted some time on the flesh of seals, and shell-fish. At length, a number of them, with the assistance of the skins of seals, formed into somewhat that assisted them in swimming, as bladders do, made their way to the shore; when a vessel was sent to the desert isle, consisting of little else than a ledge of rocks, to fetch their companions. A number of those men came to Buenos Ayres, and, by relating what had happened to them, inspired the inhabitants with sentiments of indignation, aversion, and horror. The deportment of the commodore, at a meeting with the Cabildo, was not of a nature to do away the prejudice that was formed against him. It was haughty and insolent, and altogether that of a proud conqueror; though, when our troops took possession of Buenos Ayres, the commodore was at a very considerable distance*.

When matters had grown worse and worse with the British at Buenos Ayres, and the general wished to concert with the naval commander some measures for extrication, sir Home was in a great haste to break up the conference, and get on board a frigate that carried him to his squadron, at anchor a great way down the river, as far as Monte Video. This abrupt retreat had greatly the appearance of forsaking the army, and running away; and it was said, that the commodore had shewn more anxiety about securing the

* An incident happened, of a kind somewhat ludicrous, that marked how much sir Home, in this expedition to Buenos Ayres, was bent upon plunder. At a time when general Beresford was involved in a conflict with the Spaniards, a black boy arrived with a letter from sir Home Popham to the general, informing him that in a certain church he would find a very considerable treasure.

plunder, than co-operating with the army, by taking such positions with the ships under his command, as might have tended to intercept the passage of Spanish troops from Monte Video to Colonia de Sacramento, and from thence to the right bank of the Rio de la Plata, on which Buenos Ayres is situated, to the haven of Las Conchas.

This unauthorized expedition, instigated and undertaken by sir Home Popham, was not more dishonourable and disadvantageous to the British government, than it was detrimental to a very great number of individuals. Sir Home Popham wrote home to the society at Lloyd's Coffee-house, and to the principal manufacturing towns in Britain, setting forth how great a market had been opened to a great variety of English goods. And the ministry, as soon as they heard of the conquest of Buenos Ayres, sent thither a ship of war with a convoy of merchantmen. The market was overstocked; many adventurers suffered great loss, and some were ruined. The conduct of sir Home Popham was declared by a court-martial, held in March 1807, to be highly reprehensible in a British officer, and leading to a subversion of all military discipline, as well as subordination to government: and he was reprimanded accordingly*.

A reinforcement to the British troops was sent to the Rio de la Plata, in October 1806, from England, under the command of sir Samuel Auchmuty, and convoy of sir Charles Sterling, in the Ardent ship of war, who was appointed to supersede sir Home Popham in the naval department on that station. The transports were such bad sailors, that they were obliged in their voyage, to go into Janeiro for water. He there received intelligence of the recapture

* In his own defence, he assumed a lofty tone, and said that the sum of his offence was no more than that it had been his fate to have reduced the capitals of two of the four great divisions of the world: meaning Buenos Ayres and the Cape of Good Hope.

of Buenos Ayres; but of our having possession of Maldonado, near the mouth of the river. The general, on his arrival at Maldonado, found our troops were without artillery, without stores of any kind, with only a few days' provision, and without any prospect of procuring more, without detaching a large force many miles into the country, exposed to the insults of a corps of four hundred horse, that hovered round the English to intercept supplies. "The enemy," says sir Samuel, "are armed with swords and muskets. They ride up, dismount, fire over the backs of their horses, mount, and gallop off. All the inhabitants of this country are accustomed to this mode of warfare, and every inhabitant is an enemy*." Maldonado was an open town, and so situated, that with a small force it could not be rendered tenable. The only point that appeared assailable with propriety, as it had also done to general Beresford, was Monte Video. He conceived his resources equal to the enterprize, but he found it a most arduous undertaking. He had not entrenching tools sufficient to make approaches; and, after a few days' firing, the whole powder in the fleet was reduced to five hundred barrels, about four days' consumption. To add to his difficulties, four thousand picked troops, with twenty-four pieces of cannon, were rapidly approaching him. He therefore determined, if possible, to take the place by assault: in which design, though with a heavy loss, he happily succeeded. This achievement was characterized by a cheerful patience and alacrity, cool self-command, and persevering courage and intrepidity, under difficulties and dangers uncommonly great, and some of them unexpected. A battery as near as possible to the defence of Monte Video, though exposed to the superior fire of the enemy, which had been incessant during the whole of the siege, effected a breach that was report-

* See a Letter from sir S. Auchmuty to the right honourable William Windham, dated Monte Video, February 7, 1807.

ed to be practicable, February 2. Orders were issued for the attack an hour before day-break on the ensuing morning; and a summons was sent to the governor in the evening to surrender the town: to which message no answer was returned. At the appointed hour, our troops marched to the assault: they approached near the breach before they were discovered; when a destructive fire opened upon them from every gun that could bear upon them, as well as from the musketry of the garrison. Heavy as this fire was, our loss would have been comparatively trifling, if the breach had been open; but during the night, and under our fire, the enemy had barricadoed it with hides, so as to render it nearly impracticable. The night was extremely dark. The head of the column missed the breach; and when it was approached, it was so shut up that it was mistaken for the untouched wall. In this situation, our men remained under a heavy fire for a quarter of an hour; when the breach was discerned by captain Renny, of the 40th light infantry, who gloriously fell as he mounted it. Our gallant soldiers rushed to it, and, difficult as it was of access, forced their way into the town. Cannon had been placed at the head of the principal streets, and their fire, for a short time, was destructive: but our troops advanced in all directions, clearing the streets and batteries with their bayonets, and overturning their cannon. The 40th regiment, with colonel Browne, followed: they also missed the breach, and twice passed through the fire of the batteries before they found it. The 87th regiment was posted near the north gate, which the troops who entered at the breach were to open for them; but their ardour was so great that they scaled the walls, and, as the troops within approached the gate, entered the town. At day light every thing was in our possession, except the citadel, which made a shew of resistance, but soon surrendered; and early in the morning, the women were seen peaceably walking in the streets. The number of British troops employed in the reduction of Monte

Video,

Video, amounted to upwards of four thousand, of which one thousand two hundred were engaged in the storm; that of the Spaniards to six thousand. The loss of the British, which fell chiefly on the storming column, were six hundred. The loss of the enemy was very great; about eight hundred killed, five hundred wounded, and upwards of two thousand officers and men, including the governor, prisoners. Sir Charles Sterling, in his letter to Mr. Windham, dated Monte Video, February 8, says, "It has been much the custom to speak slightly of the resistance to be expected from the Spaniards in this country, and with confidence of the facility which has been given to naval operations, by a prior knowledge of the river: but the battles lately fought prove the former opinion to be erroneous; and experience proves that all the information hitherto acquired had not prevented the most formidable difficulties."

Previous to intelligence being received of the recapture of Buenos Ayres, in August 1806, by the Spaniards, it was hoped by the British ministry, that an expedition to the west might meet with the same success which, it was yet believed, had attended his majesty's arms on the east coast of South America. With a view to this object, and to the opening of a commercial intercourse with the interior of the country, a force of four thousand two hundred men was sent out, under the command of brigadier-general Craufurd, at the end of October 1806, accompanied with a competent naval force under that of admiral Murray. The choice of the course to be steered, whether to the eastward, by the way of New South Wales, or to the westward, round Cape Horn, was left to admiral Murray, who, it appears, proceeded in the eastern direction as far as the Cape of Good Hope. It was explained to the general, that the object of the expedition was the capture of the seaports and fortresses, and the reduction of the province of Chili.—If general Craufurd should succeed in obtaining possession

session of Valparaiso and St. Jago, or establishing any other sufficient footing in Chili, he was instructed to take the earliest possible means of apprising brigadier-general Beresford thereof, and of concerting with him the means of securing, by a chain of posts, or in any other adequate manner, an uninterrupted communication, both military and commercial, between the provinces of Chili and Buenos Ayres*.

But when intelligence was received of the recapture of Buenos Ayres by the Spanish soldiery, assisted by the townsmen, the Fly sloop of war was dispatched with orders to general Craufurd to proceed, not to Chili, but to the Rio de la Plata, to join the British force under the command of sir Samuel Auchmuty. The sloop fortunately, as was then supposed, arrived before the general left the Cape of Good Hope. General Craufurd, agreeably to orders, set sail from the Cape in April, and arrived in La Plata on the 14th of June. After this junction between the two generals, the whole British force in La Plata was computed at nine thousand five hundred men. "As it had been thought adviseable (to use the words of the secretary of state for the department of war and colonies,) that an officer of high rank, as well as talents and judgement, should be sent to take the command of such of his majesty's forces as were at that time employed, or likely soon to be employed, in the southern provinces of South America, it was his majesty's pleasure to make choice for that purpose of general Whitelocke." The general accordingly set sail for his destination early in March, 1807, carrying along with him an additional force of one thousand six hundred and thirty men; of which there was a troop of horse-artillery to the number of one hundred and thirty, dismounted, with harness and appointments†. The general service intrusted to his

* Most secret letter from the right hon. William Windham, to brigadier-general Craufurd, Oct. 30, 1806.

† Letter from Mr. secretary Windham, containing instructions to lieutenant-general Whitelocke, March 5, 1807.

care, was the reduction of the whole province of Buenos Ayres under his authority.

The instructions to general Whitelocke, respecting his conduct towards the inhabitants, were the same as had been given to general Craufurd; with the addition of one respecting a case that was not known to exist, at the time of general Craufurd's sailing from England, viz. the case of general Beresford; a case which, the secretary for the colonial and war department observed, "called alike on the national honour, and on the justice due from the country to all those whom it employs in its service." It might not be clearly ascertained, at that moment, to what extent the capitulation with those troops had been violated, nor what, in consequence, was the precise demand proper to be made in their favour. But whatever should be due to them, either in virtue of any special engagements, or of the general usages established between nations, was to be enforced to the utmost; nor were any means that the force of arms might place at his disposal, to be left unemployed, till complete justice should be obtained on their behalf.

The attention of general Whitelocke was particularly summoned to the particular clause in the instructions, that related to the "language to be held in answer to any inquiries on the part of the inhabitants, respecting their future situation at a peace: a point of great delicacy and importance." It seems astonishing, that while the possibility was admitted, and even probability insinuated, of giving back the province in exchange for some other object, in any future negotiation for peace with the government of Old Spain and France—it could ever have been supposed, as Mr. Windham does, in his letter to general Whitelocke, "that an addition might be made to his majesty's forces by troops raised in Buenos Ayres:" and this too, after ministers had been informed by sir Home Popham*, that the Spanish Americans had in contem-

plation

* In a letter dated on board the Diadem, Rio de la Plata, August 25, 1806, and received by them the following January, several

plation, and even demanded the independence of the country.

In complete unison with this letter of sir Home's is one from sir Samuel Auchmuty to the right honourable W. Windham, from Monte Video, March 6, 1808. "When I had last the honour of addressing you (says sir Samuel), I was so little acquainted with the country, that I could not presume to give more than a general opinion of the disposition of the inhabitants. I had every reason to believe they were without exception inimical to us. Previously to the surrender of Monte Video, I could not place the least confidence in any information I received: nor did any person superior to the lowest class come over to me. After its capture, a sullen silence pervaded every rank; and for some time the best informed among the principal citizens appeared ignorant of the most trifling occurrences. The seizure of the viceroy by the inhabitants, first gave me an insight into the views, of many of the leading men, and convinced me, that, however inimical they were to us, they were still more so to their present government. To the reports of the capture of the viceroy, it was added, that the royal court of audienza was abolished, the king's authority set aside, and the Spanish colours no longer hoisted. These reports were circulated with avidity, and I soon found that they were acceptable to the principal part of the inhabitants. The persons who appeared before hostile and inveterate, now pressed me to advance a corps to Buenos Ayres; and assured me, if I would

several weeks before the above instructions were committed to general Whitlocke. The paragraph containing the information above stated was suppressed, in the publication of sir Home's letter in the Gazette. But the whole letter was afterwards published by sir Home, in the second, *i. e.* his own edition of his trial. The paragraph omitted in the Gazette runs thus: "The object of this expedition was considered by the natives to apply principally to their independence; by the blacks, to their total liberation: and if general Beresford had felt himself authorized, or justified in confirming either of these propositions, no exertions whatever would have been made to dispossess him of his conquest." See sir Home Popham's trial, second edition.

acknowledge

acknowledge their independence, and promise them the protection of the English government, the place would submit to me. Being fully determined to give no assurance whatever, but desirous to gain further and more positive information, I resolved to send an officer to Buenos Ayres. He was dispatched with a letter from the admiral and myself to the cabildo, claiming our prisoners, agreeably to the capitulation: it was also intimated, that we had heard they had refused obedience to the authority of the king of Spain; and, as it was impossible they could have had time to arrange a form of government, and consequently must be in a state of anarchy, we invited them to submit to his Britannic majesty's authority; assuring them of the full benefit of their laws and religion, and security to their property. The vessel containing these dispatches fell in with a boat, with general Beresford and lieutenant-colonel Pack on board, and returned immediately to Monte Video, without delivering them.

“The escape of general Beresford, an event as pleasing and important as it was unexpected, has put us in full possession of the views of the leading men, and the real state of the country. He had been ordered immediately after the fall of Monte Video, to go to a town two hundred leagues inland, and was already between forty and fifty leagues from Buenos Ayres, when two Spanish officers in the family of the governor, who had been endeavouring to enter into some political negociations with him, proposed to assist and accompany him in making his escape, which with great difficulty was effected; and the general after being three successive days secreted in Buenos Ayres, fortunately reached the ship with our dispatches.

“From the general I was made acquainted, that the report of the suppression of the court of audiencia, and the revolt from the Spanish authority, was unfounded. The forms of the ancient government were still adhered to, and the court of audiencia, as

next in authority to the viceroy, assumed his power; but the city was a prey to every disorder and tumult.

“The letter to the cabildo was in consequence withdrawn, and one addressed to the viceroy, or officers possessing the supreme authority, was substituted in its place. I have the honour to inclose a coyy of it, and of the answers received from Buenos Ayres.

“From these answers, it may be supposed that the leading people are unanimous in their determination to defend the place, and keep their prisoners. But it appears that there are two parties in that city.

“The party now in power are mostly natives of Spain, in the principal offices of church and state, and devoted to the Spanish government. It has been their policy to inflame the minds of the lower orders against the English, by every species of exaggeration and falsehood, and to lead them to such acts of atrocity, as may preclude the possibility of any communication with us.

“From a consciousness, that similarly situated, they would breathe nothing but revenge, they expect no mercy, and are become desperate and determined.

“The second party consists of natives of the country, with some Spaniards that are settled in it, The oppression of the mother country has made them most anxious to throw off the Spanish yoke; and though, from their ignorance, their want of morals, and the barbarity of their disposition, they are totally unfitted to govern themselves, they aim at following the steps of the North Americans, and erecting an independent state. If we could promise them independence, they would instantly revolt against the government, and join us with the great mass of the inhabitants. But though nothing less than independence will perfectly satisfy them, they would prefer our government, either to their present anarchy,

er to the Spanish yoke, provided we could promise not to give up the country to Spain at a peace; but until such a promise is made, we must expect to find them open or secret enemies*.”

“In this situation of affairs, general Whitelocke found the province of Buenos Ayres, when he arrived in La Plata, on the 9th of May. On the 11th he took the command of the troops: one division of which, consisting of the troops that had arrived with general Craufurd, was stationed at Colonia, opposite to Buenos Ayres, and one at Monte Video. Transports were ordered for the reception of troops for their passage to Buenos Ayres. On the 28th of June, a force was assembled near Ensenada de Barragon, amounting to seven thousand eight hundred and twenty-two rank and file, including one hundred and fifty mounted dragoons. It was provided with eighteen pieces of field artillery, and two hundred and six horses and mules for their conveyance, and for that of small-arm ammunition. There was, besides, a large quantity of ordnance stores embarked, and a reserve artillery of heavy pieces, mortars, and howitzers. There were entrenching tools for one thousand men, six pontoons with their carriages, and some pontoons†. After some fatiguing marches, through a country much intersected by swamps and deep muddy rivulets, the army reached Reduction, a village about nine miles distant from the bridge over the Rio Chuelo; on the opposite bank of which the enemy had constructed batteries, and established a formidable line of defence. The general, therefore, resolved to turn this position, by marching in two columns from his left, and crossing the river higher up, to unite his force in the suburbs of Buenos Ayres. He sent directions at the same time

* Letter from sir Samuel Auchmuty to the right honourable William Windham, Monte Video, March 6, 1808. Trial of general Whitelocke at large, Appendix, p. 50.

† Trial at large of general Whitelocke, p. 66.

to colonel Mahon, who, with two regiments, was bringing up the heavy artillery, to wait for further orders at the village of Reduction. Major-general Gower having the command of the right column, crossed the river at a ford called Passo Chico, and falling in with a corps of the enemy, attacked and defeated it. Next day, general Whitelocke, with the main body of the army, having joined general Gower, formed his line by placing brigadier sir Samuel Auchmuty's brigade on the left, extending it towards the convent of the Recolletta, from which it was distant two miles. Two regiments were stationed on its right. Brigadier-general Craufurd's brigade occupied the central and principal avenues of the town, being distant three miles from the great square and fort; three regiments on his right extended in a line towards the Residencia. The town was thus nearly invested; and this disposition of the army, and the circumstances of the town and suburbs being divided into squares of one hundred and forty yards each side, together with the knowledge that the enemy meant to occupy the flat roofs of the houses, gave rise to the following plan of attack: brigadier-general sir S. Auchmuty to take possession, with a regiment of the Plaza de Toros, and the adjacent strong ground, and there to take post. Four other regiments, divided into wings, were ordered to penetrate into the street directly in its front. The light battalion divided into wings, and each followed by a wing of the ninety-fifth regiment, and a three-pounder, was ordered to proceed down the two streets on the right of the central one, and the twenty-fifth regiment down the two adjoining; and after clearing the streets of the enemy, this latter regiment was to take post at the Residencia. Two six-pounders were ordered along the central street, covered by the carabineers and three troops of the ninth light dragoons; the remainder of which regiment was placed as a reserve in the centre. Each division was ordered to proceed along the street directly

rectly in its front, till it arrived at the last square of the houses next the river Plata; of which square it was to take possession, forming on the flat roofs, and there wait for further orders. Two corporals with tools were ordered to march at the head of each column for the purpose of breaking open the doors. The whole troops were unloaded, and no firing was to be permitted until the columns had reached their final points and formed. A cannonade in the central streets was the signal for the whole to come forward. The issue of the conflict which ensued in July, 1807, was such as was to be expected from a plan so weak and ludicrous. Our troops moving forward in the appointed order, with their unloaded muskets and iron crow's, were assailed by a heavy and continued shower of musketry, hand-grenades, bricks, and stones, from the tops of the windows of the houses, the doors of which were barricadoed in so strong a manner, as to render it almost impossible to force them. The streets were intersected by deep ditches, and cannon planted on the inside of these, poured volleys of grape-shot on our advancing columns. They were saluted also with grape-shot at the corners of all the streets. Every householder, with his negroes, defended his own dwelling, which was in itself a fortress. Yet, in the midst of all this assaillance, and while the male population of Buenos Ayres, by the means of destruction just mentioned, was employed in its defence, sir S. Auchmuty, after a most spirited and vigorous attack, in which his brigade suffered much from grape-shot and musketry, made himself master of the Plaza de Toros, took eighty-two pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of ammunition, and six hundred prisoners; which served as a place of refuge to some other regiments that were overpowered by the enemy. Brigadier-general Craufurd, with his brigade, being cut off from all communication with any of the other columns, was obliged to surrender: so also was lieutenant-colonel Duff, with a detachment under his

his command. Still, however, the result of this day's action left general Whitelocke in possession of the Plaza de Toros, a strong post on the enemy's right; and the Residencia, another strong post on his left; whilst general Whitelocke himself occupied an advanced post on his centre. But these advantages had cost about two thousand five hundred men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. This was the situation of our army in the morning of the 6th of July, when general Liniers addressed a letter to the British commander, offering to give up all his prisoners taken in the late affair, together with the seventy-first regiment, and others taken with brigadier-general Beresford, on the condition of his desisting from any further attack on the town, and withdrawing his majesty's forces from the river Plata; intimating, at the same time, that, from the exasperated state of the populace, he could not answer for the safety of the prisoners if he persisted in offensive operations. General Whitelocke, influenced by this consideration (which, he says, he knew to be founded in fact), and reflecting of how little advantage would be the possession of a country, the inhabitants of which were so absolutely hostile, resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of his troops had obtained, and acceded to a treaty of peace, on the basis that had been proposed by the Spanish commander.

At a general court-martial, held at the hospital of Chelsea, on the 28th of January, 1808, and continued by adjournments till the 18th of March, lieutenant-general John Whitelocke was tried upon four different charges: the result of which was, "That the said lieutenant-general John Whitelocke be cashiered, and declared totally unfit and unworthy to serve his majesty in any military capacity whatever." This sentence was confirmed by the king, who gave orders that it should be read at the head of every regiment in his service, and inserted in all regimental orderly books, with a view to its becoming a lasting memorial

rial of the fatal consequences to which officers expose themselves, who, in the discharge of the important duties confided to them, are deficient in that zeal, judgement, and personal exertion, which their sovereign and their country have a right to expect from officers entrusted with high commands.

On the 16th of April, 1807, Lord Hawkesbury, in the house of lords, having described the circumstances of the capture of Monte Video, moved the thanks of the house of peers to brigadier-general sir Samuel Auchmuty, for that glorious achievement; and lord Mulgrave, after a warm panegyric, moved the thanks of their lordships in like manner to rear-admiral Stirling, and the officers and men under his command. These motions were carried *nemine dissentiente*. On the same day, Lord Castlereagh, after a suitable introduction, moved, "That the thanks of the house of commons be given to brigadier-general sir Samuel Auchmuty, for the skill and gallantry displayed by him in taking the important fortress of Monte Video." This motion being carried unanimously, the thanks of the house were then also voted to brigadier-general Lumley, and the officers and men; and also to rear-admiral Stirling, for his distinguished skill and ability in effecting the landing; and also to the captains and officers of the fleet, for their co-operation, and to the seamen and marines.

CHAPTER II.

THE treaty of Tilsit, between Napoleon, emperor of the French, and Alexander, emperor of all the Russias, was signed on the 25th of June, 1807, and this treaty was scarcely concluded before the French emperor turned his eyes towards the West of Europe, and resolved on the subjugation of Portugal and Spain. He fomented, through Beauharnois, his ambassador, at the court of Madrid, discord in the royal

royal family of Spain, that he might assume to himself the arbitration of their differences. The ambassador suggested to the prince of Asturias, the idea of intermarrying with a princess related to the emperor Napoleon. The anxiety of the prince to avoid another connection, into which an attempt was made to force him, by a lady selected for him by his greatest enemy, the favourite at once of the queen and the king, and on that account alone the object of his aversion, induced him to acquiesce in the proposition of Beauharnois; with the reservation that it was to meet with the approbation of his royal parents; and he wrote a letter, signifying his wishes, to the French emperor. The clandestine communication between the prince of Asturias, and other circumstances artfully prepared, gave colour to an accusation of the innocent prince. A few days after he wrote that letter, the prince of Asturias was arrested and confined in the monastery of San Lorenzo. On the 31st of October, all the members of the different councils of state being assembled, a declaration by the king was read, of a discovery that the prince of Asturias had formed a conspiracy for dethroning him. He had been surprized, it was said, in his own apartments, with the cyphers of his correspondence; which were laid before the council of Castile, with instructions to investigate the whole matter*. The whole Spanish nation

* *The following Decree was issued from the Palace of San Lorenzo on the 30th of October, and addressed to the Governor of the Council ad interim—*

“C. R.

“God, who watches over his creatures, does not permit the consummation of atrocious deeds, when the intended victims are innocent. Thus his omnipotence has saved me from the most unheard-of catastrophe. My people, my subjects, all know my christianity and settled habits. They all love me, and I receive from all of them proofs of their veneration; such as the conduct of a parent calls for from his children. I lived persuaded of this felicity, and devoted to the repose of my family, when an unknown hand discovered the most atrocious and unheard of conspiracy, which was carried on in my own palace, against my person,

nation instantly suspected that the pretended conspiracy was an infernal calumny fabricated by the *Prince of the Peace*, Don Emanuel Godoy, for the purpose of removing the only obstacle that then opposed his audacious ambition.

The imprisonment of the prince of Asturias, and the decree fulminated against his royal person, produced an effect quite contrary to the expectations of the favourite; who now being afraid, thought proper to recede, and to mediate a reconciliation between the royal parents and their son. He forged penitential letters, November 5, to both the king and queen, and made the prince of Asturias, while a prisoner, sign them. There is nothing in the confession of the prince of a very heinous nature; and all that they can be fairly supposed to allude to, is the step he had taken, in writing to Napoleon, without the king's knowledge, on the subject of the projected marriage.

son. My life, which has so often been in danger, was too long in the eyes of my successor, who, infatuated by prejudice, and alienated from every principle of christianity that my paternal care and love had taught him, had entered into a project to dethrone me. Informed of this, I thought proper to inquire personally into the truth of the fact; and surprizing him in my room, I found in his possession the cypher of his correspondence, and of the instructions he had received from the vile conspirators.

"In consequence of this discovery, I immediately convoked the governor and council, in order that they might make the necessary inquiries; and the result has been the detection of several malefactors, whose imprisonment I have ordered; as also the arrest of my son at his residence. This is an additional aggravation of the affliction I labour under; but however painful to my feelings, it must be submitted to, as it is of the utmost importance to the suppression of such a conspiracy. At the same time that I direct the publication of this affair to my subjects, I cannot avoid expressing to them the regret by which I am agitated; but that regret will be alleviated by the demonstrations of their loyalty.

"You will take the proper measures to have this decree circulated in due form.

"CHARLES R."

"By command of his majesty, I transmit this decree to your excellency, in order that it may be duly promulgated.

"Signed by the Ministers, and addressed to all Viceroy's, &c. &c.

But a decree that had been addressed, November 3, to archbishops, bishops, prelates, and all the clergy, both secular and irregular, for a solemn thanksgiving to God for the king's deliverance, was calculated to preserve the idea, that the prince had formed or entered into a conspiracy against his father's government, if not his life. On the same day that the prince's letters were received by the king and queen, November 5, a royal edict was addressed to the governor *ad interim* of the council of Castile, declaring that the voice of nature having disarmed the hand of vengeance, the king had been moved by pity, and the intercession of the queen, to pardon his penitent son, who had given information against the authors of the horrible design in contemplation*.

Madrid, Nov. 5.

* This day the king addressed the following decree to the governor *ad interim* of the council of Castile:—

“The voice of nature unnerves the arm of vengeance; and when the offender's want of consideration pleads for pity, a father cannot refuse listening to his voice. My son has already declared the authors of that horrible plan which has been suggested by the evil-minded. He has laid open every thing in a legal form, and all is exactly consistent with those proofs that are required by the law in such cases. His confusion and repentance have dictated the remonstrances which he has addressed to me, and of which the following is the chief:—

“*Sire and Father,*

“I am guilty of failing in my duty to your majesty; I have failed in my obedience to my father and my king. I ought to do nothing without your majesty's consent: but I have been surprised. I have denounced the guilty, and beg your majesty to suffer your repentant son to kiss your feet.

“*San Lorenzo, Nov. 5.*”

“FERDINAND.”

“*Madam and Mother,*

“I sincerely repent of the great fault which I have committed against the king and queen, my father and mother!—With the greatest submission I beg your pardon, as well as for my obstinacy in denying the truth the other night. For this cause I heartily intreat your majesty to deign to interpose your mediation between my father and me, that he may condescend to suffer his repentant son to kiss his feet.

“*San Lorenzo, Nov. 5.*”

“FERDINAND.”

“In consequence of these letters, and the entreaty of the queen, my beloved spouse, I forgive my son; and he shall recover my
favour

Such was the state of affairs, when a French courier arrived at the royal palace of San Lorenzo, with a treaty concluded and signed at Fontainebleau, on the 27th of October, by Don Eugenio Isquierdo, as plenipotentiary of his catholic majesty, and marshal Duroc, in the name of the emperor of the French. By this treaty, it was agreed, among other articles, that the province of Entre Minho e Douro, with the city of Oporto, should be made over in entire property and sovereignty to the king of Etruria, with the title

favour as soon as his conduct shall give proofs of a real amendment in his proceedings. I ordain also, that the same judges who have heard this cause from the commencement, shall continue the process; and I allow them to conjoin others, as colleagues, if they shall find occasion. I enjoin them, as soon as it shall be finished, to submit to me their judgement, which shall be conformable to law, according to the magnitude of offences, and the quality of offenders. They ought to take for a basis, in reducing the heads of the accusation, the answers given by the prince to the interrogatories which he has undergone: they are copied, and signed by his own hand, as well as the papers also in his writing, which were seized in his bureaux. The decision shall be communicated to my councils, and to my tribunals, and be circulated among my subjects, in order that they may acknowledge my compassion and my justice, and may alleviate the affliction into which they were thrown by my first decree; for in that they saw the danger of their sovereign and their father, who loves them as his own children, and by whom he is beloved.

“D. BARTHOLOME MUNOZ.”

“By the royal decree of the 30th of October, inserted in the circular letters, which is addressed to you the 31st of the same month, his majesty has deigned to make known to his council, that his august person, thanks to the assistance of God, has been delivered from the catastrophe which threatened it.

“On this subject the council has proposed to his majesty to allow it, as well as all the people and communities of the kingdom, to return thanks for this favour to the Omnipotent, by a solemn festival. His majesty, having deigned to consent to the wish of his council, has resolved to give it immediate execution, and has determined to give the necessary orders for such a festival in the capital and its dependencies.

“This order of council, with a view to his due execution, is hereby communicated to you MM. the archbishops, bishops, prelates, seculars, and regulars, of the holy churches, desiring you to acknowledge to me the receipt of the present decree.

Madrid, Nov. 8, 1807.

“D. B. MUNOZ.”

of king of Northern Lusitania. The province of Alentejo, and the kingdom of the Algarves, in entire property and sovereignty, to the prince of Peace, to be by him enjoyed under the title of prince of the Algarves. The provinces of Beira, Tras os Montes, and Portuguese Estremadura, were to remain undisposed of, until there should be a general peace. The kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of the Algarves, were to acknowledge, as their protector, his catholic majesty, the king of Spain, and in no case to make peace or war without his consent. In case of the provinces of Biera, Tras os Montes, and Portuguese Estremadura, held in sequestration, devolving at a general peace to the house of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies, which the English had conquered from Spain and her allies: the new sovereign of these provinces was to have, with respect to his catholic majesty, the same obligations as the king of Northern Lusitania, and to hold them on the same conditions. His majesty the king of Etruria ceded the kingdom of Etruria, in full property and sovereignty, to his majesty the emperor of the French, and king of Italy. By a secret convention, it was agreed that French troops should be admitted into Spain, where they were to be joined by bodies of Spanish troops, and march into Portugal. The troops to be subsisted and maintained by Spain, during their march through that country, but to be paid by France. The main body of the army to be under the orders of the commander of the French troops: nevertheless, it was added, should the king of Spain, or the prince of the Peace, think fit to join the said body, the French troops, with the general commanding them, were to be subject to their order. It is probable that Bonaparte was under no hesitation in paying them this compliment*. Another

* When Bonaparte learnt how popular the prince of Asturias was in Spain, and how the king had pardoned his supposed offence, this compliment was transferred to that prince. He took him

ther body of French troops, to the number of forty thousand, was to be assembled at Bayonne; by the 20th of November, at the latest, that they might be ready to enter Spain, for the purpose of proceeding to Portugal, in case the English should send reinforcements there, or menace it with aggression.

While bodies of French troops poured into Spain, or advanced towards it, Bonaparte set out from Fontainebleau, November 15, on a journey to Italy, and arrived at Milan on the 21st. The intention of this journey had been announced in all his gazettes: but it appears almost certain, that he had no other object in view than that of diverting the attention of Europe from his designs against Spain and Portugal; for he did nothing in Italy suitable to the air of importance that was studiously given to his journey to that peninsula. The queen-regent of Etruria, as might well be imagined, acceded to the arrangement that had been made for the establishment of her family in Portugal, without a murmur. In a proclamation which the public had in the name of her son, it was declared, that in consequence of an arrangement between the king of Spain and Napoleon, emperor of France and king of Italy, the kingdom of Etruria had been disposed of otherwise than at present, and absolved the Tuscans from their oath of allegiance. At Milan, Bonaparte received the homage of the Italians from every part of the peninsula; after which he returned to Paris in January, 1808, by the way of Lyons, bringing in his train the late queen-regent of Etruria and her young son.

A short time only had elapsed after the signing of the treaty of Tilsit, before Bonaparte demanded of the court of Lisbon, 1. To shut up the ports of Portugal against England. 2. To detain all Englishmen

him under his protection, adorned him with the grand cross of the legion of honour, and appointed him generalissimo of the combined French and Spanish army, destined for the invasion of Portugal: thus, at once flattering and dishonouring him.

residing

residing in Portugal. 3. To confiscate all English property; denouncing war in case of refusal. And, without waiting for an answer, he gave orders for detaining all Portuguese merchant-ships that were in the ports of France. The prince-regent of Portugal, hoping to ward off the storm, acceded to the shutting up of his ports; but refused to comply with the other two demands, as being contrary to the principles of the public law, and to the treaties that subsisted between the two nations. The court of Portugal then began to adopt measures for securing its retreat to the Portuguese dominions in South America. For that purpose, the prince-regent ordered all ships of war fit to keep the sea, to be fitted out; and also gave warning of what was intended to the English, directing them to sell their property and leave Portugal; in order thus to avoid an effusion of blood, which, in all probability, would have proved useless. He resolved also to comply, if possible, with the views of Bonaparte, in case he should not allow himself to be softened down to more moderate pretensions. But Bonaparte peremptorily insisted, not only on the shutting up of the ports, but on the imprisonment of all British subjects, the confiscation of their property, and a dereliction of the project of a retreat to America. The prince-regent, when he had reason to believe that all the English, not naturalized in the country, had departed from Portugal, and that all English property had been sold, and even its amount exported, adopted the resolution to shut up the ports against England, and to comply with the other demands of France; declaring at the same time, that should the French troops enter Portugal, he was firmly resolved to remove the seat of government to Brazil, the most important and best defended part of his dominions.

It had been frequently stated to the cabinet of Lisbon by the English ambassador, lord Strangford, that the king of Great Britain, in agreeing not to resent the exclusion of British commerce from the ports of Portugal,

Portugal, had gone to the utmost extent of forbearance; that, in making this concession to the peculiar circumstances of the prince-regent's situation, his majesty had done all that friendship could justly require; and that a single step beyond this line of modified hostility, must necessarily lead to the extremity of actual war. Nevertheless, the prince-regent, in the hope of preserving Portugal by conciliating France, on the 8th of November, signed an order for detaining the few British subjects, and of the very inconsiderable portion of British property that yet remained at Lisbon. On the publication of this order, lord Strangford removed the arms of England from the gates of his residence, demanded his passports, presented a final remonstrance against the recent conduct of the court of Lisbon, and proceeded, November 17th, to a British squadron, commanded by sir Sidney Smith, who immediately on the suggestion of lord Strangford, established a rigorous blockade at the mouth of the Tagus. A few days afterwards, the intercourse between the court of Lisbon and the British ambassador was renewed, Lord Strangford, under due assurances of protection and security, proceeded to Lisbon on the 27th: when he found the prince-regent directing all his apprehension to a French army, which had entered Portugal, and was on its march to Lisbon, and all his hopes to an English fleet. The object of this march he was at no loss to understand: for Bonaparte had declared in his journals, "That the house of Braganza had ceased to reign." Lord Strangford promised to his royal highness, on the faith of his sovereign, that the British squadron before the Tagus should be employed to protect his retreat from Lisbon, and his voyage to the Brazils. The following decree was published, November 28, in which the prince-regent announced his intention of retiring to the city of Janeiro, till the conclusion of a general peace:

Proclamation

Proclamation of the Prince Regent of Portugal.

“ Having tried by all possible means to preserve the neutrality hitherto enjoyed by my faithful and beloved subjects, having exhausted my royal treasury, and made innumerable other sacrifices; even in going to the extremity of shutting the ports of my dominions to the subjects of my ancient and royal ally, the king of Great Britain, thus exposing the commerce of my people to total ruin, and consequently suffering the greatest losses in the collection of my royal revenues of the crown, I find that troops of the emperor of the French and king of Italy, to whom I had united myself on the continent, in hope of being no more disturbed, are actually marching into the interior of my kingdom, and are even on their way to this capital; and desiring to avoid the fatal consequences of a defence, which would be far more dangerous than profitable, serving only to create an effusion of blood, dreadful to humanity, and to enflame the animosity of the troops which have entered this kingdom, with the declaration and promise of not committing any the smallest hostility; and knowing also, that they are most particularly destined against my royal person, and that my faithful subjects would be less alarmed were I absent from this kingdom; I have resolved, for the benefit of my subjects, to retire with the queen and my mother and all my royal family, to my dominions in America, there to establish myself in the city of Rio de Janeiro, until a general peace. And moreover, considering the importance of leaving the government of these kingdoms in that good order, which is for its advantage, and for that of my people (a matter which I am essentially bound to provide for); and having duly made all reflections presented by the occasions, I have resolved to nominate as governor and regent of these kingdoms during my absence, my truly beloved cousin the marquis de Abrantio Francisco da Cunha de Menezes, lieutenant-general of my forces, the principal Castro (one of my council, and a Regido Justica); Paetrode Mello Breyner, also of my council, who will act as president of my treasury, during the incapacity of Luis de Vasconcellos e Sanzi, (who is unable so to do at present on account of illness); Don Francisco de Nerocha, president of the board of conscience and religious orders; and in the absence of any of them, the Conde de Castro Mazim (grand huntsman); whom I have nominated president of the senate, with the assistance of the secretaries thereof, the Conde de Sampayne, and in his absence Don Miguel Perrura Forjaz, and of my attorney general Joas Antonio Salter de Mendenca, on account of the great confidence which I have in them,

and

and of the experience which they possess in matters of government; being certain that my people and kingdom will be governed and directed in such a manner that my conscience shall be clear, and that this regency will entirely fulfil its duty so long as it shall please God that I should be absent from this capital, administering justice with impartiality, distributing rewards and punishments according to deserts. And these regents will further take this as my pleasure, and fulfil my order in the form thus mentioned, and in conformity to the Instructions signed by me, and accompanying this decree which they will communicate to the proper departments.

“ Palace of the Ajuda,

November 28, 1807.

(Signed)

“ THE PRINCE.”

On the morning of November 29, the Portuguese fleet set sail from the Tagus, with the prince of Brazil and the whole of the Royal family of Braganza on board, together with many of his faithful counsellors and adherents, as well as other persons attached to his present fortunes. The fleet consisted of eight sail of the line, four large frigates, several armed brigs, sloops, and corvettes, and a number of Brazil ships; amounting in all to about thirty-six sail. While they passed through the British squadron, our ships fired a salute of twenty-one guns, which was returned with an equal number. The friendly meeting of the two fleets, at a juncture so critical and important, was a most interesting and affecting, as well as a grand scene. Four English ships of the line were sent by the British admiral, to accompany the royal family to Brazil.

Dispatches, of which the following are Extracts and Copies, were received at the Admiralty on Saturday, December 19, 1807, by Captain Yeo, of his Majesty's sloop the Confidence, from Rear-Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, addressed to the hon. William Wellesley Pole.

His Majesty's ship Hibernia, 22 leagues

“ SIR, *west of the Tagus, Dec. 1, 1807.*

“ In a former dispatch, dated the 22d of November, with a postscript of the 26th, I conveyed to you, for

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the information of my lords commissioners of the Admiralty, the proofs contained in various documents of the Portuguese government being so much influenced by terror of the French arms, as to have acquiesced to certain demands of France operating against Great Britain. The distribution of the Portuguese force was made wholly on the coast, while the land-side was left totally unguarded. British subjects of all descriptions were detained; and it therefore became necessary to inform the Portuguese government, that the case had arisen which required, in obedience to my instructions, that I should declare the Tagus in a state of blockade; and lord Strangford agreeing with me that hostility should be met by hostility, the blockade was instituted, and the instructions we had received were acted upon to their full extent; still, however, bearing in recollection the first object adopted by his majesty's government, of opening a refuge for the head of the Portuguese government, menaced at it was by the powerful arms and baneful influence of the enemy, I thought it my duty to adopt the means open to us, of endeavouring to induce the prince regent of Portugal to consider his decision "to unite himself with the continent of Europe," and to recollect that he had possessions on that of America, affording an ample balance for any sacrifice he might make here, and from which he would be cut off by the nature of the maritime warfare, the termination of which could not be dictated by the combination of the continental powers of Europe.

"In this view lord Strangford having received an acquiescence to the proposition which had been made by us, for his lordship to land and confer with the prince regent under the guarantee of a flag of truce, I furnished his lordship with that conveyance and security, in order that he might give to the prince that confidence which his word of honour as the king's minister plenipotentiary united with that of a British admiral, could not fail to inspire towards inducing his royal highness to throw himself and his fleet into the arms of Great Britain, in perfect reliance on the king's
overlooking

overlooking a forced act of apparent hostility against his flag and subjects, and establishing his royal highness's government in his ultra-marine possessions, as originally promised. I have now the heartfelt satisfaction of announcing to you, that our hopes and expectations have been realized to the utmost extent. On the morning of the 29th, the Portuguese fleet (as per list annexed) came out of the Tagus with his royal highness the prince of Brazil and the whole of the royal family of Braganza on board, together with many of his faithful counsellors and adherents, as well as other persons attached to his present fortunes.

"This fleet of eight sail of the line, four frigates, two brigs, and one schooner, with a crowd of large armed merchant-ships, arranged itself under the protection of that of his majesty, while the firing of a reciprocal salute of twenty-one guns announced the friendly meeting of those who but a day before were on terms of hostility; the scene impressing every beholder (except the French army on the hills) with the most lively emotions of gratitude to Providence, that there yet existed a power in the world able, as well as willing, to protect the oppressed.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"W. S. SMITH."

List of the Portuguese Fleet that came out of the Tagus on the 29th of November, 1807.

Principe Reale, of 84 guns; Rainha de Portugal, of 74 guns; Conde Henrique, of 74 guns; Medusa, of 74 guns; Alfonso d'Albuquerque, of 64 guns; D. Joao de Castro, of 64 guns; Principe de Brazil, of 74 guns; Martino de Freitas, of 64 guns.

FRIGATES.—Minerva, of 44 guns; Golfinho, of 36 guns; Urinia, of 32 guns; and one other, name not as yet known.

BRIGS.—Voador, of 22 guns; Vinganea, of 20 guns; Lebre, of 22 guns.

SCHOONER.—Curioza, of 12 guns.

(Signed)

JOAQU. JOZE MONT. TORRES, Major-general.

(Copy) W. SIDNEY SMITH.

His Majesty's ship Hibernia, 22 leagues

" SIR, *west of the Tagus, Dec. 1, 1807.*

" In another dispatch of this day's date, I have transmitted a list of the Portuguese fleet that came out of the Tagus on the 29th ultimo, which I received that day from the admiral commanding it, when I went on board the Principe Reale to pay my visit of respect and congratulation to his royal highness the prince of Brazil, who was embarked in that ship. I here enclose the list of those I left behind. The absence of but one of the four ships is regretted by the Portuguese (the Vasco de Gama), she being under repair; her guns have been employed to arm the Freitas, 64, a new ship, and one of those which came out with the prince. The other three are mere hulks; and there is also one ship on the stocks, the Principe Regente, but she is only in frame.

" The prince said every thing that the most cordial feelings of gratitude towards, and confidence in, his majesty and the British nation, might be supposed to dictate.

" I have by signal (for we have no other mode of communicating in this weather) directed captain Moore in the Marlborough, with the London, Monarch, and Bedford, to stay by the body of the Portuguese fleet, and render it every assistance.

" I keep in the Hibernia close to the prince's ship. I cannot as yet send the Foudroyant, Plantagenet, and Conqueror on to admiral Purvis, according to their lordships' order of the 14th, which, I trust, will be the less felt as an inconvenience off Cadiz, as they appear to have been ordered thither with reference to the Russians being within the Straits, before it was known they were on my station.

" I have the honour to be, &c.

" W. SIDNEY SMITH."

List of the Portuguese Ships that remained at Lisbon.

S. Sebastiano, of 64 guns—unserviceable without a thorough repair.

Maria Prima, of 74 guns—unserviceable; ordered to be made into a floating battery, but not yet fitted.

Vasco de Gama, of 74 guns, under repair, and nearly ready.

Princesa de Beira, of 64 guns—condemned; ordered to be fitted as a floating battery.

Frigates.

Fenix, of 48 guns—in need of a thorough repair.

Amazona, of 44 guns—in need of ditto.

Perolo, of 44 guns—in need of ditto.

Tritao, of 40 guns—past repair.

Veney, of 30 guns—past repair.

(Copy)

W. SIDNEY SMITH.

Hibernia, at Sea, lat. 37. 47.

“ SIR,

14. 17. Dec. 6, 1807.

“ I have the satisfaction to acquaint you, for the information of my lords commissioners of the Admiralty, that I succeeded in collecting the whole of the Portuguese fleet, except a brig, after the gale, and that the weather was such as to allow the necessary repairs and such distribution of supernumeraries and resources to be made, as to enable vice-admiral Don Manuel d’Acunha, sotto-mayor, to report to me yesterday all the ships capable of performing the voyage to Rio de Janeiro, except one line-of-battle ship, which he requested might be conducted to an English port. I meant to escort her part of the way, but she did not quit the fleet with me last night as settled. I hope, however, she may arrive safe, as she is not in a bad state, being substituted for the Martino de Freitas, which was at first destined to go to England, in consequence of a fresh arrangement made yesterday, on the latter being found in the best state for the voyage of the two. I have detached captain Moore, in the Marlborough, with the London, Monarch, and Bedford, to attend the Portuguese fleet to the Brazils. I have thought it my duty, in addition to the usual order to take the above ships under his orders, to give captain Moore one to hoist a broad pendant after passing Madeira,

Madeira, in order to give him greater weight and consequence in the performance of the important and unusually delicate duties I have confided to him. I feel the most perfect reliance in that officer's judgment, ability, and zeal.

"The Portuguese ships did not, after their reparation, want more provisions or slops from us than the list enclosed, which I supplied from this ship and the Conqueror.

"This dispatch will be delivered by captain Yeo, of his majesty's sloop Confidence, who has shewn great address and zeal in opening the communications by flag of truce, which it was the interest of those in power who were against the measure of emigration, to obstruct.—Lord Strangford speaks of his conduct in terms of warm approbation; on this ground I beg leave to recommend him to their lordships, to whom his general merits as an officer are already well known. Having been in Lisbon without restraint during the intercourse, he is qualified to answer any questions their lordships may wish to put to him.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"W. SIDNEY SMITH."

The Portuguese fleet had not left the Tagus, when the French, with their Spanish auxiliaries, appeared on the hills above Lisbon, under the command of general Junot, who had formerly resided for several years at the court of Portugal, in the character of an ambassador from France. Though the Portuguese had long been under an apprehension of a visit from the French, they were surprized by their sudden arrival. The court of Portugal had always considered the march of an army through the mountainous province of Beira, as extremely difficult, if not impracticable, more particularly in the winter season. They never entertained an idea, that their invaders would advance by any other route than the course of the Tagus. There seems, however, to have been some remissness on the part of the Portuguese; for the entrance of the French troops into Portugal was not known

known at Lisbon, till their advanced guard had reached Abrantes*. The retreat of the royal family from Lisbon was, of course, a matter of extreme precipitation. General Junot did not meet with any more opposition on his entrance into the capital, than when he passed, on his march, the Portuguese frontier. The greatest professions were made on the part of the French army and nation, of friendship and affection for the people of Portugal. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of Lisbon were disarmed; they were inhibited from assembling together to the number of more than ten at a time; cannon were placed in all the streets and squares; very heavy contributions were imposed for the support and maintenance of the French, with their Spanish auxiliaries; and, in a word, the French system of governing subdued countries was established in its fullest extent.

After Portugal had fallen under the dominion of France, the valuable island of Madeira was committed to the protection of British troops; and to be restored to Portugal on the conclusion of a general peace.

Thus it was abundantly evident that the sole intention of Bonaparte was the compleat subjugation of Spain and Portugal. Indeed the reduction of these kingdoms appeared to be absolutely necessary for the security of the thrones he had already subjugated. That he might effect his purpose with the greater facility, his first care was to foment discord in the royal family, as we have before mentioned.

It seems that the prince of Asturias had transmitted to his father a sketch of the administration of the Prince of Peace, charging him with attachment and subserviency to the views of France. Bonaparte, apprized of this, in the autumn of 1807, took the part of the oppressed prince against the ministerial oppressor. By nourishing the ambition of the son, he ex-

* Abrantes is a town on the north bank of the Tagus, within ninety miles of Lisbon.

cited the resentment of the father, and rendered them mutual objects of mistrust, jealousy, and hatred; to disarm the father from taking precautions against the son, while he still encouraged the son in his views of immediate succession; to seduce to his side all that was most respectable in Spain, or by propositions and surmises, to subject them to popular suspicion; and thus tear asunder all the bonds of the social compact, and plunge the defenceless nation into confusion and anarchy.

Bonaparte, during his journey to Italy, towards the close of the year 1807, gave an answer to letters he had received from the king of Spain, detailing the particulars of the mysterious arrest, and subsequent release of the prince of Asturias. In his answer he denied any knowledge of that affair, or that he had ever received any letter from the prince: but this answer by no means corresponded with that afterwards transmitted by Bonaparte to Ferdinand, in which he formally declares that he had received it. He yielded his consent, however, to the king's proposal of a marriage between Ferdinand, the heir apparent, and a French princess of Bonaparte's family, foreseeing that this measure would afford a pretext for interfering in the private concerns of the royal family; and that it would withdraw their attention from ulterior measures for the fulfilment of his designs in the peninsula. Thus he hoped to gain the good will of the Spanish nation, as it tended to convince them of the sincerity of his friendship for persons to whom they were so firmly attached. It was also calculated to give credit to the insinuations of his emissaries in Spain, that Bonaparte was inclined to favour the cause of the prince of Asturias; while, through other channels, the minister, and favourite, Don Emanuel Godoy, the Prince of the Peace, whose ambitious views must soon have been discovered by a person of Bonaparte's penetration, was privately encouraged to look forward to the protection of France, in the accomplishment of his nefarious machinations.

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This mysterious conduct of Bonaparte threw the king, the queen, the prince of Asturias, and the favourite Godoy, into extreme disorder. And while they were under this distraction, the French troops spread themselves over a great portion of the Spanish territory. So far did this infatuation prevail in the administration, that orders were issued for receiving and treating the French on a more liberal scale than even their own forces.

A great number of the most important posts in Spain, as well as the whole of Portugal, being now in the possession of the French, Bonaparte transmitted to the king of Spain a complaint, that no further steps had been taken in the affair of the marriage of the heir apparent with his relation. To this Charles replied, that, retaining the same sentiments, he was desirous that the marriage should take place immediately. Some further proceedings were necessary to the maturation of Bonaparte's plans, and not being willing to commit these to writing, he thought he could not find a fitter instrument than Don Eugenio Izquierdo, whom he had detained at Paris, in a state of great dejection and terror, artfully impressed upon him, that he might thereby be induced the more effectually to execute his commission, by inspiring the royal parents, and the favourite with the same feelings. Izquierdo was ordered to repair to Spain; which he did in a very mysterious and precipitate manner. According to his verbal statements he did not bring any proposal with him in writing. On his arrival, under these circumstances at Aranjuez*, the favourite, Don Emanuel Godoy, conducted him to the presence of the royal parents, and their conferences were conducted with so much secrecy, that it was impossible for any one to discover the precise object of his mission. But shortly after Izquierdo's departure from the Spanish

* Aranjuez is one of the royal residences, situated on the banks of the Tagus, about twenty-three miles to the southward of Madrid.

capital, the king and queen of Spain began to show a disposition to abandon both the metropolis and the Peninsula, and to migrate to Mexico, in their American dominions.

The example of the royal family of Portugal, who had recently migrated to the Brazils, induced Bonaparte to indulge a hope, that the example of the court of Lisbon would be followed by that of Madrid; but scarcely had the first reports gone abroad of the intentions of the royal family of Spain to abandon the place of their residence, than discontent and fear were exhibited in the features of the inhabitants of Madrid, and of all ranks and classes of people, from the grandee to the peasant. Such, however, was the general distrust, and so many the symptoms of a determination to migrate, that all seemed to be impressed with the necessity of preventing a measure fraught with so many difficulties and mischiefs. The danger increased, and in the same proportion increased the fears of the people. A popular commotion broke forth at Aranjuez, on the 17th and 19th of March, 1808, like a sudden explosion; the people being actuated by a sort of instinct of self-preservation. The favourite Godoy, who, without the title of king, had exercised all the functions of royalty, was thrown into prison. Scarcely had this tempestuous scene taken place, when the royal parents, finding themselves deprived of the support of their favourite, the Prince of Peace, took the unexpected resolution, which, according to Don Pedro Cevallos, they had entertained for some time, of abdicating their throne; which they accordingly did in favour of their son and heir the prince of Asturias. Bonaparte, ignorant of this sudden event, had ordered his brother-in-law, styled by him prince Murat, grand duke of Berg, to advance with his army towards Madrid, under the idea, that the royal family were already on the coast in order to embark; and that, far from meeting the slightest obstacle on the part of the people, they would receive him with open arms as their deliverer. He conceived that the nation

nation was in the highest degree dissatisfied with their government; but the fact was, that they were only dissatisfied with the abuses that had crept into it.

The grand duke of Berg was no sooner apprized of the occurrences which had taken place at Aranjuez, than he advanced with his whole army to occupy the capital of the kingdom; intending to profit by the occasion, and to take such steps as should seem best calculated to realize the plan of making himself master of Spain.

In the mean time the mysterious obscurity of Bonaparte's views, the proximity of his troops, and in the ignorance which Ferdinand the Seventh was of the real object of Bonaparte's approach, as was given out, to Madrid, induced the prince to adopt such measures as appeared best calculated to conciliate his good will. Not satisfied with having communicated his accession to the throne in the most friendly and affectionate terms, the king, Ferdinand, appointed a deputation of three grandees of Spain, to proceed to Bayonne, and in his name to compliment his imperial majesty. He also appointed another grandee of Spain to pay a similar compliment to the grand duke of Berg, who had already arrived in the vicinity of the metropolis.

The French agent had immediate recourse to stratagem, and one of his contrivances was, to assure the king, and to spread the rumour in all quarters, that his imperial majesty's arrival in Madrid might be hourly expected. Under this impression, orders were given for preparing apartments in the palace, suitable to the dignity of so august a guest. And the king wrote again to the emperor, telling him, how agreeable it would be to him to be so personally acquainted with his majesty, and to assure him with his own lips, of his ardent desire to strengthen the alliance which subsisted between his imperial majesty and himself.

In the mean time the grand duke of Berg had entered Madrid at the head of his troops, and begun, without delay, to sow the seeds of discord. He spake

in a mysterious manner of the abdication of the crown, executed amidst the tumultuary mobs of Aranjuez, and insinuated, that until Ferdinand VII. was acknowledged by the emperor his master, it was impossible for him to take any step that should appear like an acknowledgement, and that he was under a necessity of treating only with the royal father. This pretext, however, did not fail to produce the effect which it was the intention of the grand duke to bring about. The moment the royal parents were made acquainted with this circumstance, they availed themselves of it to save the favourite, who remained in confinement; and in whose favour the grand duke professed to take an interest; but his sole view seems to have been, to flatter their majesties, to mortify Ferdinand, and to leave fresh matters of discord between the parents and the son. While affairs were in this state, Ferdinand made a public entry into the capital, but it was without any other parade than the most numerous concourse of people of Madrid and its environs, which was construed as a mark of the strongest expressions of love and loyalty, and acclamations which sprung from the joy and enthusiasm of his subjects—a scene, says Don Pedro Cevallos, truly grand and impressive, in which the young king was seen like a father in the midst of his children, entering his capital as the regenerator and guardian of the monarchy. Of this scene the grand duke of Berg was a witness; but he was so far from abandoning his plan, that he resolved to persevere in it with greater ardour. The experiment upon the royal parents produced the desired effect. But whilst Ferdinand, the idol of the nation, was present, it was impossible to carry the plan into execution. It was therefore necessary to make every effort to remove this prince from Madrid. To accomplish this, the grand duke assiduously spread reports of the arrival of a fresh courier from Paris, and that the emperor might be expected speedily to arrive in Madrid. In the first place, he induced the infant Don Carlos, to
set

set out to receive his imperial majesty Napoleon, on the supposition that his royal highness must meet him before he should have proceeded two days on his journey. Ferdinand acceded to the proposal. The grand duke had no sooner succeeded in procuring the departure of Don Carlos, than he manifested the most anxious desire that the king should do the same, leaving no means untried to persuade his majesty to take this step, assuring him that it would be attended by the happiest consequences both to the king and the kingdom of Spain.

While the grand duke of Berg, the French ambassador, and all the other agents of France, were proceeding in this course, they were, on the other hand, busily employed with the royal parents to procure from them a formal protest against the abdication of the crown. His majesty, Ferdinand VII. being incessantly urged to go to meet the French emperor, painfully hesitated between the necessity of performing an act of courtesy, which he was assured would be attended with such advantageous results, and his reluctance to abandon his beloved people in such critical circumstances. Cevallos declares, that in this embarrassing situation, his constant opinion, as the king's minister, was, that his majesty should not leave his capital until he should have received certain information that the emperor had actually arrived in Spain, and was on his way towards, and even near to Madrid; and that even then he should only proceed to a distance so short as not to render it necessary to sleep one night out of his capital. His majesty persisted for some days in the resolution of not quitting Madrid, until he should receive certain advice of Napoleon's approach. While he continued in that determination, the arrival of general Savary added greater weight to the reiterated solicitations of the grand duke, and the ambassador Beauharnois. General Savary was announced as the envoy from the emperor, and in that capacity he demanded an audience from the king, which was immediately granted.

granted. General Savary professed that he was sent by the emperor merely to compliment his majesty, and to know whether his sentiments with respect to France were conformable to those of the king his father; in which case the emperor would forego all consideration of what had passed, in no degree interfere in the internal concerns of the kingdom, and immediately recognize his majesty as king of Spain and the Indies. The most satisfactory answer was given to general Savary, and the conversation was continued in terms so flattering, that nothing more could have been desired. The audience terminated with an assurance, on the part of Savary, that the emperor had already left Paris, that he was near Bayonne, and on his way to the capital of Spain.

General Savary had scarcely left the audience chamber, when he began to make the most urgent applications to the king to meet the emperor, assuring him that his attention would be very grateful and flattering to his imperial majesty. And he affirmed in such positive terms, that the emperor's arrival might be expected every moment, that it was impossible, Cevallos observes, not to give credit to his assertions. The king at length yielded. The day appointed for his departure arrived. General Savary, affecting the most zealous and assiduous attention to his majesty, solicited the honour of accompanying him on his journey, which, at the farthest, according to the information which he had just received of the emperor's approach, could not extend beyond Burgos*.

King Ferdinand, during his absence, supposed to be only for a few days, left at Madrid a supreme junta† of government, consisting of the secretaries of state, usually five in number, the president of which was his uncle, the infant Don Antonio. General Savary, in a separate carriage, followed the king to Burgos:

* Burgos is about mid-way between Madrid and Bayonne; being about 140 miles N. of Madrid, and about the same distance S. W. of Bayonne.

† An assembly or board of commissioners.

but the emperor not having arrived there, the king, urged by the earnest and pressing entreaties of general Savary, proceeded to Vittoria, about 50 miles further from the capital. The general, convinced that his majesty had resolved to proceed no farther, continued his journey to Bayonne, with the intention, no doubt, of acquainting the emperor of all that had passed, and of procuring a letter from him, which should determine the king to separate himself from his people. At Vittoria, his majesty received information that Napoleon had arrived at Bourdeaux, and was on his way to Bayonne, where, in fact he arrived with his spouse, on the 15th of April. The French troops were now making suspicious movements in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, and general Savary made his appearance in that city, with a letter to Ferdinand, from the emperor of the French, dated at Bayonne, April 16; of which the following is a copy:

My Brother. I have received the Letter of your royal highness: in the papers which you have received from the king your royal highness's father, you must have found a proof of the interest I always have for you. You will permit me, under the present circumstances, to speak to you, with truth, and I wished, by my journey to Madrid, to draw over my illustrious friend to some necessary ameliorations of his states, and also to give a certain satisfaction to the public feelings. The removal of the Prince of the Peace appeared to me to be necessary for the prosperity of his majesty, and that of his subjects. The affairs of the north had retarded my journey. The event at Aranjuez took place. I pass no decision on what had previously fallen out, nor upon the conduct of the Prince of the Peace; but I know well that it is dangerous for kings to accustom their people to shed blood, or to seek to redress themselves. I pray God that your royal highness may never feel this by your own experience. It is not the interest of Spain to injure a Prince who has married a princess of the blood royal, and who for a long time directed the affairs of the kingdom. He no longer has any friends; your royal highness will possess them no longer than while you shall be fortunate. The people willingly avenge themselves for that homage which they pay us. How also can the process be drawn up against the Prince of the Peace, without involving in it the queen and the king your father?

father? This process would give nourishment to hatred and factious passions, the issue of which would be fatal to your crown. Your royal highness has no other right thereto than that which you derive from your mother. If this process degrade her, your royal highness destroys your own right. He who has lent an ear to weak and disloyal counsels, has no right to pass sentence on the Prince of the Peace. His misdeeds, if he can be reproached with them, go to destroy the rights of the crown. I have frequently expressed a desire, that the Prince of the Peace should be removed from affairs; the friendship of king Charles has often induced me to remain silent, and to turn away my eyes from his conduct. Unhappy mortals that we are! Weakness and error, these are our mottos; but all may be arranged; namely, that the Prince of the Peace should be banished from Spain, and I should invite him to a place of retirement in France. As to the abdication of king Charles the Fourth that has taken place at a moment when my troops were traversing Spain; and in the eyes of Europe, and of posterity, I should seem to have sent so many troops solely for the purpose of pushing from his throne my ally and friend. As a neighbour sovereign, it is fit that I should know this abdication, before I acknowledged it. I say to your royal highness, to the Spaniards, and to the whole world, if the abdication of king Charles has proceeded from his own will, if he was not driven to it by the insurrection and uproar at Aranjuez, I make no scruple to accede to it; and to acknowledge your royal highness as king of Spain. The circumspection which I have observed for this month past, must be a security to you for the support which you shall find in me, should ever party differences disturb you, in your turn, upon the throne.

When king Charles made us acquainted with the events of last October, I was very much affected by them; and I think that by my efforts the affair of the Escorial received a happy issue. Your royal highness was much to blame—I have no need of any other proof of this, than the letter you wrote to me, and which I shall always desire to consider as not having come to me. Your royal highness must distrust all popular commotions and insurrections—a few of my soldiers may be murdered, but the subjugation of Spain should be the consequence of it.

I see with pain, that some persons at Madrid have disseminated certain letters of the captain general of Catalonia, and have done every thing to excite disturbances among the people. Your royal highness perfectly comprehends my meaning. You perceive that I have touched slightly upon many points, which it would not be proper to enlarge upon.

You

“ You may be assured that I will conduct myself in every thing towards you, in the same way as to your royal father. You may rely upon my desire to arrange every thing, and of finding an opportunity of giving you proof of my perfect regard and esteem.

“ Herewith accept, &c.”

Bayonne, April 16, 1808.

To the contents of this letter, general Savary added so many and such vehement protestations of the interest which the emperor took in the welfare of his majesty and of Spain, that he even went so far as to say, “ I will suffer my head to be cut off, if, within a quarter of an hour after your majesty’s arrival at Bayonne, the emperor shall not have recognized you as king of Spain and the Indies. To support his own consistency, he will probably begin by giving you the title of highness, but in five minutes he will give you that of majesty, and in three days every thing will be settled, and your majesty may return to Spain immediately.” The king, after some hesitation, determined to proceed to Bayonne*.

The king of Spain had scarcely set foot on the French territory, than he remarked, that no one came to receive him, until on his arrival at St. Jean de Lus, the mayor, attended by the municipality, made his appearance. The carriage stopped, and the mayor addressed his majesty with the most lively expressions of joy, as having the honour of being first to receive a king, who was the friend and ally of France. Soon after he was met by a deputation of three grandees, who had been sent of by Ferdinand before to meet the French emperor; and their representation, with respect to the intentions of Napoleon, were not of the most flattering nature. He was now, however, too near Bayonne to think of changing his course; wherefore he continued his journey. There came out

* Cevallos does not fail to assert here, that this fatal step was taken by his majesty contrary to his councils, and those of other persons in his train, as well as to the supplication of the loyal city of Vittoria.

to meet the king, the prince of Neufchatel, and Duroc, marshal of the palace, with a detachment of the guard of honour, which the citizens of Bayonne had formed to attend his majesty Napoleon, and they invited Ferdinand to enter Bayonne, where a place had been prepared for his residence; which he did on the 20th of April. The residence prepared for the king appeared to all, and was, in reality, but little suited to the guest who was to occupy it.

While the king was taken up with doubts concerning the meaning of a reception he so little expected, he was informed that the emperor was on his way to pay him a visit. His imperial majesty arrived, accompanied by a number of his generals. The king went down to the street door to receive him, and both monarchs embraced each other with every token of friendship and affection. The emperor of the French staid but a short time with his majesty, and they embraced each other again at parting. Soon after, marshal Duroc came to invite the king to dine with the emperor, whose carriages were coming to convey the king to the castle of Marrac, about the distance of a mile and an half from Bayonne, where his imperial majesty resided, which accordingly took place. Napoleon came as far as the steps of the coach to receive his majesty; and having embraced him again, led him by the hand to the apartment provided for him.

Agreeably to the tenor of the secret engagements with Bonaparte, while the flower of the Spanish army had been transferred to the north of Germany, with a view, no doubt, to the project now going forward, bodies of French troops were speedily accumulated at different points of the north-eastern frontier of Spain.

The French troops assembled on the borders of Spain, remained but a short time inactive. Early in the year, a corps entered Catalonia, and on the 16th of February, obtained possession of the town and citadel of Barcelona, with the formidable position

tion of Monjuich. As a necessary piece of policy, it had been industriously circulated through Spain, that the French forces were destined to assist in defending the coast against any insult from the British army or navy. Advantage had been taken of the national feelings to lull the Spaniards into security, by asserting, that one great object of their powerful allies would be the reduction of Gibraltar, and its restoration to its ancient and natural masters. Whispers and surmises too were industriously spread of an intended invasion of Algiers and Morocco. The mask was, however, soon thrown aside, and the French army, which had advanced to Barcelona, pretending only to halt for a few days for refreshment, availing themselves of the unsuspecting confidence of the inhabitants, seized without blood-shed the citadel, Monjuich, and every other important post. The garrison of Monjuich, reported to have amounted to about six thousand men, retired, and made way for the French without a struggle: indeed the whole conduct of the Spanish commanders at Barcelona remains involved in suspicion and mystery.

The fortress of St. Sebastian and Figueras were taken possession of by the French in a similar way. At Pampeluna, however, they experienced a different reception; for, on the arrival of a French officer at the head of a body of troops from Bayonne, before Pampeluna, demanding admission and possession of the place, the governor, whose garrison had for different reasons been much reduced, refused to comply with this demand, until orders should arrive from his own government. The French commander then brought forward a body of three thousand men, and compelled the Spaniards, after a severe conflict, to surrender at discretion.

The French armies that had entered Spain, instead of proceeding to the southern provinces, remained inactive on the banks of the Ebro, many miles from Madrid. Messengers passing to and from that place indicated the existence of negotiations, but their ob-

ject was unknown. The Spanish troops recalled from Portugal, were rapidly advancing towards the capital. The court seemed in the greatest anxiety and uncertainty, the orders of one day being uniformly countermanded by those of the following. Indeed the administration of public affairs seemed to be arrested in every direction.

While matters were in this state of uncertainty, on the 15th of March, a report was disseminated that the king was preparing to leave Aranjuez for Seville, with a view to migrate to Mexico in his American dominions, and that the troops recalled from Portugal were destined to cover his retreat; that a numerous council had been assembled on the subject, in which, though the opinions were nearly balanced, it had been decided to undertake the journey; that the queen, and the favourite, Godoy, had avowed their desire to depart, but that the prince of Asturias opposed the design. The troops quartered in the capital, had at the same time received orders to march. But when the public alarm was at its height, on the following day (March 16), the king issued a proclamation, thanking his subjects for the marks they had shewn of attachment to his person, and explained the object of the French troops, which had entered his dominions with the most friendly purposes, to assist in defending the country against the common enemy. The assembling of his guards, it was stated, was solely for the purpose of protecting his person and family, and not for accompanying him on a journey, which none but evil-minded persons could suppose to have been projected. The king closed this very extraordinary publication, with directing the people to conduct themselves as they had hitherto done towards the troops of his great and good ally.

On the day following, March 17, when the Spanish guards were to leave Madrid, the inhabitants crowded round them, beseeching them not to abandon their native country, for the purpose of securing the flight of a prince who sacrificed his subjects to private

vate considerations. "Do you think," said they, "we have no more spirit than the people of Lisbon?" Some of the ministers themselves, who opposed the king's retreat, distributed circular notices in the villages of the vicinity, informing the inhabitants of what was going forward, and of the danger to which the country would consequently be exposed if those measures were persisted in.

On the 18th of March, the people poured along the road to Aranjuez. Relays for the king's carriages had been provided on the way to Seville. The village of Aranjuez was crowded with troops; and the baggage of the court lay ready packed up in the apartments of the palace. The preceding night had been busily spent in preparation. The residence of the Prince of the Peace was protected by his proper guards, (for to such a point of dignity he had been exalted,) with a peculiar countersign, while those of the palace had another. At four o'clock in the morning of the 19th, the people rushed in considerable numbers to the favourite's hotel, but were driven back by his guards, who in their turn were driven back by the king's body guards that had ranged themselves on the side of the people. Godoy's doors were forced; the furniture was broken; the apartments were laid waste; the princess, his spouse, daughter of Don Antonio, and niece to the king of Spain, appeared on the stairs, and was conveyed by the people with all the respect due to her birth and rank, to the king's palace. The favourite himself had disappeared, and his brother Don Diego Godoy, commandant of the king's body guards, was arrested by his own troops. Their majesties, who had not retired to rest during the night, were early in the morning visited by the French ambassador, and soon after appeared a proclamation, in which the unfortunate sovereign was made to say, that having resolved to take upon himself the command of his forces by land and sea, he had thought it proper to relieve Godoy of the duties of generalissimo, and permit him to retire

retire to whatever place he might choose, When this was known in the capital, the people attacked the houses of Godoy, and of certain ministers of state attached to his party, and destroyed the furniture without opposition, either from the magistrates, or the two Swiss regiments in the Spanish service, then quartered in the town. The Prince of the Peace was at last discovered in a garret, where he had been concealed for six and thirty hours, and committed to close custody in the common jail.

While these disorders raged with the utmost fury, the king, on the 19th of March, published a declaration at Aranjuez, signed as usual by himself, stating, that on account of his constant infirmities, and the necessity he felt of withdrawing from the burthen of public affairs to a private life, in a climate better adapted than that of Madrid to the state of his health, he had, after the most deliberate consideration, resolved to abdicate the crown in favour of his well beloved son and heir, the prince of Asturias, it was likewise directed, that this decree of his abdication should be instantly and punctually obeyed by all his subjects.

The first act of the new king, Ferdinand VII. was to publish a manifesto, declaring his own innocence and that of his ministers, and stating the nature of the papers and cyphers found in his apartment at the Escorial, in the month of October, 1807. Among his first acts also, was one confiscating all the property of every description, belonging to the Prince of the Peace, Don Emanuel Godoy.

About the same time, he appointed the duke of Infantado, a wealthy and popular nobleman, particularly attached to the interest of Ferdinand, and of England, to the important station of president of the great council of Castile, the first tribunal of the kingdom. To him also he committed the command of the Spanish life guards. Many salaries and pensions, which had long remained unpaid, were instantly

stantly discharged out of the funds of the late favourite, Godoy.

On the 25th of March, Ferdinand, already proclaimed king, made his public entry into Madrid, as related above, which was by this time under the power of the French.

The grand duke of Berg had, March 23rd, entered Madrid at the head of his army. The cavalry and a division of infantry were quartered within the town, whilst other divisions were encamped on the rising grounds in the vicinity. A corps under general Dupont was stationed at Segovia, and the Escorial. This army, which amounted to fifty-four thousand men, was received by all ranks of people with the greatest joy. The Spaniards greatly admired the fine condition the French troops were in, and particularly the beauty of the regiment of cuirassiers. The grand duke descended from his carriage at the Admiralty. The governor of Madrid, the *grandees* of Spain, and the troops in garrison at Madrid, presented themselves before him to pay their respects. The duke received them with *much affability*, and tranquillity was completely re-established in the capital.

While the governor and garrison of Madrid, and the *grandees* of Spain, submitted to this act of self-degradation, the bulk of the people felt with pain the state of humiliation into which their country had fallen. They moved about in groups from place to place, in dejection and consternation, insomuch that the new government deemed it necessary, for preserving the tranquillity of the city, to issue orders, April 3d, to the *patroles*, that had been established on the 20th of March, to continue their rounds. All keepers of public houses were ordered to shut them up before eight o'clock at night. Manufacturers and commercial people, were ordered to continue their people in their usual employment, to keep them constantly at work, and to send the names of all absentees from their usual offices to the police magistrates.

gistrates. Masters of families were earnestly enjoined to restrain their children and domestics from mixing with crowds, and joining in any tumultuous assembly.

A second decree assured the public, that the recent resolution was calculated to cement and strengthen the alliance with France, and enjoining all persons to treat the French troops with the greatest respect. Another edict expressed the utmost satisfaction at the friendly manner in which the French troops had been received by the Spaniards, but the greatest regret and sorrow at the conduct of certain individuals, which had a tendency to interrupt the good understanding that subsisted between the nations, and to excite a *distrust* of the designs of the French troops in Spain. Such sentiments either expressed by word or deeds, were to be punished with the utmost severity.

The sword that Francis I. king of France, surrendered in the famous battle of Pavia, in the reign of the emperor Charles V. of Spain, which had been kept in the royal armoury since 1525, was, by order of Ferdinand, on the 5th of April, remitted to his imperial and royal majesty Napoleon, at Bayonne. The surrender of the sword, formed a presage, and was indeed a kind of emblem of that of the crown. All the civilities, complaisances, and submissions of the Spanish court did not long secure a suitable return of civility and compliance, on the part of their French allies, guests, and invaders. The altercation and jarring, and even some encounters that terminated in death, which took place between some individuals of the different nations, might have been accounted for from the natural levity of the French character, and the pride of the Spaniards, awakened by jealousy and suspicion.

An occurrence took place at Barcelona about the middle of March, which, if the hostile designs of France could possibly have appeared unequivocal before, rendered them extremely plain. General Duhesme, commander-in-chief of the French army of observation,

Observation, of the Eastern Pyrennees, had been for some time busily employed in throwing great quantities of ammunition and provisions into the forts of Barcelona and Monjuich. The count of Espellata, captain-general of Catalonia, in a letter, dated at Barcelona, 18th of March, remonstrated with the general on this alarming and suspicious movement*.

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* "The troops," said he, "that occupied the citadel, and the fortress of Monjuich, might have considered all the houses of Barcelona as so many magazines, and the provisions they contained as their own. There was no enemy to excite apprehension; nor any thing to be expected in which the inhabitants of the town were not as much interested as the troops in garrison. Your excellency occupied the fortresses in the name of the emperor and king as an ally; and it was only on the faith of this that the Spanish government consented to its occupancy. It was under the same impression; that the town opened to you and your people its treasures, and resources of every kind which you have received in the bosom of our families. The city gave you an honourable reception, and shared with you the provisions destined for their own use. Military law prescribes the mode of provisioning garrisons when engaged in actual hostilities, or besieged, or when the country is threatened with famine. In such cases the general is under a necessity of taking measures of precaution for the subsistence of his troops, by the formation of magazines. But, where circumstances of this kind do not exist, such measures are calculated only to excite suspicion and mistrust. Neither my conduct, nor the constant moderation of my troops, nor the favourable reception accorded to the French army, is calculated to give any ground of alarm. The town is provided with necessaries of every sort, as you will see by the official statements signed by the intendant; and, even if we should fall short of some articles, your excellency has given me the strongest assurance that] preparations are at this moment going on in the ports of France, for supplying this place with provisions free from all duties. When his majesty the emperor and king, whose great name inspires us with confidence, at the same time that our fortresses are occupied by his troops, shall be informed of our pliability and honourable principles, it will not be with pleasure that he will be told, that this city, in return for its deference and conduct, has been alarmed by terrible menaces and preparations. Your excellency will be pleased to learn from his imperial majesty, what he thinks of your design before you carry it into execution, accompanying your request with this explanation of my sentiments on the subject; as I also, on my part, shall lay

The remonstrance of count Espellata, copies of which were spread about in Madrid, and over all Spain, met with general applause, and contributed to raise the resentment of the nation against the French and the French party. This is the remonstrance to which Bonaparte particularly alludes, in his letter of the 16th of April, to the prince of Asturias, in which he says, "I see with pain that some persons at Madrid have disseminated certain letters of the captain-general of Catalonia, and done every thing to excite disturbances among the people."

Ferdinand's journey towards Bayonne, excited in all the villages and towns through which he passed, great discontent and indignation; which were not appeased by the proclamations that preceded his progress. At Vittoria, when it was understood, from the authority of the king, that Bonaparte was suffered to interfere in those affairs, there was a general fermentation among the inhabitants, who, April 19, crowded about the royal residence, in the most tumultuous manner, giving vent to their sentiments of disapprobation without restraint.

The duke of Infantado issued a new proclamation, in which he endeavoured to impress the assertions contained in it, in harangues to the people. He assured them, that the intention of the new king was, to represent to the French emperor, the antipathy of

the whole of this matter before the king, my master, without whose orders I cannot accord to your excellency what the forts occupied by the Spanish troops have not themselves. If, before receiving orders from the emperor, your excellency should see any reason for living with precaution, and under the influence of fear in fortresses to be considered, at present, as forming part of the city, then indeed it may be proper to have recourse to the measures you propose. But as, at present, there was no necessity for any such measure, I wish to impress your mind with a conviction, that to establish magazines, and form considerable depots of provisions in the forts, cannot serve any good purpose; that such an intention is remarkable, calculated to rouse attention, and offensive operations; and that it may not perhaps be in your excellency's power, nor mine, to remedy the consequences, which such a fermentation must excite among the inhabitants."

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the Spanish people to the French troops that had been sent among them, and to demand their immediate recal. The tumult was somewhat assuaged; but voices were heard here and there, muttering, "That both the king and the duke of Infantado might do with Napoleon what they pleased; that Spaniards would never be slaves; and that the nation would maintain its independence without them."

From the moment that the grand duke of Berg set his foot on the Spanish territory, he did all in his power to impress the Spaniards with a conviction, that he had come among them for their good, by bringing about certain reforms in the government, insinuating at the same time, that he was on the side of the prince of Asturias, and in opposition to the Prince of the Peace, who was universally detested; nor did he fail to throw out hints and allusions to the influence of the queen in the great affairs of the nation; thereby to ingratiate himself with the people: but, true to his purpose of division and distraction, he was no sooner informed of what had passed at Aranjuez, on the 19th of March, than he made a shew of taking a very warm interest in the fate of Don Emanuel Godoy, with whom, though personally unacquainted, he had kept up a confidential and intimate correspondence. On the imprisonment of Godoy, the queen besieged, as it were, the grand duke of Berg, with one letter after another, imploring the intervention of the duke for the safety of the favourite's person: nor could a person of the grand duke's information, as well as penetration, be ignorant that his interference in behalf of this favourite, would be most acceptable to her majesty, and also, which may appear to future generations not a little singular, to the king.

During the time that Ferdinand halted at Vittoria, he was informed by the supreme junta, that the grand duke of Berg had made a formal demand of the release of Godoy. This application Ferdinand, who had solemnly promised to bring Don Emanuel to judgement according to the laws, directed the junta to resist.—

Bonaparte had himself, by letter, made a similar application to Ferdinand; who, in reply, represented the invincible necessity he was under of bringing Godoy to trial. But if his imperial majesty should continue to take an interest in the life of Don Emanuel Godoy, he gave him his word, that if the prisoner should, after mature examination of the charges laid against him, be condemned to death, that punishment should be remitted, in consideration of the intercession of his majesty.

When Bonaparte received this answer from Ferdinand, he wrote to the grand duke of Berg, telling him that the prince of Asturias had placed the prisoner at his disposal, and ordered him to demand the release of Godoy in the most energetic manner. The grand duke then sent a haughty note to the junta, in which he reminded them, that the emperor of the French, at the same time that the authority of the prince of Asturias was stated as a ground of procedure to them, acknowledged no other king of Spain than Charles the Fourth. He demanded anew the person of the Prince of the Peace to be sent to France. In consequence of which they ordered the release of Godoy, who was immediately conveyed to Bayonne.

To cover their own weakness, the junta gave out, in two gazettes extraordinary, that Don Emanuel had been released by order of Ferdinand VII. They attempted to justify such an interpretation of his letter, though nothing could be plainer than that it was the king's intention not to screen Godoy from trial, but from the last punishment, in case of his being condemned*.

Universal

* Although the history of all absolute monarchies presents many instances of sudden and surprizing elevations to great power and wealth, and as sudden and unexpected falls, there is perhaps none so striking as that of Don Emanuel Godoy. The Prince of the Peace was accounted by far the wealthiest and most powerful subject in Europe. Indeed he had all the power, and in a great measure all the wealth of the Spanish monarchy at his command. While several of the old imposts had come to be alienated,

Universal joy was excited by the imprisonment of the Prince of the Peace, with his principal officers, in all the provinces of Spain. At Salamanca, and several other towns, the bells of the churches were rung; and at Salamanca six hundred monks, and as many licentiates, danced in the market-place; young women, married women, and old men, mixed with the monks in this extravagant demonstration of their joyful transports. The Spanish newspapers, which had begun to assume a tone of freedom, styled Don Emanuel Godoy, the prince of injustice, the generalissimo of infamy, the grand admiral of treason, and the ruin of the nation.

Godoy, in his retreat, was accompanied by an escort of two hundred horsemen, which appeared necessary for his protection from the fury of the people. He arrived at Bayonne, April 26. A castle in the environs of Bayonne was appointed for his residence; and he was in all respects treated by Bonaparte as a person of distinction and consequence. The determined interference of Bonaparte for the liberation of the Prince of Peace, was owing to the resolution of the king and queen not to quit Spain for France, though called thither by Bonaparte, unless the favourite should be permitted to do so also, and to proceed on his journey before them.

King Charles the Fourth, and his queen Louisa, arrived on the 27th of April at Burgos, and on the 28th at Vittoria. A detachment of the body guards, to the number of one hundred, who had accompanied

nated from the crown, and were impropriated by certain great families, through the improvident and profligate favour of the court, the people were oppressed with new and arbitrary taxes, burthensome in themselves, and rendered more so by the mode of their collection. But the odium of the common people against the prime minister and the favourite would never have wrought his fall, if there had not been a general combination against him among the nobility, whom he so greatly eclipsed in splendour, patronage, and favour, and to whom a predominant favourite at court is a greater nuisance, perhaps, than to the nobles of any other country in Europe.

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the prince of Asturias to Bayonne, happening to be in this town, placed themselves, according to custom, in the palace to be occupied by their majesties. But when the old king set his eyes on them, with a degree of energy that surprized every one, he ordered them to be gone—"You betrayed your trust at Aranjuez, I want none of your services, and I will have none."—The guards were obliged to retire.

On the 29th, their majesties remained all night at Tolosa; and on the 30th they came, about noon, to Irun, where they received letters from Bonaparte, and two hours after entered the walls of Bayonne, where they were received with all public respect and honour.

The roaring of cannon having announced the arrival of the old king and queen of Spain, Ferdinand, with his brother, Don Carlos, went to meet them. All the Spaniards that were at Bayonne, also waited on their majesties, and went through the ceremony of kneeling and kissing hands. It was a scene of constraint and awkwardness on both sides; the king seemed as much dissatisfied with them as he had been with his body guards at Vittoria. He did not speak a word to any one but count Pignatelli of Fuentes, a courtier whom Bonaparte had appointed to insinuate himself into the confidence of the prince of Asturias for the purpose of watching him. When the ceremony was over, their old majesties, being fatigued, retired to their apartments; the prince of Asturias was going to follow them, but the king stopt him, saying, "Prince, have you not yet sufficiently outraged my grey hairs?" The prince and the Spaniards who had accompanied him to Bayonne, were much astonished at these words, and withdrew in great perturbation. At five o'clock, P. M. their majesties were visited by the emperor Napoleon, who remained with them a long time. The conversation turned on the injuries that had been done to the king and queen, the perils in which they had been involved, the

the ingratitude of men on whom they had lavished favours; and above all, on the ingratitude and rebellion of their son. The officers of king Charles's household were appointed by Bonaparte, all of them Frenchmen. On the 1st of May, the king and queen of Spain dined at the castle of Marrac with Napoleon and his empress Josephine.

The Bayonne newspapers, printed under the inspection of Talleyrand and Bonaparte himself, and which came every day under the eye of the prince of Asturias, took the side of the dethroned king and the Prince of the Peace. The Bayonne gazette of the 25th of April, the day of Ferdinand's arrival, contained various statements in contradiction of the reports that had been spread of the prince's having immense treasures in foreign funds, extenuated the instances of his mal-administration, adverted to many benefits that resulted from his ministry, and above all, entered into elaborate arguments to shew that the abdication of Charles IV. was not voluntary, but compulsory. In this manner Bonaparte endeavoured to prepare the mind of Ferdinand and his party, for the catastrophe that awaited him. At the same time it was the common conversation at Bayonne, and re-echoed from thence by the emissaries of Bonaparte, in every province throughout Spain, that nothing could save the monarchy but the interference of a mighty and powerful hand.

The prince of Asturias, as he was still styled by the French, or Ferdinand VII. as he was called by the Spaniards, had no sooner returned from dinner at the castle at Marrac to his residence, than general Savary went to inform him, that the emperor of the French and king of Italy had determined that the house of Bourbon should no longer reign in Spain; that it should be succeeded by his; and that his imperial majesty required Ferdinand, in his own name, and that of all his family, to renounce the crown of Spain and the Indies in favour of the dynasty of Bonaparte. That such a proposition should be made, after
having

having received repeated assurances of the honourable and friendly sentiments of Bonaparte towards him, struck Ferdinand and the Spanish chiefs who were with him, with surprize and consternation; and they saw with horror the dreadful situation in which they were plunged.

Bonaparte, having now thrown off the mask, proceeded to carry his project into immediate effect; for on the day following, he summoned to his palace Don Pedro Cevallos, who had been first secretary to king Charles, and now occupied the same station with Ferdinand, and was much in his confidence. Cevallos was received by M. de Champagny, minister for foreign affairs to Bonaparte. Cevallos began the conference by complaining of the manner in which his master had been drawn into France, and added, that he had been instructed to declare, that he neither could nor would renounce his right to the crown of Spain, in favour of any individual, or family whatever, to the prejudice either of himself or the other branches of his house. M. de Champagny insisted on the necessity of the required renunciation, chiefly on the ground that the abdication of king Charles had not been spontaneous. At length M. Champagny informed him, that while the house of Bourbon reigned in Spain, there could be no security for France in case of war breaking out again in the northern states of Europe.

The conference between the French and Spanish ministers was interrupted by a command from Bonaparte, who had secretly heard their discourse, to attend him in his cabinet. There, Cevallos tells us, he was treated by the French emperor, as a traitor to his former master Charles; because he was now in the service of Ferdinand, and reproached in the most insulting manner, for having maintained, in a former official conference with general Mouthion, that however necessary the recognition of Ferdinand's title to the throne of Spain might be to the preservation of amity between the two countries, still that his

his title was not to be invalidated by the withholding of any such recognition. Finding, however, Don Cevallos inflexible in the principles he professed, and despairing of success in a negotiation with that minister, Bonaparte required Ferdinand to entrust his concerns with some other minister. That no difficulty might arise on this score, Don Pedro Labrador, who had been minister at the court of Florence, was selected to conduct the negotiation on the part of Ferdinand, and instructed to declare that his master neither would, nor could consent to the renunciation of his rights, or those of his family, to the throne of their ancestors. Labrador's demands of the production of the French minister's full powers to treat with him, and for an authenticated statement of the proposals of Bonaparte, were evaded by Champagny, as matters of mere official form. Champagny added an insinuation, that Labrador might, by falling in with the emperor's views secure the prosperity of Spain, and at the same time promote his own private advantage. Labrador required that Ferdinand should be instantly permitted to return to Spain. But he was told, that matters could be arranged only by the two sovereigns, either by letters or in a personal interview. This answer, added to the other circumstances, left no doubt on the mind of Ferdinand, that he was actually under arrest. However, in order to establish beyond a doubt the certainty of this fact, Don Cevallos, by his majesty's order, sent a note to the French minister for foreign affairs, telling him, that the king was determined to return to Madrid, to tranquillize the agitation of his subjects; and to provide for the transaction of the important business of the kingdom; assuring M. Champagny at the same time, that he himself would continue, in order to treat with his imperial majesty, on affairs reciprocally advantageous to both nations.

The French emperor, finding Ferdinand completely inflexible, had recourse to other expedients for effecting his object. It was with a view to this, that

the old king and queen were invited to repair to Bayonne, for the purpose of a final arrangement of affairs.

Charles had scarcely reached Bayonne, when he demanded that his son should resign the crown so lately assumed, signifying at the same time, his resolution not to remount the throne himself, but to renounce all his rights, and those of his family, in favour of France. Ferdinand VII. overawed, a prisoner, and controlled by circumstances, on the 1st of May, transmitted in writing a conditional renunciation of the crown in favour of his father. He proposed that Charles should return to Madrid, whither he would attend him as a dutiful son; that the Cortes, or at least, the great council of the kingdom, should be assembled; that his present resignation, with his motives thereto, should be duly and regularly recorded; that Charles should dismiss from his presence the persons who had so justly incurred the detestation of the nation; that if Charles, as it was understood, declined to resume the reins of government, Ferdinand would undertake the administration, either in the name of his father, and as his lieutenant, or in his own name.

On the following day, May 2, the old king, in a long answer, declared his abdication to have been compulsory, and attributed his present distressful situation to the inveterate hatred of Ferdinand against France, of which evidence in his own letters had been communicated by the emperor; and he concludes with asserting his conviction, that the disorders of Spain were to be remedied only by Bonaparte, whom, from long experience, the aged monarch says, he knew to be incapable of forming any design hostile to the honour and interests of the royal family of Spain.

Ferdinand's reply to this communication, dated the 4th of May, together with many powerful representations to his father, on the future situation of the kingdom, contains many strong arguments for believing

believing the abdication of the 19th of March to have been voluntary, although the consequences to be apprehended from the popular commotions, might have had a commanding influence on Charles's mind.

On the same day, 4th of May, when this reply was sent by Ferdinand to king Charles, that monarch announced to the council of Castile, his abdication of all his claims on the Spanish kingdoms, in favour of his friend and ally, the emperor of the French, by a treaty which had been signed and ratified, and which stipulated for the integrity and independence of the Spanish kingdoms, and the preservation of the holy catholic religion, not only as the predominant, but as the sole and exclusive religion in Spain. He had thought proper to send this letter, that they might conform themselves thereto, publish its contents, and make every exertion in favour of Napoleon, "Display," said king Charles, "the utmost frankness and friendship towards the French; and above all, direct your care to preserve the country from insurrections and tumults." But before this letter of abdication should be delivered, he had dispatched a proclamation, dated on the same day, the purport of which was, to prepare the public mind, in some degree, for what was so soon to follow. Charles told his "Dear subjects," that perfidious men sought to mislead them, to arm the Spaniards against the French, and the French against the Spaniards; but the devastation of Spain, and calamities of every kind would be the consequence. In this critical juncture, he had concerted with his ally, the emperor of the French, measures for their welfare. All those who spoke against France thirsted for their blood. They were either the enemies of the Spanish nation, or the agents of England, who sought, by their intrigues, to sever the mother country from her colonies: to effect a separation of her provinces; or to involve the country for a long course of years in trouble and disaster. "Spaniards," said he, "be guided by my experience, and yield
§ 2 obedience

obedience to the authority which I derive from God and my ancestors. Follow my example, and be assured, under the present circumstances, there is neither prosperity, nor safety for the Spaniards, but in the friendship of the grand emperor our ally."

The negociation between the father and the son, for the purpose of procuring the unconditional and absolute renunciation of all right on the part of Ferdinand to the Spanish throne, did not keep pace with the ardour of Bonaparte; who, therefore, adopted measures for bringing it to a conclusion in his own peculiar way. At four in the afternoon of the 5th of May, his imperial majesty went to visit the old king and queen of Spain. At this interview there were present, besides their majesties, the Infant Don Carlos, Godoy, the grandes of Spain, who had accompanied the new king in his journey to Bayonne, and the Spanish minister Don Pedro Cevallos. After a conference, which was continued above an hour, Ferdinand was called in by his father, "To hear," says Cevallos, "in the presence of the emperor, expressions so disgusting and humiliating that I dare not record them*." There seemed to be no end to the

* The scene to which Cevallos alludes was this. The queen, in a transport of passion, addressing Ferdinand, said, "Traitor, you have for years meditated the death of the king your father; but thanks to the vigilance, the zeal, and the loyalty, of the Prince of the Peace, you have not been able to effect your purpose: neither you, nor any of the infamous traitors who have co-operated with you, for the accomplishment of your designs. I tell you to your face, that you are my son, but not the son of the king. And yet, without having any other right to the crown than those of your mother, you have sought to tear it from us by force. But I agree and demand, that the emperor Napoleon shall be umpire between us: Napoleon, to whom we cede and transfer our rights, to the exclusion of our own family. I call on him to punish you and your associates, as so many traitors, and to abandon to him the whole Spanish nation." This scene of the queen bastardizing her own legitimate son in the presence of the king, his legitimate father; and proclaiming her own infamy before her husband, is something so new, surprizing, and singular, that it would not have gained universal and undoubted credit as it has done, if it were not attested by so many witnesses.

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queen's reproaches and rage, when Napoleon interrupted her, by saying, "No ! I give to Ferdinand the crown of Naples, and to Charles that of Etruria, with one of my nieces in marriage to each of them. Let them declare if they be willing to accept this offer." After a short silence, Don Carlos replied, "Emperor, I was not born to be a king, but an infant of Spain." Ferdinand was silent. Bonaparte, after a short pause, said, "*Prince il faut opter entre la cession et la mort.*"—"Cession or death;" and six hours were allowed him for coming to a determination. King Charles seconding the threat of Bonaparte, ordered his son to make an absolute resignation of the crown, under pain of being treated, with all his household, as an usurper of the throne, and a conspirator against the life of his father. To this proposition, Ferdinand being desirous not to involve in his misfortunes the number of persons comprehended in the threat of Charles IV. assented. And next day, in a letter to his father, after stating the circumstances of constraint in which he was placed, he made the resignation which was commanded. After this, Ferdinand was deprived of his coach of state, and sword of honour. He had no other attendant than the commandant of the party that watched him.

On the same day, May 5, a treaty of abdication was agreed to, and signed by the Prince of Peace, on the part of king Charles IV. and marshal Duroc on that of Bonaparte. The motives by which Charles was actuated in this extraordinary transaction are stated in the preamble to have been to save Spain from the agitation of faction, and war both internal and external, to preserve together with the colonies the unity of the monarchy, and to join the means of France with those of Spain, for the purpose of obtaining a maritime peace. In the first articles, Charles cedes to his majesty, the emperor Napoleon, all his rights to the throne of Spain, and the Indies,

Indies, as things had come to such a pass, that he alone could re-establish social order.

In the mean time, there was, as might be expected, an action and re-action between what was going on at Bayonne, and what came to pass at Madrid. The public mind in Spain had never been in a state of public tranquillity since the middle of March, when it was suspected that Charles IV. intended to remove to Seville, with all his family; and the determination of Ferdinand to pass the frontier, or to put himself into the hands of the French at Bayonne. These circumstances raised a fermentation, which threatened some terrible explosion, and it was not without difficulty that the junta of government, were able to calm the alarms of the people, so far as to restrain them from insulting the French, and treating them with violence.

A courier extraordinary arrived every evening at Madrid, with news of the proceedings at Bayonne. This news was not published in the gazette, but circulated under the form of letters from particular persons in the suit of the king. These bulletins were at first satisfactory, as they were full of nothing but the honours done to Ferdinand, and the friendly reception he met with at Bayonne from Bonaparte. By and by it was surmised that affairs at the castle of Marrac wore but a gloomy aspect; and soon after it was perfectly known that it was intended by the ruler of France to compel Ferdinand to resign his crown. The courier expected on Sunday, the 30th of April, did not arrive; and the mail looked for hourly, was still due on the evening of the 1st of May, when several thousands of the inhabitants of the capital assembled at *the Port of the Sun*, and other streets near the post-office, on the look-out for the arrival of the post. The French garrison of Madrid rested all night on their arms, and on Monday the 2d of May, the sun, says an Englishman, who was present, rose on many an unfortunate inhabitant,

bitant, who was never to behold the dawn of another day.

This was the day fixed for the departure of the queen of Etruria, daughter of king Charles, and her son, Don Francisco, for Bayonne, to join the rest of the royal family: for it was determined by Bonaparte, that not a branch or scion of that family should remain in Spain. Great numbers of the people crowded to the place that was in front of the palace, to see her going away; and among these, many wives and children, to bid adieu to their husbands and their fathers, belonging to the family, and the escort of the queen, and to bewail their unhappy lot, in being left behind, without any provision being made for their future subsistence. As the first carriage drew up to the gate, a report was circulated by several individuals among the people, that Don Antonio, president of the junta or provisional government, was also going to abandon them. And this mistake produced a tumult. The populace cut the traces of his carriage, and forced it back into the court of the palace. But, on satisfactory assurances that Don Antonio was not going to quit Madrid, they permitted the horses again to be put to the coach, which drove without obstruction to the palace gate. In the midst of this disturbance, an aid-de-camp, sent by the grand duke of Berg, to mark and give an account of what was going forward, made his appearance; the people showed an inclination to insult this officer and treat him rudely, but he was extricated by some Spanish officers who were present, and suffered to return to his chief. After this, the carriages with the queen of Etruria, and her brother, were permitted to set out. The infant Don Francisco, manifested unequivocal tears of reluctance to leave the palace. He was observed even to weep bitterly, which greatly affected the people, and raised their indignation to the highest pitch. At this instant, the same aid-de-camp returned with a detachment of French soldiers, and immediately there commenced a

scene of carnage and horror. It is said that the populace were the first aggressors. But the French were the first to let fly volleys of musquetry, and many innocent spectators, in course, were killed, and others wounded. The news spread over the whole city with the rapidity of lightning, and in less than an hour, every individual of the lower classes, who possessed the means, appeared in the streets in arms. At first the Spaniards had the best of it in the greater part of the city, although the Spanish troops had no share in the engagement, having been confined by their officers to their barracks. A great number of the French were killed, and their arms supplied such of the Spaniards as had none of their own. But as soon as the dispositions directed by the grand duke began to be carried into effect, the advantage was decidedly on the side of the French. All the French troops in Madrid were set in motion. Each column had one or more pieces of flying artillery, with which they scoured the streets as they moved onward, and which were afterwards placed at the spots from whence they might do the greatest execution. The place where the Spaniards made the stoutest defence was the store-house of artillery of *Monteleone House*, which, besides ammunition, contained arms for ten thousand men. Thither the grand duke sent a detachment to take possession of the artillery and ammunition, but he found it occupied by a small number of the inhabitants of Madrid and Spanish artillery-men, under the command of two artillery officers, of the names of Doaize and Velayde. A twenty-four pounder, charged with grape-shot, placed at the gate of the store-house, in front of a long and narrow street, and duly pointed and levelled, made such havoc among the French column as it advanced by this street, that the commander was obliged to send to the grand duke for a reinforcement. Two other columns were dispatched with all speed to his succour. The French columns attacked this small garrison on both flanks from the windows and tops of the adjoining houses,
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and repeatedly summoned it to surrender, but the brave and resolute commanders refused to listen to any propositions of the kind, and their constancy remained unshaken till they were both killed. The command of this little arsenal now devolved on a corporal of artillery, who, sensible that nothing good was to be expected from further resistance, offered to capitulate. This offer the French general readily accepted. But a Spanish officer, the major of the warlike store-house, appeared on horseback, waving a white handkerchief, and proclaiming peace; on which the French were suffered to take possession of the place. In about two hours, the firing in every part of the town ceased; an effect produced by the personal interposition of the members of the council of Castile and the other tribunals, who flew from one street to another on horseback, accompanied by several Spanish noblemen, with some French generals, and escorted by parties of cavalry, consisting of Spanish body-guards and troopers belonging to the French imperial guards, mixed together.

The inhabitants of Madrid now flattered themselves that the carnage was at an end; but in the afternoon, the grand duke issued general orders to his army for the immediate formation of a military tribunal, of which general Grouchy was appointed president. Before this tribunal all persons were brought who had been made prisoners in the early part of the day, or found in the street with any kind of arms about them, or any implements whatever that might possibly have been used, or by any construction considered as a weapon; those who were found with muskets, swords, penknives, and even scissors, were all of them considered as equally guilty, and ordered to be instantly shot; and the sentence was executed without a moment's delay. Several other persons were condemned to be shot on the day after the next.

The whole of the French troops employed against Madrid, on the horrible 2d of May, was computed

not to have exceeded ten thousand at most; and the whole city of Madrid, by order of the junta, was disarmed.

By a royal edict, dated at Bayonne, May 4, the grand duke of Berg, whom Charles calls his cousin, was appointed lieutenant-general, or viceroy of all Spain. And the council of Castile, and the captains general and governor of provinces, were directed to obey his orders, which was intimated to the junta of government and of war. This decree may be considered not only as a preparatory measure, but an actual transference of all power, military and civil, to the French. As the grand duke was commander-in-chief of the troops belonging to his ally, the emperor of the French, Charles judged it necessary, he says, to make him lieutenant-general of Spain, in order to give the whole force within his kingdom, for the preservation of peace and property, the "same direction:" plainly insinuating, that without such an arrangement, the forces of the different nations might receive opposite directions. It was also decreed by the royal edict, that the grand duke of Berg, in quality of governor-general, should be president of the junta of government. But in this the junta had been as forward as his majesty: for on the same day, May 4, the junta having declared that "there was not a moment to be lost for preventing the evils to be threatened by disrespect to the constituted authorities, made a tender of the presidency of that council to the grand duke of Berg, which was accepted. Don Antonio, as well as every other branch of the royal family, was called to Bayonne.

On the 6th of May, the grand duke of Berg issued a proclamation to his army, in which he says, that the "2d of May had forced them to draw the sword; they had acquitted themselves to his satisfaction, and that he would not fail to report their praiseworthy conduct to the emperor; but order and tranquility was restored; the guilty had been punished; the men who had been misled, acknowledged their errors;

errors; in short, a veil was to cover all that had passed, and that confidence ought now to return. He exhorted his soldiers to return to their old relations of friendship with the inhabitants of the capital. The conduct of the Spanish troops were worthy of eulogy. He bade the inhabitants of Madrid to banish from their minds all uneasiness and apprehension, and to see nothing in the soldiers of the grand Napoleon, the *protector of Spain*, but friendly troops, and faithful allies. The inhabitants of all orders and degrees, might wear their cloaks according to their usual fashion. They would not on that account, be any longer arrested, or otherwise molested. He also published another proclamation, addressed to "The brave Spaniards," to the same effect, but of greater length. He sets out with saying, that the "2d of May would be a day of sorrow to him as it was to them. The common enemy to him and them, after behaving in such a manner as might have wearied out his patience, had finished their provoking conduct with exciting the people of Madrid, and of the adjacent villages to excesses, that had reduced him to employ the irresistible force under his command."

On the same day a circular letter was addressed by the council of supreme and general inquisition, to all the courts of the kingdom. This venerable body, without hesitation or reserve, imputed what the Spanish nation called the massacre of the 2d of May, to the people of Madrid. "The melancholy consequences," said they, "of the disgraceful tumults in this capital, on the 2d instant, by the violence of the people towards the troops of the emperor of the French, have rendered the most active vigilance necessary on the part of all the magistracies and all the respectable bodies of the nation, in order to prevent the renewal of such excesses, and to preserve tranquillity in every community actuated by a due attention to its own interest, no less than by the laws of hospitality towards friendly officers and soldiers who injure no person, and who, up to this moment,

have given the strongest proofs of good order and discipline, by punishing those who have been guilty of excesses, or who have ill treated any Spaniard in his person or property."

The proclamation of the grand duke of Berg to the Spaniards, May 6th, in which he tells them, that the fate of Spain was under the deliberation of their own princes, in concert with the great emperor Napoleon, within the precincts of France, was followed by another, May 19, for convening the notables, who were called on to send deputies to a junta to be assembled at Bayonne, for the purpose of settling some plan that might secure the tranquillity and happiness of Spain. And on the 25th of May a proclamation was issued, in which Bonaparte insinuated to the Spaniards, that having received a commission from Heaven to reform their government, and to make them again what they had been before, a great, and glorious, and happy nation, "Your princes have ceded to me their rights to the crown of Spain—Your nation is old; my mission is to restore its youth."

It was presumed, that the public mind was now sufficiently prepared for the reception of an imperial decree, which was communicated to the council of Castile, May 29th, informing the council of the measures which the emperor, (by virtue of his rights to the crown of Spain, which had been ceded to him,) had taken for fixing the basis of the new government of the kingdom, of which the grand duke of Berg was to continue in the mean time to be viceroy; and the council of Castile were required to affix the said imperial decree on the usual places, that no man might pretend ignorance of the same*.

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* The decree ordered, 1. That the assembly of the notables which had already been summoned by the lieutenant-general of the kingdom, should be held on the 15th of June at Bayonne. The deputies were charged with the sentiments, desires, and complaints of those they represented; and also to fix the basis of the new government for the kingdom. 2. Napoleon's cousin, the grand

This decree was published by the council of Castile, as they were ordered and directed. To constitute this assembly, Bonaparte named about one hundred and fifty Spaniards of different classes, conditions, and corporations; but only about ninety were convened. A part of these, representing some cities, tribunals, or other public bodies, brought with them instructions in the nature of powers given them by those whom they represented, but altogether insufficient to answer the purpose intended. The ministers of the council were without any powers or instructions whatever; a precaution adopted by this tribunal in conformity to the judgement of its commissioners, in order to avoid all involuntary compromises. Most of the deputies had no other powers than merely to take their departure, and many of them did not belong to any public body, or acknowledged class of the community.

The junta at Bayonne held their twelfth meeting on the 7th of July, the day appointed for the acceptance of the new constitution. In the chamber where they sat, were erected a magnificent throne, and a richly decorated altar, the service of which was performed by the archbishop of Burgos. Joseph Bonaparte, to whom Napoleon had transferred the crown of Spain, being seated on the throne, delivered a speech to the "Gentlemen deputies," in which he told them, that he was desirous of presenting himself in the midst of them previously to their separation from each other.—"Assembled," said Joseph, "in consequence of one of the extraordinary events to which all nations in their turn, and at particular junctures, are subject; and in pursuance of the dispositions of the emperor Napoleon, our

grand duke of Berg, was continued to fulfil the functions of lieutenant-general of the kingdom. 3. The ministers, the council of state, the council of Castile, and all civil, ecclesiastical, and military authorities, were as far as requisite, confirmed. Justice was to be administered under the same forms, and in the same manner, as usual.

illustrious

illustrious brother.—Your sentiments have been those of his age. The result of these sentiments will be consolidated in the constitutional act which will be forthwith read to you, It will preserve Spain from many tedious broils, which were easily to be foreseen from the disquietude with which the nation had been long agitated.” He proceeded to touch on the intrigues of the enemies of the continent, who hoped to sever Spain from her colonies; but “if the Spaniards were disposed to make the same sacrifices with him, then should Spain be speedily tranquil and happy at home, and just and powerful abroad.”—The act of constitution was read over in a loud voice, and the members of the junta, on the question being put, unanimously declared their acceptance thereof.

A short address was delivered by the president of the junta, in answer to the speech of king Joseph; after which the several members took the following oath:—“I swear obedience to the king, the constitution, and the laws.” The junta then attended his majesty’s levee, to pay him their respects on the occasion. And his majesty gave them the most gracious reception, and conversed with them nearly an hour. The viceroy of Spain, the grand duke of Berg, was present at the inauguration of king Joseph. He was called by Bonaparte, and arrived at Bayonne on the 6th of July. It was deemed expedient by Bonaparte, before the departure of Joseph for the capital, to have some conversation with the lieutenant-general, concerning the present state of Spain, and disposition of the Spaniards. It was judged political wisdom that Joseph should attach a number of the Spanish nobility to his interests, by appointing them to offices of dignity, trust, and emolument. On the 1st of July, there was a nomination of eight ministers, viz, Don Louis Mariano de Urquijo, secretary of state, Don Pedro Cevallos, minister for foreign relations; Don Joseph de Aranza, ministers for the Indies; admiral Don Joseph Massaredo, minister of marine;
Don

Don Gonzalo O'Farrel, minister of war; Don Gaspar Melchior de Jovellanos, minister of the interior; the count Cabarrus, minister of finances; and Don Sebastian Pinuela, minister of justice.—Two captains of the body-guards, viz. the duke of Park, a grandee of Spain, and the duke of St. Germain, also a grandee of Spain.—Two colonels of the guards, viz. the duke of Infantado, colonel of the regiment of Spanish guards, and the prince of Castel-Franco, colonel of the Walloon guards, grand officers of the crown. The marquis of Ariza, great chamberlain; the duke of Hijah, grand master of the ceremonies; and count Fernando Nunez, grand huntsman. Chamberlains; the count Santa Collonna, the duke of Ossuna, count Castel Florida, and the duke of Sotomayor, all grantees of Spain.

In this list of officers of the household, court, and public service of Joseph, we observe the names of persons of the first rank in the country, and even of some who had laboured long to overthrow the Prince of the Peace, and place the prince of Asturias on the throne of his father.

King Joseph set foot on the territory of Spain on the 9th of July, escorted by a guard of four thousand Italian troops, and followed by upwards of an hundred coaches, carrying his suite, and the members of the Bayonne junta. This guard, gradually increased, amounted, by the time Joseph arrived at Madrid, to ten thousand; but his true guard was an army of eighteen thousand men, under marshal Bessieres, properly posted for that purpose. Napoleon accompanied him as far as Trun, twelve miles distant from the frontier. In all the towns and villages through which Joseph passed in his way to the capital, a sullen silence prevailed. Few of the men went out of their houses, or interrupted their ordinary employments, and some of the women appeared at the windows and balconies, crying out *Viva Fernando VII.* On the 22d of July, king Joseph made his public entry into Madrid.

At the period when Bonaparte's arrangements relative to the settlement of Spain seemed to be completed, and waited only for the sanction of the junta he had called at Bayonne, insurrections broke out in all the provinces not immediately under the control of that monarch's arms. These insurrections did not appear to cause him any uneasiness, and even after they began to wear a serious aspect he regarded the Spanish commotions with indifference and contempt. The public mind in Spain was in a state of fermentation ever since the affair at Madrid on the 2nd of May, and commotions and tumults arose in various places; but it was not until the Madrid Gazette of the 20th of that month had proclaimed the abdication of the Spanish crown by Ferdinand VII. in favour of the emperor of the French, that there was a general insurrection. The publication of that Gazette was quickly followed by the anniversary of St. Ferdinand, the tutelar saint of the prince, on the 27th of the same month, which seemed to awaken the Spaniards from their supineness; for it was on that day that the insurrection broke out in different parts of that country.

The history of the war in Spain for what remains of the year 1808, after the close of the month of May, naturally divides itself into three periods; viz. First, that previous to the formation of the central juntas; secondly, that during the government of the central juntas; and, thirdly, that under the supreme and central junta.

The effects of the first of these periods, which was but of short duration, were, as usual in similar cases for the most part the effect of popular passion. Don Miguel de Saavedra, captain general of the province of Valencia, where the insurrection first broke out, who attempted to oppose the views of the insurgents, was put to death. The insurgents then demanded, that all the goods belonging to the French should be declared to be forfeited, and their persons secured in the citadel. A few days after this they dragged

dragged the crew of a French ship, which had been pursued by an English frigate, and sought refuge on the Spanish coast, to prison; and on the 14th of June, in a fresh paroxysm of rage, they massacred them. At Cuença, the corregidor and the attendant were thrown into chains, and carried off by a party of peasants. The governor of Carthagená was murdered. General Truxillo, governor of Malaga, was murdered at Granada; his body being dragged through the streets, cut in pieces, and afterwards burnt. The French consul at Malaga, Mornard, and some French merchants of that place, were secured on the 4th of June, from the fury of the people, in the Moorish castle of Gibralfaro. A great quantity of arms and ammunition taken from an English privateer in 1800, had been lodged in a warehouse in the suburbs, to be sold. On the 20th of June a report prevailed that this magazine had been purchased by the French consul for the use of the French army. The people of Malaga marched to the castle, and, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the deputy-governor, and the resistance of the guard, they burst into the castle, pierced the victim of their fury with a thousand daggers, and burned his dead body in a bonfire made of the furniture and some wrecks of the consul's house. The dépôt was broken open, and all that it contained destroyed. All this was done in spite of every effort on the part of the municipal government of Malaga to prevent it. This tumult was at last quelled by a singular circumstance. The dean and chapter fell on the expedient of a procession, to thank God for their deliverance from the oppressor. The multitude immediately joined the procession, and tranquillity was restored. The governor of St. Lucas Barameda was massacred. At Jaen, the peasants murdered the corregidor, and plundered the town.

Similar scenes were exhibited in Estremadura and the Castiles. At Badajos the insurrection broke out on the 30th of May, and was in an instant matured. The palace of the governor was assaulted. The

No. VII. U insurgents

insurgents demanded arms, to be enrolled, and formed into a regular body. The government, with the bishop, appeared at the balcony, exhorting the multitude to retire, but in vain. They overpowered the guard of the palace, rushed in, seized the governor, and dragged him as far as the Palm gate, where with knives and sticks they put him to death.

At Cadiz, on the 29th of May, the people rose against the lieutenant-general Solano, marquis del Socorro, captain general of the province of Andalusia, and governor of the city of Cadiz. The marquis, with the Spanish troops under his command, had been recalled for the purpose of covering the flight of Charles IV. from Aranjuez to Seville. At Madrid he formed an intimate and confidential connection with the grand duke of Berg, and general O'Farrel, an Irishman in the Spanish service, but drawn over to the side of the French. While the Spanish patriots at this place, with their allies the English, entered into a correspondence and contract with Sir Hugh Dalrymple, governor of Gibraltar, the English admiral Purvis, and general Castanos, commander of the Spanish camp at St. Roch, for the purpose of acting against the French according to circumstances, the French party kept up a correspondence with Madrid. Solano came in post haste to Cadiz, and issued proclamations against all who should enter into correspondence with the English forces, while a strong detachment from the main army of the French at Madrid was on its march to Cadiz. An immense number of people, conducted by Spanish officers and certain merchants of Cadiz, assembled round the governor's palace, at Chulana, a village in the vicinity of Cadiz, demanding arms and ammunition. Solano appeared at the balcony, and in a long speech endeavoured to persuade the people, that the power of the emperor of the French was altogether irresistible, and that if they should attempt to resist his will by force, they would precipitate their own destruction. They heard him with patience a long

long time ; but interrupted him at last, by repeating their cry of “ arms and ammunition. Long live Ferdinand VII.” Arms were brought from the barracks, and a cannon from the bulwarks. The gates of the palace were instantly forced: the governor’s guard was disarmed: Solano himself, attempting to make his escape by the tops of the houses, was seized and dragged into the street. Even in this extremity, he proclaimed the power and the vengeance of Bonaparte, and declared, “ that he was ready to die in the cause of the grand Napoleon.” A person who was near him, on hearing these words, dashed his brains out at one blow with a club.

Some excesses were committed in the provinces of Leon and Asturias. At Corunna, in Galicia, on the 1st of June, the people demanded that all the French residing at Corunna, should be arrested.

The reign of mere democracy was, however, of short duration. The zeal and efforts of unconnected individuals, were quickly brought into unity of design and action, by the establishment of provincial juntas. The municipal government of the towns of Spain, though complicated, wore in general an air of popular representation. Wherever there were two thousand householders, four deputies, and a syndic were named by the people, and formed part of the town council.—On the 27th of May there was a convention at Seville of the magistrates, the constituted authorities, and the most respectable of the inhabitants of all classes. This convention, by common consent, elected a supreme provincial junta. Various provinces acquiesced in the authority assumed by the junta of Seville, nor was it even opposed by any of them ; though particular juntas were established in the respective provinces for maintaining order, and calling forth their resources in support of the common cause.

Whatever was done by the Spaniards at this period, wore the twofold character of heroism and wisdom.

Abandoned to themselves, they had to provide against internal disunion and anarchy, as well as external aggression. All classes of men were obedient to the authority of the juntas, who were animated by one spirit of national indignation. The council of Castile had sanctioned all the edicts of the grand duke of Berg; but allowance was made for the state of coercion in which they were; when, on restraint being removed, they joined the patriots, they were hailed and respected as the true friends of their country, and all was forgotten. Similar indulgence was extended to such of the Spanish junta at Bayonne, and nobles that had accompanied Ferdinand to that place of confinement, as deserted the cause of Joseph as soon as it was in their power, and joined their countrymen in arms.

Noblemen and gentlemen, the clergy of all conditions, manufacturers, artizans, and labourers, all presented themselves voluntarily to be enrolled in the public service. There was yet another class of volunteers, of which we find frequent mention, not only in the papers of the day, published in various forms by the Spaniards, but even in the French bulletins, namely, the literary class; the class of students and professors in the universities. There were not less than twenty-four universities in Spain, and several of them crowded with students, who took upon them the profession of arms. Of the companies of students, some were called "the company of Brutus" others, "the company of Cato," "the company of the People," and by other allusions to the great cause of freedom. On their standard was inscribed, "Liberty or Death!"

The courage of this literary class is noticed in the French, as well as the Spanish accounts of occurrences. The companies formed of the monks and armed peasants, bore the names of saints. Many of the standards bore the device of the French eagle, torn to pieces by the lion of Spain. Among the higher clergy, there were many who entered at once into the

military spirit. The bishop of St. Andero wore always a cutlass at his side.

Every incentive that could be drawn from the religious character of the Spaniards, was employed to rouse the people to arms. A proclamation from his holiness the pope, Pius VII. to the Spanish catholics, together with a civil catechism, or brief compendium of the obligations of a good Spaniard, was industriously circulated in every province, town, village, and hamlet. Sermons were preached by the bishops in favour of the cause; and extracts from them printed and published*.

Shortly after the tragical end of Solano, the lieutenant-general of Andalusia, and government of Cadiz, were conferred by the supreme junta of Seville, that now exercised all the powers of government, on Don Thomas Morla, who had been long odious to the nobility on account of the severity of his manners, and his attachment to Don Emanuel Godoy, the Prince of Peace. But, as his great rival and adversary, general O'Farrel, had gone over to the French, his subsequent declarations of irreconcilable hatred to that party were believed to be founded in sincerity.

In the mean time, in consequence of the concert between general Castanos and the patriots of Cadiz on the one part, and the commanders of the British forces at Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean on the other, lord Collingwood arrived with ships to take the command of the English fleet off Cadiz, and general Spencer with five or six English regiments from Gibraltar, and the two Swiss regiments of Meuron and Watteville. Lord Collingwood offered his services for the reduction of the French fleet: but Morla

* The juntas, in their proclamations to the people, talked very gravely (according to their fanatical notions) of the patronage and protection to be expected from their LADY OF THE PILLAR. Nor were pious frauds disdained. At Valladolid, Saragossa, Valencia, and Seville, miracles were solemnly proclaimed, and those to whom such proclamations were addressed, seriously believed this piece of religious craft.

very properly determined, that this should be exclusively, an achievement of the Spaniards. The French ships lay in the canal of the arsenal in such a position, that they were out of the reach of the cannon of the castles, as well as of the Spanish squadron off Cadiz. But gun-boats, bomb-vessels, and tremendous batteries, constructed on the isle of Leon, and near fort Louis, soon reduced admiral Rosilly to surrender (June 14,) the French fleet, after offering in vain, terms of capitulation. The French fleet consisted of five ships of the line, of seventy-four guns, one frigates, and four thousand seamen and marines.

Advice having been received, that a small detachment of French had assembled at Tavira, to enter Spain by the river Guadiana, general Spencer, with the small detachment under his command, at the entreaty of general Morla, set sail for the Guadiana, and landed his troops at Ayamonte. Three ships had already been sent to the mouth of the Guadiana by admiral Purvis. In consequence of these movements, the French retired in all directions to Lisbon, with the exception of some weak detachments, left to occupy the small forts of other positions on that side of Portugal. The Portuguese, animated by the presence of the English, and the example, as well as addresses of the Spaniards, every where rose against the French. Deputations were sent from every part of Portugal to admiral sir Charles Cotton, commanding the naval forces of Britain in that quarter, soliciting succours. The admiral, with due frankness, immediately replied: "Agreeably on your desires, I send you ships, troops, arms, and ammunition: and have given orders for hoisting the flag of his royal highness the prince regent of Portugal, around which the whole Portuguese nation ought instantly to rally, and take up arms in a cause at once so just and so glorious. To secure success, unanimity is necessary. Unite yourselves with your brave friends and neighbours, the Spaniards."

On board the Hibernia, off the Tagus, July 4, 1808.

A declaration

A declaration of War against the Emperor of France, Napoleon the First, was published by the supreme junta of Seville:

“ Ferdinand the Seventh, King of Spain and the Indies,
and in his Name the Supreme Junta of both.

“ France, under the government of the emperor Napoleon the First, has violated towards Spain the most sacred compacts—has arrested her monarchs—obliged them to a forced and manifestly void abdication and renunciation; has behaved with the same violence towards the Spanish nobles whom he keeps in his power—has declared that he will elect a king of Spain, the most horrible attempt that is recorded in history—has sent his troops into Spain, seized her fortresses and her capital, and scattered her forces throughout the country—has committed against Spain all sorts of assassinations, robberies, and unheard of cruelties: and this he has done with the most enormous ingratitude to the services which the Spanish nation has rendered France, to the friendship it has shown her, thus treating it with the most dreadful perfidy, fraud, and treachery, such as was never committed against any nation or monarch by the most barbarous or ambitious king or people. He has, in fine, declared that he will trample down our monarchy, our fundamental laws, and bring about the ruin of our holy catholic religion. The only remedy, therefore, for such greivous ills, which are so manifest to all Europe, is in war, which we declare against him.

“ In the name, therefore, of our king Ferdinand the Seventh, and of all the Spanish nation, we declare war, by land and sea against the emperor Napoleon the First, and against France; we are determined to throw off her dominion and tyranny, and command all Spaniards to act hastily against her, to do her all possible damage according to the laws of war, to place an embargo upon the French ships in our ports, and all property and effects, in whatever part of Spain they may be, whether belonging to the government or the individuals of that nation. In the same manner we command, that no embarrassment or molestation be done to the English nation, nor its government, nor its ships, property, or effects, nor any individual of that nation. We declare, that there shall be open and free communication with England: that we have contracted and will keep an armistice with her, and that we hope to conclude a durable and lasting peace.

“ Moreover we protest, that we will not lay down our arms, till the emperor Napoleon the First has restored to Spain our king Ferdinand the Seventh, and the rest of the royal family; has respected the forced rights of the nation, which he has
violated,

violated, and her liberties, integrity and independence. With the same understanding and accordance with the Spanish nation, we command that the present solemn declaration be printed, posted, and circulated, among all the people and provinces of Spain and America, that it may be known in Europe, Africa, and Asia.

“ Given at the royal palace of Alcazar at Seville, this 6th of June, 1808.

“ By order of the supreme junta of government.

“ MANUEL MARIA AGUILAR, Sec.

“ JUAN BAPTISTA PARDO, Sec.”

It is necessary to mention that the noble efforts of the Spaniards were immediately followed by peace, harmony, and friendship, between that nation and Great Britain and her allies. Proclamations of peace and amity with England and her ally Sweden, were published by the juntas; and whatever power was at war with France, was at peace with England.

Proclamation of Peace with England and Sweden her Ally.

“ Ferdinand VII. king of Spain, and in his royal name:

“ The supreme junta of this principality declares a general peace with England, and at the same time the closest alliance with that nation, which has with the greatest generosity offered all the succours and assistance that have been asked of her. They also declare peace with Sweden, and order that all our ports should be open to the vessels of both nations, and that this royal resolution be communicated to all the justices of the principality.”

Preliminaries of a new and perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two nations of Spain and Portugal, were signed at Oporto, in the name of Ferdinand VII. and the prince-regent of Portugal, July 14, 1808. The bishop of Oporto, president of the junta of government of that city, which, Lisbon as well as Madrid being in the hands of the French, seems to have taken a pattern from Seville, signed the treaty in the name of the prince. Application, was made, June 12, to lord Collingwood, by the government of Cadiz, for a frigate to conduct commissioners, appointed by the supreme junta of Seville, to England, in order to treat with
his

his majesty's ministers, on matters of great interest and importance to both countries. As the admiral who commanded in the port of Cadiz was one of the deputies, lord Collingwood thought it proper, that his departure should be delayed till the surrender of the French ships in the harbour: within two or three days after which, the deputies set sail in the *Revenge* frigate for England, where they arrived on the 24th of July. Before their arrival deputies had appeared in London, from the principality of Asturias, bearing the first certain intelligence of the insurrection in Spain, and soliciting the aid of the British government. This was immediately granted, as the following declaration will evince:

His Britannic Majesty's Declaration to the Envoys of Asturias. Dated Office of Foreign Affairs, 12th June.

" My Lords,

" I have laid before my sovereign the letter which you were authorised by the junta of Asturias to deliver to me, together with powers entrusted to you by the junta, entreating in their name, his majesty's assistance. His majesty has desired me to assure your excellencies, that he feels the warmest interest in the resolution of the principality of Asturias to sustain against the atrocious usurper of France a contest in favour of the independence of the Spanish monarchy: that his majesty is disposed to grant every kind of assistance to efforts so magnanimous and praise-worthy. His majesty has, therefore, ordered me to declare, that no time shall be lost in embarking for the port of Gijon the succours that you require, as being the most pressingly necessary; he will besides send a naval force capable of protecting the coast of Asturias against any attempts which the French may make, and of introducing troops by sea into the country.—His majesty will make further efforts in so just a cause. His majesty has also ordered me to declare to your excellencies, his readiness to extend the same succours to every part of the Spanish monarchy which may be animated by the same spirit of the inhabitants of Asturias, as well as his majesty's sincere desire to renew those ties of friendship which subsisted so long between the two nations, and to direct his united efforts against any power which may evince hostile intentions against Spain, as well as Great Britain. I recommend to your excellencies to communicate, as soon as possible, to the junta, the man-

ner in which his majesty has received the proposals transmitted by your excellencies. A vessel has been got ready at Portsmouth, to carry any person you may think proper to dispatch.—I beg your excellencies to accept the assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed)

“GEORGE CANNING.”

On the 9th of June, six Spanish gentlemen, having at their head the viscount de Materosa and Don Diego de la Vega, arrived in London, and were followed by a succession of deputies, or envoys from other provinces, both Spanish and Portuguese. Peace was proclaimed with Spain in the London Gazette of the 5th of July; of which proclamation the following is a copy :

“At the Court of the Queen’s Palace, July 4, 1808 ; present the King’s Most Excellent Majesty in council.

“His majesty having taken into his consideration the glorious exertions of the Spanish nation for the deliverance of their country from the tyranny and usurpation of France, and the assurances which his majesty has received from several of the provinces of Spain, of their friendly disposition towards this kingdom, his majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered,

“1. That all hostilities against Spain on the part of his majesty shall immediately cease.—2. That the blockade of all the ports of Spain, except such as may be still in the possession or under the control of France, shall be forthwith raised.—3. That all ships and vessels belonging to Spain, shall have free admission into the ports of his majesty’s dominions, as before the present hostilities.—4. That all ships and vessels belonging to Spain, which shall be met at sea by his majesty’s ships and cruisers, shall be treated in the same manner as the ships of states in amity with his majesty, and shall be suffered to carry on any trade now considered by his majesty to be lawfully carried on by neutral ships.—5. That all vessels and goods belonging to persons residing in the Spanish colonies, which shall be detained by any of his majesty’s cruisers after the date hereof, shall be brought into port, and shall be carefully preserved in safe custody, to await his majesty’s further pleasure, until it shall be known whether the said colonies, or any of them, in which the owners of such ships and goods reside, shall have made common cause with Spain against the power of France.

“And

“ And the right honourable the lords commissioners of his majesty’s treasury, his majesty’s principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, the judges of the high court of admiralty, and the judges of the courts of vice-admiralty, are to take such measures herein as to them may respectively appertain.

“ STEPHEN COTTRELL.”

The Spanish prisoners in our jails, to the number of several thousands, were set free, clothed, and sent home to join their brethren in arms. The British arsenals, fleets, and squadrons, and treasures: all that Spain could demand, or England afford, was without hesitation or the smallest delay liberally granted. The first supply to the Spanish patriots, which was sent within a few days after the arrival of the Asturian deputies, consisted of 300,000*l.* sterling in dollars, five thousand muskets, thirty thousand pikes, and an immense quantity of powder and balls. Materosa’s secretary was sent home, together with three British officers of rank, with these succours, and assurances that others should be sent from time to time, as well as troops, and whatever the patriots might need. A promise which was faithfully fulfilled*.

The kingdom of Spain is divided into fourteen provinces, of which four were in the hands of the French: these were Navarre, Biscay, and the two Castiles. The French were also in possession of Barcelona. On the last day of May, a paper was published by the junta of Seville, under the title of “Precautions which it will be proper to observe throughout the different provinces of Spain, in the necessity to which they

* The deputies were splendidly entertained by the city of London, the bank, and other public bodies, as well as by individuals of great distinction. Subscriptions were opened in London, Liverpool, Bristol, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dublin, Cork, Waterford, and many other places, for supporting the cause of Spain, and several military corps, militia and volunteers, offered their services. The supreme junta of Asturias did not fail, in a gazette, dated Oviedo, June 30, to publish, with expressions of the most profound gratitude, the generosity of the British nation.

have

have been driven by the French, for resisting the unjust and violent possession which her armies are endeavouring to take of the kingdom."

No accurate estimate has been made, or could be made, or the numbers of men bearing arms, veterans and new levies, that appeared in the cause of the country in the various provinces. In some, all the males capable of bearing arms, were inrolled from fifteen to forty-five; in others, from sixteen to forty-six; and in some, to fifty. If all the enrolments were duly made, and all the persons enrolled, actually brought into the field, the amount of the whole must have exceeded a million; but this is scarcely to be supposed; and the numbers must have been fluctuating. One circumstance, however, wholly unworthy of the patriots, must not be passed over without observation. The provincial juntas, even the central junta into which these in the progress of time and events were resolved, were in the constant habit of exaggerating, prodigiously, the number of fighting men. If this would have dismayed the French, or inspired a general confidence in the Spanish nation, it might have been excused, nay, even commended; but the trick was quickly discovered. Indeed those false statements, by misleading their own generals, as was afterwards sadly experienced by sir John Moore, did incredible mischief. However, there was not any deficiency either in numbers, or in individual zeal or courage. What was really wanted was some person of authority, talents, and experience, to command and direct the resources of the country in one combined plan of operations. On the other hand, unity of design, promptitude of action, and aggression instead of defence, were extremely great advantages on the side of the French.

But the exact numbers of the French armies in the peninsula, at the period when the insurrection broke out, cannot be ascertained. The French gazettes sometimes exaggerated and at other times lessened the numbers of their forces, at particular places, and

on particular occasions, just as it seemed to suit their purpose. It is well known that there were at the close of May and the commencement of June, three marshals of France in the very heart of Spain; viz. the grand duke of Berg, and generals Moncey, and Bessieres. This supposes three distinct corps of the grand army, or nine divisions, forming in all from seventy to seventy-five thousand men: to which we must add the corps under marshal Ney, on the frontier of the Eastern Pyrennees, and occupying the fortresses of Barcelona and Montjuich. Marshal Ney's corps may be computed at ten thousand men. Adding to these twenty thousand French in Portugal under general Junot, and fifteen thousand auxiliaries, Hanoverians, Swiss, and Spaniards, we have an aggregate of about one hundred and twenty thousand men.

Of these hundred and twenty thousand men, fifty thousand were stationed in or near Madrid, under the command of the grand duke of Berg and marshal Moncey. From this great body detachments were sent to take possession of Cadiz and Valencia. One of these detachments proceeded towards its destination under general Dupont: the other marched to Valencia, under marshal Moncey. Marshal Bessieres, whose principal force was posted at Vittoria and Pampeluna, for guarding the two roads to Madrid, and securing the communication between that capital and Bayonne, had it in charge to push detachments to the right and left, for keeping as great an extent of country as possible in check.

It must be acknowledged, that there is great wisdom in the plans laid down by the French in this affair of Spain; for the reduction of the city of Valencia, would have been an important step towards that of the whole province, and would likewise have opened a way for combining the operations of marshal Moncey and general Duhesme in Catalonia. That of Cadiz, besides the importance of its harbour, ships, and naval arsenal, would have terminated a military line of posts from Bayonne, by Vittoria, Burgos,
1 Madrid,

Madrid, Cordova, and Seville, and would have completely divided the peninsula from north-east to south-west, and have cut off all co-operation between the eastern and western divisions of the peninsula.

Marshal Bessieres, who commanded the northern army of the French, was opposed by general Cuesta, who was at the head of the four western provinces of Galicia, Asturias, Estremadura, Leon, and certain unsubdued, or as they were called by the French, refractory districts of Biscay. General Castanos was appointed commander-in-chief of the four kingdoms of Andalusia, with the provinces of Grenada and Valencia, which had united themselves with Andalusia. Admiral Cisneros was captain-general of Murcia; Don Joseph Palafox of Arragon, and count Espellata of Catalonia. The garrison of St. Roch and Ceuta, joined their brethren in arms, under the general command of Castanos; those of Majorca and Minorca the patriots of Catalonia.

The army under Dupont, when it left Madrid, towards the close of May, amounted to fifteen thousand men; but, in its progress, it was gradually diminished by sickness, by desertion, and by the necessity of sending out, from time to time, parties for bringing in forage and provisions, the greater part of which were destroyed or taken by parties of armed peasants. Having crossed the Sierra Morena, he descended into the plains of Andalusia, and on the 7th of June advanced to Cordova, of which he took possession, without much opposition from the Spanish troops quartered there, joined by a number of peasants*. On the 13th, parties of French advanced beyond Cordova. On the 16th, the French commander being informed that general Castanos was marching against him, at the head of twenty-one thousand regular troops, infantry, twenty-five thou-

* For three days, the city of Cordova was given up to pillage. The churches, after being swept of their sacred vessels and ornaments, were converted into stables.

sand cavalry, and a numerous artillery, besides a great number of insurgents who volunteered their service, retreated from Cordova to Andujar; where he took up a strong position with the Guadalquivir in front, and added to the natural strength of the place, deep entrenchments. General Castanos thought it improper to attack the enemy in his entrenched camp, but determined to cut off the supplies, by getting between him and a division of that army, under the orders of general Wedel. General Dupont, in this perilous situation, dispatched messengers to Madrid, requesting reinforcements. A division of eight thousand men was sent under general Belliard, famous for his exploits in Upper Egypt, by the Sierra Morena. And Dupont, in order to facilitate a junction with the expected reinforcements, quitted his position at Andujar, and fell back on Baylen. But Castanos posted divisions and detachments of his army in so judicious a manner, as not only to cut off all communication between the corps under general Wedel and general Dupont, but also between this last corps, which was the more numerous, and Madrid†. A detachment of five hundred men sent out from the French camp at Andujar, to seek and meet Belliard was cut off by the smugglers of the

† The deplorable situation to which Dupont was reduced, is thus described in an intercepted letter from him to general Belliard. —“ We have not a moment to lose for quitting a position, in which we cannot subsist. The soldiers being under arms the whole day, cannot now, as heretofore, reap the corn and make bread: for all the peasants have abandoned both their hamlets and their harvests. For Heaven’s sake, send us prompt reinforcements; in one word, a body of troops forming one compacted mass, of which the component parts must be as near to each other as ever it is possible. If we suffer the enemy to keep the field, all the southern provinces and the other troops of the line will hasten to take part with the rebels. A decisive blow in Andalusia, would contribute greatly to the subjugation of all Spain. Send me, without a moment’s delay, medicines and linen for the wounded: for the enemy has intercepted, for the space of a month, all our ammunition waggons, and the provisions sent for us from Toledo.”

mountains,

mountains, who had formed themselves into a body, four thousand strong, and sworn (contrary to the practice of civilized nations) to grant no quarter. The same body, and other parties of Spaniards, harassed the detachment of Belliard in the defiles of the Sierra Morena, night and day. Instead of forming a junction with Dupont, he was seen to return to Madrid with half the numbers with which he had set out. On the 20th of July, about three o'clock in the Morning, the army under Dupont attacked the Spaniards. There was a division of nine thousand strong, under the command of lieutenant general Reding, a Swiss. There was another division of the Spanish army of five thousand, under general de Coupigny; a third under general de Pena, of six thousand; and a fourth under general Jones, of five thousand; in all twenty-five thousand. The force of Dupont did not exceed eight thousand.

The first shock of the French was so furious, that the foremost companies of the Spaniards suffered prodigiously. But the Spaniards maintained their ground, and, supported by their artillery, attacked and drove the French back before them at all points. Yet the French nobly kept up the conflict, constantly renewing their assaults without any other interruption than what was unavoidably occasioned by momentary retreats, for the formation of fresh columns, till half an hour past mid-day.

At two o'clock in the afternoon, the advanced guard of the division under general Pena arrived at the scene of action, and began to play on the enemy with his artillery; when a flag of truce appeared, desiring to treat for a capitulation. An armistice ensued of course. But during this, the division under the command of general Pena, was attacked by the French division, six thousand strong, under general Wedel, who came up, while Dupont was engaged with the generals Reding and Coupigny. The battalion of Cordova was surprized and taken, with two field pieces. The number of the French killed and wounded

wounded in the battle of Baylen, amounted it was computed, to three thousand; but that of the Spaniards to a much greater number. The negotiation between Dupont and the Spanish commander-in-chief, general Castanos, did not last long. Dupont was told that he must surrender at discretion: which he agreed to. General Wedel's division was comprehended in the capitulation, as well as that of Dupont, forming together a body of fourteen thousand. It was agreed that general Wedel's division should be sent home by sea, to Rochfort.

Marshal Moncey's forces were not more successful in Valencia than those of general Dupont were in Andalusia, though he escaped capture, and made good his retreat, with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, to Madrid. The passes through the rugged mountains were guarded by some troops of the line, and a considerably body of Valentian insurgents. These guards were attacked by Moncey, on the 21st of June, and routed. Having crossed the mountains, he marched to Valencia.

On the 26th, he was attacked at Bunolos by general Caro, a nephew of the illustrious general Romana, and suffered severely, in both cavalry and infantry. He was attacked again by general Caro, between Quarte and Mislata, when he also sustained considerable loss. Nevertheless, though thus harassed, he continued his march, and on the 28th, opened a heavy fire on Valencia, of both artillery and musquetry, which was continued without ceasing from mid-day till the evening. The Valentians returned his fire with some pieces of artillery planted at the gates of the city, and by showers of musketry from the tops of the houses. On the other hand, he had to maintain a conflict with general Caro, who had followed the French close at their heels, for the defence of Valencia. An impetuous charge with the bayonet, made such havoc among the ranks of the French, that they retired, at about eight o'clock at night to their camp between Quarte and Mislata,

which was fortified by strong entrenchments and formidable batteries. From thence he continued his retreat on Madrid, harassed for some days by general Caro, as he had been on his march through the plain of Valencia. Fifteen hundred men were made prisoners, and sent to Carthagera,

The campaign of Arragon was still more glorious to the Spanish patriots, than those of Andalusia and Valencia. Arragon, situated between Madrid and the frontier of France, was obliged to fight with one reinforcement of fresh troops after another. In every engagement before the walls of Saragossa, Palafox was victorious. The inhabitants of Saragossa equalled the patriotic herosim of the Numantians and Saguntines. Every mode of defence and attack that human imagination could devise was adopted, and whatever human courage could dare to attempt, was performed.

On the 25th of May, the inhabitants of this defenceless city, and the peasantry of the surrounding country, rose to repel the aggressions of the French, and to frustrate the design of changing the dynasty on the Spanish throne, announced in the manifesto of the grand duke of Berg, on the 20th of May. The captain-general of Arragon, Guiliamah, had betrayed an inclination to submit to the enemy. He was, on this account, seized, and thrown into prison, and the government, unanimously conferred on Don Joseph Palafox *, the youngest of three brothers of one of the most distinguished families in Arragon. At the commencement of his command, the neighbouring provinces of Navarre and Catalonia were in possession of

* This nobleman, at the commencement of the revolution, had been selected from the officers of the guards, to be second in command to the marquis de Castellar, to whose custody the Prince of the Peace was confined after his arrest at Aranjuez. Though he had been in the Spanish guards all his life, he had never seen actual service. His time had been principally passed in the dissipation of Madrid, where he was not a little distinguished by the splendour and fashion of his appearance.

the French. The passes of the Pyrenees leading directly into Arragon, were open, and the grand duke of Berg, with the main body of the French forces, was stationed at Madrid. Thus surrounded by his enemy, general Palafox mustered the regular troops quartered at Saragossa, amounting to two hundred and twenty men; and he found the public treasury of the province could not furnish him with more than two thousand reals, a sum in English money, equal to 20*l.* 16*s.* 8*d.* Animated, however, by the patriotism, and the confidence reposed in him by his countrymen, he did not despair of his country's cause. He published a proclamation on the 31st of May, encouraging the Arragonese in their ardour, and declaring war against France.

Early in the month of June, a detachment of eight thousand French infantry, and nine hundred cavalry, under the general of division Le Fevre, began to march from Pampeluna against Saragossa. After a succession of skirmishes with the Arragonese, at Tudela, Mallen Gaul, and Alagon, the French advanced, June 14, within a short distance of Saragossa, where they took up a position in the valley on the opposite side of the town, to that side which was situated on the Ebro. Having occupied this post, they deferred their general attack on the city till the morrow: but a small detachment of cavalry that penetrated into the town on the 14th of June, paid dearly for their rashness. On the 15th, the French sent a detachment against the outposts on the canal of Arragon, while their main body attempted to storm the city by the gate called Portillo. The efforts of the Arragonese were, after a most severe conflict, finally crowned with success. A party of the French that entered the town, were instantly put to death, and Le Fevre withdrew his troops out of the reach of the Arragonese cannon.

The French being thus repulsed, general Palafox set out from Saragossa to collect reinforcements, and provide resources for a siege, and to place the rest

of the kingdom in a state of defence, in case of the reduction of the capital. He found from twelve to fourteen hundred soldiers, who had escaped from Madrid, and united with them a small division of militia stationed at Calatayud. With this force he determined to attack the French. He hoped now to place the French between his little army and the city of Saragossa; but was frustrated by a sudden attack on the part of the enemy in the night at Epila, when the Spaniards, after an obstinate resistance, were compelled to yield to superior numbers and discipline. The wrecks of this small force retired to Calatayud, and afterwards with great difficulty threw themselves into Saragossa.

Meanwhile the French received reinforcements of troops and artillery from Pampeluna, and began to occupy the several military positions in the plain covered with olive trees that surrounds Saragossa. They were not allowed to carry on these operations unmolested. In a short time, however, the French had invested nearly one half of the town, and on the 28th of June they took possession of Torrero. The battery on the neighbouring height also, which had been entrusted to an artillery officer, and five hundred men, fell into their hands. The officer was declared a traitor to his country, for not having defended this important post as he ought to have done, and on his return into Saragossa, was immediately hanged. After the surrender of the Torrero, the city could not communicate with the country on any other side than that of the Ebro.

While these operations of the enemy were carried on, the Arragonese were busily employed in placing their town in the best possible state of defence that their slender resources would admit of. They tore down the awnings from their windows, and formed them into sacks, which they filled with sand, and piled up before every gate, in the form of a battery, digging round each of them a deep trench. The exertions of the men were animated with women of every description,

scription, who formed themselves into parties for the relief of the wounded; and for carrying water and provisions to the batteries of the gates, while their children were employed in conveying cartridges made by the monks. Scarcely a day passed without a sanguinary contest between detachments of the French and Arragonese, in the neighbouring olive woods. About the last day of June, a powder magazine in the heart of the city blew up, and in a moment nearly a whole street was reduced to a heap of ruins. The inhabitants had scarcely recovered from their consternation at this dreadful loss, when the French, who had received mortars, howitzers, and cannon, opened a destructive fire upon the city. The sand bag battery before the gate called *Portillo*, against which the attack of the enemy was principally directed, was gallantly defended. It was several times destroyed, and as often reconstructed under the fire of the enemy*. Attack was made after attack; Saragossa was more and more closely

* Here an act of heroism was performed by a female, to which there is scarcely any thing equal in history. Augustina Saragossa, about twenty-two years of age, a handsome young woman, of the lower class of the people, whilst performing her duty of carrying refreshments to the gates, arrived at the battery of the *Portillo*, at the very moment when the fire of the French had absolutely destroyed every person that was stationed on it. The citizens and soldiers, for a moment hesitated to re-man the guns. Augustina, rushing forward over the wounded and slain, snatched a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, and fired off a twenty-six pounder. Then, jumping upon the gun, she made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during the siege: and her fellow-citizens, stimulated by this daring act of intrepidity to fresh exertions, instantly rushed into the battery, and again opened a tremendous fire on the enemy. Mr. Vaughan, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, and one of Dr. Ratcliffe's travelling fellows from that University, whose excellent narrative has been our principal guide in this account of the siege of Saragossa, relates, that when he saw this heroine there, "She had a small shield of honour embroidered on the sleeve of her gown, with *Saragoza* inscribed upon it, and was receiving a pension from the government, and the daily pay of an artilleryman."

invested.

invested. Above the city the Ebro was fordable, and below it the French, in spite of the efforts of the Arragonese, constructed a bridge. Having by these means transported their cavalry to the opposite bank of the river, they destroyed the mills which supplied the town with flour, levied contributions in the different villages, and cut off the only communication by which the besieged could receive any supplies either of provisions or ammunition. In this critical situation, the active and intelligent captain general of Arragon, established in various parts of the city corn mills worked by horses, and ordered the monks to be employed, under skilful directors, in manufacturing gun-powder. All the sulphur the place afforded was put into immediate requisition. The earth of the streets was carefully washed, in order to furnish saltpetre; and charcoal was made of the stalks of hemp, which in that part of Spain grows to a very unusual size. On this simple foundation there was formed, afterwards, a regular manufactory of gunpowder at Saragossa, yielding 13 arrobas of Castile, or 325lbs. per day.

Towards the end of July, the large population of Saragossa was but scantily supplied with food, and had but little or no hope of succour. By the unremitting exertion of forty-six days, their spirits were exhausted, and their bodily strength impaired. A desperate effort was made to recover the important post of Torrero, in vain! after which the Arragonese, despairing of being able to make any sortie with effect, resolved to conquer or to perish within the walls of their city. During a bombardment on the 2d and 3d of August, a foundling hospital, which contained the sick and wounded, who from time to time had been conveyed there during the siege, unfortunately caught fire, and was rapidly consumed. All attention to private property was instantly abandoned. Every body was seen hastening to the relief of the sick and the helpless children: in which act of humanity none were more conspicuous than the
1 women,

women, who persisted in their humane exertions, equally undaunted by the shot and shells of the enemy, and the flames of the building before them. On the 4th of August the French opened a tremendous battery on the quarter of the city called Santa Engracia. In an instant the mud walls opposite to their batteries vanished; and the splendid convent of Santa Engracia was on fire and tottering in ruins. The French columns immediately rushed through this entrance into the city, took the batteries before the adjacent gates in reverse, and after a most sanguinary conflict, penetrating into the centre of the town, were in possession before the day closed of one half of Saragossa. The French general then demanded a capitulation; but that was refused by Palafox; who declared he would carry on the war by the knife, when every other method failed.

One side of the street Corso, was now occupied by the French, in the centre of which general Verdier was seen giving his orders from the Franciscan convent. The Arragonese maintained their positions on the opposite side, throwing up batteries at the openings of the streets within a few paces of similar batteries of the French. The intervening space was soon heaped up with dead, either thrown from the windows of the houses in which they had been slain, or killed in the conflicts below. From this enormous accumulation of the dead, there was the utmost reason to apprehend a pestilence. To an Arragonese it was almost certain death to appear in the middle of the street.

When the French were expected to renew their efforts to obtain complete possession of the city, on the 5th of August, the Arragonese found their ammunition beginning to fail. The only cry that assailed the ears of the gallant general, as he rode amongst the people was, that if ammunition failed, they were ready to attack the enemy with only their knives. At this awful crisis, just before night-fall, a convoy of provisions and ammunition, with a reinforcement

forcement of three thousand men, composed of Spanish guards, Swiss, and volunteers of Arragon, unexpectedly made their entrance into the city, under the command of Don Francisco Palafox, the brother of the captain general.

During the night of the 13th of August, the fire of the French was particularly destructive; and when their batteries ceased, flames were seen to burst out in many parts of the buildings in their possession. On the morning of the 14th, to the great surprize of the Arragonese, their columns were seen at a distance retreating over the plain on the road to Pampeluna. The retreating French were followed into Navarre by general Palafox, with a force composed of Arragonese and Valentinians, who had begun their march for the relief of Saragossa, when the siege was raised.

Duhesme, the French governor of Catalonia, had been directed to reduce Gerona, at the same time that Lefevre was sent against Saragossa. Gerona, in the campaign of 1808, gave an earnest of that valour and patriotism, which was found afterwards to equal those of Saragossa. Duhesme, after spending upwards of a fortnight in the siege of Gerona, into which he threw in one night four hundred bombs and grenades, was forced, by the vigorous sallies of the Geronese, and the movement of other Catalonians, who threatened to attack him in flank and rear, to retreat to Barcelona, leaving before Gerona, some pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of provisions and ammunition. In his retreat he sustained a great loss both of men and baggage.

On the 30th of June, in the morning, the French under general Goullès, and brigadier general Besieres, marched from Barcelona against the main strength of the insurgents, which rested on the right bank of the Llobregat. Proceeding to the mouth of the river, they forced the passage, and pushing up the right bank, took several Catalonian posts in the rear. Undisciplined, without a commander of any authority,

authority, or none that could inspire confidence; and surprized, perhaps, by this manœuvre, the peasants submitted to the French without much resistance. At the same time general Leckie, with a division of French, amounting to fifteen hundred, assailed and took possession of the bridge of Molinos del Rey, with the three pieces that guarded the passage way; but not without a well-fought battle, in which the loss of the French was computed to be equal to that of the Spaniards. On the side of Figueras, general Reible proceeded thither from Bellegarde against the insurgents, on the 5th of July. The insurgents being worsted in a smart action, and dispersed, he threw provisions into the place, and a reinforcement into the garrison.

General Duhesme, in revenge for his repulse from Gerona, burnt many houses in the towns and villages by which he passed, took many prisoners, and laid waste the whole plain or district within the jurisdiction of the city of Barcelona; all the cultivated fields, villages, convents, and churches were destroyed.

During these operations, the junta of Catalonia had established themselves at Lerida, for the conveniency of communicating with Arragon and Valencia.

When general Duhesme returned to Barcelona, he found his two forts in great want of both powder and provisions. During his absence about a month from Barcelona, it had been cut off from a free intercourse with the neighbouring country. And a vessel loaded with powder for their use, and another with salted pork, had been taken by the English. Duhesme pointed the cannon of the citadel against the inhabitants, threatening them with death if they did not furnish him with twelve thousand rations of provisions daily, and an excessive number of pipes of wine and brandy.

In the mean time the affairs of the patriots in the north of Spain wore but an unfavourable aspect, and a battle was fought at Medina del Rio Seco, in the

province of Leon, which turned the tide of fortune, and might have exceedingly damped, if not altogether quashed the insurrection, if this advantage on the side of the French had not been counterbalanced by the events in the south and the east just related.

Marshal Bessieres at the same time that he sent a force against Saragossa, pushed forward columns for the reduction of Logrono, Segovia, Valladolid, and St. Andero. All these objects were easily accomplished. The raw and undisciplined levies of patriots did not long sustain a conflict with the impetuous and well-directed exertions of the veteran and victorious French; but consulted their safety by flight, for the most part throwing down their arms. On the 7th of June, general Frere, having arrived with his column within a quarter of a mile of Segovia, sent an officer to the magistrates, demanding a parley.

The insurgents, five thousand strong, with thirty pieces of cannon, would not suffer the messenger to approach, but fired on him. On this the place was taken by force; the resistance here was not inconsiderable; a great number of wounded and others fell into the hands of the French, with all their cannon. The city of Segovia, after the defeat and flight of the armed peasants made its submissions, in the manner required by the French general. When general La Salle, June 8th, was approaching Palentia, a deputation, with the bishop at their head, brought the submission of the town. The town and province of Palentia were disarmed. On the 12th of June, general La Salle advanced to Duennas, where he formed a junction with general Merle, and from whence he continued his march to Valladolid, where the spirit of insurrection had grown very strong, and which was a great rendezvous of the patriots. General Cuesta, with seven thousand men, and six pieces of artillery, had taken post at Cabezon, a small town on the Pisuerga, about nine miles to the north of Valladolid. General Sabathier was ordered to force the

the position, which had been reconnoitred, of the insurgents, whilst general Merle was directed to cut off his retreat to Valladolid. The firing, according to the French accounts, lasted but half an hour, when the insurgents were completely beaten, scattered in every direction on the field of battle, leaving their artillery, four thousand muskets, and about one thousand killed.

The bishop of Valladolid, with the principal clergy of the city, came to meet general La Salle, supplicating forgiveness to the city and its inhabitants, which was readily granted. The city and province of Valladolid were disarmed. Ten members of the council of Placentia, Segovia, and Valladolid, were deputed to go to his catholic majesty (Joseph Bonaparte) at Bayonne, there to supplicate his forgiveness, in the act of tending their own fealty, and that of their fellow-citizens.

General Merle proceeded to the mountains of St. Andero: on the morning of the 21st of June, he fell upon the insurgents, headed by the bishop, drove them from their positions, and took from them two eighteen pounders, which, loaded with grape shot, they had fired only twice. In other parts of the mountainous district, parties of the insurgents were driven from post to post into St. Andero, by general Ducos. On the 23d, the generals Merle and Ducos entered St. Andero, on different sides of the town; which having made its submission, like Segovia, Placentia, and Valladolid, was obliged to swear fealty to the French.

A great number of patriots had been assembling, for some time, at Benevento, under the standard of general Cuesta. In this number were comprehended all the Spanish prisoners who had been sent back to Spain by the British government. With this force, general Cuesta marched to Valladolid, with the design of cutting off the communication between the French in the northern provinces of Spain, and those in Madrid. It was his plan, having reduced Valla-

dolid, to advance to Burgos. The force under Cuesta, is stated to have amounted to thirty-five thousand men. Marshal Bessieres advanced to meet them with a force, amounting in all to twelve thousand, of which two thousand were cavalry, with a proportionate train of artillery. On the 14th of July, at day break, he came in sight of the enemy, and attacked them on the right. And at the same time general Monton, at the head of another division, made himself master of the town of Medina del Rio Seco, with fixed bayonets. The Spaniards fled in great confusion; and lost all their artillery, consisting of forty pieces of cannon. Six thousand were made prisoners, and more than twelve thousand left on the field of battle. All their baggage and military stores fell into the hands of the French. They were pursued by marshal Bessieres, who at Benavento, July 19th, found an immense quantity of arms and ammunition. Here, he received a letter of submission from the inhabitants of Zamora, and on the following day, the 20th, he entered that town, whence he proceeded to Majorga; where he received a deputation from Leon, which city he entered on the 26th. The bishop came two miles to meet him, and the council appearing before the gates of the city, presented the keys, in token of submission.

The kind of order observed by the Spaniards, is sufficiently illustrated by the rapidity of their retreat, and the distance to which they retreated. On the other hand that their disasters were not so great as had been given out, and that reinforcements were advancing to join general Cuesta, is rendered extremely probable by the retreat or flight of king Joseph Bonaparte, on the 27th of July, from Madrid.

After intelligence was received of the surrender of Dupont * at Baylen, and the discovery that so many

* According to the various accounts which were published on the continent, general Dupont, on his arrival in France, was tried by a courtmartial, condemned to death, and immediately shot by torch-light.

of the ministers of Joseph had made their escape from Madrid, the French immediately began to fortify the Reteiro. Duhesme had been repulsed from Gerona, Saragossa still held out, armies from Valencia and Andalusia menaced the capital. The army of the western provinces, under general Cuesta, though routed and dispersed by the battle of Medina del Rio Seco, manifested a determination to rally. The French, therefore, in the evening of the 29th of July, began to evacuate Madrid. King Joseph, with the last companies of the troops, left Madrid on the 29th, and took the route of Segovia, from whence he proceeded to Burgos, the rendezvous of the whole of his army at and in the vicinity of Madrid. The French carried along with them all the artillery and ammunition, for which they could find means of conveyance; spiking the cannon, and destroying the ammunition they were obliged to leave behind them. The French army was accompanied or followed by such of the Spaniards as had accepted offices under the government of Joseph, and most of the French established in various situations in Madrid.

By a well combined plan, concerted between the English admiral Keats, in the Baltic, and the marquis de la Romana, ten thousand of the Spanish troops stationed in Funen, Langeland, Zealand, and Jutland, emancipated themselves from the French yoke, and, under the protection of the British fleet, were conveyed, with their stores, arms, and artillery, to Spain, where they landed at Corunna on the 30th of September. The Marquis de la Romana himself returned home by the way of London, where he arrived on the 16th of September, for the purpose of having a conference with the British ministry, and British military officers. One Spanish regiment of two thousand men, was too critically situated in Jutland to effect its escape: and two in Zealand were disarmed. While the French general Frision was in the act of haranguing these troops, for the purpose of engaging them to declare for king Joseph, one of
1 the

the soldiers stepped forth from the ranks and fired a pistol at him, which missing the general, killed the aid-de-camp*.

When the real state of Spain became manifested to Europe by the flight of king Joseph from Madrid, and the concentration of the French forces on the defiles of Biscay, and on the Ebro, Bonaparte's sarcasms against the insurgents were interrupted for a long time, as well as his military operations; and it was evident, that the Spanish insurrection was of too serious a nature to be treated lightly. It was mani-

* The marquis de la Romana was kept in profound ignorance of the events that had taken place in his country, and various attempts had been made, on the part of the British government, to communicate the tidings to him, and to devise means for his escape with the troops under his command, without effect. At length a Swedish clergyman was found in whom the firmest confidence could be placed. This gentleman, disguised as a low and travelling tradesman, went by the way of Heligoland, and having overcome many obstacles with the utmost patience, prudence, and fortitude, at length arrived at the place where the marquis and his troops were stationed. Having ascertained the person of the marquis, he was obliged to watch incessantly for an opportunity of addressing him, without exciting the suspicion of the numerous spies by whom he was surrounded. The venerable agent was obliged, as if by accident, to jostle the marquis in the street, in order to attract his attention. Having done so, he apologized, as if ignorant of the person whom he addressed, and concluded with offering to sell him some excellent coffee. The marquis treated this offer with contempt, and signified that he supposed he was speaking to a smuggler. The minister of the gospel, however, persevered in recommending his coffee, and in the course of the conversation, found means to intimate that he was not a smuggler but a gentleman.—“We'll soon see that,” said the marquis, and then asked him if he could speak Latin. The minister answered in the affirmative, and a conversation ensued, apparently about coffee, and the gestures of both were calculated to deceive all who might observe them. The marquis was then informed of the outlines of what had occurred in Spain, of the assistance the British government had rendered, and of the readiness of his Britannic majesty to adopt any measure that might be thought practicable for effecting the rescue of himself and his troops, that they might join their heroic countrymen in resisting the base attempts of France to enslave them.

festly not to be crushed but by a greater force than he could at present spare.

Orders were transmitted from Paris to the members of the confederation of the Rhine, to call out their respective quotas, which, when assembled, would be very powerful. Of the German troops of this confederation, eighty thousand were taken into the pay of France, clothed in the uniform of French soldiers, and sent into France to garrison the towns quitted by French regiments sent to reinforce the French army in Spain.

The inhabitants of Lisbon, overawed by the army of Junot, were restrained at first from expressing their joy, otherwise than in private and confidential conversation. The public voice of Portugal was first heard at Oporto. This town, besides the circumstance of being situate at a considerable distance from the force under Junot, possessed another advantage: It had been occupied by about three thousand Spanish troops, who before their departure to join the patriotic standard in Spain, took the French general under whose orders they were, and all his staff, prisoners, and delivered up the government of the city to Lewis D'Oliveira, who had filled that office before the arrival of the French. The treachery of this person, his attachment to the French, and the measures he took for restoring their authority, roused the indignation of the people to such a pitch, that he found it impossible to avert their threatened vengeance otherwise than by yielding up his authority. They rose on the 18th of June, broke open the depots of stores, and having supplied themselves with arms, proceeded to destroy every vestige of French power, and to imprison every person suspected of being in their interest. The bishop of Oporto, who, with most of the other priests, had been incessant in his efforts to rouse the people to arms, was appointed governor of the city, and the most vigorous measures were adopted for defending it against any force. General Loison, with about three thousand men, advanced

vanced against the insurgents as far as Amiranthe; but on being made acquainted with the determined spirit of the people of Oporto, he retreated on Lisbon. Nearly all the inhabitants of the Northern parts of Portugal, rose in arms against the French. The south of Portugal was restrained from coming forward in so open a manner, by their vicinity to the army of Junot, and by a strong and numerous French party among themselves. Notwithstanding the terror, however, of Junot, a friendly intercourse was maintained between Lisbon and sir Charles Cotton.

No sooner did Junot receive certain intelligence of the Spanish insurrection, than he ordered the Spanish troops to be disarmed, and put on board the hulks in the Tagus.

The French being expelled from the northern provinces of Portugal, and the authority of the prince regent re-established, provisional juntas were formed, similar in their character and functions to those of Spain. Of these, that of Oporto exerted itself with the most zeal and effect, in heightening and directing the patriotic enthusiasm of the people, and in the establishment of such orders and regulations as were required by the peculiar circumstances of the country. Oporto, in this respect, was the Seville of Portugal. The junta having taken such measures for raising and supporting an army as circumstances admitted, naturally looked for support and assistance to England, nor were their hopes disappointed. An army, under the command of sir Arthur Wellesly, destined for Portugal, where it ultimately landed, was, in the first instance, offered to the Spaniards. This army, consisting of about ten thousand men, set sail from Cork, on the 12th of July, and arrived at Corunna on the 20th. The battle of Medina del Rio Seco, had taken place a few days before, and the Spaniards were retreating fast in different directions: one division of them adhering to Cuesta, proceeded to Salamanca; another, under general Blake, made
for

the mountains. In consequence of this intelligence, combined with his instructions, sir Arthur Wellesley offered the assistance of the force under his command to the junta of Galicia. The junta replied, that they did not want men, and they wished for nothing from the British government except money, arms, and ammunition. But they expressed their firm conviction that his army might be of infinite service both to the Portuguese, and their own nation, if it was employed to drive the French from Lisbon. In the north of Portugal, and consequently at no great distance from Galicia, the French were still in force. Against them, in the first place, sir Arthur Wellesley might direct his attack with every probability of success, and with the certainty of relieving the province of Galicia, if the insurrection at Oporto still existed, or could be revived when he reached that city. Leaving Corunna, sir Arthur proceeded to Oporto; and on his arrival there, the bishop, who was the governor, informed him, that the Portuguese force was sufficient to deter the French from making any attacks, or if not, to repel them. Sir Arthur, however, that he might be the better enabled to judge what was best to be done, left his forces at Oporto, in order to have a conference with sir Charles Cotton, off Lisbon: with whom he consulted about the practicability and the prudence of forcing the entrance of the Tagus, and attacking the forts in the vicinity of that capital. In the mean time, while on board the *Hibernia*, the admiral's ship, he received a letter from general Spencer, then with about six thousand men, off Cadiz. This force was destined to co-operate with the Spanish forces under Castanos, in their operations against Dupont, or in conjunction with the expedition under sir Arthur Wellesley. As the junta of Seville did not deem the aid of general Spencer's corps at all necessary towards the reduction of Dupont's army, and as sir Arthur was decidedly of opinion that his own army, and that of general Spencer, could be but of little avail towards the expulsion

of the French from Portugal, while they acted separately, he gave orders to general Spencer to form a junction with him.

Having made himself acquainted, as accurately as he could with the numerical strength and disposition of the French army, the English general determined to land his forces in Mondego Bay, where he would be able to effect a landing, and to form his army into order, without any opposition from the enemy; while at the same time, he would be assisted and supported by the Portuguese army which had advanced to Coimbra. Previous to landing the troops he received advice from the British government that five thousand men, under general Anstruther, were proceeding to join him, and that twelve thousand more, under sir John Moore, would speedily be dispatched for the same purpose. He was also informed of the surrender of general Dupont, and that the army of Junot was considerably weakened by the necessity of sending about six thousand men, under general Loison, to quell an insurrection that had broken out in the southern districts of Portugal. In consequence of this information, sir Arthur was induced to disembark his troops without delay. Soon after the disembarkation was effected, the corps under general Spencer also landed. And on the 9th of August the advanced guard marched forward on the road to Lisbon. On the 12th the army reached Legria. On the 15th the advanced guard came up with a party of the French at Obidos, where a slight action took place. On the 16th the army halted, and on the next day the general came to the determination of attacking the French under general Laborde at Roleia; which is situated on an eminence, having a plain in its front, at the end of a valley, which commences at Caldos, in the centre of the valley, and about eight miles from Roleia, is the town and old Moorish fort of Obidos, from which post the enemy's pickets had been driven on the 15th. The French force amounted to about six thousand, of which about five hundred were cavalry,

valry, with five pieces of cannon. And there was some reason to believe that general Loison, who was at Rio Major on the 16th, would join general Laborde by his right in the course of the night. The plan of attack was formed accordingly, and the army breaking up from Caldas on the 17th, was formed into three columns; the right destined to turn the enemy's left, and penetrate into the mountains in his rear; the left to ascend the hills at Obidos, to turn all the posts on the left of the valley, and also watch the motions of general Loison; the centre column to attack general Laborde's position in front. The enemy was defeated, but retreated in good order. By this victory the road was cleared to Lisbon. On the day after the battle the British army moved to Lourinha, to protect the landing, and facilitate the junction of the troops under general Anstruther; and on the 21st they resumed their march.

The following is an Extract of the dispatch from sir Arthur Wellesley relative to the battle of Vimeira:

"SIR,

"Vimeira, Aug. 21, 1808.

"I have the honour to report to you, that the enemy attacked us in our position at Vimeira this morning. The village of Vimeira stands in a valley, through which runs the river Maceira; at the back, and to the westward and northward of this village, is a mountain, the western point of which touches the sea, and the eastern is separated by a deep ravine from the heights, over which passes the road which leads from Lourinha and the northward to Vimeira. The greater part of the infantry, the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th, and 8th brigades, were posted on this mountain, with eight pieces of artillery; major-general Hill's brigade being on the right, major-general Ferguson's on the left, having one battalion on the heights, separated from the mountain. On the eastern and southern side of the town is a hill which is entirely commanded, particularly on its right, by the mountain to the westward of the town, and commanding all the ground in the neighbourhood to the southward and eastward, on which brigadier-general Fane was posted with his riflemen and the 50th regiment, and brigadier-general Anstruther with his brigade, with half a brigade of six-pounders, and half a brigade of nine-pounders, which had been ordered to the position in the course of last night. The ground over

which passes the road from Lourinha commanded the left of this height, and it had not been occupied, excepting by a picquet, as the camp had been taken up only for one night; and there was no water in the neighbourhood of this height. The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the valley, between the hills on which the infantry stood, both flanking and supporting brigadier-general Fane's advanced guard.

"The enemy first appeared at eight o'clock in the morning, in large bodies of cavalry on our left, upon the heights of the road to Lourinha; and it was soon obvious that the attack would be made upon our advanced guard, and the left of our position; and major-general Ferguson's brigade was immediately moved across the ravine to the heights, on the road to Lourinha, with three pieces of cannon: he was followed successively by brigadier-general Nightingale, with his brigade, and three pieces of cannon; brigadier-general Ackland with his brigade, and brigadier-general Bowes with his brigade. These troops were formed (major-general Ferguson's brigade in the first line; brigadier-general Nightingale's in the second; and brigadier-general Bowes's and Ackland's, in columns in the rear) on those heights, with their right upon the valley which leads into Vimeira, and the left upon the other ravine, which separates these heights from the range which terminates at the landing place at Maceira. On these last-mentioned heights, the Portuguese troops which had been in the bottom near Vimeira, were posted in the first instance, and they were supported by brigadier-general Craufurd's brigade.

"The troops of the advanced guard on the height to the southward and eastward of the town were deemed sufficient for its defence, and major-general Hill was moved to the centre of the mountain on which the great body of infantry had been posted, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve to the whole army. In addition to this support, these troops had that of the cavalry in the rear of their right.

"The enemy's attack began in several columns upon the whole of the troops on this height; on the left they advanced, notwithstanding the fire of the riflemen, close to the 50th regiment, and were checked and driven back only by the bayonets of the corps. The 2d battalion, 43d regiment, was likewise closely engaged with them in the road which leads into Vimeira; a part of that corps having been ordered into the church-yard, to prevent them from penetrating into the town. On the right of the position, they were repulsed by the bayonets of the 97th regiment, which corps was successively supported by the 2d battalion, 52d regiment, which, by an advance in column, took the enemy in flank.

Besides

“ Besides this opposition given to the attack of the enemy on our advanced guard by their own exertions, they were attacked in flank by brigadier-general Ackland's brigade, in its advance to its position on the heights on the left, and a cannonade was kept up on the flank of the enemy's columns by the artillery on those heights.

“ At length, after a most desperate contest, the enemy was driven back in confusion from this attack with the loss of seven pieces of cannon, many prisoners, and a great number of officers and soldiers, killed and wounded. He was pursued by the detachment of the 20th light dragoons; but the enemy's cavalry were so much superior in numbers, that this detachment has suffered much, and lieutenant-colonel Taylor was unfortunately killed.

“ Nearly at the same time the enemy's attack commenced upon the heights, on the road to Lourinha. This attack was supported by a large body of cavalry, and was made with the usual impetuosity of French troops. It was received with steadiness by major-general Ferguson's brigade, consisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st regiments; and these corps charged as soon as the enemy approached them, who gave way, and they continued to advance upon him, supported by the 82d, one of the corps of brigadier-general Nightingale's brigade, which, as the ground extended, afterwards formed a part of the first line; by the 29th regiment, and by brigadier-general Bowes's and Ackland's brigades, while brigadier-general Craufurd's brigade, and the Portuguese troops, in two lines, advanced along the height on the left. In the advance of major-general Ferguson's brigade, six pieces of cannon were taken from the enemy, with many prisoners, and vast numbers were killed and wounded.

“ The enemy afterwards made an attempt to recover a part of his artillery, by attacking the 71st and 82d regiments, which were halted in a valley in which it had been taken. These regiments retired from the low grounds in the valley to the heights, where they halted, faced about, fired and advanced upon the enemy, who had by that time arrived in the low ground, and they thus obliged him to retire with great loss.

“ In this action, in which the whole of the French force in Portugal was employed, under the command of the duke D'Abrantes [Junot] in person, in which the enemy was certainly superior in cavalry and artillery, and in which not more than half of the British army was actually engaged, he has sustained a signal defeat, and has lost thirteen pieces of cannon, twenty-three ammunition waggons, with powder, shells, stores of all descriptions, and twenty-thousand rounds
of

of musket ammunition. One general officer (Beniere) has been wounded and taken prisoner, and a great many officers and soldiers have been killed, wounded, and taken."

By the London Gazette Extraordinary of the 16th of September, it appears, that the following dispatch was received on the evening of the preceding day, from lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple, commanding his majesty's troops in Portugal:

"MY LORD, *Head-quarters, Cintra, Sept. 3.*

"I have the honour to inform your lordship that I landed in Portugal, and took the command of the army on Monday the 22d of August, the next day after the battle of Vimeira, and where the enemy sustained a signal defeat, where the valour and discipline of the British troops, and the talents of British officers, were eminently displayed. A few hours after my arrival, general Kellermann came in with a flag of truce from the French general-in-chief, in order to propose an agreement for a cessation of hostilities, for the purpose of concluding a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops. The enclosed contains the several articles at first agreed upon, and signed by sir Arthur Wellesley and general Kellermann; but as this was done with a reference to the British admiral, who when the agreement was communicated to him, objected to the 7th article, which had for its object the disposal of the Russian fleet in the Tagus, it was finally concluded, that lieutenant-colonel Murray, quartermaster-general to the British army, and general Kellermann, should proceed to the discussion of the remaining articles, and finally to conclude a convention for the evacuation of Portugal, subject to the ratification of the French general-in-chief, and the British commanders by sea and land.—After considerable discussion, and repeated reference to me, which rendered it necessary for me to avail myself of the limited period latterly prescribed for the suspension of hostilities, in order to move the army forwards, and to place the several columns upon the routes by which they were to advance, the convention was signed, and the ratification exchanged the 30th of last month. That no time might be lost in obtaining anchorage for the transports and other shipping, which had for some days been exposed to great peril on this dangerous coast, and to insure the communication between the army and the victuallers, which was cut off by the badness of the weather, and the surf upon the shore; I sent orders to the buffs and 42d regiments, which were on board of transports with sir C. Cotton's fleet, to land and take possession of the
forts

forts of the Tagus, whenever the admiral thought it proper to do so. This was accordingly carried into execution yesterday morning, when the forts of Cascaes, St. Julien, and Bugio, were evacuated by the French troops, and taken possession of by ours. As I landed in Portugal, entirely unacquainted with the actual state of the French army, and many circumstances of a local and incidental nature, which doubtless had great weight in deciding the question; my own opinion in favour of the expediency of expelling the French army from Portugal, by means of the convention the late defeat had induced the French general-in-chief to solicit, instead of doing so by a continuation of hostilities, was principally founded on the great importance of time, which the season of the year rendered peculiarly valuable, and which the enemy could easily have consumed in the protracted defence of the strong places they occupied, had terms of convention been refused them.—When the suspension of arms was agreed upon, the army under sir John Moore had not arrived; and doubts were even entertained, whether so large a body of men could be landed on an open and a dangerous beach; and, that being effected, whether the supply of so large an army with provisions from the ships could be provided for under all the disadvantages to which the shipping were exposed. During the negotiation, the former difficulty was overcome by the activity, zeal, and intelligence of captain Malcolm, of the Donegal, and the officers and men under his orders; but the possibility of the latter seems to have been at an end, nearly at the moment when it was no longer necessary. Captain Dalrymple of the 18th dragoons, my military secretary, will have the honour of delivering to your lordship this dispatch. He is fully informed of whatever has been done under my orders, relative to the service on which I have been employed, and can give any explanation thereupon that may be required.

“ HEW DALRYMPLE, Lieut.-general.”

A suspension of arms agreed upon between sir A. Wellesley and general Kellermann, on the 22d of August, was the basis of the following convention; the seventh article of that preliminary treaty (which was afterwards rejected by sir C. Cotton) stipulated that the Russian fleet should be allowed to remain in the Tagus, unmolested, as long as it thought proper, or to return home.

Definitive

*Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of Portugal
by the French Army.*

“ The generals commanding in chief the British and French armies in Portugal, having determined to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered into on the 22d inst. for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the undermentioned officers to negotiate the same in their names, viz.:—On the part of the general-in-chief of the British army, lieut. colonel Murray, quarter-master-general, and on the part of the general-in-chief of the French army, M. Kellermann, general of division; to whom they have given authority to negotiate and conclude a convention to that effect, subject to their ratification respectively, and to that of the admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus. Those two officers, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the articles which follow:—Art. I. All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal occupied by the French troops shall be delivered up to the British army in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present convention.—Art. II. The French shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage; they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and on their arrival in France, they shall be at liberty to serve.—Art. III. The English government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France between Rochefort and L'Orient inclusively.—Art. IV. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun. All other artillery, arms, and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the convention.—Art. V. The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; that is to say, its military chest, and carriages attached to the field commissariat and field hospitals; or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its account as the commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner, all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.—Art. VI. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the generals and other officers of all ranks. It is, however, fully understood, that the means of conveyance for horses at the disposal of British commanders are very limited;

limited; some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon; the number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed six hundred; and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed two hundred. At all events, every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.—Art. VII. In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the places, the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days of the date of the ratification, or sooner, if possible.—Art. VIII. The garrisons of Elvas, and its forts, and of Peniche and Palmela, will be embarked at Lisbon; that of Almada at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.—Art. IX. All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the troops are entrusted to the British army. They are to be taken care of whilst they remain in this country, at the expence of the British government, under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France when the final evacuation is effected. The English government will provide for their return to France, which shall take place by detachments of about one hundred and fifty or two hundred men at a time. A sufficient number of French medical officers shall be left behind to attend them.—Art. X. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked in the harbours specified, or in any other of the ports of France to which stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given them to return to England without delay, and security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port.—Art. XI. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.—Art. XII. The forts of St. Julien, the Bugio, and Cascais, shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries, as far as the Lazaretto or Trafuria on one side, and fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the second division, as shall also the harbour, and all armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, Almada, Peniche, and Palmela, shall be given up as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the mean time the general-in-

chief of the British army will give notice of the present convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all further hostilities.—Art. XIII. Commissaries shall be named on both sides, to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.—Art. XIV. Should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any article, it will be explained favourably to the French army.—Art. XV. From the date of the ratification of the present convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever, of the French government, against subjects of Portugal, or any other individual residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops in Dec. 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled; and all sequestrations laid upon their property, moveable or immoveable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.—Art. XVI. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected: their property of every kind, moveable and immoveable, shall be respected; and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army, or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them with the liberty of retaining or disposing of it, and passing the produce of the sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose. It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement, only, however, in so far as regards leaving the port; and that none of the stipulations above-mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculation.—Art. XVII. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army; and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders; they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property, it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French government; they are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the 16th article.—Art. XVIII. The Spanish troops detained on-board ship in the port of Lisbon shall be given up to the commander-in-chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain without being taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of last May, and the days immediately following.—Art. XIX. There shall be

be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal, since the commencement of the present hostilities.—Art. XX. Hostages of the rank of field-officers shall be mutually furnished on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present convention. The officers of the British army shall be restored on the completion of the articles which concern the army; and the officers of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army.—Art. XXI. It shall be allowed to the general-in-chief of the French army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British admiral to convey him to Bourdeaux or Rochefort.—Art. XXII. The British admiral will be invited to accommodate his excellency, the commander-in-chief, and the other principal officers of the French army on board ships of war.

“ Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808.

(Signed)

“ GEO. MURRAY, quar.-mas.-gen.

“ KELLERMANN, le gén. de division.

“ Nous duc d'Abrantes, général en chef de l'armée Française, avons ratifié et ratifions la présente convention définitive dans tous ses articles, pour être exécutée selon sa forme et teneur.

(Signed)

“ LE DUC D'ABRANTES.

“ Au quartier général de Lisbonne,
“ le 30 Aout, 1808.”

Additional Articles to the Convention of the 30th Aug. 1808.

“ Art. I. The individuals in the civil employment of the army made prisoners, either by the British troops, or by the Portuguese in any part Portugal, will be restored, as is customary without exchange.—Art. II. The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines up to the day of embarkation; the garrisons up to the day of the evacuation of the fortresses.—The remainder of the magazines shall be delivered over in the usual form to the British government, which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses of the army from the above-mentioned periods till their arrival in France, under the condition of their being reimbursed by the French government for the excess of the expences beyond the estimation, to be made by both parties, of the value of the magazines delivered up to the British army. The provisions on-board the ships of war, in possession of the French army, will be taken on account by the British government,

in like manner with the magazines in the fortresses.—Art. III. The general commanding the British troops will take the necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the means of subsistence between the country and the capital.

“ Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808.

(Signed)

“ GEO. MURRAY, quar.-mas.-gen.

“ KELLERMANN, le gén. de division.

“ Nous duc d’Abrantes, général en chef de l’armée Française, avons ratifié et ratifions les articles additionels à la convention et contre, pour être exécutés suivant leur forme et teneur.

“ LE DUC D’ABRANTES.

“ A. J. DALRYMPLE, cap. milit. sec.”

The following is a copy of the dispatches from admiral sir C. Cotton, bart., commander-in-chief of his majesty’s ships and vessels on the coast of Portugal :

“ SIR, *Hibernia, off the Tagus, Sept. 3.*

“ Enclosed herewith, for the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, is a copy of a convention*, entered into by lieutenant-col. Murray and gen. Kellermann, for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army, such convention having been ratified by lieutenant-gen. sir Hew Dalrymple, myself, and the French commander-in-chief. British troops consisting of the 3d and 42d regiments, were on the 2d inst. landed, to occupy the forts of Cascais, St. Antonio, St. Julien, and the Bugio ; and no time shall be lost to embark the French troops, agreeably to the said convention.—Capt. Halsted, first captain of this ship, and captain of the fleet, who is the bearer of these dispatches to their lordships, respecting the Russian squadron in the Tagus, is in full possession of my confidence, and will be able to explain to their lordships the motives inducing me to ratify the convention in question, as well as give any further information that may be thought necessary. “ C. COTTON.”

“ SIR, *Hibernia, off the Tagus, Sept. 4.*

“ Herewith I have the honour to enclose to you, for the information of the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a convention entered into by me with vice-admiral Seniavin, commanding the Russian fleet in the Tagus ; by which it will appear to their lordships that such fleet has been surrendered to me, to be held by his majesty as a deposit, until six months after the conclusion of peace between Russia and England. I have charged capt. Halsted, first captain of

* A copy of the convention enclosed in a letter from sir Hew Dalrymple.

the Hibernia, and captain of the fleet, with the delivery of this dispatch to their lordships; he was sent by me to negotiate the convention with vice-admiral Seniavin, and will be able to explain every particular. To capt. Halsted I feel greatly indebted for his able advice and assistance upon all points of service; his zeal and diligence have been exemplary, and entitle him to my highest commendation. Rear-admiral Tyler has been directed to superintend the first division of the Russian fleet, which I purpose ordering under his protection, immediately to Spithead; to him (since with me) I have been indebted for every assistance, and to the captains, officers, and crews, of those ships that have been employed throughout a tediously protracted blockade (by whom every exertion has been made with a degree of cheerfulness, doing them infinite honour). I feel extremely grateful, and deem it my duty to offer every possible testimony of my approbation in their favour.

“ C. COTTON.”

Articles of a Convention entered into between Vice-Admiral Seniavin, Knight of the Order of St. Alexander, and other Russian Orders, and Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart., for the Surrender of the Russian Fleet, now anchored in the River Tagus.

“ ART. I. The ships of war of the emperor of Russia, now in the Tagus, as specified in the annexed list, shall be delivered up to admiral Cotton immediately, with all their stores as they now are, to be sent to England, and there held as a deposit by his Britannic majesty, to be restored to his imperial majesty within six months after the conclusion of a peace between his Britannic majesty and his imperial majesty the emperor of all the Russias.

“ ART. II. Vice-admiral Seniavin, with the officers, sailors, and marines, under his command, to return to Russia without any condition or stipulation respecting their future services; to be conveyed there in men-of-war, or proper vessels, at the expence of his Britannic majesty.

“ Done and concluded on board the ship Twerday, in the Tagus, and on board his Britannic Majesty's ship Hibernia; off the mouth of that river, the 3d day of Sept. 1808.

“ DE SENIAVIN,

“ CHARLES COTTON.”

The indignation of the British nation was raised by the convention of Cintra, to a painful height. The throne was besieged, as it were, with petitions from

from all parts of the kingdom, calling loudly for an inquiry into that transaction. The answer to the petition from the city of London, that for "The institution of an enquiry, there was no need of their interference," was universally deemed ungracious. An enquiry, however, was set on foot. The board in their report, after giving a well-arranged, and not altogether an uncircumstantial account of sir Arthur Wellesley's expedition, declared, "That on a consideration of all circumstances, as set forth in the report, they most humbly submitted their opinion, that no further military proceeding was necessary on that subject. Because some of them might differ in their sentiments respecting the fitness of the convention in the relative situation of the two armies, it was their unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness appeared throughout to have been exhibited by lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple, sir Harry Burrard, and sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the ardour and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers, on every occasion during the expedition, had done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on his majesty's arms."

But his royal highness the duke of York, in a letter to sir David Dundas, president of the board of inquiry, observed to the board, that in their report, their opinion respecting the conditions of the armistice and convention had been altogether omitted. He therefore thought it his duty to call their attention to these two principal points in this important case, the armistice and the convention, and to desire that they might be pleased to take the same again into their most serious consideration, and subjoin to the opinion they had already given on the other points, whether, under all the circumstances that appeared in evidence before them, respecting the relative situation of the two armies, on the 22d of August, it was their opinion, that an armistice was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of the armistice were such as ought to have been agreed upon?

upon? And whether, upon a like consideration of the relative situation of the two armies subsequent to the armistice, and when all the British forces were landed, it was their opinion, that a convention was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that convention were such as ought to have been agreed upon." The board met again on the 27th of December. The questions proposed by the commander-in-chief were put to each of the members. Some approved the treaties in question, adding the reasons of their approbation; others disapproved of them, giving the reasons of their disapprobation. The result of the inquiry was laid before his majesty; a formal declaration of disapprobation on the part of the king, of both the armistice and convention, with reasons, was officially communicated to sir Hew Dalrymple, in the following terms:

"The King has taken into his consideration the report of the board of enquiry, together with the documents and opinions thereunto annexed. While his majesty adopts the unanimous opinion of the board, that no farther military proceeding is necessary to be had upon the transactions referred to their investigation, his majesty does not intend thereby to convey any expression of his majesty's satisfaction at the terms and conditions of the armistice and convention.

"When those instruments were first laid before his majesty, the king, reserving for investigation those parts of the definitive convention, in which his majesty's immediate interests were concerned, caused it to be signified to sir Hew Dalrymple, by his majesty's secretary of state, that his majesty, nevertheless, felt himself compelled at once to express his disapprobation of those articles, in which stipulations were made, directly affecting the interest or feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese nations.

"At the close of the enquiry, the king, abstaining from any observations upon any other parts of the convention, repeats his disapprobation of those articles; his majesty deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorized admission, into military conventions, of articles of such a description, which, especially when incautiously framed, may lead to the most injurious consequences.

"His majesty cannot forbear farther to observe, that lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple's delaying to transmit
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for his information the armistice concluded on the 22d of August, until the 4th of September, when he, at the same time, transmitted the ratified convention, was calculated to produce great public inconvenience, and that such inconvenience did in fact result therefrom."

Sir Arthur Wellesley had strenuously recommended a pursuit of the French; and great pains was taken by his friends at home, to screen him from the odium of both the armistice and the convention: with which sir Arthur appears indeed to have expressed much dissatisfaction to his friends in private, though he had not hinted any disapprobation when in consultation with the other generals. But the board unanimously approved the judgement of sir Harry Burrard, in abstaining from pursuit. "A superior cavalry," they observed, "retarding our advance, would have allowed the enemy's infantry, without any degree of risk, to continue their retreat in the most rapid manner, till they should have arrived at any given and advantageous point of rallying and formation: nor did sir A. Wellesley, on the 17th of August, when the enemy had not half the cavalry he had on the 21st, pursue a more inconsiderable and beaten army, with any marked advantage."

In short, the report of the board was an indirect censure on sir Arthur; for if sir Harry Burrard was justified under all the circumstances in not advancing until the arrival of the reinforcements under sir John Moore, sir Arthur Wellesley, who knew that he must be speedily reinforced, judged ill in pushing forward and exposing himself to an attack, from which the enemy could only experience, at the worst, the disadvantage of a repulse, instead of waiting for a day or two, for such an augmentation of numbers as would have ensured the ruin of the enemy, notwithstanding the superiority of cavalry. It was generally believed that sir Arthur burned with a desire to engage with the French, before he should be superseded in the command by the arrival of sir John Moore.

As the defeat of Junot and the deliverance of Portugal were only mediate, and not the ultimate object of the British army, it marched from Lisbon, but not till the 27th of October, nearly two months after the convention of Cintra, under the command of general sir John Moore, to the assistance of the Spanish patriots. The general's instructions were, to march through Spain with his face towards Burgos; which was to be the general rendezvous of the British troops: not only of those now under the command of that officer, but of those with which he was to be reinforced from England. And he was to combine his operations with those of the commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies.

CHAPTER IV.

AN interview had taken place between the emperor Napoleon and Alexander at Erfurth, on which occasion their differences being adjusted, it was easy to persuade Alexander, that the insurrection in Spain was only the natural consequence, and what was to be apprehended from the convention of the treaty of Tilsit. In consequence of this interview, the veteran troops of France began to march from the Oder to the Ebro; while, on the other hand, forty thousand French conscripts were sent to Germany.—Another visible effect of the meeting at Erfurth was an offer of peace on the part of Russia and France to the British government. A flag of truce, with two officers, one a Frenchman, the other a Russian, arrived October 21st, at Dover. The Frenchman, by order of lord Hawkesbury, who happened then to be at Walmer Castle, was detained. The Russian messenger was allowed to proceed on the 22d to London. It was proposed, by the overture to his Britannic majesty, to enter into a negociation for a general peace, in concert with his majesty's allies, and to treat either on the basis of *uti possidetis*, or on any

other basis consistent with justice. The king professed his readiness to enter into such a negotiation in concurrence with his allies; in the number of whom he comprehended the Spanish nation. In the reply returned by France to this proposition of his majesty, the Spanish nation was described by the appellation of the "Spanish Insurgents;" and the demand for admitting the existing government of Spain, as a party to any negotiation, was rejected as inadmissible and insulting. A declaration, therefore, by his majesty, was published on the 15th of December, concluding with saying, that "neither the honour of his majesty, nor the generosity of the British nation, would admit of his majesty's consenting to commence a negotiation by the abandonment of a brave and loyal people, who are contending for the preservation of all that is dear to man, and whose exertions in a cause so unquestionably just, his majesty has solemnly pledged himself to sustain."

While the army of France lay inactive on the banks of the Ebro, and the passes into the mountainous provinces of Biscay, the provincial juntas had leisure to resolve themselves into one supreme and central junta.

It is well known, that the situation of the Spaniards, when their country was assailed by the intrigues, the treachery, and the arms of France, was without example in their history, unforeseen by their laws, and in opposition to their habits. In such circumstances, it was necessary to give a direction to the public force, correspondent with the will and sacrifices of the people. The necessity gave rise to the juntas in the provinces, which collected into themselves the whole authority of the nation, for the purpose of expelling the invaders, and maintaining internal order and tranquillity. But so soon as the capital was delivered from the French, and the communication between the provinces re-established, it became practicable, as well as necessary, to collect the public authority, which had been divided into as many parts as there were

were provincial governments, into one centre, from whence the strength and the will of the nation might be called into action. A supreme and central junta, formed by deputies nominated by the respective juntas, was installed at Aranjuez, on the 25th of September. After hearing mass, which was celebrated by the primate of Laodicea, also archbishop, and one of the members of the junta for Seville, a strong oath, administered on the Holy Evangelists, was taken by all the deputies. After a solemn *Te Deum*, the deputies walked between two lines of troops to the royal palace, a hall of which was consecrated to their sessions. An immense multitude of all ranks and descriptions of persons, who had assembled to behold this ceremony, giving way to the most ardent enthusiasm, made the air resound with the cry of "*Viva Fernando Septimo.*"

The supreme central junta was acknowledged by the council of Castile, and all the other constituted authorities in the kingdom. The supreme junta of Spain issued the following

PROCLAMATION TO THE SPANISH NATION :

"SPANIARDS! The supreme junta of government, the depositary of the supreme authority, has devoted the first moments which succeeded its formation, to the urgent measures which its situation and the circumstances of the time, prescribe. But from the first instant of its installation, it has believed that one of its obligations is to address itself to you, with the dignity which becomes a great and generous nation, in order to inform you of your situation, and establish in a frank and noble manner those relations of reciprocal confidence which are the bases of every just and prudent administration. Without these, neither the government can fulfil the high duty imposed upon it, nor the governed attain the objects desired.

"A tyranny of twenty years, exercised by the unfittest hands ever known, had placed our country on the brink of perdition. The oppressor of Europe saw that the time was arrived for carrying into execution the plot he had long been forming, and adding the richest and most brilliant wreath to his bloody crown. Every thing appeared to flatter

his hopes. The nation was alienated from its government by hatred or contempt—the royal family was divided—the beloved heir to the crown accused, calumniated, and, if possible, degraded; the public force dispersed and disorganized; the resources exhausted; the French troops were introduced into the kingdom, and had already seized the strong places of the frontier; finally, sixty thousand men were ready to enter the capital, in order from thence to give law to the kingdom.

“ It was at this critical moment that, suddenly awaking from the slumber in which you lay, you precipitated the favourite from the height of power he had usurped, and placed on the throne the prince you idolized. An act of fraud the most abominable which the records of human perversity bear, deprived you of your most innocent king; and the aggression of Bonaparte, and tyranny of the French, were announced to Spain by the cannonade of the 2d of May on Madrid, and by the blood and slaughter of its innocent and brave inhabitants—a horrible but fit presage of the fate Napoleon was preparing for you.

“ From that memorable day, when the supreme authority was sold to the enemy which our deceived monarch had left at the head of the government—when the other authorities were oppressed, and the seat of the empire occupied by the foe, the French believed that no further resistance would be made, and spread themselves from east to south, to extend their dominion, and enjoy the fruits of their perfidy. Fools! they were not aware that they were insulting and outraging a people most jealous of their honour, and that they rushed on inevitable perdition.

“ The irritated provinces of Spain rose against the oppressors suddenly, but with solemnity, and swore to perish rather than sustain so ignominious a tyranny. Europe, in astonishment, was informed at the same instant of the offence and the chastisement; and a nation which but a short time before had scarcely the semblance of power, became at once the object of the interest and admiration of the universe.

“ Our situation was unexampled in our history, unforeseen by our laws, and as it were, opposed to our habits. It was necessary to give a direction to the public force, corresponding with the will and the sacrifices of the people; and this necessity created the juntas in the provinces, which collected in themselves the whole authority of the nation, in order to expel the public enemy and maintain the peace of the interior. What their energy has been—how they have discharged the trust imposed upon them by the people—and what

what gratitude the nation owes them, let the fields declare, which have been covered with the bodies of Frenchmen, the military spoils of the invader, which serve to deck our temples as trophies; the lives and independence of the greater part of the national magistrates which have been preserved, and the applauses of so many thousands of individuals who owe to them their liberty and their vengeance.

“ But as soon as the capital was delivered from the enemy, and the communication between the provinces was re-established, it was necessary to unite the public authority into one centre, which had been divided into as many parts as there were provincial juntas, whence the strength and activity of the nation could be called into exercise. This was the decision of the public voice, and this was the measure adopted by the provinces. Their respective juntas nominated deputies, who concurred in forming the centre of authority; and in less time than had been in French machiavelianism to destroy our ancient government, a new and much more formidable administration was seen in the central junta which is now addressing you.

“ The concurrence in the national will, which wrought this good—the universal freedom from selfish motives which induced the provinces to intrust their authority and power to other hands; this has been, Spaniards, your greatest action, this your best victory. The present age which beholds you, and posterity, to whom you will serve for study and admiration, will find in this act the most convincing proof of your virtue and prudence. The enemies of Spain had already designed the moment of your ruin; they already saw the division, which would be formed by the convulsions of civil discord—they already triumphed, believing the provinces would be disunited by ambition, and that some pretending to superiority over the rest, would apply to them for protection and aid. But, lo! a central power has been formed before their eyes, and peacefully acknowledged by all; the car of the state runs upon one axle tree, and vehemently and powerfully forces its way, crushing all the pretensions and all the hopes of their iniquity.

“ The junta being established, its attention was at once turned to the discharge of its duties. To drive the enemy beyond the Pyrennees, and compel him to deliver up the august person of our august king, and those of his brother and uncle, recognizing at the same time our liberty and independence, was the first duty which the junta conceived the nation had imposed upon it. Much of this it found already effected, at the period of its establishment; the public enthusiasm was kindled; armies were formed, composed almost
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wholly of fresh troops ; important victories were gained ; the enemy was driven to the frontiers ; the opinion in favour of his military skill destroyed, and the laurels which adorned those conquerors of Europe transferred to the brows of our warriors.

“ This had already been done, and was what might be expected from the impulse of the first moment ; but having effected all that could be produced by impetuosity and valour, it is necessary to avail ourselves of the means prescribed by prudence and constancy ; for what we have yet to attain, Spaniards, we must repeat it again and again, is an arduous undertaking, and ought to call into exercise all your enthusiasm and all your virtue.

“ You will be convinced of this when you turn your attention to the internal and external situation of public affairs, at the time when the junta began to exercise its functions. Our armies full of ardour, and eager to march to victory, but naked and unprovided with every thing : beyond, the remains of the French armies awaiting reinforcements on the banks of the Ebro, ravaging Upper Castile, the Rioja, and the provinces of Biscay : occupying Pampeluna and Barcelona with their fortresses ; masters of the castle of St. Ferdinand, ruling over almost the whole of Navarre and Catalonia : the despot of France, restless on his throne, deceiving the slaves who obey him by the grossest impostures, and striving to lull to inactivity all the other states, in order to discharge on us alone the enormous weight of his military force ; the powers of the continent, in fine, oppressed or insulted by France, expecting with anxiety the issue of this first struggle, desiring to declare against the common enemy of all, but proceeding with the timid circumspection which their past misfortunes counsel.

“ It is evident that the sole asylum which remains for the preservation of their independence, is a general confederacy—a confederacy which will assuredly take place at last, for interest persuades and necessity prescribes it. Which is the state which can hold relations of amity with Bonaparte ? Who can give credit to his words and promises, or trust to his loyalty and good faith ? The fate of Spain will serve as a lesson and a warning, her resolution as an example, her victories as an incentive ; and the reprobate who has trampled under foot the principles of equity, and the sanctity of good faith, is placed himself in the hard necessity of having more power than all of them, or of being buried under the mountains raised by his frenzy.

“ The security and certainty of a league, so necessary and just, are to be determined by our previous exertions, and the
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prudence of our conduct. When we shall have raised a mass of military force as terrible for its quantity as for its preparation—when we shall hold in our hands all the means of profiting by success, or remedying a reverse—when the sound judgement and integrity which distinguish the Spanish people, among all others, will manifest themselves in the regulation of all our proceedings and pretensions: then all Europe, secure of triumphing, will unite itself to us, and avenge at once its injuries and ours. Then Spain will enjoy the glory of having saved the powers of the continent, and reposing in the moderation and rectitude of her desires, and in the strength of her situation, she will be, and she will be recognized as the loyal confederate of all, but neither the slave nor the tyrant of any.

“Let us then now employ all the means we possess, as if we had to sustain alone the whole force of France. For this purpose, the junta has believed that it is necessary to maintain under arms five hundred and fifty thousand effective men; the fifty thousand to be cavalry; an enormous mass of strength, and disproportionate it may be confessed to our present situation and our ancient wants, but by no means unsuited to the present occasion. The three armies which are to occupy the frontier, and the bodies of reserve which are to support their operations, and supply their wants, will easily absorb the designated number. And what are they, or the sacrifices which necessity requires, compared with the enterprize we have proposed to ourselves, and the enthusiasm which animates us? Spaniards, the power of our adversary is colossal, his ambition is still greater than his power, and his existence is incompatible with our liberty. Judge of his exertions by the barbarity of his character, and the extremity of his danger; but these are the exertions of a tyrant, and will be confounded, opposed to the valour of a great and free people, who have resolved upon no other termination to their conflict than to conquer or die.

“Considering the magnitude and importance of this first object, the junta turned its attention to the vast means necessary to attain it. The neglect of the last government, if that may be called government which was one continued and monstrous dilapidation, had exhausted all the sources of prosperity, had obstructed the canals which brought life and food to all the members of the state, dissipating the treasures, disorganizing the public force, and consuming the resources.

“The junta has already announced to the public the great savings which result from the suppression of the expences of the royal household, the enormous sums which had been devoured by the greedy and insatiable avarice of the favourite,
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the product of his great possessions, and that of the estates of those unworthy Spaniards who fled with the tyrant. We may add to these the profit which will accrue to the state from a free navigation and commerce, and from the communication already opened with America. Principally we rely on a well-arranged administration of the public revenue, and regularly-distributed contributions, to the reform and management of which the junta will directly apply its attention. We may add to these means, the succours which are now given with so generous a hand, and will be hereafter granted us by the English nation. But it is incumbent on us, that these succours which have been so opportunely given, and so gratefully received, and the effects of which have been so beneficial, should be hereafter recognised and recompensed with the reciprocity and decorum which become a great and powerful nation. The Spanish monarchy ought not, in this respect, to be placed in a state of inequality and dependence upon its allies.

“ The produce of these means will certainly be great, but at the same time it will be slow, and for that reason insufficient for the urgent necessities of the state. Are they sufficient to furnish for a time the ordinary supplies, discharge the immense debt which will be incurred, and maintain the formidable army which is to be kept on foot: But the junta will, in case the manifold events and force of circumstances should exhaust the treasury, have recourse at once to the nation with the confidence which its ardent patriotism ought to inspire, and the necessity and notoriety of the sacrifice. For evils so extraordinary as the present, remedies as extraordinary must be applied; and as the government judges it to be one of its obligations to give an exact account to the nation of the application of the resources and funds which it is about to administer, it has no fear that its demands will be disregarded through distrust, or be detested as arbitrary.

“ Thus much with respect to the defence of the kingdom, and the means of effecting it, the most urgent concerns and the first in the order of time which the junta has under its care. But, Spaniards, there are others as necessary and primary as that, without attending to which the junta would fulfil but half its duties, and which is the great reward of your enthusiasm and sacrifices. Political independence is nothing without felicity and interior security. Turn your eyes to the time when oppressed and degraded, ignorant of your own strength, and finding no asylum against your evils, either in the institutions or in the laws, you held foreign dominion less odious than the wasting tyranny which internally consumed you. The dominion of a will always capricious, and for the

the greater part unjust, has, for your calamity, lasted long enough in Spain; your patience, your love of order, and your generous loyalty, have been long enough abused; it is time that the voice of the law only should begin to command, founded on general utility. This was the desire of our good and unfortunate monarch; this was the path he pointed out, even during an unjust captivity to which a perfidious traitor reduced him. Country, Spaniards! ought not to be a vague and a vain name to you: it ought to import in your ears and in your heart the sanctuary of the laws and customs, the theatre for talents, and the reward of virtue.

“ Yes, Spaniards, the great day is drawing near, when, according to the uniform desires of our beloved king, and of his loyal people, the monarchy will be established on solid and durable bases. You will then possess fundamental laws, which will be beneficial, friends of order, restrictive of arbitrary power; and these being re-established, and your genuine rights being assured, you will rejoice to behold a monument worthy of you, and of the monarch who is to watch over the preservation of it, blessing, amid so many calamities, the share which the people will have had in its erection. The junta, which holds in its hand the supreme direction of the national forces, in order, by all means, to assure its defence, felicity, and glory; the junta, which has already publicly acknowledged the great influence which a nation ought to have in the government, which alone, and without any assistance, has done every thing in the name of the king and for his cause; the junta solemnly promise to you, that you shall possess that country which you have invoked with so much enthusiasm, and defended, or rather conquered, with so much valour.

“ Until the military operations, slow at first, in order better to secure a happy result, shall furnish the opportunity and repose necessary for the grand and solemn re-union which it announces to you, the government will take care privately to discuss and to examine the projects of reform, and the institutions which ought to be presented for the national sanction. Without instruction, or knowledge, or data, the majestic work of legislation is the result of a blind and unstable will, and as such, exposed to error, inconsistency, and contempt! Wise Spaniards! you who, devoted to the investigation of the social principles, unite the love of humanity to the love of country, and instruction of zeal: this concern is yours, the happy execution of which is so necessary. The junta, instead of rejecting your council, desires and seeks it. The knowledge and illustration of our ancient constitutional law; changes, which, in their re-establishment, they ought to

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undergo from the difference of circumstances ; reforms which are to be made in the civil, criminal, and commercial codes ; projects to meliorate public education, which, among us, is so greatly in decline ; a system of regulated economy for the better distribution and collection of the national revenue ; all these claim your attention, and form a vast series of problems and objects of meditation, in which you may manifest your talents and your acquirements. The junta will form from among you different committees, each intrusted with a particular department, to whom are to be freely addressed all writings on matters of government and administration, in which may be discussed the different objects which claim the general attention ; so that each contributing by his exertions to give a just and enlightened direction to the public opinion, they may enable the nation to establish solidly and tranquilly its internal felicity.

“ The Spanish revolution will thus be distinguished by characteristic features, altogether the reverse of those which were seen in the French revolution. That began in the wretched internal intrigues of courtiers ; ours, in the necessity of repelling an unjust and powerful aggressor : in that there were as many opinions concerning the forms of government as there were factions, or rather persons : in ours, there is but one opinion, one general desire ; an hereditary monarchy, and Ferdinand VII. on the throne. The French, shedding torrents of blood during their anarchy, proclaimed no one principle which they did not afterwards reject ; they made no law which they did not violate, and at last they submitted to a barbarous despotism. The Spaniards, who, on account of the perfidious invasion of the French, found themselves without a government, and without communication with each other, have not shewn themselves terrible or bloody, except towards their enemies, and well know how to meliorate their institutions, and consolidate their liberty, without overthrowing the state.

“ O Spaniards ! How beautiful a perspective of glory and felicity we behold before us, if we know how to profit by the singular epoch ; if we fulfil the high purposes which Providence points out to us ! Instead of being objects of compassion and contempt, as we have hitherto been, we are about to become the envy and admiration of the world. The delicious climate we enjoy, the fertile soil whence we draw our subsistence, our geographical position, the riches which nature has lavished upon us, and the noble and generous character with which she has endowed us, will not be wasted gifts in the hands of a vile and enslaved people.

“ Already the Spanish name is pronounced with respect in

in Europe, whose nations, which lie trampled upon by the French, hang all their hopes upon our fortune; even the very slaves of the tyrant, groaning under his intolerable yoke, form vows for us. Let us be constant, and we shall gather the fruit which victory will produce; the laws of religion satisfied; our monarch either restored to the throne, or avenged; the fundamental laws of the monarchy restored and consecrated, in a manner solemn, and consonant with civil liberty; the fountains of public prosperity pouring benefits spontaneously, and without impediment; our relations with our colonies drawn more closely and become more fraternal, and consequently more useful; in fine, activity, industry, talents and virtues stimulated and rewarded: to such a degree of splendour and fortune we shall raise our country, if we ourselves correspond with the magnificent circumstances which surround us.

“These are the views, and this is the plan which the junta proposed to itself from the moment of its installation, in order to fulfil the two primary and essential objects of its institution. Its members charged with an authority so great, and making themselves responsible by entertaining hopes so flattering, do not fail to see the difficulties they have to conquer in order to realize them, the enormity of the weight which hangs over them, nor the dangers to which they are exposed; but they will think the fatigues, and the devotion of their persons to the service of the country well paid, if they succeed in inspiring Spaniards with that confidence, without which the public good cannot be secured, and which the junta dares to affirm it merits, from the rectitude of its principles and the purity of its intentions.”

Aranjuez, Oct. 26, 1808.

The junta, amongst its first acts, appointed a new council of war, consisting of five members, the president of which was general Castanos. Great savings were made from the suppression of the expences of the royal household, the enormous sums which had been annually devoured by the insatiable avarice and profuse donations of the favourite, and the confiscation of the estates of those Spaniards who had sided and fled with the usurper from Madrid. These resources sufficed for their first operations without any new taxes on the people. The first efforts of the junta were directed to the setting in motion all the troops in Andalusia, Grenada, and Estremadura, as well as the

new levies; to the transportation of Dupont's army, agreeably to the treaty; and to the furnishing of the English army, that had vanquished Junot, with the means of marching from Portugal to join the Spaniards. In the midst of these cares, they sent envoys to demand succours from Britain. The forces of the patriots, including now the army of Romana, and the Spanish regiments that had been confined in hulks of ships by Junot, were divided into three, and disposed in such a manner as to form together, towards the end of October, one grand army. The eastern wing was commanded by general Joseph Palafox; the north-western, by general Blake; the centre, by general Castanos.—The number under general Blake was computed at fifty-five thousand: that under general Castanos at sixty-five thousand; and that under the orders of general Palafox, at twenty thousand. General Castanos was commander-in-chief. Besides these there was a small army in Estremadura, and another in Catalonia. The positions of the French army remained, with some variation, on the whole pretty much the same as in August; its right towards the ocean, its left on Arragon, its front on the Ebro. It was strengthened from time to time by reinforcements from France. The design of the Spaniards was, with the right and left wings of their grand army to turn the wings of the French army, whilst Castanos should make a vigorous attack, and break through the centre of their forces.

The emperor of the French having ordered a levy of one hundred and sixty thousand conscripts, set troops in motion for Spain, and, provided for all that might be demanded by the contingencies of war, set out from Paris for Spain without waiting for an answer to the overture for a negotiation with the British government. With his usual celerity, having set out from Rambouillet, on the 30th of October, he arrived at Bayonne on the 3d of November, and on the 5th, accompanied by a reinforcement of twelve thousand men, he joined his brother Joseph at Vittoria.

Agreeably

Agreeably to the general plan of operations, concerted with the Spanish officers, general Castanos crossed the Ebro at the three points with only a shew of resistance, and he was suffered to push forward detachments, and take possession of Lerin, Viana, Caporoso, and other French posts on the left bank of the Ebro. The French did not oppose his course towards Pampeluna, any farther than was necessary to conceal their own plan of operations. Marshal Moncey, the duke of Cornegliano, was directed with the left wing of the French army to advance along the banks of the Alagon and the Ebro, and instead of opposing the passage, by presenting a weak front, to decoy general Castanos across the Ebro. The stratagem having succeeded, marshal Ney, the duke of Elchingen, with his division, passing the line of the Ebro, and moving forward with great celerity in separate columns, took the Spanish posts at Logrono and Calahorra, threw the whole country into alarm and confusion, and cut off the communication between the Spanish armies respectively under the command of Blake and Castanos.

In a series of actions from the 31st of October, the army under general Blake was driven from post to post; from Durango to Guenas; from Guenas to Valmaseda; from Valmaseda to Espinosa. In a strong position there, the Gallician army made a stand, in order to save its magazines and artillery; but their efforts were in vain; for they were obliged to retreat with precipitation. During the conflict at Espinosa, a detachment was sent against the last retreat of the Gallicians, Reynosa. On the 11th of November, they were suddenly attacked, and forced to consult their safety by flight; throwing away their arms and colours, and abandoning their artillery. General Blake, with the remains of his broken army, took refuge in Asturias. What remained of the corps of the marquis of Romana, that had formed part of the Gallician army, fled first to St Andero, and afterwards to Asturias. The Spaniards were closely pursued

sued by marshal Soult, duke of Dalmatia, the van of whose army entered St. Andero on the 16th. The bishop of which city took refuge in an English frigate.

In the mean time the army of Estremadura, under the command of count Belvedere, a young man, was permitted without opposition, to advance to Burgos, of which he took possession without resistance. Here the French fell on him, routed his army, and almost annihilated it. The count, with the small remains of his army, fled to Lerma, and from thence to Aranda.

Having routed and dispersed the armies of the north of Spain, and of Estremadura, the French next fell on the central army under Castanos; and an engagement ensued at Tudela, 23d November, which fixed the fate of the campaign*.

By

* It is thus described clearly, intelligibly, and, we doubt not in the least, faithfully, in the eleventh bulletin of the grand French army. "On the 22d of November, at the break of day, the French army began its march. It took its direction to Calahorra, where on the evening before, were the head-quarters of Castanos. Finding that town evacuated, it marched on Alfaro, from whence the enemy had also retreated. On the 23d, at break of day, the general of division, Lefevre, at the head of the cavalry, and supported by the division of general Morlat, forming the advanced guard, met with the enemy. He immediately gave information to the duke of Montebello, who found the army of the enemy in seven divisions, consisting of forty-five thousand men, under arms, with its right before Tudela, and its left occupying a league and an half, a *disposition altogether faulty*. The Arragonese were on the right, the troops of Valencia and New Castile in the centre, and the three divisions of Andalusia, which general Castanos commanded more especially, formed the left. Forty pieces of cannon covered the enemy's line.

"At nine in the morning the column of the French army began to display themselves with that order, regularity, and coolness, which characterise veteran troops. Situations were chosen for establishing batteries, with sixty pieces of cannon; but the impetuosity of the French troops, and the inquietude of the enemy, did not allow time for this. The Spaniards were already vanquished by the order and movements of the French,

By the battle of Tudela, the road was laid open to Madrid. On the 29th of November a division of the French army, under the command of general Victor, duke of Belluna, arrived at the pass of the Sierra Morena, called Puerto. It was defended by thirteen thousand men of the Spanish army of reserve, under the orders of general San Juan. In the conflict which took place at the Puerto, the Spaniards fled, leaving behind them their artillery and standards.

On the 1st of December, advanced parties of the French cavalry appeared before Madrid; and were driven back from certain gates several times: but on the third, they were in possession of the gate of Alcalá, and also of the Reteiro. The junta then hoisted a white flag. The people of Madrid pulled it down, and persisted in their design of defending

French army. The duke of Montebello caused the centre to be pierced by the division of general Maurice Matthews. The general of division Lefevre, with his cavalry, immediately passed on the trot through this opening, and by a quarter wheel to the left, enveloped the enemy. The moment when half the enemy's line found itself thus turned and defeated, was that in which general le Grange attacked the village of Cascante, where the line of Castanos was placed, which did not exhibit a better countenance than the right, but abandoned the field of battle, leaving behind it its artillery, and a great number of prisoners. The cavalry pursued the remains of the enemy's army to Mallen, in the direction of Saragossa, and to Tarragona, in the direction of Agreda. Seven standards, thirty pieces of cannon, twelve colonels, and three hundred officers, were taken. Four thousand Spaniards were left dead on the field of battle, or driven into the Ebro, while a part of the fugitives retired to Saragossa, the left wing of the Spanish army which had been cut off fled in disorder to Tarragona and Agreda. Five thousand Spaniards, all troops of the line, were taken prisoners in the pursuit. No quarter was given to any of the peasants found in arms. This army of forty-five thousand men has been thus beaten and defeated, without our having more than six thousand men engaged. The battle of Burgos had smitten the centre of the enemy, and the battle of Espinosa, the right; the battle of Tudela had struck the left. Victory had thus struck as with a thunderbolt, and dispersed the whole league of the enemy."

the city; but this enthusiasm soon began to subside; and when they learnt that the French were fortifying themselves in the Reteiro, they retired to their respective habitations.

During the night of December the 3d, a Spanish officer, who had been taken prisoner at Somosierra, brought a message from general Berthier, summoning for the second time Madrid to surrender. The marquis of Castellar, captain general of Castile, sent a letter to Berthier, in answer to the summons, demanding a suspension of hostilities, that he might have time for consulting the superior authorities. The superior authorities had a secret correspondence with the enemy, and had already come to a determination on the subject. When intelligence that the French had forced the passage of the Sierra Morena reached Madrid, a council was held, at which the honourable Mr. Stuart, the British envoy at Madrid, was present. Don Thomas Morla took the lead, and expatiated at great length on the hopeless state of affairs; and urged the necessity of immediately entering into a capitulation for the capital. When he sat down, another counsellor rose, and reproached Morla for his proposal. He said that this advice was more suited to a minister of Joseph Bonaparte, than to one of king Ferdinand. Two days after this discussion, Don T. Morla, together with the prince of Castel Branco, to whom the defence of Madrid had been committed by the supreme junta, sent a dispatch to sir John Moore, describing the formidable Spanish force that was assembled at that city; and pressing him to advance, with all possible expedition to the capital. Had sir John Moore complied with their request, his army would have been thrown completely into the hands of the French*.

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* We find many strange misrepresentations in the Spanish gazettes of this time, and are at a loss whether to set them down to the account of folly, or a traitorous design to lull the Spaniards into a false security and inaction. After general Blake had officially

The letter of the marquis of Castellar, sent to marshal Berthier on the morning of the 4th, produced a peremptory summons to surrender immediately. On the evening of the same day, Don Thomas Morla and Don Bertrando Yriate waited on Berthier, and were introduced by him to Bonaparte; who told them, that if the city did not tender its submission by five or six o'clock next morning, it would be taken by assault, and every one found with arms in his hands put to the sword: in consequence of which declaration, the Spanish troops in Madrid were sent off, by the gates of Segovia and Tudela, in the dead of night.

Bonaparte extended his clemency to the degraded deputation from the junta. To conceal their concert with him, and at the same time to gratify his sarcastic humour, he cunningly taunted Morla for his former perfidy in breaking the capitulation with Dupont. "The English," said he, "are not renowned for good faith: but having agreed to the convention of Cintra, they observed it." Morla's fortune and military rank were preserved to him. The same indulgence was shewn to his associates, who having joined him in betraying their country, did not disdain to live under the protection of the emperor. Morla, in a circular letter addressed to the Andalusians, endeavoured to draw them over to the side of king Joseph; who, he told them, was a man of great mildness and humanity of disposition.

Bonaparte addressed a manifesto to the Spanish nation, in which he promised them all good things if

ally notified to the central junta, about the middle of October, that the army he had been able to collect amounted to no more than twenty-two or twenty-three thousand men; we find it stated in the Madrid gazette of October the 21st, that seventy thousand men had passed through the town of Lugo.—At Madrid, November the 23d, was published a proclamation, in which it was declared, that the enemy's troops hardly amounted "to eight thousand men, according to the report of the general whom the junta has charged with the defence of the important post of Guadarama."

they received with sincerity Joseph for their king; if not, he would put the crown on his own head, treat them as a conquered province, and find another kingdom for his brother.

The troops that had fled from the Puerto, or gate of Guadarama, having arrived on the 3d of December, almost under the walls of Madrid, demanded with loud cries to be led to its defence. Their commander, count St. Juan, who opposed so dangerous an attempt, was massacred.

The grand interest excited by the state of Spain in the year 1808, was, the consideration that it would in all probability sever the mother country from the colonies, and open a new theatre on the other side of the Atlantic, that would change the politics and improve the condition of the world. But it was easy to foresee, that the great Spanish continent in America with the adjacent isles, would never return to such a state of dependence as that under which it had laboured for centuries, even though Ferdinand the Seventh should be restored to the throne, which became less and less probable.

In conformity with the uniform intentions of the provincial juntas, the central junta, declared that the colonies in Asia and America should not be considered as dependent provinces, but enjoy all the privileges of the metropolis and mother country. This was also declared in the new constitution framed for Spain by Bonaparte.

In the Canaries, in Mexico, and the Floridas, Cuba, and the other islands, and throughout the whole of South America, every Spaniard, as if animated by the same soul, breathed the same sentiments of devotion to the king and detestation of Bonaparte. The vengeance of many would no doubt have been wrecked on unoffending individuals of the French nation. In the Floridas the French were so apprehensive of falling victims to the vengeance of the enraged Spaniards, that they fled with their effects into the territories of the United States. But the moderation

deration and wisdom of men in authority; restrained the fury of the populace. The proclamation of Március Somernelos, commander-in-chief of the land forces, and governor of the isles of Cuba, in a proclamation of the 18th of July, exhorts the natives to repress the natural impetuosity of their character, and to let the peaceable French, who had sought an asylum amongst them, find protection. The marquis of Villa Vicensis, commander-in-chief of the marine, in one of the same date, says, "Let us swear that if every Spaniard in the mother country should fall, which ought not, and cannot be feared, Spain, notwithstanding this, shall not cease to exist. Is not this country also Spain? Are not we also Spaniards? And shall not Ferdinand VII. and his successors reign over us!—Remember!—The French in Cuba are not mercenary assassins! nor servants or subjects of Napoleon." General Linieres, governor of Buenos Ayres, a Frenchman, in his proclamation upon the state of affairs, after recommending concord, said, "Let us imitate the example of our ancestors in this happy land, who wisely escaped the disasters that afflicted Spain in the war of the succession, by awaiting the fate of the mother country, to obey the legitimate authority occupying the sovereignty." Hostilities were every where else declared against France, and the most liberal and prompt contributions remitted to the patriots in Old Spain. This year the French were driven out of the islands of Porto Rico, Deseada, and Marie Galante.

The great affairs of Europe in the year 1808 are exhibited in the contest between Spain and Portugal, with their ally Great Britain, on the one part; and the ruler of France, aided by his vassal princes and kings, on the other.

CHAPTER V.

THE events of the year 1809 were of a truly afflictive nature. The disasters at Corunna in the commencement of the year, and the more recent expeditions to Spain and Portugal, seemed to forbid even the most distant hope of bridling the ambition, or curbing the vast projects of the emperor of France. We may indeed contemplate the fate of nations with a philosophic mind, and behold, in the downfall of the monarchies of Europe, the destruction of much tyranny, and the demolition of governments hostile to the happiness of the human race; but at the same time the ministers of this country feel anxious for the independence of nations, when so much power is accumulated in the grasp of the French emperor, as to place nearly the whole of the continent of Europe at his command; an extent of power which perhaps was never vested in any one person since the world began till the present age. From the co-operation of England with Spain much was expected, but the result was very different from what there had been great reason to apprehend.

In the summer and autumn of 1808, it was almost the general wish of Great Britain to afford the people of Spain every assistance in their power. The British cabinet was excited to lend them all the aid in men and money that their situation and circumstances could require. The experiment was tried, and the fate of sir John Moore and his brave army, abundantly prove that the generality of the Spanish people did not covet the interference of England to save them from what appeared to us their much dreaded ruin.

By reason of some services performed by lord Cochrane, and some other naval officers, either the Spaniards were enabled to recover several of their towns, or the plans and movements of the French were materially thwarted; and the fleet under lord Collingwood, in the Mediterranean, was of great benefit to the cause of the patriots. Barcelona had been long besieged

besieged by them, and was reduced to such straits, for want of ammunition and provisions, that there was every reason to hope for its speedy surrender, provided the French were not able to supply it with what it so much stood in need of. This the French determined, if possible, to effect by sea; and the French admiral Bauden had orders to attempt the relief of Barcelona. For this purpose he sailed from Toulon, towards the end of October, with three sail of the line, four frigates, and twenty large transports. As soon as they were discovered, lord Collingwood gave orders to admiral Martin to chase them. The French line of battle ships, and one of the frigates, ran ashore between Cette and Frontignan, and were set on fire by their crews, to prevent them from falling into our hands. The transports separated from the men of war, and took shelter in the bay of Rosas, where, under the protection of an armed storeship, two bombards, and a xebec, they were attacked and destroyed. In this action we had fifteen killed, and forty-five wounded. The British army destined to act in favour of the Spaniards, consisted of the troops which marched from Portugal, under the command of sir John Moore, and those which were sent from England under the command of sir David Baird. The latter arrived at Corunna on the 13th of October, 1808, and was astonished and disappointed to find that the junta of Galicia refused him permission to land his troops. When at last he was permitted to land them, his reception was so extremely cold, that he was disposed to doubt whether the Spanish government really wished for the co-operation of the British. The same impression was made on sir John Moore: when he arrived at Salamanca, on the 13th of November, he found so little preparation made for the reception or accommodation of his army, that he wrote to the British minister at Madrid, desiring him plainly to tell the Spanish government, that if they expected his army to advance, they must pay more attention to its wants. He had been officially informed that his

entry into Spain would be covered by sixty or seventy thousand men; whereas when he had got so far as to be within three marches of the French army, not even a Spanish picquet had appeared to protect his front. At this critical time the Spanish general Blake was defeated, and a report reached sir David Baird that the French were advancing upon his division in two directions, so as to threaten to surround him. In consequence he appeared to retreat upon Corunna; but sir John Moore, having ascertained that the report was unfounded, ordered sir David Baird to advance, in order if possible to form a junction with him. On the 28th of November sir John Moore received information that Castanos was completely defeated. No army now remained against which the whole French force might be directed, except the British; and it was vain to expect that they, even had they been united, could have resisted or checked the enemy. Sir John Moore therefore determined to fall back on Portugal, to hasten the junction of general Hope, who had gone towards Madrid, and to order sir David Baird to regain Corunna as expeditiously as possible; and from the events which afterwards took place, there is much reason to lament that the determination was afterwards changed.

All the principal Spanish armies were beaten and dispersed. A week had elapsed since the army of Castanos had suffered a total defeat on the Ebro. Burgos was in possession of the French; and even Valladolid had been entered and occupied by the cavalry. A reinforcement, amounting to nearly thirty thousand, was advancing on the side of Biscay. The French thus numerous, having driven before them the Spanish armies, found nothing to oppose their plans, whether they were directed to the immediate attack of the British army or to the occupation of the Spanish capital,

After the main body of the British army had been joined by general Hope's division, they advanced towards Valladolid, in order to have the corps under
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the command of sir David Baird in their rear. Before, however, they had proceeded a day's march on this route, sir John Moore learned by an intercepted dispatch, that Bonaparte was advancing towards Lisbon, and that a body of eighteen thousand men under Soult was posted at Saldanha. The British general immediately resolved to attempt the attack of Soult's corps: but it does not seem to have struck sir John Moore that Soult was posted with this comparatively small body of men, for the purpose of enticing the British army further into Spain, while Bonaparte in person, with his whole disposable force, endeavoured to place himself between the British army and the route of their retreat towards Portugal and the sea. Sir John Moore, therefore, quitted his route towards Valladolid, as soon as he heard that Soult was at Saldanha, and, by a movement on the left, having effected his junction with sir David Baird, advanced by rapid marches to the Carrion. Here the advanced post of the two armies first met; and the superiority of the British cavalry was eminently displayed in a most brilliant and successful skirmish. But just as sir John Moore had issued his orders for the main body of his army to commence a general attack, he received information that Bonaparte in person had left Madrid with his army in order to get into the rear of the British; that the army which had been stationed at Talavera had moved forward to Salamanca; and that Soult himself had received strong reinforcements. There was now no alternative, nor any time to be lost. Retreat was become indispensably necessary: the only difficulty and doubt lay in the route that the British ought to take in their present critical situation.

It is easy to ascertain the exact numbers of the French that were dispatched after sir John Moore. The corps of Soult, before it was reinforced, consisted of eight thousand men. The right flank of the British was threatened by Junot, who had under him fifteen thousand men. Bonaparte left Madrid at the head of forty thousand men. So that on the lowest calculation

calculation the force which was sent in pursuit of the British must be reckoned at sixty thousand men, while sir John Moore had not more than twenty-seven thousand. So rapid was the march of the main body of the French army under Bonaparte, and so closely did they pursue sir John Moore, that the advanced guard of the enemy entered Fordesillas on the same day that the British began to retreat from Sahagun, so that the difference between them was scarcely thirty miles. At Benevento the cavalry and part of the artillery of Bonaparte's army came up with the rear of the British; and another skirmish took place, which terminated greatly to the glory and honour of the British cavalry under lord Paget.

By this time, Bonaparte finding that he could not himself come up with sir John Moore before he reached Benevento, gave up the pursuit, and committed it to three marshals of France, who, with as many divisions, were commanded to follow the British closely, and to effect their destruction.

The British army at this time was most dreadfully situated. In the midst of winter, in a dreary and desolate country; the soldiers, chilled and drenched by deluges of rain, wearied by long and rapid marches in bad roads deep with mud, were almost entirely destitute of fuel to cook their victuals or dry their clothes, and when they did halt, found it extremely difficult to procure shelter. Their provisions were scanty, or procured with great labour and in an irregular manner: the waggons, in which were their magazines, baggage, and stores, were often deserted in the night time by the Spanish drivers, terrified at the approach of the French; the bullocks and mules by which they were drawn would not move, except by the native drivers: it was therefore often necessary to destroy the provisions and stores, in order that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy. The difficulties and anxiety of the British commander were increased by the relaxation which took place in the discipline of the army.

The French army now pressed hard upon the British

tish, so that sir John Moore came to a determination to offer battle at Lugo, of the ground in front of which he had received a favourable account. In the mean time he sent off dispatches to sir Samuel Hood at Vigo, to send round the transports to Corunna, on which place, as three long marches nearer than Vigo, he thought it preferable to direct his retreat. Another lamentable and unaccountable instance of the supineness and inactivity of the Spaniards occurred about this time: Between thirty and forty waggons loaded with arms, clothes, and provisions from England were moving slowly on towards the marquis of Romana's army, which had long been destitute of these supplies, and they were now moving forward, exactly at a time when the rapid approach of the French would effectually prevent them from reaching their destination.

Marshal Soult, however, did not think it prudent to attack the British in the strong and judicious position they had taken up near Lugo; and sir John Moore, not judging it safe either to act offensively or to delay his retreat any longer, quitted his ground in the night, leaving fires burning to deceive the enemy. The French did not discover the retreat till long after day-light, so that the British army got the start of them considerably.

On the 11th of January the whole of the British reached Corunna, except one division, which had been dispatched to Vigo. But unfortunately the transports from the latter port were not yet arrived, and the French army were seen the next morning approaching the town. Thus at length were the British army arrived at the port where they hoped to embark, not however without the probability of a battle. In this approaching battle, they had many circumstances adverse to them: they were exhausted and worn out by a rapid march across two hundred and fifty miles of a dreadful country, in the most inclement season of the year, deprived of every accommodation, and often destitute of food and shelter. They had been obliged

to sacrifice most of their baggage, and some of their artillery; the greater number of their horses had been put to death, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy.

The French forces made only partial indications of attack till the noon of the 16th of January, when they began to place some guns in the front of the right and left of their line, and to follow up this preparatory movement by a rapid attack upon the division of general Baird. When the enemy's line were first getting under arms, sir John Moore was employed in visiting the outposts, and in explaining his plans to the general officers. As soon as he was informed of the hostile indications of the French, he flew to the field, expressing his regret, that the advanced time of the day would not allow the British army to reap all the advantages of a victory which he regarded as certain. But the career of this gallant general was near its end. As captain Hardinge, who had been sent to order up a battalion of the guards to the left flank of the highlanders, was making his report, a cannon ball struck the left shoulder of sir John Moore, and beat him to the ground. So composed and unaltered was his countenance, so intently and earnestly was it fixed upon the advancing highlanders, that for a few moments it was hoped he was rather stunned than materially hurt by the shot. But it was soon discovered that he was mortally wounded, and was immediately carried from the field of battle.

The soldiers, although they knew that their general was carried off, continued to fight with undiminished confidence and valour. The attack of the French upon the right of our army was completely repulsed, and in their turn they were obliged to draw back their left flank entirely, in order to prevent it from being turned. At five in the evening the light began to fail. The enemy had been repulsed in every attack; and when the firing ceased, the British army occupied a more forward line than at the commencement of the engagement. The British army lost, in killed and wounded,

wounded, between seven and eight hundred men: the French are supposed to have lost nearly double that number.

General Hope, on whom the command devolved, when sir John Moore * was killed, and sir David Baird wounded, thought it advisable to proceed in the embarkation of his troops, for which, indeed the preparatory measures had been taken by sir John Moore. Accordingly about ten o'clock at night the troops quitted their position, and marched into Corunna, strong picquets being left to guard the ground, and to give notice of the approach of the enemy. The embarkation immediately commenced, and was covered by the rear guard, under general Beresford, consisting of about two thousand men, who occupied the lines in front of the town, while a corps de reserve under general Hill was stationed on a promontory immediately behind it. Before day-light the whole army, with the exception of the rear guard, were on board the ships. The enemy seemed by no means disposed to renew the engagement, or even to take advantage of the confusion necessarily attendant upon the rapid embarkation of such a large body of men during the night time. In the course of the next forenoon, however, they occupied the rising ground near the harbour with some cannon, and fired at the transports: their fire was not destructive, nor would it have been attended with any serious consequences, had not the masters of some of the transports, panic struck, cut their cables, and suffered their vessels to run aground. In the course of the day after the

* As sir John Moore had repeatedly declared his wish to colonel Anderson to be buried where he had fallen, if it should be his lot to be killed in battle, it was determined to bury his body on the rampart of the citadel of Corunna. Accordingly at eight o'clock in the morning it was deposited, unclothed and undressed in a grave hastily dug by some soldiers. Some months afterwards, when the Spaniards again got possession of Corunna, the marquis de Romana ordered the body to be taken up, and properly interred in the citadel; and over the tomb a short and simple inscription was engraven.

battle general Hill's corps de reserve, the sick and wounded, and the rear guard, were safely embarked, in the view of the enemy, who offered no molestation or hindrance. The brigade under general Crauford, which, separating from the main army, had proceeded towards Vigo, arrived after a most fatiguing and harassing march at that port, where fortunately they found ready a sufficient number of transports to take them on board and convey them to Great Britain.

The British army having retreated from the peninsula, the attention and movements of the French were principally directed to the pursuit and discomfiture of the Spanish corps which still occupied the centre of the kingdom, and to the occupation of such of the seaports as kept open the communication with England or contained the Spanish navy. Accordingly in the centre of Spain the duke of Belluno attacked and defeated one of the divisions of the duke del Infantado's army, under the command of Venegas: the loss of the Spanish in this affair was not great, as they did not offer any obstinate or continued resistance to the French forces, but fled and dispersed after a short and ineffectual combat. After the engagement, the duke del Infantado crossed the province of Valencia, and took the route towards Granada.

The obstinate and persevering heroism with which the city of Saragossa was defended, was well calculated to inspire the rest of the kingdom with a similar spirit, and to hold out to the Spanish nation the beneficial consequences which would unavoidably result to their cause, if they followed the example of that city. While Madrid opened its gates to the French, Saragossa compelled the enemy to fly from before its walls with great slaughter; and when again besieged by a more numerous and better provided army, it did not yield, till the ravages of disease had broken the spirit and thinned the number of its inhabitants, to a great degree. The second siege commenced early in January;
and

and on the 21st of February it was compelled to capitulate.

The first place in Portugal against which the French directed their efforts was Oporto. At this time the city of Oporto was defended by twenty-four thousand men, and more than two hundred pieces of cannon: notwithstanding which the French made themselves masters of it with little loss, after a short and feeble resistance. About the same time they advanced against Chaves. General Francisco de Silveira who commanded there, retired on their approach; but having collected a more adequate force, he advanced again, and retook Chaves, with twelve pieces of artillery and one thousand five hundred prisoners.

The situation of marshal Soult who commanded the French army that had taken possession of Oporto, was rendered critical and hazardous by the successful operations of the patriots in Galicia. Assisted by two British frigates, the *Lively* and the *Venus*, they compelled the garrison of Vigo, consisting of one thousand five hundred men, to surrender, and afterwards drove the enemy from the towns of Tuy and Viana.

The only engagement worthy of notice, took place at Medellin between the French force under marshal Victor, and the Spanish army under general Cuesta; the latter general found Victor's division, consisting of about twenty thousand foot and three thousand cavalry, drawn up in front of Medellin. Against the enemy Cuesta determined to commence a rapid and general attack. The left wing of the Spanish infantry advanced within pistol shot of the French; the first battery was already taken: the cavalry of the enemy made a charge in order to regain possession of it: to oppose them the Spanish cavalry regiments of *Almania* and *Infante*, and the two squadrons of the imperial chasseurs of *Toledo* were ordered to advance; but instead of executing this order, they wheeled round, fled before the enemy, and threw the left wing
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of the Spanish into disorder. The French, perceiving and taking advantage of this circumstance, directed their efforts against the right and centre of the Spanish. General Cuesta did all in his power to restore order on his left wing, and to check the attack on his centre and right; but finding his efforts unavailing, he was obliged to retreat. The loss of the Spaniards in this engagement was very severe: upwards of one hundred and seventy officers were either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners; and the loss in rank and file bore rather more than the usual proportion to this number of officers.

The disposition of the British government toward the Spanish patriots still continued in a high degree favourable; and their determination to support them, which had hitherto been destitute of the usual formalities of a treaty, was early in the year expressed to the world by a solemn treaty of peace and alliance between Great Britain and Spain. Don Pedro Cevallos, the author of the exposition of the plans and intrigues by which Bonaparte had got Charles and Ferdinand into his power, was sent to London as ambassador from the supreme junta, acting in the name of Ferdinand, with ample powers to form an alliance with the British court. The reception of this nobleman was a decisive proof of the resolution of the British ministry to abide by the Spaniards; and his Britannic majesty not only engages himself to assist the Spanish nation in their struggle against France, but he also promises "not to acknowledge any other king of Spain and of the Indies thereunto appertaining, than his catholic majesty Ferdinand VII. his heirs, or such lawful successor as the Spanish nation shall acknowledge;" by the fourth article the contracting parties agree not to make peace with France except with common consent.

In order to carry into effect the promise of assistance which the British ministry had bound themselves to afford to the patriots, and to free Portugal from the

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the French forces, sir Arthur Wellesley was dispatched to that country with an army, which, though not very numerous, was extremely well equipped and provided, and was deemed by the general himself perfectly equal to drive the enemy from Portugal, and to defend it from any future attacks they might make against it. The situation of Soult indeed began to be very hazardous: cut off as he was from any immediate and effectual communication and support, and dependent for the supply of his army upon an exhausted and hostile country, he attempted to force a passage into Spain by the route of Zamora; but not being able to effect it, after five days obstinate fighting, he was obliged again to retreat back upon Oporto. At length after several partial battles, in which the French were uniformly unsuccessful, they retired hastily towards Amaranthe, leaving behind them several prisoners and five pieces of cannon. In Oporto the French left seven hundred sick and wounded*. In order to render his flight more rapid and successful, Soult was under the necessity of abandoning the greater part of his artillery and baggage; and sir Arthur Wellesley was compelled to give up the pursuit, in order to protect Lisbon and its vicinity from marshal Victor.

The affairs of the patriots, however, were chequered with alternate success and disaster in the greater part of Spain; but in Galicia the success, at least for a season, preponderated. But their advantages were, in some degree, counterbalanced by the recapture of St. Andero. This town, destined to frequent capture and recapture, and of great importance both to the patriots and the French, on account of its situation, was taken by general Balasteros on the 10th of June. On that very night the French general Bonnet, at the head of a large body of troops, came suddenly and unexpectedly upon it, and after having gained possession of it, put

* See the dispatch of sir Arthur Wellesley, dated May 12, 1809.

the whole Spanish garrison, amounting to five thousand men, to the sword. General Ballasteros at first eluded the search of the enemy, but was afterwards taken.

In the north-east of Spain, the army of Blake was principally occupied in endeavouring to relieve, or throw succours into, Gerona, which still held out against all the efforts of the French. This general also made an attempt to regain possession of Saragossa; in which he not only completely failed, but exposed his army by it to a fatal and inglorious defeat at Belchite. He was opposed by the French general Suchet. The enemy at first appeared on the heights, and soon afterwards directed their attack against the left flank of the Spanish army; this attack, supported by twenty discharges of cannon, was completely successful; and in a short time, only the general and officers were left to oppose the enemy. In their flight the Spaniards not merely abandoned their baggages, but even threw away their arms. The fruits of this victory to the French, were nine pieces of cannon, immense quantities of provisions, stores, and ammunition, and upwards of three thousand prisoners. The loss of the French was very trifling, not exceeding forty killed and two hundred wounded. After this fatal defeat, Blake was obliged to quit Arragon, and, at a distance from the enemy, endeavoured to restore discipline to the remains of his forces.

Before the French could reach Seville, or advance with safety to the south of Spain, it was requisite that they should gain possession of the passes of the Sierra Morena. In the strong holds of these passes a considerable body of Spanish forces under general Venegas was posted: so strong was the position they occupied, that Sebastiani did not deem it prudent to attack them: he therefore had recourse to a feigned retreat, for the purpose of drawing them into the plain. This manœuvre at first appeared to have succeeded. The Spaniards left the

Sierra Morena, and crossed the Guadiana towards the position which Sebastiani had taken. As soon as intelligence reached Madrid that the Spaniards had deserted their strong holds, and that a passage into the south of Spain might easily be effected by their defeat, Joseph Bonaparte left the capital and proceeded to Confuegra. The Spaniards, however, aware of the force and design of the enemy, suddenly recrossed the Guadiana, and re-occupied the passes of the Sierra Morena.

In July, when Joseph Bonaparte found that the plan of passing into the south of Spain through the passes of the Sierra Morena was hopeless, he joined the army under marshal Victor, bringing with him considerable reinforcements from general Sebastiani's division. Victor, with his army thus strengthened, and amounting to about thirty-five thousand men, was stationed in the neighbourhood of Talavera, and along the banks of the river Alberche. He had taken up this position for the purpose of opposing the march of the united British and Spanish armies against Madrid. At length the generals agreed on the plan of operations which they were jointly to pursue: their armies were united, and the march toward Madrid was begun. The Spanish army, under the immediate command of Cuesta, amounted to thirty-eight thousand men. The force of Venegas, who had again advanced as far as Madri-lejos, consisted of seven thousand cavalry, and a proportionate number of infantry. Of these troops, fourteen thousand were employed in guarding the bridge D'Arzobispo. On the 20th of July, a complete junction of the British and Spanish armies had taken place; and immediate measures were taken to carry into effect the plan of operations agreed upon by sir Arthur Wellesley and general Cuesta. In the mean time, all the French forces in that part of Spain were united, consisting of the divisions of marshal Victor and general Sebastiani, the guards of Joseph Bonaparte, amounting to about eight thou-

sand men, and the garrison of Madrid. This force was commanded by Joseph Bonaparte, aided by marshals Jourdan and Victor, and general Sebastiani. With this united force the French attacked the advanced guard of general Ceusta, and obliged him to fall back upon the British, with very considerable loss. They then attacked the united British and Spanish armies, with their Portuguese auxiliaries; but being unsuccessful, they retreated across the Alberche, in the most regular order; having lost twenty pieces of cannon, and a few prisoners. Their loss in killed and wounded was supposed to be nearly ten thousand men; among the former were generals Lapisse and Morlat; and among the latter, generals Sebastiani and Boulet. The loss of the British was proportionally severe: the killed, wounded, and missing, amounting to nearly six thousand men; among the killed were major-general Mackenzie, brigadier-general Langworth, and brigadier-major Becket. As the Spanish troops were only partially engaged, their loss was comparatively small, not exceeding one thousand men in killed, wounded, and missing.

Our troops had scarcely time to congratulate themselves on having achieved this brilliant victory, when the unexpected intelligence was received that Soult, Ney, and Mortier, having formed a junction, had advanced through Estremadura, and were already in the rear of the British. There was no time for delay or hesitation: the army could be saved only by promptly adopting the most active measures. As no doubt could be entertained that the army of Victor, though defeated at the battle of Talavera, would again advance, as soon as he heard of the approach of the forces under Soult, Ney, and Mortier, it was necessary that part of the combined troops should remain at Talavera, as well for the purpose of checking Victor, as to take care of the wounded. On the 3d of August the British left Talavera, and marched to Oropesa: on the evening
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of that day, sir Arthur Wellesley received information that Cuesta meant to leave Talavera immediately, and that he would be obliged to let most of the wounded and sick fall into the hands of the French, from the want of means of conveyance. On one side were the corps of Soult and Ney, thirty thousand strong, in the possession of the high road leading to the passage of the Tagus, at the bridge of Almaraz: on the other side there were nearly thirty thousand men, under Victor, to whose advance no obstacle existed, after the retreat of general Cuesta from Talavera. In this embarrassing situation the most rapid retreat was indispensably requisite; and to this the troops, having been without their allowance of provisions for several days, were very unequal*. He therefore judged it expedient to retreat to Badajoz. Here during the remainder of the year his army remained not only inactive, but exposed from the unhealthiness of the situation to the ravages of a very fatal disorder.

General Augereau assumed the command of the French army which was besieging Gerona, defeated general Blake, and took the city, after a most vigorous defence. The Spaniards in their turn were successful against the French at Zamanes; but Joseph Bonaparte completely defeated the Spanish army of the centre, (which was destined to attack Madrid,) at Ocana, on the 19th of November.

CHAPTER VI.

BY comparing the actual state of the Peninsula, at the commencement of the year 1810, with that in which it has been placed almost at any time since the revolution began, we shall find ground for believing that the final and permanent conquest of it is still

* See lord Wellington's dispatch, dated Deleytosa, August 8, 1809.

far distant, even if it be at all practicable; that, if it ever be achieved, it will be the conquest of a country rendered desolate, and almost stripped of its inhabitants; and that Joseph Bonaparte will return king of Spain—not king of the Spanish nation. On the other hand, it is difficult to foresee, from contemplating the plans of the Spanish government, so deficient in wisdom and utility; and the little progress made by the Spanish armies in military habits or skill, by what means the French can be totally expelled from the Peninsula. Bonaparte may indeed be tired of the attempt—he may give it up as hopeless;—he may no longer be able to supply the necessary means of troops and money; and hence he may withdraw his armies: but unless he do this, we cannot perceive how the Spaniards, or more properly and justly speaking, the Spanish government, acting in the manner it has hitherto done, will be able to rescue their country from the presence of the French armies. If Spain is ultimately freed completely and permanently from them, it will be the work of the people, not of the government, such as it is now; and it will give a grand and inspiring lesson how much can be done even by a nation who, in repelling the invading foe, want the noblest and most powerful motive—the experience and the love of liberty.

The defeat and dispersion of the principal Spanish army, under the command of Areisaga, was as disgraceful and disastrous as any that has occurred since the beginning of the war. They formed the only defence of the southern part of the Peninsula, and occupied the strong passes of the Sierra Morena; of course, after their dispersion, no obstacle lay in the way of the French proceeding to Cordova or Seville. The inhabitants of this part of Spain, trusting to the strong position which their army occupied, were thunder-struck when they heard that it was defeated; that the French had crossed the Sierra Morena, and were on full march towards Cordova and Seville. The populace of every country are naturally disposed to suspect treachery

treachery whenever misfortune occurs: it is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the people of the South of Spain, under these circumstances, thought themselves betrayed, and regarded the supreme junta at Seville as the cause of their misfortune. Against them their fury was directed; but the greater part of them took flight the moment the insurrection commenced, and thus escaped the vengeance of the people.

The grand object of the French, after gaining possession of Cordova and Seville was Cadiz; towards it they hasted by forced marches; but fortunately it was saved by the alacrity and generalship of the duke of Albuquerque. At the head of eleven thousand men, whom he had collected and saved from the wreck of Areisaga's army, he entered the isle of Leon, and thus rendered it impossible for the French to take Cadiz, unless by the very tedious and uncertain method of blockade. The situation of this place is such, that whoever are masters at sea can protect it from the most formidable attacks by land. We had long kept a large naval force off the harbour; and as soon as it was ascertained that the French were advancing against the city, the English admiral placed his ships in such a manner as to protect it from immediate capture, and at the same time recommended that such of the batteries as commanded the harbour, and were within the reach and the power of the French, should be destroyed. Both the Spanish governor and the people very willingly acceded to the request, and the works were accordingly demolished.

In order that nothing might be wanting on the part of the British government which might contribute towards the protection and safety of this most important place, several regiments were sent over from this country; and the fortifications were, under the superintendence of British engineers, put in the best condition. At first the French seem to have been very sanguine in their hopes of gaining possession of the place; they began to erect very strong and formidable works, and carried on their operations on a large scale, and at the

thesame time in a progressive and regular manner. Their expectations were probably confirmed and raised by the result of their first enterprise. Before they could expect to injure or even to reach Cadiz itself with their batteries, it was necessary to silence or to gain possession of Fort Matagorda. This fort was in a very weak and defenceless state; and as there had not been time or opportunity to repair and render it more tenable, no more than about two hundred men were put into it. On the morning of the 21st of April, the enemy opened their fire upon the gun-boats that were stationed near the fort, and compelled them to abandon their position; immediately afterwards they opened a heavy and destructive fire against the fort itself from six different batteries. At the close of the day a large breach in the escarp of the rampart was effected, and the magazine was completely laid open. In this state the small garrison were able to bring only seven guns to bear against the enemy: with these, however, they silenced one of the batteries. In the course of the second day's attack the fort became a complete ruin; and it was consequently evacuated by order of general Graham, the British commander in Cadiz.

The enemy, however, reaped little benefit from this success; and the history of the siege during the remainder of the year may be told in a few words. The besieging army was under the command of marshal Victor, who found himself exposed to all the difficulties that have beset the French armies since they entered Spain, increased in this case by the peculiar circumstances in which he was situated. Having to conduct the siege of a place naturally of considerable strength, and which was defended in a great measure by British ships, he required a regular and full supply of every thing necessary for such an undertaking; but he found frequently that his force and his attention were called off by the hostile disposition and operations of the inhabitants, who surrounded him on all sides; while his distance from France rendered it almost impossible to procure, in sufficient abundance,

either the common or regular supplies which the siege demanded. Hence, at one period, the enemy appeared almost to have abandoned the attempt. Shortly afterwards they would resume the construction of their batteries, or throw a few harmless shells into the town. It would be difficult, through the whole of their operations against Cadiz, during the year, 1810, to trace that system of activity, promptitude, and vigour, by which all the military proceedings of the French were distinguished prior to the period of their entrance into the Peninsula.

The affairs of Portugal in 1810 were much more important than those in Spain: they were not only more important in themselves, but, as previous and preparatory to what we shall have to record in our next chapters, they are uncommonly interesting.

When the revolution in the Peninsula first broke out, few persons turned their conjectures or their hopes on the Portuguese. Nothing was expected from them if the Spaniards were unsuccessful: both the character of the people, and the comparatively small extent and nature of their country seemed to forbid the indulgence of such an idea. One thing, however, was in their favour: having been long the allies of the English, they did not look upon them with such averted eyes as the Spaniards did; having frequently received military assistance from them, they did not object to it now. Besides, the regent of Portugal, having been conveyed to his transatlantic dominions by the British, had, as it were, left his European territories under their protection: they could, therefore, with more propriety, as well as with more effect, direct the councils and the plans of the Portuguese government. While, therefore, the British cabinet were unable to infuse wisdom or vigour into the superior or inferior juntas of Spain, they directed the Portuguese government as they pleased. While the British soldiers, instead of receiving assistance from the Spanish armies, had, in more than one instance, been compelled to fight their battles in their presence, but without their assistance; and

and while the repeated defeat of the Spanish troops when by themselves, and the constant victories of the British, unsupported as they were, failed to overcome the prejudices of the Spanish government to the plan of placing English officers at the head of their armies, the Portuguese readily acceded to the plan; and by the unremitting attention of marshal Beresford, in the course of a few months the Portuguese soldiers were worthy of fighting by the side of Britons, and had gained and displayed much more skill, discipline, and courage, than the Spaniards had acquired after the experience of nearly three years.

Besides the force which general Beresford had under him, lord Wellington had incorporated with his army a considerable number of Portuguese troops. His lordship, when he was under the necessity of retreating, after the battle of Talavera, seemed to have given up all idea of advancing into Spain, and to have determined to direct and confine his operations to the defence of Portugal. To attain and secure this grand object, he formed a plan which, though it was not completely developed, nor productive of the beneficial consequences which he expected from it till the beginning of 1811, it is necessary to explain here, in order that his movements during 1810 may be understood and justly appreciated. As the force which this country could send into the Peninsula was necessarily small in comparison with the immense armies of France, and as the Portuguese troops could not at first be expected to be able to equal the English, it was expedient to defend Portugal in that particular spot where inequality of numbers would be compensated by local and artificial strength, and where the means of supplying and increasing his force would be easy to the British general, and proportionably difficult to the enemy. Lord Wellington, either from his own observation, or from what is known to have been the plan and intention of Junot, if the convention of Cintra had not taken place, resolved to make his stand at Torres Vedras, within a short distance of Lisbon.

this position every thing would be favourable to him, and adverse to the enemy: it could be made so strong as to be absolutely impregnable. Lying near the Tagus, lord Wellington could receive reinforcements or supplies readily from England; and if it should happen that he was driven from his lines, or found it prudent to abandon them, the vicinity of the river would enable him to embark his army in a short space of time, and with little difficulty. On the other hand, the French general in the neighbourhood of Lisbon would be in the very heart of a hostile country, neither disposed nor able to supply his army, and from the nature of the war in the Peninsula, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to procure the supplies from any great distance. In order, however, to make his defence of the lines of Torres Vedras more effectual and secure, and at the same time to render the situation of the French, if they should advance to Lisbon, more difficult and desperate, lord Wellington determined to retard the progress of the enemy as long as he could without hazarding a general engagement. If he could prevent the French from reaching Torres Vedras till the close of the year, he would give time to perfect the discipline, and to exercise the courage of the Portuguese troops, while at that season the difficulties of the enemy in the vicinity of Lisbon would be greatly increased, and their retreat, if they should resolve on a retreat, would be almost as hazardous as their continuance. In consequence and furtherance of this scheme, Lord Wellington, with his combined army of British, Spaniards, and Portuguese, advanced at the commencement of the summer, to the north-eastern frontiers of the Peninsula. His lordship's force at this time consisted of about thirty thousand British, and nearly double that number of Spaniards and Portuguese.

Bonaparte on his part was evidently preparing to make a more powerful effort to put an end to the war in the Peninsula than he had ever done since he himself advanced into it. Massena was sent from

Paris to put himself at the head of an army, composed of the divisions of Soult and Ney, and of large reinforcements brought from other parts of Spain and from France. A considerable portion of this army consisted of Germans and Italians, many of whom deserted. The army of Massena has been differently estimated: he himself, in a proclamation he issued to the Portuguese, soon after he took the command of it, rated it at upwards of one hundred thousand men; but from other accounts it does not seem that his army consisted of more than seventy thousand at the time of his advancement into Portugal.

In the beginning of July the positions of the hostile armies were as follow: A small French corps was posted before Badajos, on the south-eastern frontier of Portugal: this was watched by the Spanish army of Romana, consisting of nine thousand men, and by general Hill, with about five thousand. The grand army of the French, under Massena, was posted before Ciudad Rodrigo, which place he determined to take before he advanced into Portugal. The English army under lord Wellington was at the same time at Alverche, three leagues in front of Celerico. It was in five divisions: the fifth division was denominated light, and consisted of three English regiments, and two regiments of Portuguese caçadores, or marksmen. Each division had attached to it some Portuguese regiments, with one or two English officers in them; and in such excellent order, in point of discipline, that it was reasonably expected that they would not disgrace their companions in arms.

The first division of the army, under general Spencer, was at Celerico: the second, under general Hill, at Portalegre: the third, with general Cole, was cantoned at Guarda: the fourth, under general Picton, was at Pinbel; and the light division, under general Craufurd, was advanced close up to the French army at Ciudad Rodrigo.

Marshal Massena carried on the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo with great activity: at the same time doing every

every thing in his power to tempt or provoke lord Wellington to advance and hazard a general engagement for the relief of the place: his lordship was, however, immovable: he did every thing he could to protract the siege, or to relieve or assist the besieged, short of exposing his army to a general action, and thus departing from the plan he had laid down. The garrison defended themselves with great bravery; and did not surrender themselves till the fortress was no longer defensible. The following is an extract from lord Wellington's dispatch, dated Alverca, July 11, 1810:

“ Since I wrote to your lordship [lord Liverpool] this day, I have received a report that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered to the enemy yesterday evening. There was a practical breach in the place, and the enemy had made preparations for a storm; when marshal Ney offering terms of capitulation, the garrison surrendered. The enemy took up their ground before this place on the 26th of April; they invested it completely on the 11th of June, and opened their fire upon it on the 24th of June; and, adverting to the nature of the place, to the deficiency and defects of its works, to the advantages which the enemy had in their attack upon it, and to the numbers and formidable equipment by which it was attacked, I consider the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo to have been most honourable to the governor, Don Andres Hervasti, and its garrison; and to have been equally creditable to the arms of Spain with the celebrated defence of other places, by which this nation has been illustrated during the existing contest for its independence. There was an affair between our picquets and those of the enemy this morning, in which the enemy lost two officers and thirty-one men, and twenty horses prisoners. We have had the misfortune to lose lieutenant-colonel Talbot, and eight men of the 14th light dragoons killed, and twenty-three wounded.”

By the French account of the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo, it appears, “ that upwards of two thousand men were killed, including the troops and inhabitants. The garrison, consisting of seven thousand men, laid down their arms in the arsenal, on the entrance of the French troops.” Massena says, “ We have taken in the place six stand of colours, one hundred and twenty-five excellent pieces of artillery, the greater part of them brass, two hundred thousand pounds of powder,

one million two hundred thousand cartridges, and a considerable quantity of shot and artillery stores."

As soon as Massena had captured Ciudad Rodrigo, he advanced to the siege of Almeida, Lord Wellington slowly retiring before him, and occasionally opposing his progress. This naturally gave rise to several partial actions, in which the British troops gave strong and convincing proofs of their superior prowess, considering the numbers they were opposed to. The garrison of Almeida was invested by the French on the Spanish side; and in order to encourage the garrison in that place, brigadier-general Craufurd was stationed on the right bank of the Coa with the advanced corps, consisting of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments, part of the 14th light dragoons, and 1st German hussars, a troop of horse artillery, and two battalions of Portuguese chasseurs; which force was attacked on the morning of the 24th of July, 1810, by a large body of the French army, consisting chiefly of cavalry. The enemy being greatly superior in numbers, the British gradually fell back in as good order as possible on ground so extremely intricate, that their loss consisted of three hundred men, including wounded and missing.

Lord Wellington's dispatch, dated Celerico, August 29, 1810, says, among other things:

"The enemy opened their fire upon Almeida late on Saturday night, or early on Sunday morning the 26th instant, and I am concerned to add, that they obtained possession of the place in the course of the night of the 27th. I have no intelligence upon which I can rely, of the cause of its surrender. An explosion had been heard at our advanced posts, and I observed on Monday that the steeple of the church was destroyed, and many houses of the town unroofed. I had a telegraphic communication with the governor, but unfortunately the weather did not allow of our using it on Sunday, or during great part of Monday, and when the weather cleared on that day, it was obvious that the governor was in communication with the enemy. After I was certain of the fall of the place, I moved the infantry of the army again into the valley of the Mondego, keeping a division upon Guarda, and the out-posts of the cavalry at Alverca. The enemy
attacked

attacked our picquets twice yesterday in the morning, but feebly, and they were repulsed; in the afternoon, however, they obliged Sir S. Cotton to draw in his posts to this side of Fraxdras. Captain Lygon, of the 16th light dragoons, was wounded in the morning, and two men of the royal dragoons were wounded in the afternoon. A picquet of the regiment made a gallant and successful charge upon a party of the enemy's infantry and cavalry, and took some prisoners. The second corps of general Regnier has made no movement of any importance since I had the honour of addressing your lordship last. A patrolle, however, belonging to this corps fell in with a squadron of dragoons, consisting of one troop of the 13th British, and one troop of the 4th Portuguese, belonging to general Hill's corps, under the command of captain White of the 18th, and the whole of them were taken, with the exception of the captain and one man, who, I since understand, have been killed."

Thus it appears, that the French opened their fire on Almeida on the 26th of August, and that in twenty-four hours the Portuguese opened their gates, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war. Lord Wellington seems, from his dispatch, to have been quite ignorant of the cause of its submission; but, if any credit is to be given to Massena's account of the conquest, it was accelerated by the disposition of the inhabitants themselves, "who," according to the French general, "loudly expressed their satisfaction at being freed from the yoke of the English."

In consequence of the capture of Almeida, Massena advanced further into Portugal; and lord Wellington slowly retired before him, taking the road to Coimbra. His lordship had well considered every part of the country where he could make a stand, in such a manner as to harrass and retard the enemy, without the risk of being forced to a general engagement. He thus hoped at the same time to draw the enemy further from their supplies, into the heart of a hostile country, and to weaken him by partial actions as he advanced, while himself was falling back on his supplies and reinforcements. In order that the French might derive as little advantage as possible from the resources of the country, lord Wellington issued a proclamation, call-

ing upon the Portuguese to resist the invaders, and to obstruct, with all their might, the advance of the French into the interior of the kingdom, by removing out of their reach every thing that might contribute to their subsistence, or to facilitate their progress.

After the fall of Almeida, lord Wellington continued his retreat to the left of the Mondego river; but having thought it practicable to protect Coimbra, and by the same movement to perplex and retard the enemy, he again crossed the Mondego, and took up his position on the Sierra de Busaco. This Sierra is a high ridge, which extends from the Mondego in a northerly direction, about eight miles. At the highest point of the ridge, about two miles from its termination, is the convent and garden of Busaco. The Sierra de Busaco is connected by a mountainous tract of country with the Sierra de Coramula, which extends in a northeasterly direction beyond Viseu, and separates the valley of the Mondego from the valley of the Douro, on the left of the Mondego.

“The 8th corps,” according to lord Wellington’s dispatch, dated the 30th of September, 1810, “joined the enemy in our front on the 26th, but did not make any serious attack on that day. The light troops on both sides were engaged throughout the lines. At six in the morning of the 27th, the enemy made two desperate attacks upon our position, the one on the right, the other on the left, of the highest point of the Sierra. The attack on the right was made by two divisions of the second corps, on that part of the Sierra occupied by the 3d division of infantry. One division of French infantry arrived at the top of the ridge, when it was attacked in the most gallant manner by the 88th regiment, under the command of lieutenant-col. Wallace, and the 45th regiment, under the command of the hon. lieutenant-colonel Meade, and by the 8th Portuguese regiment, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Douglas, directed by major-general Picton. These three corps advanced with the

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bayonet,

bayonet, and drove the enemy's division from the advantageous ground which they had obtained. The other division, of the 2d corps attacked further on the right, by the road leading by St. Antonio de Cantaro, also in front of major-general Picton's division. This division was repulsed before it could reach the top of the ridge, by the 74th regiment, under the command of the hon. lieutenant-colonel French, and the brigade of Portuguese infantry, under the command of colonel Champelmond, directed by colonel Mackinnon. Major-general Leith also moved to his left, to the support of major-general Picton, and aided in the defeat of the enemy on this post, by the 3d battalion royals, the 1st battalion and the 2d battalion 38th regiment. In these attacks, major-general Leith and Picton, colonels Mackinnon and Champelmond, of the Portuguese service, who was wounded, lieutenant-colonel Wallace, the honourable lieutenant-colonel Meade, lieutenant-colonel Sutton of the 9th Portuguese regiment, major Smith of the 45th regiment, who was unfortunately killed, lieutenant-colonel Douglas, and major Birmingham, of the 8th Portuguese regiment, distinguished themselves. Major-general Picton reports of the 9th and 21st Portuguese regiments, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Sutton, and by lieutenant-colonel de Arouje Bacellar, and of the Portuguese artillery, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Arenschild. I have also to mention in a particular manner the conduct of captain Dansey of the 88th regiment. Major-general Leith reports the good conduct of the royals, 1st battalion 9th, and 2d battalion 38th regiment; and I beg to assure your lordship, that I never witnessed a more gallant attack than that made by the 38th, 45th, and 8th Portuguese regiment, on the enemy's division which had reached the ridge of the Sierra. On the left the enemy attacked, with three divisions of infantry of the 6th corps, that part of the Sierra occupied by the left division commanded by brigadier-general Craufurd, and by the brigade of Portuguese infantry commanded by brigadier-general Pack.

Pack. One division of infantry only made any progress towards the top of the hill ; and they were immediately charged with the bayonet by brigadier-general Craufurd with the 48th, 52d, and 95th regiments, and the 3d Portuguese caçadores, and driven down with immense loss. Brigadier-general Cleman's brigade of Portuguese infantry, which was in reserve, was moved up to support the right of brigadier-general Craufurd's division ; and a battalion of the 19th Portuguese regiment, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Macbean, made a gallant and successful charge upon a body of another division of the enemy, which was endeavouring to penetrate in that quarter. In this attack brigadier-general Craufurd, lieutenant-colonels Beckwith of the 95th, and Barclay of the 52d, and the commanding officers of the regiments engaged, distinguished themselves. Besides these attacks, the light troops of the two armies were engaged throughout the 27th, and the 4th Portuguese caçadores, and the 1st and 16th regiments, directed by brigadier-general Pack, and commanded by lieutenant-colonel de Rego Bonito, lieutenant-colonel Hill, and major Armstrong, showed great steadiness and gallantry. The loss sustained by the enemy in his attack on the 27th has been enormous. I understand that the general of division Merle and general Maucum, are wounded, and general Simon was taken prisoner by the 52d regiment, and three colonels, thirty-three officers, and two hundred and fifty men. The enemy left two thousand killed upon the field of battle ; and I understand, from the prisoners and deserters, that the loss in wounded is immense. The enemy did not renew his attack excepting by the fire of his light troops, on the 28th ; but he moved a large body of infantry and cavalry from the left of his centre to the rear, from whence I saw his cavalry in march on the road which leads from Mortagoa over the mountains towards Oporto.—Having thought it probable that he would endeavour to turn our left by that road, I had directed colonel Trant, with his
division

division of militia, to march to Sardaõ, with the intention that he should occupy those mountains; but unfortunately he was sent round by Oporto by the general officer commanding in the north, in consequence of a small detachment of the enemy being in possession of St. Pedro de Sul; and notwithstanding the efforts which he made to arrive in time, he did not reach Sardaõ till the 28th at night, after the enemy was in possession of the ground. As it was probable that in the course of the night of the 28th the enemy would throw his whole army upon that road, by which he could avoid the Sierra de Busaco, and reach Coimbra by the high road to Oporto, and thus the army would have been exposed to be cut off from that town, or to a general action on less favourable ground; and as I had reinforcements in my rear, I was induced to withdraw from the Sierra de Busaco. The enemy did break up in the mountains at eleven at night of the 28th, and he made the march expected. His advanced guard was at Avelans, in the road from Oporto to Coimbra, yesterday; and the whole army was seen in march through the mountains. That under my command, however, was already in the low country, between the Sierra de Busaco and the sea, and the whole of it, with the exception of the advanced guard, is this day on the left of the Mondego. Although, from the unfortunate circumstance of the delay of colonel Trant's arrival at Sardaõ, I am apprehensive that I shall not succeed in effecting the object which I had in view in passing the Mondego, and in occupying the Sierra de Busaco, I do not regret my having done so. This movement has afforded me a favourable opportunity of showing the enemy the description of troops of which this army is composed; it has brought the Portuguese levies into action with the enemy for the first time in an advantageous situation; and they have proved that the trouble which has been taken with them has not been thrown away, and that they are worthy of contending in the same ranks with British troops in this interesting cause, which they afford the

best hopes of saving. Throughout the contest upon the Sierra, and in all the previous marches, and in those which we have since made, the whole army has conducted themselves in the most regular manner. Accordingly all the operations have been carried with ease, the soldiers have suffered no privations, have undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no loss of stores, and the army is in the highest spirits."

The enemy were thus repulsed with very great loss in their attempt to drive us from the Sierra de Busaco, and thus to open a passage for his further advance into Portugal; but he accomplished by a manœuvre what he could not effect by force. On the evening of the 28th, lord Wellington observed the French army withdrawing from their position, and silently creeping round the northern edge of the Sierra: they had already reached Avelans, on the high road to Coimbra, two days after the engagement. The British general had foreseen this, and had given orders to colonel Trant, who commanded the Portuguese militia, to occupy Sardaõ, in order to prevent it: but from some cause, not well explained, colonel Trant had gone round by Oporto. In this situation, lord Wellington, that he might prevent his army from being cut off from Coimbra, or from being compelled to a general action on less favourable ground, was under the necessity of quitting Busaco, and retreating again to the left bank of the Mondego. The conduct of the French general in this attack is not easy to understand, or to explain, consistently with his known and acknowledged talents: he made a desperate attack on troops posted on a lofty and strong eminence, for the purpose of accomplishing that which it appears might have been effected with less trouble and no loss by the movement he afterwards made.

Marshal Massena appears to have been so perfectly convinced that the retreat of lord Wellington was for the purpose of embarking at Lisbon; and that his sole object ought to be immediate and close pursuit, that he abandoned his wounded at Coimbra, with little or

no protection; and advanced without waiting to form and establish regular magazines. This conduct too appears unaccountable: Massena must have known of the strong position of Torres Vedras, which Junot had meant to have occupied, if the convention of Cintra had not taken place. He had been sufficiently long in Portugal to have had personal experience of the hostility of the Portuguese nation; and that, through this hostility, he would not only be unable to draw much from the country, but that his supplies and reinforcements coming from Spain would be liable to interruption and capture. The season of the year was adverse to him and favourable to lord Wellington: he could not bring up his heavy artillery, and therefore could not attack the lines of Torres Vedras: while on the other hand, if, on his advance to Lisbon, he found the position of lord Wellington impregnable, he must continue there during the whole of the winter and rainy season, his army exposed to sickness and desertion, and at a distance from supply or assistance. The only mode of accounting for Massena's advance towards Lisbon, under these circumstances, is, by supposing that he thought it possible lord Wellington meant to abandon Portugal; and that he was driven on, in some measure, contrary to his own judgement, by the taunting letters which it is known he received from Bonaparte; accusing him of delay and unwillingness to fight; and calling upon him to drive the English army, so inferior to his own, out of Portugal.

As soon as Massena advanced near enough to Torres Vedras to reconnoitre the British lines, he must have been convinced that he could not attack them with the least prospect of success. They were naturally strong; and labour and art had been brought to assist their natural strength. The line extended from Alhandra on the right, to Mafra on the left, forming a distance of about thirty-five miles, flanked on one side by the sea, and on the other by the Tagus. "This line is protected by nature by a range of mountains, through which there are four roads to Lisbon, formed by a

hollow space between the mountains, by which they are completely commanded, and on which have been erected a long range of batteries." Besides, in many places the roads were undermined, and trains laid. The British army, which occupied these lines, was divided into four bodies, each guarding one of the passes of the mountains. It consisted of thirty-five thousand fighting men; besides twenty-five thousand regular Portuguese troops; forty thousand militia of that nation, and about ten thousand Spaniards. The French army could not, when they reached the vicinity of Torres Vedras, consist of more than sixty thousand men, harassed, fatigued, much straitened for provisions, and many sick. The Germans and Italians were continually deserting; and the foraging parties were daily cut off either by the armed peasantry, or by the Portuguese militia in their rear, under the command of Trant and Silveira.

When these circumstances were known in England, the destruction of Massena's army was regarded as inevitable; and the period was eagerly anticipated, when want of provisions would compel him either to attack the British lines, or to commence his retreat. Either it was supposed must be fatal. It was indeed possible, that he might receive supplies and reinforcements from Spain; that the state of the roads, the season of the year, and above all, the continued hostility of the people, rendered their arrival very doubtful. It was known that he could not for many weeks convey intelligence to Paris of the battle of Busaco; and that the messengers he employed on this and other occasions, he was under the necessity of guarding through Portugal with a large body of troops. Besides, it was not easy to conjecture from what quarter he could derive reinforcements or supplies: the French armies were scarcely equal to the difficulties and opposition they met with in every part of the Peninsula.

Massena, however, contrary to the expectation of the British nation, and contrary it would seem to the expectation and conjectures of lord Wellington, kept his

his position in front of Torres Vedras long after his army was said to be literally and actually starving. At length, on the 14th of November, he left his position: on the morning of the following day the allied army broke up and followed the march of the enemy, firmly hoping that the time was now arrived for his destruction. Massena retreated to Santarem, where he made a stand; and when the new position he took up there was examined, it was found to be so strong by nature and art, that it would have been madness to have attacked him in it. Lord Wellington, therefore, contented himself with fixing his head-quarters at Cartaxo, and watching the further movements and operations of the French; and in these positions the two armies remained at the close of the year.

To be more particular, however, in our account of the operations of the armies, it is necessary to make a few extracts from the letters and dispatches of lord Wellington, which will undoubtedly convey the best information on the subject.

In a letter which lord Wellington addressed to Don Miguel de Preira Forjaz, dated Pero Negro, Oct. 20, his lordship says,

“ Since the letter which I addressed to your Excellency on the 13th instant, the enemy has been employed principally in reconnoitring the positions occupied by our troops, and in fortifying his own. To accomplish the first object, he has skirmished with the troops which form our advanced posts, and who have always behaved well. On the 14th the enemy attacked with infantry, supported by artillery, a small detachment of the 71st regiment, which formed the advanced guard of sir Brent Spencer’s division, near Sobral de Monte Agraco, and that for the purpose of covering a reconnoissance made by one of his parties. Our detachment charged with the most distinguished gallantry, and compelled him to retire on the above-mentioned place. The whole of the 8th corps of the French army, and part of the 6th, arrived that evening on the plain near Sobral, and in consequence sir Brent Spencer’s division was under the necessity of falling back from the advanced situation which it occupied. Colonel Trant arrived near Coimbra on the 7th instant, and immediately attacked the advanced posts, which the enemy had without the city, which he cut off and prevented them from entering the city, against

against which he marched rapidly. The resistance the enemy made did not last long. He took eighty officers prisoners, and five thousand men, for the most part sick and wounded. On the following day brigadier-general Miller and colonel Wilson arrived at Coimbra, with the detachments under their command. They have since taken nearly three hundred and fifty prisoners, soldiers who had straggled from their regiments during the march for the purpose of getting provisions. Colonel Wilson has since advanced with a party of infantry and cavalry to Condeixa, and at the same time brigadier-general Miller occupies Coimbra."

In a letter from colonel Nicholas Trant to Marshal Beresford, dated Coimbra, Oct. 7, 1810, is the following passage, part of which is alluded to in the above extract :

"I have reason to believe that the number of prisoners exceeds five thousand; of which four thousand are on their march for Oporto, including one whole company of the emperor's marine guards. Three thousand five hundred muskets fell into our possession, nearly the whole of which were charged: from whence you may judge of the number of effective men. We found no artillery, but we have taken a quantity of cattle and sheep, which the enemy had collected. There are about eighty officers among the prisoners, as well as I can judge. From the nature of the attack, your Excellency will easily perceive the difficulty that there was in preventing the soldiers and armed peasants from plundering the prisoners; and I am sorry to say, that the latter committed some acts of violence, but I believe only six or eight French have been the victims of their resentment. I have to observe, that nothing can exceed the state of misery that prevails in this city. The enemy, not content with having plundered every part of it, and robbing every one they met, set fire to some houses, and having heaped up in the streets, in the greatest disorder, all the provisions that the army could not carry along with it; so that it could scarcely be expected, that above eight hundred soldiers, natives of this city and its vicinity, surrounded by their wretched relatives and acquaintances, could be patient witnesses of a scene of devastation in which their property was destroyed in so iniquitous and scandalous a manner. However, I hope your Excellency will believe, that I did every thing in my power to protect the French that fell into our hands, and after the two first movements of violence, I succeeded in securing them against insult."

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A dispatch, of which the following is an extract, was received on the 3d of December at lord Liverpool's office, addressed to his lordship by lieutenant-general viscount Wellington, dated Cantaxo, November 21, 1810.

“ The enemy [under Massena] retired from the position which they had held for the last month, with their right at Sobral, and their left resting upon the Tagus, in the night of the 14th instant; and went by the road of Alenquer towards Alcoentre with their right, and Villa Nova with their left. They continued their retreat towards Santarem on the following day. The allied army broke up from their position on the morning of the 15th instant, and followed the march of the enemy; and the advanced guard was at Alenquer on the 15th, and the British cavalry and advanced guard at Azambuga and Alcoentre on the 16th, and at this place [Cantaxo] on the 17th. In these movements, they made about four hundred prisoners.”

A dispatch, of which the following is an extract, was received at the office of the earl of Liverpool on the 24th of December, from lieutenant-general Wellington, dated Cantaxo, Dec. 8, 1810.

“ The detachment of the enemy's troops commanded by general Gardanne, which had retired to Sobreira Formosa, have continued their march to the frontier, and by the last accounts had entered Spain. I have not heard that this detachment had any communication with the enemy's troops on the left of Zezere, from which they were distant about three leagues. I understood, that having lost some prisoners, taken by a patrol and by a party of the Ordenanza, which accompanied the hon. lieutenant-colonel Ponsonby on a reconnoissance from Abrantes to the river Codes, they made very particular enquiries respecting the position of lieutenant-general Hill's corps, and the means which the allies possessed of crossing the Tagus at Abrantes; and, having commenced their march from Cardigos towards the Codes in the morning, they retired about eleven with great precipitation, and continued their retreat in the same manner till they reached the frontier. They were followed by the Ordenanza, who did them much mischief on the march, and took much baggage from them. The enemy destroyed many horses and mules which could not keep up with them; and this march, if it was ordered by superior authority, and is connected with any other arrangement, had every appearance, and was attended by all the consequences

consequences of a precipitate and forced retreat. No alteration of any importance has been made in the position of the enemy's troops since I addressed your lordship."

But in determining the probably issue of the contest in Spain, so far as it depended upon the Spaniards themselves, perhaps a cool and comprehensive view of what had actually taken place would lead us to this conclusion: That while the disposition and the exertions of the people continue to be such as they have hitherto been, Bonaparte will not be able to gain possession of the peninsula; but that, on the other hand, while the Spanish government, and the Spanish leading men, both in council and in war, continue to act as they have hitherto done, the French armies will not be driven completely and permanently beyond the Pyrennees. We by no means think that the Spanish provisional government, by abolishing what in this country would be deemed intolerable hardships, and certain proofs of slavery, would materially increase the number or energy of the opponents of the French. Some, however, of the middling ranks in Spain, men neither sunk into ignorance, superstition, or habits of slavery, like the mass of the people, nor, like the higher classes, afraid of making use of that mass to expel their invaders, would undoubtedly come forward with more zeal and effect, if what they deem abuses and imperfections in the laws and constitution were abolished. But the great advantage which would be derived from a wise and efficient government (to which revolutionary Spain had hitherto been a stranger) would be, that the mass of the people, such as they are, inveterate against the French, not perhaps from the purest or most enlightened motives, would be directed and enabled to use their efforts to the best advantage. System would be given to their operations; and consequently they would terminate in effects more permanently and generally beneficial to the common cause than they have yet done. The armies, however, would reap the greatest advantage from a radical change in the character of the provisional government:

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government: they would gain more discipline, be better officered, and gradually advance to an equality in point of courage and success with the troops of France.

It was a difficult and delicate thing for the British government to interfere in the organization or the principles of the Spanish government. As there could be no doubt of our well-wishes and zeal for the cause in which the peninsula was engaged, there could be no impropriety in suggesting such alterations in the mode of conducting the war, as our cabinet thought would be beneficial. We might perhaps even go further: and if we could fully and satisfactorily trace the want of success in the Spanish armies to radical defects in the government; we did not go beyond propriety in pointing out the causes and requesting that they should be removed. But merely as allies, and while only the common cause was suffering, it was scarcely proper that we should add remonstrance to our advice: when, however, the defects in the organization of the Spanish armies led our troops into danger, or snatched away the fruits of that victory which British valour and skill had gained; and when that defective organization could be distinctly traced to the government, we were perfectly justified in adding remonstrance to advice; and in pointing out those defects, upon the removal of which our future co-operation entirely depended.

The marquis of Wellesley, therefore, while he was ambassador at Seville, considered it as his duty to write an official letter to the secretary of the supreme junta, repeating what he had frequently before urged, on "the necessity of strengthening and amending the frame of the government, by concentrating the executive power in a more compact form, and by resting that power on the direct support of the collective wisdom of the nation, and on the immediate aid of a due representation of the several states of the realm." He remarks that he had also pointed out the causes which had rendered vain and fruitless the efforts of the British in the last campaign; and the only practicable

means of enabling Spain to derive and enjoy that species of assistance which she most anxiously desired. In consequence of this representation, the supreme central junta determined to delegate the military branch of the executive power to a committee of seven of its members. Lord Wellesley justly remarks upon this proposed arrangement, that it would be weakening instead of concentrating and strengthening the executive power; that it would take away activity and vigour from what already was deficient in these qualities. Its effects upon the organization and success of the armies would be prejudicial; they had failed, because there was no unity in the councils which directed them; and certainly their failure was much more likely to be encreased than removed, when that part of the executive which was hereafter to superintend them, was not only separated from the other branches of the government, but split into parts.

Another part of lord Wellesley's letter referred to the meeting of the cortes; a measure which the junta had long and frequently promised to adopt, but the execution of which they had always delayed under some vague and frivolous pretext. There is great manliness in the following passage of the letter; and the sentiments which it breathes, as well as the language in which they are expressed, are so creditable to the noble marquis, and so different from those which his general character, and the spirit of his government in India, would have led us to expect, that justice to him, not less than the merit of the passage itself, induces us to give it in his own words. "The intention of assembling the cortes was announced in the month of May 1809. It will be difficult to persuade the world, that all the necessary regulations, with a view of that important event, might not have been completed before the month of March 1810." (The period the supreme junta had fixed). "I am well aware of the absolute necessity of preparing the principal rules and orders for the regular dispatch of business before that assembly shall meet; but it would have

have been highly desirable that the utmost degree of expedition should have been used in calling the aid of the cortes to support the executive government in the great work of delivering the Spanish nation from the French usurpation, and of restoring the independence of the monarchy, together with the prosperity and happiness of the people. These objects are inseparable from the interests of the alliance: and it is therefore with the deepest regret that I witness any course of proceedings tending to procrastinate those improvements in the condition of Spain, which alone can enable her to receive the auxiliary armies of Great Britain."

Lord Wellesley then adverts to the plan which he had submitted to the supreme junta; according to which, every branch of the executive power was to be lodged in the hands of the council, of not more than five persons, to be chosen either from the body of the junta, or from the nation at large, with reference exclusively to the character and qualifications of the persons to be elected. The council of regency was to exercise the executive power till the cortes were assembled: every exertion was to be made to expedite the meeting of the cortes: a deliberate council was to be formed, for the purpose of selecting and preparing such business as it may be proper to bring before the early consideration of the cortes. "The same act of the junta by which the regency shall be appointed and the cortes called, shall contain the principal articles of redress of grievances, correction of abuses, and relief of exactions in Spain and the Indies, and also the heads of such concessions to the colonies as shall fully secure to them a full share in the representative body of the Spanish empire." The last head of the plan which the marquis of Wellesley submitted to the junta, was, that the regency, as soon they met, should issue the necessary orders for correcting the whole system of the military department in Spain. This plan was given in on the 8th of September, 1809: and the junta fixed the meeting of the cortes for the 1st of March, 1810! On the other

points they were not more yielding to lord Wellesley's representations; nor did the withdrawing of British assistance, unless they altered their measures and system, which was very strongly hinted at in his letter, appear to give them the least apprehension. A strong suspicion of disaffection, or at least coolness, to the cause of their country, hangs over all who have yet directed the councils of Spain, and most who have headed her armies; which suspicion, if it should be found that there are no grounds for it, must be consequently changed into a thorough contempt for their abilities.

In the beginning of 1810, the instructions to be observed in the election of deputies to the cortes were published. The object and purpose of the assembling of the cortes is first set forth: on it was declared to depend the successful termination of the contest, in which the people of Spain were engaged with Bonaparte for the salvation of their country; the restoration of their "beloved sovereign;" and the re-establishment of an ameliorated constitution worthy of the Spanish nation. The general rules by which those qualified to send members to the cortes ought to proceed, are sufficiently simple and common-place: the interest of individuals is not to be preferred to the interest of the nation at large: no person destitute of talent, or in other respects not qualified for the situation, ought to be chosen; nor ought the people to view the business as of such subordinate and trifling moment as to deem any person qualified to fill the situation of member to the cortes. But the supreme junta, from whom these instructions proceeded, seems to have dreaded lest any friends to anarchy or revolution, or any disposed to abuse the power committed to them, should have been returned. If in this description they adopted the literal and just meaning of the words, the advice was good; but if under them they ranged and included all who were anxious and determined to remove grievances, and really to ameliorate the constitution of Spain and the condition of the inhabitants,

habitants, they sought to render ineffectual the grand and only desirable object of the meeting of the cortes. Indeed the extreme and shuffling backwardness which they manifested towards issuing the proclamation for the assembling of the cortes; their own conduct, marked and distinguished by any thing except an enlightened and liberal love of their country or regard to the liberties of their fellow-citizens, raised a suspicion, that the members of the cortes, when assembled, would not, so far as depended upon them, be of much utility to the nation.

The instructions were divided into six chapters. In the first chapter it is directed that parochial and district juntas should be assembled through the medium of the justices, for the purpose of nominating electors. These electoral provincial juntas are to appoint a deputy to the cortes, in the proportion of one to every 50,000 inhabitants, estimating the population according to the census which was taken in 1787; an additional deputy is to be allowed and chosen in every province which contains 25,000 inhabitants more than that number. In the 10th article of the first chapter, a statistical table of Spain is given, from which it appears that the population is rated at 10,534,985; consequently the number of effective deputies would be 208: besides this regular number, 68 supplemental deputies were to be returned to serve in the cortes in case of death. It is directed that in the choice of deputies, those shall be preferred, who, *cæteris paribus*, are able to serve their country at their own charge. A sum was however fixed for the deputies of 120 reals a day, while they were in actual attendance; 40 reals for the electors of districts; and 20 for the parochial electors.

The second chapter orders that the parochial juntas shall choose one elector each to repair to the electoral junta for the district. Every inhabitant who is a householder (including the secular clergy) is to have a vote in the choice of these electors. The exceptions are foreigners, persons under criminal prosecution,

cution, those who have suffered a criminal or infamous punishment, bankrupts, debtors to the public, and such as are insane, or deaf and dumb. At the parish meeting each individual is to declare openly and audibly, the person qualified by law, whom he thinks best suited for the office of parochial elector; and the twelve persons who stand highest on the list are to choose the electors for the districts.

The third chapter applies the regulations contained in the preceding one, to the appointment of a deputy to the provincial electoral assembly; the only difference being, that any person resident in the district, even though he be not a member of that body, may be chosen.

By the fourth chapter it is ordered, that in the provincial electoral juntas the votes are to be given in succession *virá voce*. After each elector has declared whom he thinks best qualified to be a deputy, the secretary is to read over the lists; and whoever has the greatest number of votes, provided that number exceed half the electors, is to be capable of being balloted for as a deputy. When three persons are thus chosen, one out of the number is to be elected by ballot as the deputy to the cortes. This process is to be continued of choosing three by *virá voce* declaration, and one out of these three by ballot, till the number of deputies which the population of the district requires are chosen. Every person born in the district, having reached the age of twenty-five years, and not being a menial servant, is eligible as a member of the cortes.

In the 5th and 6th chapters each of the superior juntas of observation and defence, and each of the cities which had votes when the cortes were last assembled in 1789, are empowered to send one deputy; conducting the election according to the rules prescribed in the preceding chapters.

It was intended that the cortes should assemble in Seville; but as the French had gained possession of that city before the deputies were all chosen, the isle
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de Leon was fixed upon as the place of their meeting. They first assembled towards the end of September. Don Ranon Dou, the deputy for Catalonia, was named as their president: a man of considerable political and literary talents: particularly known and distinguished as the author of a work on the "Public Law of Spain." Don Evarista Perez de Castro, deputy for the province of Valladolid, was appointed secretary. In the first sittings, after the necessary preliminary business was gone through, Capmany moved some very strong resolutions against such members, who, while they had a seat in the cortes, should accept of any place or office. Another measure, still stronger, and which held out hopes and a promise of energy and patriotism, which were but very inadequately and miserably fulfilled by their subsequent conduct, was a resolution, carried by a large majority, that all members, till a year had expired after their functions as deputies had ceased, should be disqualified from accepting of any office.

In the sitting of the 27th of September, Arguelles called the attention of the cortes to a most important subject, namely, the political liberty of the press; he did not wish that a discussion respecting the propriety or advantage of establishing the liberty of the press in Spain should be immediately gone into: on such a point they ought to proceed slowly, and with due deliberation and caution; but he thought a committee should be appointed, "which, taking into consideration all that has already been written on this important subject, might examine and investigate the question, and submit to the cortes the result of their labours and their reflections; as well as point out the manner in which it might appear to them that the political liberty of the press might be fixed." This motion was strongly supported by Torrero, an ecclesiastic: he painted in glowing and animated terms the evils which Spain had already suffered from a controlled

trolled press; and the real and substantial benefit which she must unavoidably derive from the establishment of a free press. He reprobated the conduct of the central junta on this subject: their criminal silence and mysterious conduct had not only given great offence and created considerable suspicion, but it had discredited them from the first moment of their institution. The people, believing that nothing good could proceed from them, did not feel disposed to second any measures they resolved upon, which were really conducive to the welfare of the country. They became indifferent to their proceedings. But no truth could be more evident than this, that it was not only the right but the duty of the people to interest themselves about the proceedings of their representatives; to watch their language and their conduct narrowly and strictly. How could they do this, unless that language and that conduct were known to them; unless they were permitted to give utterance without any restraint to their observations and opinions on the measures of their representatives; in short, unless the political liberty of the press was established on the broadest and firmest basis? Public opinion ought to be consulted, even in cases where it might not be wise or safe to follow it; but how could the opinion of the public be known, if the press were under restraint? The press, being its echo, could not be preserved too pure or free.

The motion was opposed by only a very few members; and a committee was appointed, consisting of eight deputies, among whom were Arguelles Perez de Castro, Palacios, and Hermida.

In the sitting of the 28th of September, some interesting discussions took place respecting the American colonies. A plan with regard to the mode of transmitting to them the decrees which had been already passed, had been referred to a committee. At this sitting the committee produced a sketch of four decrees,

crees, in which, among other things, it was asserted, that the Spanish Americans, not having forfeited their privileges by any misconduct, should possess the same right of electing deputies which the people in Spain did; that the right should not only be the same in nature but also in extent; that is, that one deputy should be returned to the cortes for every fifty thousand inhabitants, including in this number not only the casts, but all such as were freemen. The member for Lima expressed a wish to pass these decrees immediately, and for that purpose that they should be read twice during that sitting. This, however, was strongly opposed by several members, and the decision was postponed.

The discussion respecting the liberty of the press was resumed in several meetings before it was finally settled. It met with considerable opposition from many members; and the sentiments which they uttered, and the arguments which they used, were by no means such as could have been expected, even in Spain, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. After it had been almost unanimously agreed that the point of the political liberty of the press had been sufficiently discussed, a question arose, whether the voting should be public or secret. The latter was recommended, on the plea that thus there would be more liberty: a plea which would have equally justified secret voting on every occasion, and which, if examined, will be found not less weak and groundless than suspicious. The observations of Luxan, the vice-president, were just and magnanimous on this subject: he observed, that it was the wish of the Spanish nation that they should be all heroes: that it required firmness and constancy, not only in those who were in favour of the liberty of the press, but in those who were against it: that the nation would look with the same aspect upon those who heroically gave their votes for the liberty of the press, as upon those who with virtue and constancy voted against it; since both acted equally from a sense of duty, and were regarded with equal confidence by

the Spanish nation. This question was then put, and it was almost unanimously decided, that the voting should be public. On the 19th of October, the cortes proceeded to vote respecting the liberty of the press: every deputy was called upon by name to give his opinion in an audible voice. When the votes were counted, it appeared that the "political liberty of the press" was carried by 70 votes against 32: of the minority, nine were not against the measure positively, but only against its adoption at present.

The council of regency had long given dissatisfaction to the nation at large: they took scarcely any measures which were in the least calculated to recruit the armies, or to repair the disasters which had befallen them. Every thing about their conduct was feeble, languid, and inefficient: the circumstances of the country demanded and required men of a very opposite character: men whose minds would be continually on the alert; who possessed talents and experience, and who would bring them forth whenever they were needed. It was therefore necessary to dissolve the regency, and to appoint a new executive power. The new executive consisted of three members; Ajar, who was appointed president, Blake, and Ciscar: as however the first two were then absent, and for the purpose of supplying the place of any of the members in case of indisposition, two supplementary members were chosen; these were senior Puig, and the marquis del Palacio. On the 28th of October, such of the members of the new regency as were in the isle de León attended the meeting of the cortes, to take the prescribed oaths. On this occasion the marquis del Palacio wished to take the oath, "without prejudice to the oath which he had previously taken to Ferdinand VII." At first it was supposed that the marquis was not acquainted with the form, and it was repeated to him: he however persisted in the addition; saying that he did not refuse to take the oath, but that the words which he had added were necessary to quiet his conscience. More indignation was excited by this
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behaviour than it seemed to call for ; and the marquis was treated with a rigour and harshness which could scarcely have been exceeded had he declared himself a traitor to Ferdinand VII. A short and stormy discussion took place ; the marquis was sent to prison, and another member, the marquis de Castelar, elected to supply his place. A short time afterwards, Palacio, in consequence of an application to the president, was released from prison, on condition of remaining at his own house in close arrest.

Soon after the cortes had come to the vote that the press should be free, they issued a decree on the subject. The preamble to this decree is ample in its promises, and lays down a principle, which, if carried to its just conclusions, would produce the utmost freedom of political discussion. " The general and extraordinary cortes, considering that the individual rights of citizens to publish their thoughts and political ideas is not only a barrier to the arbitrary power of those who govern, but also the means of enlightening the nation in general, and the only way of arriving at the knowledge of what is truly the public opinion, have decreed," &c.

The great objection to the formation of the juntas, by this decree for licensing books, consists in this ; that some of their members are ecclesiastics. As the decree did not alter the law respecting the publication of religious books, there does not appear any good or sufficient reason why, in determining what books may be published on other subjects not connected with religion, ecclesiastics should have been vested with any power. It may indeed be urged, that in the case of the supreme junta, the ecclesiastical members form only one third ; and in the provincial juntas, only two-fifths : but on the other hand, though they do not reach a numerical majority, yet, when their great influence is taken into the account, it may justly be doubted whether in many instances they would not be able to carry the majority along with them. What their own individual opinion would be, both on the

general question of the freedom of the press, and on particular cases of free and undaunted discussion, may fairly be gathered from the character which the ecclesiastics in Spain bear; and from the fact, that in this very decree it is expressly declared, that all writings on matters of religion shall remain subject to the same controul they have been under since the council of Trent. On the whole, though it must be admitted that some progress has been made towards free discussion on political subjects, and consequently towards what is true and beneficial; yet the Spanish press, by this decree, is by no means placed on a footing such as the peculiar state and circumstances of the country demanded, or such as a real and undaunted regard to the liberty and well-being of the subject would have established. As a first step to an important object, it should be hailed with joy and gratitude; but if no advance is made, the press probably will soon fall into the same degraded condition in which it was previous to the decree.

CHAPTER VII.

IT is indeed one of the most plausible, and, at the same time, one of the most weighty objections, against the usefulness of the study of history, that, in the long series of events which it embraces and narrates, nothing is to be learned but what might with infinitely more facility, and with equal certainty, be discovered from the transactions that are continually passing around us: that men are naturally fond of power; and that, when they obtain possession of it, they are generally prone and apt to abuse it: that sovereigns in particular, are too much disposed to trust to the representations and glosses of their ministers, and of those who flatter and court them, are, it is suggested, among the most novel and important maxims with which the study of history supplies us, so far as human character in general, and the character

racter of sovereigns in particular, is concerned. It is further objected, that even if we depend upon the study of history for supplying us with very new or very important political maxims, we shall be greatly disappointed. Whoever then, after the perusal of the history of most nations, whether of ancient or modern times, sits down to recollect and digest the political rules and maxims which he has been able to glean, will perceive that they are what may be termed common-place, and only such as he might have obtained from casting his eyes round on the public events as they occurred.

That there is a considerable share of truth and justice in these remarks ; but if they be applied, without exception, against the utility of the study of every history, they cease to be just and true. In ancient as well as in modern times, there arise, every now and then, a series of events so totally distinguished and apart from the common every-day transactions of states, that they must, in their origin, their progress, and their consequences, strongly fix the attention and interest, and must to the politician and philosopher afford much insight, not before possessed, into the causes of the rise and fall of states and kingdoms, and into the nature of the human character when acted upon, or surrounded by peculiar circumstances. Those who are but moderately conversant in ancient or modern history, will easily fix upon and recognize these remarkable epochs, so pregnant with interest and instruction: the latest which have occurred are the French and the Spanish revolutions. It may, however, be justly maintained, that the lesson which is taught by what has already occurred, and by what is yet transacting in Spain, is both more novel and more important than what was taught by the events as they occurred in the progress of the French revolution.

The mere simple statement of the fact, with respect to the transactions of the war in the Peninsula, will excite considerable surprise and interest, and naturally provoke enquiry and investigation. France,
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after having, with more rapidity and uniform process than was ever known before, conquered the most powerful armies, and destroyed the most wealthy and firmly established European nations; by which she had not only extended her territory and increased her armies and her resources, but, what perhaps was of greater moment, infused into her own soldiers a belief of invincibility, and into those of other states a degrading and weakening feeling of military inferiority, attacked a country, the inhabitants of which had long been declining both in patriotism and valour; the armies of which were either in a wretched state of preparation and discipline, or actually, at the moment of invasion, at a distance, surrounded by the troops or the allies of the invaders; and the sovereign of which had joined, either from treachery or fear, with those who were come with the avowed purpose of wresting the sceptre from his hand, and of over-running and conquering his ancient and hereditary dominions.

Indeed, when we examine with more minuteness into the various circumstances and particulars of this event, our astonishment and admiration, instead of being diminished, will be considerably augmented and increased. It may truly be said, when we compare what the inhabitants of the Peninsula have done towards the preservation of their country from the overgrown power of France, and towards the resistance and destruction of the French armies, with what other nations have done when placed in a similar situation, that the former have greatly surpassed the achievements of ancient times: for, in all former and similar cases, there existed at the main spring of action uncommon vigour, activity, and patriotism; and by these were naturally set and continued in motion and success all the energies of the country. To take the French revolution for example: at first, there can be no doubt that the greatest mind—the mind of the most enlightened and comprehensive views, and of the most determined and active character, directed the move-
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ments of France, so far as they respected the defence and protection of her territory from the invasion and conquest of a foreign power : even afterwards, in the very midst of all that savage brutality which disgraced the revolution, and which brought to light and into action a set of men infinitely worse than the most degrading and misanthropical ideas of human nature had dared to form ; in the midst of all this there was the mark of undoubted talent, and that talent was so directed as to call forth the energies of the country. Far otherwise has it been in Spain ever since the commencement of the war in that country : there has, in fact, been no head,—no ruling or superintending power to arrange, methodize, and direct, the well-disposed and well-directed vigour of the nation. It has been even worse than that : for those into whose hands the ill fortune of the state has uniformly thrown the direction of public affairs, have not only been destitute of all positive qualities which could possibly have rendered them fit for their situation and office ; but, in too many instances and respects, the activity and vigour which they have actually discovered and exercised have done manifest and extensive mischief to the cause they were bound to benefit and support. Circumstances will justify the position, however harsh, and even strange and paradoxical it may appear, that without the government which have exercised power and rule over Spain since the commencement of the revolution, she would have achieved much more than she has actually done.

In endeavouring, therefore, to form a just estimate of the efforts of the Spaniards to drive the French beyond the Pyrenees, or to defend effectually their country from the hostile attacks of their invaders, we ought always carefully and candidly to bear in mind (among many circumstances to which we shall shortly briefly advert) the character and conduct of the men who have been at the head of the government. There is likewise another consideration to be taken into the scale, when weighing this most important subject.

As from the events of the war the Spanish provisional government were compelled to desert the place where they had first fixed their abode; and as afterwards from the same cause they were in fact shut up in Cadiz; it behoved them to have displayed more than usual wisdom, activity, and vigour in their councils and plans, in order to do away the effect of these untoward events, and to command respect and confidence from the people, even in the midst of their misfortunes and virtual exile. The Roman senate never appeared with more dignity, they never inspired more awe into the breasts of their enemies, nor filled the breasts of their countrymen with more confidence in the public cause, than when the enemy were within sight of Rome. In such a situation, if men are really possessed of patriotism, wisdom, and vigour in that degree which public danger and calamity demand, these qualities will naturally break forth. But with respect to the provisional governments of Spain, in proportion as the crisis of their country's fate became more near and more dreadful,—in proportion as the display and exercise of patriotism and activity became more necessary, they exhibited, if possible, stronger proofs of weakness, intrigue, and selfishness.

Nevertheless, there are other circumstances which ought to be allowed their due weight, before we can sit in candid judgement upon the efforts of the Spaniards to protect their country against the power of Bonaparte. In the agitations and convulsions which a revolution occasion, or which are the natural and necessary consequence of a whole people being excited in defence of their independence, and being, in a great degree, thrown loose from regular government, the buoyancy of great and aspiring talents will unavoidably raise them to their proper and just level. The history of all nations, under these circumstances, undoubtedly prove this: the history of France, perhaps more than that of any nation ancient or modern, may be cited in illustration of this position. But indeed the truth of it is so very readily and generally acknowledged,

acknowledged, that men are much more disposed to wonder that great talents should not arise and display themselves during the convulsions of a state, than that they should become conspicuous and active. But what is the case with respect to Spain? Would it not be difficult to point out one individual, either in the civil or military line, of permanent talents, whom the revolution has produced or called forth? However we may account for this circumstance, the existence of it is undoubted; and if it be so, if no commanding talents adequate to the direction and management of the affairs of Spain, during these momentous, arduous, and most difficult crisis, have arisen, ought we not to be the more surprised that she has still been enabled to resist the attacks of the power of France? Let us also take into consideration the character of those men who conduct the hostile councils, and lead on the hostile armies, in order that we may gain a still further insight into the merit of Spanish resistance. When France was attacked at the commencement of the revolution of that country, although the generals who conducted the hostile armies were men of considerable talents, yet they were not pre-eminently so; and, in a very short space of time, France, in respect of generals, was fully adequate to cope with her enemies. But the case with Spain was widely different: she was attacked by men perfect masters in the art of war, who led against her feeble and undisciplined troops armies habituated to conquer, and which had been led on to victory.

It was, however, expected and foretold by the sanguine friends of the Spanish cause, that, although at first her generals were inexperienced, and her troops raw and undisciplined, yet during the continuance of a protracted resistance these disadvantages would gradually diminish, and the Spanish generals and armies would, from the unavoidable and natural operation of circumstances, become at least equal to those of her invader. But these hopes have hitherto been disappointed; and these prophecies are still without their

accomplishment. Whenever a French and Spanish army encounter each other, if the numerical force be nearly equal, the advantage is on the side of the French : little or nothing seems to have been gained by experience, on the part of the Spanish generals, of skill or military knowledge ; and still less, on the part of the soldiers, of steadiness and discipline. Neither can be depended upon : under some circumstances, and in some instances, the generals will display and exert no contemptible share of military skill in the mode of attack or defence, and in the manœuvres during the battle ; and their skill will be seconded by corresponding discipline and steadiness on the part of the troops ; while under other circumstances, and at other times, all the ignorance and inexperience of generals and soldiers totally unused to warfare will be most fatally exhibited. Here, then, is another cause for astonishment ; that under these circumstances Spain is not conquered. What is it that has prevented her conquest ? The nature of the Peninsula is particularly favourable to the cause and exertions of the Spaniards. This, of course, was equally favourable at the commencement of the revolution ; but the Spaniards at that time, too much disposed to trust their defence to regular armies, neglected in a great degree the advantages which the nature of their territory supplied. But now they have turned their attention more closely and effectually to them. There is only one unfavourable consequence which this mode of warfare was likely to produce, and against which they do not appear sufficiently to have guarded : this desultory warfare, this occupation of the strong parts of their territory, ought never to have been regarded as the ultimate object of their efforts, nor as of itself adequate to the expulsion of the French. It should only have been determined to have recourse to it, until the regular armies could be increased and matured in skill and discipline : it should have been regarded more as a temporary and mediate than as a lasting and ultimate measure. Had it been viewed solely and exclusively

clusively in this light, it could have produced much more beneficial effects than have actually proceeded from it.

The nature of the Spanish territory has, however, from the nature of the warfare carried on in the Peninsula, and from the protracted state of that warfare, produced another advantage to the Spanish cause, which was indeed partially foreseen by many of its advocates. In all the countries that have been over-run and conquered by France, her armies have been in a great measure both paid and supported by contributions and exactions on the inhabitants; and as the conquest was generally achieved in the short space of one campaign of but a very few months continuance, there occurred no difficulty in obtaining money and provisions amply sufficient from the occupied territory. But in Spain the case was different: the protracted state of the warfare of itself was sufficient to produce very great difficulties in the way of paying and supporting the French armies; and as the warfare was not only much protracted, but the French armies frequently compelled to remain long stationary, these difficulties were much increased. There were also other circumstances which operated the same way. In other countries which France had over-run and conquered, the inhabitants were either neutral towards them, or so little hostile, that the French could easily procure what supplies they had, or compel them to collect and forward them to the armies. In Spain it was directly the reverse: the inhabitants not only would not forage for the French armies, nor without compulsion give up what stores they had, but they intercepted the supplies on their way to the armies. Thus Bonaparte found his troops placed in circumstances, under the operation of which the acknowledged and tried excellence of his commissariat was of little avail: they were in the midst of a country stripped of all supplies, or at least possessing those supplies by no means in a degree sufficient for the maintenance of his numerous forces; and the supplies, widely and thinly

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scattered, could not be procured and collected unless his soldiers were exposed to great peril from the Spaniards; and when they were collected, they could not, without very great hazard of being intercepted, be conveyed to the armies. To attempt to send the supplies from France was out of the question; even though the intervening country had been peaceable and friendly, and though the roads had been excellent, and the distance much less, this could not have been done for any length of time; but when the hostile disposition of the inhabitants, the bad state of the roads, and the great length of the way, were taken into consideration, even the enterprize and activity of the French emperor would have been foiled in the attempt to supply his armies in the Peninsula from beyond the Pyrenees.

But Bonaparte had been accustomed to depend upon the countries which he invaded and conquered, not only for the support, but also for the pay of his troops. Partly, because, in all probability, he had not the pecuniary means necessary for the regular and full pay of his numerous armies; and partly, in order to animate them with the stimulus of hope to the most arduous enterprize and the most rapid exertions, he held out to them the prospect of pay, only when they achieved the conquest either of a considerable portion or of the capital of the enemy's territory. In his wars with Austria he followed this plan; and the possession of Vienna was the period when he rewarded his soldiers for their conquests. He appears to have pursued the same plan in the Peninsula: the capture of Madrid brought to his armies a certain portion of their pay; and the remainder was promised when they should plant the French eagle on the walls of Lisbon. But the Peninsula, neither rich in money nor fertile in provisions, was soon exhausted; or at least that portion of it which was still untouched, or had recovered from the former plunder of the French, was now placed beyond their reach and their power by the military prowess of the British army. Bonaparte, therefore,

fore, was compelled, either to suffer his forces to remain without pay, or to send the necessary money from France: the latter alternative was neither very agreeable nor very easy to him; and there is reason to apprehend, that his armies obtained much less plunder, and received much less pay, as well as endured more hardships, in every respect, since they crossed the Pyrenees than ever they did before that period.

The natural consequences of these circumstances in which the French armies were placed followed in some degree; though not to such an extent as might have been anticipated. It might have been expected that the power and influence of Bonaparte with his generals, his soldiers, and with the French nation in general, having been but of late growth, and nurtured by his success, and by the consequent elevation and enrichment of his soldiers, would have fallen with his disasters in Spain; or, at least, that his armies would have been greatly thinned by desertion; and that their spirits would have been broken by the protracted and unsuccessful nature of the warfare in which they had been so very long engaged. There can be no doubt that the foreign troops in the service of Bonaparte in the Peninsula have deserted in very considerable numbers; but very few indeed of the troops of France have quitted his standard; nor do they appear to fight with a diminution of their accustomed spirit, perseverance, and valour.

We have already observed, that the events which have occurred during the war in the Peninsula are more pregnant with instruction than any series of events which either ancient or modern history presents to our notice. We alluded particularly to those events, so far as the defence of the Spaniards is concerned: but even when we contemplate the French character, as it was exhibited in the conduct and behaviour of their generals and soldiers who were employed in the Peninsula, there is ample room for gathering instruction, and for indulging in reflection; though that instruction and that reflection are not of

so pleasant and cheering a nature as what the events of the war, so far as the Spaniards are concerned, give rise to. It is impossible not to be considerably alarmed at the firm and unshaken attachment of the French generals and soldiers to the cause of Bonaparte, even in the midst of defeat and disgrace, and when neither motives of honour, of fame, nor of pecuniary emolument remain. So far as we have an opportunity of judging, the French armies in the Peninsula are as much devoted to Bonaparte, as if success and plunder and fame had been the uniform results of their campaigns. It might have been expected by those who are conversant with the French character, that when Bonaparte ceased to be victorious, when he failed in his attempts to extend the French empire, and to acquire for France the title of sovereign of the continent of Europe, then his influence both with the French nation and with his armies would have begun to wane; but as yet there are no signs of it.

But to return from this digression (in which we have indulged principally for the purpose of illustrating our position, that the events which have occurred in the Peninsula are pregnant with instruction on whatever side they may be viewed). If we have truly and justly stated the nature of the warfare in which Bonaparte is engaged in the Peninsula, we shall find no difficulty in removing the surprise of those who have expressed it, because he has not sent larger armies, and at once overwhelmed the Spaniards with numbers. It may justly be doubted whether the conquest of Spain, in the manner and to the extent that Bonaparte has conquered the other countries on the continent of Europe, could be achieved by the most numerous and well-appointed armies that were ever led into the field. But there is another point of view in which this circumstance may be placed: Bonaparte has already in the Peninsula armies as numerous as he can maintain there; if more men were sent, they could not find means of subsistence. In this single fact, viz. in the impossibility, in the present and late state,

state, of subsisting numerous bodies of troops, is contained nearly the whole secret of the safety of the Spaniards; we say nearly the whole secret; for besides this, as we have already noticed, the nature of the warfare carried on by the Spaniards sets a large army almost at defiance: the most useful and successful of the Spanish armies, if armies they can be called, are of such a texture, and formed of such materials, that a large force can make little or no impression upon them. If they are routed and destroyed, it must be by bodies of men disposed and organized like themselves.

We have hitherto confined our remarks and inferences to Spain and the Spaniards; because in the case of the Portuguese there are peculiar circumstances which require to be separately stated and considered. Before, however, we advert to the condition, the exertions, and the hopes of the Portuguese, we shall concisely consider the effects which must necessarily be produced by the nature of the war on the state of Spain, and the character of the people of Spain.

When we reflect that the Spanish territory has now been upwards of three years the seat of warfare, and when we consider the peculiar nature of the warfare which has been carried on, we are naturally and almost unavoidably led to indulge in melancholy reflections on the actual misery which it must produce, and on the desolateness and sterility which it must spread over one of the finest countries in Europe. Without doubt these evils must be produced; that now, and for a great length of time, the most fertile tracts in Spain will be comparatively unproductive; and that much individual misery has already been engendered, and will continue to seize upon the wretched inhabitants. But there is another point of view in which this subject may be placed, much more important, though not so obvious: we allude to the permanent effects on the Spanish character and habits which this revolutionary war will produce. We are very apprehensive the effects will not be good; or, at least, that
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much that is bad will be mixed with what is good. Had the efforts of the Spaniards been called forth and successfully exercised in a regular warfare; and had the talents of her statesmen discovered themselves in wise and comprehensive plans for the safety and protection of the country, the Spanish character must have come out of the contest much purified and exalted. But in a mode of warfare which calls for cunning and mere bodily activity and strength, and which is upheld rather by a national antipathy against the invaders than by any clear and ardent love of liberty and independence, the human character cannot be much benefited. The manners and dispositions of the inhabitants, it is to be apprehended, will become fierce and untractable; and great danger and difficulty will arise, even when the country shall be freed from the invaders, in reducing those who have been so effectual in freeing it, to regular habits of order and subordination. Both from the nature of the war they wage against the French armies, and from the desolate state of their own country, the Spanish guerillas are compelled to subsist and to act in a disorderly manner, and in their operations frequently to injure their countrymen, that they may reach the enemies of their country. Habituated to such a life, they must acquire much of the character of the irregular troops of former times; bold, enterprising, and frank, but at the same time fond of rapine, and disposed to live rather contrary to, than according to the law of their native land.

Such are the reflections, as far as Spain is concerned, which we think proper to offer to our readers, before we enter into the history of the campaign in the Peninsula during the year 1811. We shall now state those circumstances which distinguish from Spain, and render peculiar, the state and probable issue of the Portuguese contest.

The most prominent and most important distinguishing feature in the character of the Spanish and the Portuguese, so far as the issue of the contest in which

which they were both engaged was concerned, consisted in their relative dislike to the French, and attachment to the English. The Spaniards undoubtedly have a natural antipathy to the French ; but it is by no means so strong and operative, and not nearly so general, as it exists among the inhabitants of Portugal. The Spaniards, ever since a prince of the house of Bourbon sat upon their throne, have approximated in a small degree to the French character, and have certainly thrown aside some of that dislike which they formerly entertained against the French nation: still, however, there was sufficient of this dislike called again into action, as it had been, by the conduct of Bonaparte towards them, to have produced the most hostile effects towards the French, had it been general ; but it was in this last respect that it differed principally from the hatred which the Portuguese bore to the French. Among the Spaniards there were but too many, and those too of the highest rank and most extensive and commanding influence, who were well disposed towards the French. Among the Portuguese, on the contrary, there was scarcely an individual to be found who was not animated with an equal degree of hostility both against the character and the objects of their invading foes.

The difference indeed between the Spaniards and the Portuguese with respect to their friendly disposition towards the English was still more striking and important. That feeling of abhorrence, which the ignorant and bigoted catholic feels towards those whom he considers as heretics, was in the case of the Portuguese in a great measure done away, so far as the English were concerned, by the long and close alliance which had subsisted between the two nations ; by the intercourse which commerce had produced and kept up between them ; and by the assistance which, in more than one instance, British soldiers had rendered them against their enemies. On the contrary, the Spaniards, less accustomed, and perhaps naturally less disposed to associate with foreigners, and especially

ally with heretics, were averse even to receive succour from the English. They had besides, or conceived they had, reasons for suspicion and mistrust, which the Portuguese had not. The seizure of the Spanish frigates undoubtedly operated to the prejudice of the British. Portugal had never known us but as allies and defenders. Spain had generally known us as enemies from whom she had suffered very severely in former wars. France had never been able, because she never had the opportunity, to instil hatred and suspicion of us into the minds of the Portuguese, while she had ample means, through the family compact, and by her close alliance, of stirring up these passions in the breasts of the Spaniards.

But if there were no other points of difference between the Spaniards and Portuguese than these, a little reflection might convince us, that these of themselves must produce a great difference in their efforts and success during the war in which they are both engaged. While there have been numerous well-founded complaints against the Spaniards in different parts of the country, on the ground that they have rather favoured and encouraged than opposed the French, or at least that they have displayed a very unnatural and blameable apathy for the fate of their country, the Portuguese have uniformly shown and proved themselves hostile to their invaders; and though in several instances they have been deficient in courage and steadiness, they have never been found wanting in a proper disposition. A similar remark might be made with respect to the conduct of the two nations towards the English: while the Spaniards have either thwarted our measures for their defence, or rendered them useless and ineffectual by their jealousy and backwardness, the Portuguese have cheerfully put themselves under our guidance and authority, and have co-operated, at least as much as could well have been expected from them, in the defence of their country.

It is surely too evident to require much amplification of remark to prove, that a hostile feeling towards the

the French, and a friendly disposition towards the English, are absolutely necessary for the protection and independence of the Peninsula. It may be saying too much to assert, that by the assistance of the English the Peninsula will be effectually, completely, and permanently freed from the French armies; but it is certainly not maintaining an improbable or unfounded position, to maintain, that *without* the assistance of the English armies the Peninsula will never be freed from its Gallic invaders. If Spain, therefore, were what Portugal is, in regard to hostile disposition to the French, and cordial and friendly feeling towards the English, the cause of the Peninsula would wear a more favourable aspect. But there are several other circumstances which render the cause and situation of Portugal more favourable than that of Spain, for the assistance of her ally.

It is undoubtedly the fact, that the limited extent and nature of the country are more favourable to defence, both by the natives and by the English. The extent of sea-coast which Portugal possesses, and the circumstance, that this sea-coast lies nearly opposite to England, and within a few days sail, are much to her advantage. The French can thus be continually attacked and harassed, even if they could get into the heart of the country; but there are also numerous and great obstacles to their advancing so far. On almost the whole of the frontier of Portugal, nature has raised formidable barriers for her protection; and even if these are passed, an enemy cannot proceed far, before additional obstacles to this progress appear. But the most important point is the situation of the capital of Portugal; though a country is not necessarily subdued when its capital is in possession of the enemy, yet till that event takes place, the enemy cannot possibly be said to have conquered it. The French, aware of the *éclat* and impression produced by their being able to occupy the capital of the different countries which they have invaded, have regularly pushed forward against them; and have, in fact, in almost

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every instance, made their occupation of the capital the means of subduing and bringing to terms their adversaries. In most countries, the capitals are so situated as to become an easy prey to the invaders: in Spain, Madrid soon fell; but Lisbon is happily situated both for defence by an army, and for that army, while defending it, being supplied by a naval power such as Britain. It is also to be remarked, that the French, by the very act of drawing near to attack Lisbon, necessarily remove themselves to a great distance from their reinforcements and supplies, while they enter into a tract of country very ill calculated to support an army of great magnitude.

Again: the friendly disposition of the Portuguese towards the English, to which we have already adverted, has produced one important public effect, besides drawing together the individuals of the two nations. While the Spaniards will neither receive our councils, nor permit our officers to discipline their troops, Portugal may be said to be actually governed by British statesmen, while her armies are in every respect under the command of British officers. It is almost needless to dwell upon the beneficial consequences resulting from this: there is not only more vigour, and more uniform and hearty co-operation, but the Portuguese soldiers must ultimately, though necessarily very slowly, assume much of the character of those with whom they are thus associated.

Were we apprehensive that the desultory and irregular mode of warfare in which the greater part of the inhabitants of Spain were engaged, would produce on their character not the most desirable effects; we might, on the other hand, anticipate, from the state into which the Portuguese nation are now brought by the effects of the British, and by intercourse with them, a very great change in their character for the better.

Whether, therefore, we look forward to the probable issue of the war in Spain and Portugal, or to the effects which, whether successful or not, it will probably

probably produce on the character and disposition of the inhabitants of the Peninsula respectively ; we shall find much more reason to anticipate good from the latter than from the former. When Spain, like Portugal, shall so far discover and acknowledge her real interests, as to accept Great Britain for her friend and ally without scruple or jealousy ; when she will cordially adopt the only remedy for the ignorance of her generals, and the unsteadiness of her troops, by incorporating them completely with our armies ; when her councils shall be directed by talents adequate to the emergency and difficulty of the situation in which she is placed ; and when, like Portugal, her inhabitants shall be unanimous, at least in not joining and assisting the French, then we may venture to predict, that her hopes of success will be better founded, and the day of her triumph, tranquillity, and independence be not far distant.

But after all that has been urged, and must be allowed, with respect to the difficult situation in which the French armies in Spain are placed, and the impossibility of augmenting those armies from the impoverished state of the country, still the whole conduct of the war in Spain must tend to lower our opinion of Bonaparte's talents, both as a statesman and as a military character. At the very outset of the Spanish revolution he was manifestly ignorant of the state of Spain ; he was totally unapprehensive of any opposition or resistance in the least formidable from the Spanish nation. Afterwards, when they did rise up in arms against him, he did not act with his accustomed decision, promptitude, and vigour ; he left his work incomplete, to go to war with Austria ; although it might have been imagined that the nature of Spanish resistance would have been sufficiently known to him who had seen and felt it, to have convinced him that it was of infinitely more importance to crush the Spaniards than to conquer Austria. It is also difficult to account for the circumstance that Bonaparte himself has not gone into Spain to head his armies, since the

war there presented so many difficulties, and advanced so very slowly. It is not consistent with his character, or with his former conduct, to suppose that he is deterred from an apprehension of danger: that was more likely to incite than to deter him. Upon the whole, and in all its parts, his conduct during the Spanish war has been very unaccountable: it however tends very strongly to illustrate and prove a position to which we have already adverted,—that his power in France is laid now on other foundations than mere military conquest and glory. Had it rested solely or principally on these, from which unquestionably it took its rise, Bonaparte durst not have been absent from the scene of danger; nor would he have felt as tranquil and safe, as he appears to have done, amidst the disasters of his armies in the Peninsula. Is there not also reason to apprehend, that not only in France, but also in most of the other countries on the continent, which the French arms have over-run and conquered, the people are beginning to settle, as it were, and become habituated to the new order of things? Can we suppose, if there still existed among them the same spirit of independence and hostility towards France, that it would not have manifested itself since the reverses of the French armies in the Peninsula? After every check or defeat which they have sustained, we have been desired to be on the watch,—for that the throne of Bonaparte was shaken, if not in France, at least in the conquered nations. But our victories in the Peninsula have passed over ineffectual in this respect: his armies have been defeated and disgraced there, but France and the conquered countries remained tranquil, and obedient to his yoke.

CHAPTER VIII.

WHEN intelligence of the retreat of Marshal Massena * from the position he occupied near the British lines at Torres Vedras to Santarem, first reached England, the joy and congratulation were excessive :

* The life of marshal Massena is full of important military adventure : it presents a scene which, to the military man, is replete with professional instruction—a scene in which eminent talents burst forth to improve and adorn the science of military tactics.

Among those who took a distinguished part in the first civil commotions of France, general Massena must be confessed to rank high. He was born at Nice, where his father was a merchant. He obtained, in early youth, a commission in a regiment of the king of Sardinia. When general Anselme, in the commencement of the revolutionary wars, invaded the kingdom of Sardinia, and attacked Nice, the Sardinian troops, instead of defending it, opened the gates of the city, and laid down their arms. The idea of republicanism had spread throughout Italy, and Massena, who was an early champion for these principles, passed from his allegiance to his native sovereign into the ranks of the Republican army. His progress, as might be expected, was rendered no less rapid than it was justly earned by his talents, by his alacrity, his local knowledge, the influence of his connections, and the peremptory and vigorous character of his mind.

Massena had not been long in the French service before he was advanced to the staff, and served a campaign with the French army of the Maritime Alps, in which he was eminently useful and intrepid. The Republic decreed him honours, and advanced him to the command of a brigade. In November, 1793, he defeated the Sardinian army at Castel-Geneste. Baca, and, by a judicious manœuvre, seized upon Figaretto. In the spring of the succeeding year he was opposed to the Austrians, whom he defeated upon several occasions ; and, in return for his services, he was raised to the rank of a general of division.

In the campaign of 1795, Massena commanded the right wing of the French Italian army, and chased the Austrians through a difficult and almost impenetrable country ; and when the Austrians turned upon him, and became assailants, he defended the port of Petit Gibraltar with consummate skill and success.

In 1796, Bonaparte assumed the command of the French army in Italy, and Massena acted under him as his principal general, and contributed greatly to the brilliant opening of the campaign. The promptitude and impetuosity of Massena are almost without example

cessive : his immediate and further retreat was looked forward to with certainty. When, however, he seemed resolved to retain the new position he had taken up, those who had been most sanguine began to despond :

example at this period. On the 11th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of April, he was perpetually engaged with the Austrians, and on each day obtained a victory, glorious and decisive. The absence of the ordinary military refreshments, and even of a natural respite, did not restrain the ardour of his progress. Bonaparte, maintaining his ground with the main body of his army, dispatched Massena with the advanced guard, who, on the 14th of May, entered Milan. On the 25th, with perhaps a secret contempt for the wily and intriguing republic of Venice, he seized upon Verona. On the 22nd of June he pushed on his conquests, and marched upon Roveredo. He here engaged and repulsed the advanced posts of the Austrian army, under the command of general Beaulieu ; and on the 16th of July he directed the attack on the lines of the Austrians, which were extended, with confidence and seeming security, between the Adige and Lac de Guarda, and carried them after a long resistance, but in a manner which increased his military renown, and marked him as competent for supreme command.

The mind of the military reader must be obviously impressed by the circumstances of this narrative. We perceive a rapidity of movement, a march from success to success, and such a versatility of talent exercised in all the operations of the field, in siege, encampment, the conflict of large bodies, and the skilful management of small detachments. In a word, we see, in this short narrative of the opening of the life of Massena, as brilliant a military *début* as was ever witnessed in history.

On the 29th of July, Massena was not so fortunate ; the Austrians compelled him to retreat from La Corona ; and in making an injudicious assault on Lonado, his troops were repulsed, routed, and surrounded, and he had already lost six hundred men and his artillery, when Bonaparte appeared, and regained the day.

The campaign in Italy was conducted by Bonaparte and Massena at this period, upon a scale of grandeur, and with an incredible activity, of which no military annals afford an example. It presents copious materials for the study of professional men. We can perceive an active genius seizing at one glance, and connecting by simultaneous movements, the most distant armies, and the most remote detachments ; establishing a mutual dependence between the marches and attacks ; upon the Adige, the Po, the Waahl, and the Danube. In short, we are called upon to contemplate a system of warfare, which, by its rapidity, its impulse, and the harmonious combinations of its several parts, enabled its contrivers.

despond: they looked upon his retreat to Santarem as a mere feint; or, at least, as rendered expedient and necessary only by the devastation of the country he had so long occupied. Early in the year 1811,
intelligence

contrivers to calculate upon its effects, and to ascertain them previously with the certainty of mechanical movements, conducted upon philosophical principles, whilst it could only be conjectured, and duly appreciated by the enemy, from the tremendous uniformity of its results, and the unequivocal demonstration of its success.

On the 13th of March, 1797, Massena defeated, at Cadon, a body of Imperial troops, under count de Lusignan, and compelled him to surrender. In a few days after he forced the passage of Cassa Pola, put the enemy to confusion, broke through their formidable entrenchments, and took several hundred prisoners, with all their magazines. He obtained new advantages at Taris and Clagenfurt; upon which occasion the archduke Charles, who had too long neglected the progress of the republican army of Italy, and at length perceived the danger threatened to a division of his force, which two columns of the French were hourly gathering round, sent a strong body to attack the hostile general. Massena here displayed a valour, activity, and judgement, not exceeded by his master. In consequence of the mountainous character of the country, a battle on this occasion was literally fought *above the clouds*. The engagement was sharp and sanguinary, but the movements of the Austrians were too regular and lifeless to counteract the daring enterprize, and everlasting activity of the brigade commanded by Massena. The Austrians were again beaten; the French cavalry pursued them across hills covered with snow, and chased them along lakes of ice.

A few days after this bold repulse, Massena fell in with a detachment of the imperial army: he seized upon their artillery, which they deserted upon the shock of his charge, and nearly the whole baggage of the Austrian army fell into his hands.

There was now some pause in the splendid career of this intrepid officer. Bonaparte dispatched him to Vienna, to treat for a peace. This mission was the foundation of the peace of Leoben; and Massena, after an interview with the archduke Charles, at Durlach, on the 1st of May, 1797, proceeded to Paris, where he was received with triumph, with pomp, and with magnificence. On the 18th of May the Directory gave him a feast in the hall of Odeon, which concluded with a ball, and a banquet of luxuries, consisting of eight hundred covers.

The short-lived peace of Leoben afforded Massena no long interval of leisure. The second coalition was formed, and he was nominated commander in chief over the French Helvetian

intelligence was received by lord Wellington that a very numerous corps, amounting, it was said, to nearly fifteen thousand men, were on their march to join Massena. The Portuguese general Silveira in vain

army, destined to assist Jourdan, by penetrating through the Tyrol, and then compelling, by a combined impulse, the emperor to sue, once more, for peace, under the walls of his capital. The Austrians, however, assisted by the Russians, were superior to the French in point of numbers, and Massena was compelled to exert all his talents to preserve his army from being overcome: this he effected, and at length defeated the Russians at Schaffhausen, who were under the command of general Korsakow; and, having carried Zurich by assault, a body of Russian troops posted in that city was compelled to surrender. In this victory the spoil made by Massena was immense. He took five thousand prisoners, one hundred pieces of cannon, fifteen standards, besides all the baggage and artillery of the Russians, whose flight was precipitate and full of panic.

The effects of this victory enabled the French to obtain a superiority on that central theatre of war, whence they could succour their army in Italy, menace the Austrians on the side of their remote frontiers, and chase the war from the frontiers of the Republic.

At this time the Russians under Suwarrow were fighting in Italy; but the Russian commander was directed by the allies to enter Switzerland, and oppose the French in that quarter. The Russians, however, were unable to withstand the native operations of Massena, who daily assaulted them, and they were compelled to retreat.

Massena was then ordered to succeed general Championet in the command of the French army near Genoa, which was besieged by a very superior Austrian army under general Melas, and blockaded by an English fleet. Here he performed prodigies of valour, but was at length, on the 4th of June, 1800, (unsubdued by the force of arms, and compelled by famine alone,) to surrender Genoa to the Austrian army. Of the inhabitants of Genoa during the siege there died by fever nearly seven thousand, and by famine twenty thousand four hundred and ninety-three. After the battle of Marengo, Genoa was re-delivered to the French, and a peace was concluded between Austria and France.

From this period the name of Massena does not frequently occur in the subsequent wars between France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. It does not, at least, occur as connected with any great military exploit.

After the peace of Presburgh, Massena lived in retirement a few miles from Paris, and in a gaiety and luxury which flowed

vain endeavoured to interrupt this body of men, or to harrass them during their progress. The Portuguese troops by themselves were not able to cope with the French, and Silveira was compelled to abandon his object, after having suffered severely for his temerity.

For some time after Massena had been thus reinforced, desertions from his army were less common

without example. He was thought to love money more than glory, and was perhaps the richest of all the successful generals of France. Without elegance or refinement, without political ambition, or civil talents, he was content to be secure in luxurious enjoyment, and thought himself recompensed sufficiently by the emperor Napoleon, in being permitted to live in splendour without molestation or jealousy. But as new campaigns were at hand, the life of Massena began anew to be busy.

In 1807, Massena was summoned to the grand army in Poland. He commanded the corps detached upon the Narew in the direction of Druezewo. He had only to support one affair of advanced posts, which was at first to his disadvantage, but which he repaired by the arrival of all his troops.

In 1809, Massena was employed in the grand army. His corps not having been able to take a part in any of the great battles, he served in the capacity of an aid-du-camp. Bonaparte says in his bulletin, that the Duke of Rivoli (Massena's title,) served him by carrying orders to the different corps of the army. At the battle of Essling, he had to perform more important functions. He stood in need of all his firmness to keep up his men under a terrible fire of artillery and musketry, which could only be feebly returned, in consequence of the want of ammunition. His conduct in that battle gained him the title of Prince of Essling.

Suffice it to say, that Massena, Prince of Essling, is doubtless one of the ablest generals of France, possessing an unconquerable firmness, great sagacity, and everlasting activity. But in all these qualities, he had an equal competitor in Lord Wellington, and in some respects a superior. Massena, however, is a general, whom it is impossible to starve in any country, but whose retreat from Portugal was perhaps one of the most formidable of all his manœuvres. Massena is now about fifty-three years of age, of a middle stature, and a strong constitution. It will be seen, that it has been our purpose to explain his character without undue eulogium on the one hand, or indecent scurrility on the other; for we do not apprehend, that any good is to be obtained by traducing the characters of those generals by whom we are opposed. Truth is the historian's best guide, and he should adhere to it.

and not so numerous; and the accounts of deserters no longer presented that picture of famine and wretchedness which they had formerly given. Indeed, from the statements of the French papers, from the reports of deserters, and from what lord Wellington learnt by other means, it was rendered certain, that a large supply of provisions had been brought to Massena's army by the corps which had joined him.

At first it was imagined that, being now so strongly reinforced, he would make an attempt on lord Wellington at Cartaxo; especially as the position of the latter was not now nearly so formidable as it had been at Torres Vedras; but the French marshal manifested no such disposition or intention. On the other hand, lord Wellington found that the position occupied by the enemy at Santarem could not be attacked with any prospect of success; it had been chosen with great judgement and skill, and fortified with the utmost care and caution. Thus to all appearance the two armies were exactly in every circumstance, except mere locality, placed relatively to each other as they had been at the close of the year 1810. The French indeed had opened to themselves an entry into a more fertile district of Portugal; but no part of this kingdom, exhausted as it had been, could long support such a numerous army as Massena commanded. Besides, it must have become apparent to him, that even were it possible for him to continue at Santarem during the whole of the approaching spring, still his stay there could be of no avail: each day rendered the subsistence of his army more difficult, and saw it decrease by sickness and desertion; while each day added to the strength of lord Wellington's lines, without exposing his armies to the difficulties under which that of the French suffered.

Well acquainted with these things, lord Wellington confidently and repeatedly predicted that the French must retreat: this prediction not having been verified so soon as was expected and hoped for, many accused lord Wellington of being a false prophet: the day of
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the completion of his prophecy was, however, at hand. On the 5th of March, 1811, marshal Massena, having arranged every thing for his retreat with the most consummate skill and foresight, and with the most profound secrecy, broke up from his position at Santarem. He in part succeeded in deceiving lord Wellington with respect to the line of his retreat, by indicating a disposition to occupy Thomar; but having by his manœuvre drawn off part of the British army, Massena continued his march towards the river Mondego, with one corps on the road of Espinhel, another on the road of Anciao, and the remainder of his army towards Pombal.

The British immediately commenced a rapid pursuit; the light dragoons and hussars at the very beginning of the pursuit overtaking the rear of the French, and taking about two hundred prisoners. Nothing very important occurred till the 9th of March, on which day the French collected three of their corps in front of Pombal, and awaited the British. On the 11th lord Wellington had brought forward a sufficient number to attack them; but the French stood only to receive the attack of our advanced troops, when they again retreated. On the 12th, the sixth and the twelfth corps of the enemy took up a strong position at the end of a defile between Redinha and Pombal, having their right on the river Soare, and their left extended towards the high ground that hangs over the river of Redinha; their rear being protected by the town of this name. The same day lord Wellington having brought up part of his army, attacked them in this position. Their right, though protected by the wood, was first carried: by this successful manœuvre, the troops were drawn up in the plain beyond the defile with great accuracy and celerity. The heights above the river of Redinha were the next object of British valour: from these the enemy were immediately driven: the French thus forced from their strong positions, crossed the bridge over the river, and were closely pursued by the British.

tish. So soon as they reached the other side, the French again occupied the opposite heights, on which, in anticipation of such a manœuvre, they had placed several pieces of cannon. Some time necessarily elapsed before a body of troops sufficiently numerous could cross the river to attack them on these fortified heights. So soon, however, as the third division of the British army had crossed, they manœuvred on the enemy's left flank, while the light infantry and cavalry, supported by the light division, drove them upon their main body at Ceudeixa.

This place again afforded them an opportunity of rallying, which the necessity under which Massena was placed of resting and collecting his army obliged him frequently to repeat, and which his consummate skill and experience enabled him to do with great effect. Lord Wellington, however, did not permit them to remain long at Ceudeixa: by sending the third division under general Picton through the mountains upon their left, he dislodged them, and they retreated about a league further.

On the 14th of March, the 6th and 8th corps of the French army formed in a very strong position near Cazac Nova: this position was naturally so strong, and occupied with so much skill, that no attack in front could dislodge them from it. Lord Wellington therefore ordered movements to be made on their flanks, which were completely successful, compelling the enemy to retire from all the positions they successively took up in the mountains. In consequence of these operations of the British, Coimbra and Upper Beira were saved from the ravages of the French, and a communication was opened with the northern provinces of Portugal: the enemy were also obliged to change the line of their retreat, and to proceed along the road by Ponte de Marcella, in which the militia under colonel Trant and colonel Wilson annoyed and harrassed them excessively.

On the 18th and 19th of March, they attempted to make a stand in the Sierra de Moita, but they were driven

driven from that position with the loss of six hundred prisoners. On the 21st they were at Galiga, and the British head quarters were at Algazil on the 20th. The French continued to retreat, occasionally occupying a strong position, which they were always compelled to abandon on the advance of the British army to attack them. On the 28th of March, they occupied in force a position on the Guarda, in such a manner and with such appearances of a determination to retain it if possible, that lord Wellington thought it proper to collect his arms in the neighbourhood of Celerico for the purpose of attacking. He had, however, scarcely made the requisite arrangement and movements for this purpose, when the enemy left their position on the Guarda without firing a shot; and retired upon Sabugal on the Coa. They kept this river in their front, and presented themselves very strong both in point of numbers and in position. On the 3d of April lord Wellington, having recruited his army and brought them up to the French, resolved to dislodge them: for this purpose he ordered a division of his army early in the morning to ford the Coa half a league to the right of Sabugal: as the British advanced, the picquets of the enemy fell back: our troops crossed the river in a masterly style, and formed on the opposite side, under a heavy fire from the enemy. Those who crossed first maintained themselves for a considerable length of time unsupported against the whole of the second corps of the French army. In this situation, recourse was had to the charge with the bayonet. The French fled; but as the British pursued, they found the enemy again forming in greater strength, having fallen back on their reinforcements. The British in their turn were now compelled to retreat to the ground they had just before occupied, where they formed under a heavy fire of grape, cannister, and musketry. The French now advanced; but being received by the British bayonets, their progress was first arrested, and then changed into flight. The British in this their second pursuit

pursuit were more successful: they gained the heights which the enemy had occupied, and took one howitzer. By this time the second brigade had crossed the Ever, and come to the assistance of their comrades: the enemy now formed column and retired, crossing the Portuguese frontier thirty days from the date of the commencement of their retreat from Santarem.

Of the whole of this retreat of marshal Massena, considered purely and exclusively in a military point of view, it is impossible to speak but in the highest terms of commendation. The whole country, (to use the words of lord Wellington) afforded many advantageous positions to a retreating army, of which the French showed that they knew how to avail themselves. They retreated from Portugal, as they entered it, in one solid mass; covering their rear, on their march, by the operations of either one or two corps d'armée, in the strong positions which the country afforded; and these corps d'armée were closely supported by the main body. Before they broke up from Santarem, they destroyed part of their ammunition and cannon; and in the course of their retreat they disencumbered themselves of whatever was useless, or that their horses could not draw. Their sick and wounded were sent off some days before they commenced their retreat, and were always kept a day or two's march in advance. As they did not leave Santarem till they were nearly destitute of provisions, they of course were obliged to depend principally for their support on the plunder of the country through which they bent their course.

But while due praise must be given to the military skill displayed during the retreat, the conduct of the French army must be stigmatized as most wantonly outrageous and barbarous. They gave loose to the utmost cruelty and rapine; after inducing the inhabitants of many of the towns and villages through which they passed, to continue in them under the promise of good treatment, they plundered them and burnt their habitations. It is no doubt extremely difficult to
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keep in order a retreating army; but still the efforts of the officers, if they are not actuated by the same spirit as the soldiers, may do much to protect the suffering people. There is, however, too much reason to apprehend that the French officers instead of repressing and punishing the cruelties and rapine of their men, encouraged them by their example and advice. It might indeed have been expected that the French commander, knowing that Bonaparte was resolved on the conquest of Portugal, would have preserved from devastation, as much as possible, a country intended to be made a part of the great empire; and would have avoided rousing the antipathy of the inhabitants against the French by their barbarity and cruelty. But the disappointment and rage of Massena, at being compelled to retreat, not being able to vent themselves on any other objects, were let loose against the unfortunate Portuguese, and closed his mind against all considerations of prudence and policy, as well as against all feelings of humanity and compassion. From this evil, dreadful as it was, one good result must follow; it is surely not possible that the inhabitants of a country which has been thus desolated and destroyed by the French, can ever again receive them as friends, or put the slightest confidence in their promises or assurances, however solemnly made.

On the 4th of April the French retreating army entered the Spanish frontier; and on the 7th of that month lord Wellington sent six squadrons of cavalry, under sir William Erskine, to reconnoitre Almeida, which was the only place they held in Portugal. Sir William succeeded in driving in the French out-posts, and in cutting off the communication between the garrison and the army.

Although, from the skill with which marshal Massena conducted his retreat, the French army had suffered much less by attacks from the pursuing army than had been expected and anticipated, and had in fact entered Spain entire and undispersed; yet it was very generally and confidently believed, that it was ren-

dered totally unfit for any active operations for a considerable length of time. Lord Wellington was evidently of this opinion: for in one of his dispatches he expressly says, as "the enemy's army would not for some time be in a situation to attempt the relief of Almeida," he should take the opportunity of visiting the army under sir William Beresford in Estremadura. Massena, however, with uncommon celerity re-equipped his army, and brought them into the field again prepared for active operations. Scarcely had lord Wellington reached Estremadura, when he was recalled by intelligence from sir Brent Spencer, whom he had left in command of the army during his absence, that the French were again advancing, and appeared determined to hazard a battle for the purpose of relieving Almeida.

On the 2d of May, therefore, the whole of the French army, reinforced by all the cavalry which Castile and Leon could supply, and by about nine hundred of the imperial guard, crossed the Agueda at Ciudad Rodrigo. Preparatory to the approaching battle, Massena issued general orders, in which he told his soldiers, that the relief of Almeida must be accomplished before they could procure that repose which their fatigues and exertions rendered necessary and desirable. Animated by this promise if they were victorious, the French advanced with great boldness: and lord Wellington, in his turn, seeing their great superiority in point of cavalry, drew in his outposts, and took up a stronger and more favourable position. The light division fell back on the village of Fuentes de Honor, on the Duas Casas, where the 1st, 3d, and 7th divisions were collected; the 6th division occupied and defended the bridge at Alameda; and the 5th division guarded the passages of the Duas Casas at Fort Conception and Aldea d' Obispo. Almeida in the mean time was blockaded by brigadier-general Pack's brigade and the queen's regiment from the 6th division.

The village of Fuentes de Honor was the first and principal

principal object of attack by the French, on the afternoon of the 3d of May. The British forces that were stationed there received and repelled this attack; but as lord Wellington perceived that the French were bringing up fresh troops to recommence the attack, and as this village was a place of great consequence for the subsequent operations and manœuvres of the battle, he ordered reinforcements into it. The enemy were charged, when they renewed the attack, by lieutenant-colonel Cadogan at the head of the 71st regiment, and driven from the village of which they had obtained a momentary possession. Night terminated the contest, which thus far was favourable to the British forces.

On the morning of the 5th lord Wellington perceived, from the changes which had taken place in the relative positions of the different corps of the French forces, that they meant to renew the attack on Fuentes de Honor; and with great promptitude and skill he made the arrangements and movements necessary to receive and repel the enemy. As they had found their former mode of attacking the village unsuccessful, they resolved to cross the Duas Casas at Poya Velho: which they did, obliging the advanced guard to retire. The 8th corps of the enemy being thus established at Poya Velho, the Spanish division of the allied army were compelled to quit their station at Nave d' Aver. Having thus far succeeded in their object, the French cavalry made a grand and general charge; this charge was met by a few squadrons of the British dragoons, and the enemy were driven with the loss of several men and some prisoners. Although the attempts of the enemy were unsuccessful, yet lord Wellington perceived that it would not be in his power both to maintain the communication across the Coa by Sabugal, and to provide for the blockade of Almeida: he therefore resolved to give up the former, as the least important object. By adopting this measure, the British army now occupied the high ground from the Turon to the Duas Casas; the village of Fuentes de

Honor, the great object of contention, being in front of the left division. The enemy still continued to charge in different parts of the British line; and in one of their charges they were repulsed by lieutenant-colonel Hill with the piquets of the 1st division, and of the 3d regiment of guards: but as these troops were falling back, they did not see the direction of another body of the enemy, in sufficient time to form to oppose it, and lieutenant-colonel Hill and many men were taken prisoners, and several wounded, before a detachment could move to support them.

The principal and most determined efforts of the French were directed against the village of Fuentes de Honor, during the whole of the second day's battle; but though the British for a moment occasionally were driven from parts of it, yet they always regained them, and at the final termination of the battle the village continued entirely in our possession. In the course of the night of the 7th of May, the French commenced their retreat from their position on the Duas Casas; on the 8th they retired to the woods between Espeje Gallegos, and Fuentes de Honor; and during the night of the 9th, their whole army broke up, and retired across the Azava, leaving Almeida to its fate. The loss on both sides, in consequence of this long and arduous battle, was very severe; but the French suffered more considerably than ourselves.

The fall of Almeida was now looked forward to as the result of the victory which the British army had gained; for being again closely invested, and Massena having evidently given up all intentions of again advancing to its relief, no hope of preserving the town or the garrison seemed to remain. The town did indeed fall into our possession; but the garrison, consisting of about fifteen hundred men under general Brennier, partly by adroitness and skill, and partly by extreme good fortune, escaped. It appears from this officer's report to Massena, that early in the month of April he had made preparations to blow up the fortifications of Almeida. On the 7th of May he received orders

orders to that effect; but that the besieging army might not suspect what was going forward, a heavy cannonade was kept up from the fortress for some evenings previously to that on which it was proposed to blow up the fortifications and evacuate the place. On the morning of the 10th general Brennier having destroyed all the cannon and ammunition, and rendered all the fortifications useless, communicated to the garrison his intention to evacuate Almeida, and informed them of the dispositions he had determined upon, and the route he meant to pursue. At midnight the watch-word was given, and the garrison marched out in two columns. Every thing was so well arranged, and the retreat carried on with so much silence and secrecy, that the besieging army had no suspicion that the place was evacuated, till the garrison had got a considerable way from the place. Pursuit was then given, and the rear guard of the French overtaken and attacked with some loss; but the main body reached the left bank of the Aguada in a great measure unmolested, where they were received and protected by the second corps under general Regnier, who had been left, after the retreat of Massena, for that purpose. Notwithstanding the skill with which this retreat was arranged and executed, there is no doubt that, if the besieging army had been sufficiently on the watch, the garrison must have been intercepted and taken. Blame was consequently thrown, and perhaps justly, on those whose duty it was to have invested and watched Almeida more closely and carefully.

During the time that these transactions were carrying on upon the northern frontier of Portugal, the French were not inactive on the south-western frontier, and in Estremadura. The force opposed to them, consisting of English and Portuguese, was under the immediate command of sir William Beresford. The first object of the enemy was the attack and conquest of Badajoz, which, after a resistance by no means proportioned either to the strength of the place, or the
number

number of the garrison, fell into their hands early in the spring. Sir William Beresford, sensible of the importance of regaining this place, if possible, having collected all his forces, advanced to besiege it. On the other hand, the French marshal Soult * seemed

* Marshal Soult, duke of Dalmatia, was born of poor parents, and is one of the four generals of the French imperial guard. The duke of Dalmatia is only forty-three years of age, though by his appearance one would imagine he was upwards of fifty: his height is five feet ten inches: although slender, he is very vigorous: his face is but ordinary, his complexion pallid; but his look is scrutinizing, and his pensive air is expressive of a genius above the common race. He may be considered as being himself the only founder of his military fortune. At the age of sixteen, he enlisted as a common soldier; but his good conduct occasioned his being distinguished by the chief officers of his company, who successively appointed him corporal and serjeant. Endued with much intelligence, he soon became versed in the art of manœuvring; and, even in that period, he evinced towards his subordinates that firmness of character which has since greatly contributed to his advancement. In 1792, his reputation as a good instructor obtained him the situation of adjutant-major in a battalion of national guards. In 1793, he was appointed an officer of the staff, and some little time after, adjutant-general. Soult was employed in the army of the Moselle, under the command of general Jourdan. At the time when forty thousand men of that army marched upon the Sambre, to relieve Charleroi, he was appointed chief of the staff for the division of general Lefevre, which formed the advanced guard of that army.

The 27th of June, 1794, the day of the battle of Fleurus, the right of the French, commanded by Moreau, was attacked by Beaulieu at three in the morning. By noon all the troops of Moreau were thrown into confusion, and himself, surrounded by the Austrian dragoons, owed his safety only to the bravery of some officers of his staff, who protected his retreat to Lefevre's division. "Give me," said Moreau to this general, "four battalions of your troops, that I may drive the enemy away from my position." Lefevre consulted Soult, who said aloud, that this disposition would expose the safety of the whole division. Moreau cast a threatening look at him, and asked him, who he was, that he should take upon himself to use so peremptory a tone? "I am calm," said Soult, coldly, "and you are not. When we shall have secured our position, you shall have the battalions you wish for." At that instant, the prince of Cobourg attacked Lefevre with the choice of his troops; seven successive and unsuccessful onsets were made by the Hungarian grenadiers. Soult conveyed

ed determined to hazard an engagement for its protection and relief. In the mean time the allied army sustained considerable loss in an unsuccessful attempt against Fort St. Christoval. On the 12th of May, Soult

conveyed himself with rapidity wherever there was the greatest danger; Moreau also fought like a lion. Lefevre remained with the reserve. At six o'clock in the evening, the whole army of the Moselle, with the exception of Lefevre's division, was in retreat. The general was just going to give orders to retrograde, when Soult conjured him to wait, assuring him that, as far as he could judge, from the manœuvres of the second line, the enemy was commencing his retreat. This opinion of Soult was speedily confirmed, and Moreau and Soult marched together to take possession of Lambussart. This village was taken and retaken several times; and after being engaged for eighteen hours, Cobourg retreated in good order. Moreau, who witnessed the skill and the coolness of Soult, said to Lefevre, "The chief of your staff is a man of merit; he will soon bring himself into notice."

During the campaigns of 1794, 1795, 1796, and 1797, Soult continued to direct Lefevre's division; but Lefevre always spoke coolly of him, it being his policy to lessen the merit of Soult, lest the general in chief, or the government, should deprive him of that general, to place him in a situation more suitable to his talents. This is the true reason which retained Soult so long in a secondary rank. Any one that had seen Lefevre, and had heard him speak on military affairs, was astonished that a man so shallow should ever have acquired so great reputation; but it was Soult who was the author of his general's glory. Soult superintended every where; he was seldom absent at the time of the distributions, taking care that the provisions were of good quality, which obtained him the affections of the soldiers: he reprimanded those officers who were negligent, encouraged those who did their duty well, and in every engagement he was sure to be found in the foremost ranks.

Soult was at last nominated general of brigade; and, upon Lefevre's being wounded, Jourdan entrusted the division to Soult, who commanded it in chief on the day of the battle of Leibtingen, March 26, 1799. Made general of division, he was employed in Switzerland; he was employed under Massena, of whom he was considered as the right hand; he followed that general into Italy, and co-operated with him at the siege of Genoa, where Soult was wounded, a ball having shattered the right leg. He was made prisoner with his brother, who was then aid-de-camp and chief of a squadron in the kingdom of Grenada.

The Austrians losing the battle of Marengo, occasioned Soult's return to his own country. So soon as he was recovered from his wounds,

Soult advanced from Seville to the relief of Badajoz. In order to be able to meet him, Sir William Beresford had formed a junction with the Spanish forces under generals Castanos and Blake : still, as the allied force

wounds, he was entrusted with the command of the army of observation in the kingdom of Naples. He was afterwards sent for to Paris, and appointed colonel-general of the foot chasseurs of the consular guard : he constantly showed himself worthy of Bonaparte's confidence, and it was shortly perceived how greatly the influence of Soult operated in improving whatever related to the service. Bonaparte perceiving the progress of his guard in order, conduct, and instruction, the result of Soult's exertions, conceived he could not make a better choice than in appointing that officer to the chief command of the camp at Boulogne.

During his stay at Boulogne, Soult evinced uncommon activity : almost continually on horseback, he severally visited the courts, the camps, and the cantonments ; and it was there that he instructed his troops in those manœuvres which were of so much service to him in the battle of Austerlitz. When the army of the Boulogne camp proceeded to Germany, Soult passed the Rhine at Spire, Sept. 20, 1805, and directed his march through Heilbron for Nordlingen. On the 6th of October, he seized on the tête-de-point of Donavert, crossing the Danube, and marched straight to Augsburg, of which he took possession without striking a blow ; he also seized on Memingen, without experiencing much resistance. During the whole of this campaign, he was intrusted with the most important affairs.

Marshal Soult commanded the right wing at the battle of Austerlitz. On this occasion Bonaparte sent him an order for an immediate attack, and to possess himself of the heights of Pratzen. Soult said to the aid-de-camp who brought the order, " I will commence the attack as soon as I can do it successfully ; but it is not yet the proper time." This reply being reported to Bonaparte, filled him with rage, and he immediately sent another aid-de-camp, who arrived precisely at the moment that Soult had put his troops in motion, which he had only delayed, to allow the Russians time to extend their army towards the left, by which they would weaken their centre. All who opposed his march were either killed or taken. Bonaparte, who was stationed on a height, from which he could discover the movements of the army, was charmed with the precision and brilliant results of his lieutenant's manœuvres ; he went to him at full gallop, and in presence of all his staff, who had but a few moments before beheld him most vehemently exclaiming against Soult, embraced him, saying, " My lord, marshal Soult, I esteem you the most able tactician of my empire." " Sire, I believe it," said Soult, " since your majesty

force was not adequate, at the same time, to continue the siege of Badajoz, and to repel the attack of the French, general Beresford determined upon a temporary raising of the siege. Accordingly he broke up from that place, and marched the infantry to a posi-

majesty has the goodness to esteem it so." This well-timed complaisance caused so much pleasure to Bonaparte, that it astonished the officers who were present.

At the battle of Jena, marshal Soult decided the victory by his movements against the centre of the Prussian army, after having taken possession of the wood which was on his right.

On the 16th of October, 1806, Soult refused, at Guïessen, to give confidence to the armistice said to have been agreed upon by general Kalkreuth, with a view of favouring the retreat of the column which covered the flight of the king of Prussia; and he rendered great services in Prussia and Poland. At the battle of Eylau, though inferior in number, he held Benningsen's army in check. Augereau had been routed, and had left the right of Soult unprotected; Davoust had been retarded in his march by bad roads; Ney was fighting against the Prussians; and Bernadotte was too far distant to take a part in the engagement. Soult, however, arranged his forces with so much skill, that he made them appear much more numerous than they were. On the approach of night, Bonaparte, alarmed at the enormous loss which he had sustained, wished to retreat. "Let us remain where we are, sire," said Soult to him, "for although we have been dreadfully handled, we shall pass for conquerors, if we remain last on the field of battle; and I have observed some movements in the Russian army, which induce me to think the enemy will effect his retreat during the night." Although Bonaparte was apprehensive of the contrary, he resolved to follow the advice of Soult, of whose extraordinary perspicuity he was well aware. The Russians retreated, and the French gained the battle of Eylau.

After the peace of Tilsit, marshal Soult was appointed to take a command in the army of Spain. On the 10th of November, 1808, he took the command of the second corps, attacked the army of Estremadura, and, destroying it, took possession of Burgos; he marched upon Reynosa, occupied St. Andero, and penetrated into the kingdom of Asturias, whilst the other corps of the French army manœuvred on the two rivers of the Ebro, and defeated Castanos and Tudela.

Marshal Soult is one of the first generals in the French army, and is perhaps superior to them all in the practical knowledge of manœuvres in the field. He has been one of the most amply rewarded by Bonaparte with riches and honours, and seeks only to preserve to himself the favour of his sovereign by honourably performing his duty.

tion in front of Valverde; this position, however, leaving Badajoz entirely open, the British commander removed his army to Albuera, thus placing it between the enemy and Badajoz. Here it was drawn up to receive the French in two lines nearly parallel to the river Albuera, on the ridge of a hill which gradually rose from that river, so as to cover the roads from Badajoz and Valverde. The Spanish corps under general Blake were posted on the right.

On the morning of the 16th the enemy began to move his cavalry, crossing the rivulet of Albuera considerably above the right of the allied army. The front of the British was the first object of his attack: against this he directed a strong force of cavalry, and two heavy columns of infantry: and at the same time he filed the great body of his infantry over the river beyond the right of the allied army, under the cover and protection of his vastly superior cavalry. By this manœuvre he threatened to turn the allied army on that flank, and cut them off from Valverde. This, however, was prevented by the change of movement on the part of general Cole's division and the Spanish troops under general Blake. The next object of the enemy was the possession of the rising ground on which part of the Spanish forces was posted: by gaining possession of this he would have been enabled to command the position of the greater part of the allied army, and thus have rendered their situation extremely critical, and probably decided the fate of the day. The Spanish troops on this rising ground fought well for some time; but at length they gave way, and the French gained the height. Conceiving that they had now won the battle, they raised a shout of joy and congratulation.

As the allied army immediately began to feel the dreadful consequences of the height being in possession of the enemy, general Beresford determined, if possible to drive them from it. For this purpose the

the right brigade of general Stewart's division, under lieutenant-colonel Colburne, advanced against them with a well-directed and heavy fire: the enemy, however, stood firm, and it was found necessary to charge them with the bayonet. While the British were in the act of charging, a body of Polish cavalry, armed with long lances, (whom the thickness of the atmosphere, and the nature of the ground had concealed,) turned them and threw them into confusion: the slaughter here was dreadful: indeed nearly this whole column was cut off, and the enemy still kept possession of the heights. The third brigade, under major-general Houghton, now came up: he fell cheering his men as they advanced to the charge: but their charge was successful: the enemy were forced from the heights, and driven down to the banks of the river with the most dreadful slaughter. This was the principal point of attack of the enemy: but while this was carrying on, the front of the allied army, which was posted at the village and bridge, was also attacked; but here the contest was not so arduous, nor so long doubtful, as the French were repulsed and driven back with considerable loss. While the French infantry were making their attack on the right of the allied army, his cavalry endeavoured to turn it; but though they were much more numerous, their endeavours were completely frustrated. Here the attack of the enemy terminated: routed on all sides he retired across the Albuera: but as his cavalry was immensely superior, general Beresford did not think it prudent to pursue him. In this most severe engagement the loss of the French was nearly eight thousand men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners: while that of the allied army amounted to nearly seven thousand; the greater part of whom were British.

Shortly after this battle lord Wellington joined general Beresford, leaving his army in the north of Portugal under the command of general Spencer, and

the siege of Badajoz was re-commenced. The French army opposed to general Spencer was now commanded by marshal Marmont, Massena having been recalled to Paris. It soon appeared that the French were resolved that Badajoz should not fall if they could possibly hinder it. In order, therefore, that Soult might again be able to advance to its relief, Marmont detached a strong corps, amounting to fifteen thousand men, under Dronet, to reinforce him; and lord Wellington deemed it necessary to gain possession of Badajoz, if possible, before the French army, thus reinforced, should advance to its relief; and for this purpose two different attacks were made against it. But though the British troops behaved with their accustomed bravery and steadiness, both attempts were unsuccessful, and our loss in making them was very great.

Lord Wellington then raised the siege; having, however, compelled the French, in order to relieve Badajoz, to collect all their force from Castile, from Madrid, and from Andalusia; in short, the whole disposable troops which the French had in Spain; thus affording the Spaniards an excellent opportunity of regaining some of their lost territory, and of acting with advantage and success; but, as has always happened, the opportunity was suffered to pass by without the least attempt to benefit by it.

It being, however, deemed of great importance to draw off the pressure and attack of the French army from the Spanish troops, lord Wellington returned to the northern frontier of Portugal in October, and threatened Ciudad Rodrigo. By this movement and indication he hoped, besides relieving Spain, and giving an opportunity to her armies to act with advantage and success, to compel the French to assemble in great force, and advance into a country where they could not be easily supported. By thus keeping their grand army constantly on the alert, and never permitting it for any considerable length of time to separate, and spread itself over any extended tract

tract of country, he was sure to harrass it with fatigue, and likewise to shorten it for supplies and provisions. These objects would be completely attained if the French advanced to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, in such force as would make it prudent for him to retreat; and if they did not advance at all, or advanced only with an inferior or equal force, he safely calculated upon the fall of the fortress in either case, and the fall of the fortress and their defeat in the latter case.

The French advanced in great force from Salamanca towards Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 21st of September: and lord Wellington took up such a position with his army as might enable him accurately to ascertain the strength of their forces, and to resist their attack or retire as he might judge most prudent. On the morning of the 25th the enemy commenced his first attack, beating in the light posts on the left of the British line: in consequence of this partial success he ventured to cross the river Azava, when he was in his turn attacked and compelled to retire. His principal point of attack, however, was the centre of the British army. With a column of between thirty and forty squadrons of cavalry, and twelve pieces of cannon, he made the attack, which was sustained by the 77th and the second battalion of the 5th British regiments; and by the 21st Portuguese regiment, with three squadrons of major-general Alton's brigade; at the same time fourteen battalions of French infantry advanced to the same point. As these could not immediately be opposed by corresponding reinforcements on our part, the battalion of the 5th and the 73d regiments were formed into one square; and the 21st Portuguese regiment into another; and both retired before the enemy without breaking their ranks.

On the 27th the French again advanced to the attack; but as lord Wellington had now ascertained that their force was greatly superior, he retired from the position he had occupied and preserved on the 26th to the distance of about three leagues, where he drew

drew up his army in such an excellent manner that the intention and attempt of the enemy to turn his left were frustrated. On the 28th lord Wellington retreated still further, and took up a new position at Quadra Sayez: the French then, having relieved Ciudad Rodrigo, separated towards Placentia and Salamanca.

The only remaining military transaction of the troops under the command of lord Wellington during this year, of any moment or consequence, took place in Estremadura: and as it was very brilliant and completely successful, it deserves particular notice, although the number of troops engaged on either side was comparatively small.

While the main and principal British army under lord Wellington remained posted in the north of Portugal at Frenada, general Hill was stationed at Portalegre, on the southern bank of the Tagus. From this place he was ordered to advance by his lordship for the purpose of intercepting and attacking a French corps which was moving towards the south of Spain. Accordingly general Hill with a brigade of British infantry, half a brigade of Portuguese artillery, and some cavalry, arrived at Ralharteda on the 26th of October, having learnt that the enemy, who had advanced to Alseda, had fallen back to Arroyo del Puerco.

On the morning of the 27th general Hill * followed the French by a short route towards Merida, in the
hope

* In our account of lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill, our readers will be pleased to peruse a few particulars relative to the excellent family from whom he is descended. The family of the Hills has long been seated in Shropshire, and has been for centuries distinguished for benevolence and virtue. It has exhibited, for a long succession of years, the fruits of hereditary example, and a good domestic education. By means of such example, and such education, each successive head of the family has transmitted his own virtue and piety to his children; and the latter, in their turn, have conveyed the same solid testimony to their own descendants. Such is the value of family habits, of piety and virtue.

hope that he should be able to intercept and bring them to action. On his march he was joined by a body of Spaniards from Cáceres; and at the same time received such information respecting the movements

virtue. Their effect extends beyond the individual. They form families and households to virtue, and secure the piety of generations yet unborn.

One of the ancestors of general Hill, Sir Rowland Hill, mercer, was lord-mayor of London, in 1550, and is mentioned by Leland, the learned antiquary. "There is," says Leland, "a new bridge of stone made on Terne by a merchant of London, called Rowland Hill, a little above the confluence of the Severn and Terne." And Camden adds, "The old bridge of Atcham was erected in the reign of king Edward VI. at the sole expence of Rowland Hill, merchant, formerly lord-mayor of London, whose extraordinary munificence and liberality were displayed in many public works in different parts of the kingdom, and particularly in this his native county. For, besides founding a free grammar school at Drayton, and allotting sufficient stipends for the maintenance of the same, he annually clothed three hundred poor people. He also contributed most liberally to the repairing of Stoke church, and built two stone bridges, viz. this at Atcham, and one at Terne, and two others of timber, at his own cost and charge during his life time."

In this Sir Rowland Hill the family was divided into two branches, one of which, according to a brief memoir, from which we are writing, was represented by the late Noel Hill, Esq. of Attingham, or Atcham, who was many years one of the knights of the shire. This gentleman, about 1782, built a most beautiful seat at Terne, to which he gave the name of Attingham. In 1784, Mr. Hill was created Baron Berwick of Attingham, in which title he was succeeded by his son, the present Lord Berwick.

Sir Rowland Hill, the grandfather of general Hill, was of the other branch of the family. He is mentioned as a most worthy and honourable gentleman in all the relations of public and private life. He contributed very liberally to the comforts and conveniences of his neighbourhood, and built and founded, we believe, some public works at Shrewsbury and its vicinity. Of these the most conspicuous and most useful is the English bridge, as it is termed, in contradistinction to the Welch, the first stone of which was laid by Sir Rowland Hill, Bart. on the 27th of July, 1769. At his death, Sir Rowland Hill left three sons, namely, Sir Richard Hill, Bart. who was, for several years, one of the representatives for Shropshire, and who died at his seat at Hawkestone, about ten miles from Shrewsbury, Nov. 28, 1808,

in

ments and position of the enemy, as persuaded him, that they were completely ignorant that he was in pursuit of them, and so very near them. He therefore made a forced march to Aleuesca the same evening that he received the information, and placed his troops in

in the 76th year of his age. Sir Richard was succeeded in his title and estates by his second brother, the present Sir John Hill, Bart. who is the father of lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill.

The third son of the late Sir Rowland is the Reverend Rowland Hill, of Surrey Chapel, who, at a very early age, devoted his talents and his fortune to the reformation of mankind; who has been in the discharge of his holy functions indefatigable; and who continues successfully to preach the glad tidings of salvation.

Sir John Hill, the third and present baronet, was born July 21, 1740. He married one of the daughters and co-heiresses of John Chambré, of Pelton in Shropshire, Esq. by whom he has had sixteen children. He represented the town of Shrewsbury in parliament for thirteen years.

Lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill is the fourth son of the above-mentioned baronet. He was born August 1, 1772, and entered the army at an early period in life. He passed through all the gradations of military rank with credit and esteem; and being a gentleman of a religious turn of mind, he neither partook with his brother officers in vicious and frivolous pursuits, nor in consuming his time at the billiard room, but spent his leisure hours in study and religious exercises.

He accompanied general Abercrombie in the expedition to Egypt. While in that country the thanks of both houses of parliament were voted to the army and navy, and each regiment which had served during the campaign was allowed to add an embroidered sphinx to its colours, and to have the word Egypt inscribed upon them. The Grand Seignior likewise testified his gratitude, by instituting the order of the Crescent. The principal commanders were admitted to the honour of knighthood, and gold medals were distributed among the field officers, captains, and subalterns of the victorious army.

General Hill's next service was in the war of the Peninsula, where he distinguished himself at the battle of Talavera, in which he was wounded after having repulsed the French in repeated attacks. Mr. Perceval moved the thanks of the house of commons for the victory of Talavera; and in his speech on this occasion, he mentioned the distinguished manner in which general Hill had repulsed the French at the point of the bayonet. On other occasions, general Hill crowned his former reputation; but, as they are detailed in different parts of this work, there is no necessity to mention them in this place.

such

such a position, that though they were close upon the enemy, they were concealed from his view. He now ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the French were still ignorant of his approach, and extremely off their guard. He then determined, if possible, to surprize, or at least to bring them to action, and made immediately the necessary arrangement and dispositions for that purpose.

The town of Arroyo del Molino, where the main body of the French were posted, is situated at the extremity of a hill, which runs from it to the rear in the form of a crescent; and is so steep as to be almost inaccessible. Near to this hill there are two roads, by either of which an enemy might effect his escape: the object therefore of general Hill was to post a body of troops so as to cut off their retreat by these roads.

The whole of the British troops, therefore, advanced in one body towards Arroyo del Molino, on the 28th. When they came within half a mile of the town the column closed under cover of a bridge, and divided into three bodies. The left column marched directly upon the town; the right column broke off to the right, so as to act with advantage and turn the enemy's left; and the third column, comprized of cavalry, moved between the two columns of infantry, ready to act in front, or move round either of them, as circumstances might require. The enemy did not perceive the approach of the British forces till they were very near them; and at the moment when they were filing off from the town upon the road to Merida. The enemy were immediately attacked; and being thus completely taken by surprize, they made but a feeble resistance, and sought their safety in flight. By the judicious measures and precautions of general Hill, however, their retreat was almost entirely cut off; no way being open to them except over and across the steep hill already mentioned: this way they attempted to escape, but were closely and effectually pursued.

Thus, in a very short space of time, general Girard with his corps of two thousand five hundred infantry,

and six hundred cavalry, was surprized, routed, and dispersed; Brune, a general of cavalry, the prince d'Aremberg, a colonel of cavalry, several other officers, and upwards of one thousand soldiers, were made prisoners: while the loss on the side of the British, in this most spirited and splendid enterprize was very trifling. The whole of the enemy's artillery, baggage, and commissariat, some magazines of corn, which he had collected at Caceres and Merida, and the contribution of the money which he had levied on the former town, besides the total dispersion of general Girard's corps.

Brigadier-general Morillo, when he returned from the pursuit of the dispersed, whom he followed for eight leagues, reported, that besides those killed in the plain, upwards of six hundred dead were found in the woods and mountains. General Girard escaped in the direction of the Serena, with two or three hundred men, mostly without arms, many of them wounded. On this occasion the total of the British loss was seven rank and file and five horses killed; and one lieutenant-colonel, two majors, four captains, four serjeants, forty-seven rank and file, and eleven horses wounded; and one general staff missing.—The Portuguese loss was six rank and file wounded.

Such were the operations and achievements of the main British army, under the command of lord Wellington, in the Peninsula during the year 1811: and perhaps it would be impossible to point out, in the most brilliant period of our history, an equal space of time, in which a British general displayed greater talent and skill, or British troops performed greater prodigies of valour. Lord Wellington rose above all the calumnies which had been heaped upon him; and demonstrated that he was perfectly competent to surpass the most renowned and the most successful French marshals, both in the general management of a campaign, and in the particular arrangements of a battle.

CHAPTER IX.

ALTHOUGH the operations and achievements of the British army under lord Wellington are most deserving of notice and record, both on account of their magnitude, splendour, and success, and by reason of their connection with the fate of the Peninsula being more close and immediate than that of the detached and inferior armies of Spain, yet the military transactions in the other parts of the Peninsula during the year 1811, were by no means destitute of interest and importance.

By the operations of the British and Spanish armies Bonaparte appears to have been thrown so completely out of his expectations, his plans, and his calculations, with respect to the resistance he met with in his designs upon the independence of Spain, and the protracted and obstinate nature of the contest, that for a considerable length of time he carried on the war there in a very desultory manner by armies apparently unconnected with each other, and by no means acting in concert with one another. It is not easy to account for this circumstance; and yet it cannot be denied by any one who will peruse even the French accounts, published at different intervals, and evidently with great reluctance, respecting the operations and progress of their armies in various parts of the Peninsula. The narrative, indeed, in most of these accounts, is as desultory and unconnected as the operations it embraces: since directly opposite to the very clear and orderly account which the French bulletins in other wars, gave of the events of the campaign, the intelligence from the armies in Spain, was uncommonly confused, meagre, and contradictory. About the beginning of the year 1811, however, a regular plan appears to have been formed by Bonaparte for conducting the war in Spain. The principal feature in this plan was the occupancy of the principal cities in the Peninsula. The advantages, and indeed the absolute
R r 2 necessity,

necessity, of this plan for the success and support of his armies is evident. We have already observed, that the greatest difficulty Bonaparte has to overcome in prosecuting the Spanish war, arises from want of provisions: the country where operations are carrying on being stripped of every thing, and the numerous and active parties of the guerillas rendering it almost impossible to collect and convey from a distance the necessary supplies. Another circumstance, also, was peculiarly hostile to his designs on Spain: while his armies actually occupied any particular district the inhabitants were submissive and quiet; but so soon as they marched to extend their conquests, the territory they left was no longer theirs. Now, as it was impossible, especially in the desolate state of the country, to fill Spain with a sufficient number of troops to keep it all in awe and submission, it is evident that the very force that it was necessary to employ for the purpose of subduing one particular district, by its removal gave the district it had occupied an opportunity of rising in arms against them.

If, however, the French in the different provinces of Spain could gain possession of the principal cities, they would be able, in some respect, to remove both these difficulties. By having possession of these towns, they could lay up stores of provisions in safety from the guerillas, and so near their different armies as to be conveyed to them without interruption or danger; while, at the same time, a comparatively small force being stationed in each of the towns would be fully competent to keep the adjoining district in awe and submission. Besides, if circumstances rendered it necessary for Bonaparte to recall the greater part of his troops from the Peninsula, he would always be able, even with what were left in these towns, to preserve a firm footing till it was expedient for him to send back his numerous armies. To these considerations may be added, the effect that the occupation of their principal cities by the French, must necessarily produce upon the minds and courage of the Spaniards themselves,

themselves, who having Frenchmen among them, would, in a course of time become friends rather than enemies.

The siege of Cadiz *, which was begun soon after the commencement of the Spanish war, originated partly,

* As Cadiz has hitherto withstood the arms of France from almost the commencement of the war in the Peninsula, we shall here give a particular description of it.

Cadiz is a very ancient town. By the Romans it was called Gades, by the Phœnicians, Gadir, or Gaddir; some of the ancients gave it the name of Tartessus. It was first built by the Tyrians; and after them it was possessed by the Carthaginians, from whom it came under the dominion of the Romans. It is a famous trading city of the province of Andalusia in Spain, lying on the N. W. extremity of the long and irregular neck of land of an island which extends itself from S. E. to N. W. the eastern part of which is now called Cadiz, and the S. E. part the island of Leon. It is joined to the main land, from which only a narrow channel or arm of the sea separates it, by means of the bridge Suaco, both ends of this being defended by redoubts, and other works. The island, from fort St Catalina to the island of S. Hedro, is five miles long, and from the S. point near the latter, to the north point just by the above mentioned bridge, almost two miles broad. It produces little corn, but the best Spanish wine; and upon it are some pasture grounds, and on the side of the harbour great quantities of salt are made. The neck of land which extends itself from the island, terminates in two head lands, the principal and most westerly of which is called St. Sebastian. The city of Cadiz is pretty large in circuit; yet all the large end of the neck of land is not built upon, and the delightful west side, which is called Santo Campo, or the Church Court, is almost uninhabited, the only building upon it being a spacious hospital, and two chapels, on account of its being not so commodious for the landing of merchandize, as the east side. Most of the streets of Cadiz are narrow, crooked, indifferently paved, and very dirty; but some of them are broad, straight, and well paved. The houses are generally between three and four stories high; many of them having a quadrangular area, and several of these are very handsome. The city is greatly in want of fresh water; and in it are reckoned thirteen convents; among which is a college, said to be the finest in all Andalusia; yet has but one parish church, which is the cathedral; though the number of its inhabitants amounts to forty thousand, and it contains about five thousand houses. Its bishop is a suffragan to the metropolitan see of Seville, with an annual revenue of twelve thousand ducats; his diocese consists but of fourteen parishes. Here

partly, perhaps, from these considerations, and partly from a desire to gain possession of the fleet which lay

is the royal audience of the Indies, or the Indian board of trade, which was removed hither from Seville. Both before and after the arrival of the Spanish ships from America, and their sailing from Cadiz thither again, this place is very brisk and stirring, from the great number of strangers who come hither for the sake of trade, who are said to amount to nearly fifty thousand. It is the center of all the American trade, to which port the English, French, Dutch, and Italian merchants, in the time of peace, send their goods, which Spanish factors, in their respective names, put on board the ships for America. Besides these just mentioned, all others, who trade by sea, have their agents, correspondents, and commissioners at Cadiz; and the consuls of the aforesaid nations, during peace, make a considerable figure here.

At Cadiz the Spaniards have their principal arsenals of maritime stores, and here also they build most of their men of war; their docks, &c. at this place, being better than any others in Spain. The harbour and bay of Cadiz is very fine and spacious; and for the defence of the entrance into it, it has not only fort Matagorda, but also fort Puntal, lying opposite to it upon a point of the neck of land on which Cadiz stands. Between these two forts and the points of land on which they stand, the entrance into the harbour is about five hundred fathoms broad. At ebb tide a great part of the harbour, which is said to be ten French leagues in circuit, lies dry. The outer and furthestmost bay, which lies between Rota and St. Sebastian, and which extends itself to Puerto de Santa Maria, is divided into two parts by the rocks Los Pueros and Diamante.

Cadiz is surrounded with such walls and irregular bastions as the situation of the ground would admit of. There is no approaching to the South side, by reason of its high and steep shores. At present it is rather dangerous landing on the North side, as there are sand banks and rocks under water; but on the S. W. side there is a landing place, at which stands a small fort called Santa Catalina. Towards the S. W. point is a ridge of rocks, which at the time of flood are partly covered with water. The outermost of these is a small island, upon which is a watch-tower and a light-house, together with two chapels, as also fort St. Sebastian stands there. As Cadiz then can be no where attempted, but at the narrowest part of the neck of land lying between it and the S. E. part of the isle of Leon, this has also been fortified. In 1596, the English, under the earl of Essex, landing on the island, took and burnt the town, having first plundered it of immense treasures, and destroyed the galleons in the harbour; after which they quitted the place. In the year 1702, the duke of Ormond attacked it without success. Cadiz is sixty miles N. W. of Gibraltar, and two hundred and twenty miles S. E. of Lisbon.

there,

there, and of a place whence the coasts of Ireland might be threatened, if not actually invaded. That Cadiz would soon have fallen, had it not been for our assistance both by sea and land, there can be no doubt: there was less of the Spanish spirit in it than in any other town in Spain. But by our assistance it offered insuperable difficulties to the French; while the necessity they were under of repeatedly withdrawing the besieging army, for the purpose of augmenting their forces in other parts of the Peninsula, rendered their progress still more slow, and their prospect still more doubtful and distant of obtaining possession of it.

General Graham, who commanded the British forces in Cadiz, perceiving a favourable opportunity, resolved to profit by the absence of a considerable part of the besieging army, and endeavoured to destroy their works, and open a communication with the Isle de Leon. With this view, in conjunction with a Spanish force, (the whole being under the command of the Spanish general La Pena,) he effected a night march of nearly sixteen hours, on the 4th of March, from the camp near Veger, and arrived on the morning of the 5th on a low ridge, called Barrosa, a few miles from the mouth of the river Petri Santi. The enemy's lines were at Santi Petri; and those were immediately and successfully attacked by the van-guard of the Spanish army, under brigadier-general Ledrjabel, by this means opening the communication with the Isle de Leon. After this was effected, general Graham, who with the British occupied the heights of Barrosa, received orders from the Spanish commander-in-chief to quit that position and take up that of Torre de Bermesa, for the purpose of securing a communication across the river. General Graham had scarcely left the heights of Barrosa, and advanced towards a wood near the Bermesa, when he received intelligence that the French had appeared in force on the plain, and were proceeding rapidly, without doubt, for the purpose of gaining the heights. On these heights a body of Spaniards had been left, as it

was of the utmost importance to keep them, as they formed the key to the position of Santi Petri: but as the advancing force of the enemy was greatly superior to that of the Spaniards, general Graham determined to measure back his steps, and if possible reach the heights of Barrosa before the French could drive his allies from them. As, however, the ground on which the British army was formed was very uneven, and they were under an absolute necessity of counter-marching with the utmost rapidity, the columns were never arranged in complete order. At the time that this counter-march was begun, part of general Graham's force were entangled in a wood; and before they could possibly get clear, and move on towards Barrosa, he had the misfortune to perceive the Spanish troops, to whom the occupancy of the heights had been committed, give way, and the enemy beginning to ascend them. No time was now to be lost: every thing evidently depended on the rapidity of his movement, and on the steadiness and bravery of his troops. Although they were necessarily much fatigued from the long and arduous march which they had but a very short time before performed, yet they pushed forward with the utmost alacrity. Indeed the situation of general Graham's corps was such, that it could only be saved by the prompt arrangement of a judicious plan, and the cool and brave execution of it on the part of the soldiers. The right wing of the enemy, while their main body was ascending the heights of Barrosa, stood on the plain, near the wood, within cannon shot of the English. Had retreat been resolved upon in this situation, it could only have been effected by crossing the narrow ridge of Bermesa; and during this march (the different divisions of the army must unavoidably have thrown one another into confusion.

Under these circumstances general Graham determined on the immediate attack of the enemy, having the most perfect reliance on the bravery of his own troops. For this purpose a powerful battery of ten
guns

guns began to play from the centre; while on the right were drawn up the brigade of guards, the flank battalion of the 28th, two companies of the 2nd rifle corps, and a part of the 67th regiment; the left was formed by a brigade of the Coldstream guards, and the flank battalion of lieutenant-colonel Barnard's regiment.

The battery in the centre was directed against general Laval's division, which continued to advance, notwithstanding it suffered severely, till it was received and checked by the left wing of the British. This wing, after checking the French, advanced to the charge with the utmost intrepidity, and soon decided the defeat of general Laval's division. In this rencontre the eagle of the eighth regiment of light infantry and one howitzer were taken.

General Rufin's division of the French forces was posted on the hill: against this the right wing of the British directed their attack. The enemy trusting to the superiority of their numbers, and the advantage they derived from their position, met our troops on the ascent of the hill, where the battle raged fiercely, and was very sanguinary. It was, however, but of short duration, for the enemy were quickly compelled to give way; and when they did yield, their position on the ascent of the hill contributed greatly to their confusion and slaughter. Two pieces of cannon were the fruit of the victory of the right wing of the British army.

The battle of Barrosa, though obstinate in its nature, and brilliant in its result, did not continue more than an hour and a half: at the end of that time the enemy were in full retreat. General Graham did not think it advisable to pursue them, on account of the exhausted state of his troops. After the battle the British troops re-occupied their first position on the heights of Barrosa, where they were joined by the two battalions of the Spaniards, to whom they had been entrusted when he first quitted them. On the morning of the 6th he proceeded to the Isle de Leon,

for the purpose of procuring supplies. Our loss in this most glorious action was one thousand two hundred and forty-three in killed and wounded; while the loss of the enemy amounted to nearly three thousand. Two generals, Rupin and Rousseau, who was wounded, were taken; and general Bellegarde was killed in the action. General Rousseau afterwards died of his wounds.

In this battle the Portuguese who were attached to general Graham's army behaved remarkably well. That portion also of the Spanish forces which came out of the Isle of Leon, and established the communication across the river Santi Petri, also proved themselves worthy of fighting by the side of Britons. But the great body of the Spanish army, under the commander in chief, general La Pena, deserve a different character for their conduct on that day. It is impossible to account for the orders that were issued by this general for general Graham to quit the heights of Barrosa; for his not supporting the Spaniards who were left there, when he saw the enemy advancing against them; and for his permitting the troops under him to remain quiet and distant spectators of the battle between general Graham * and the French forces. Even

* The name of Graham is as well known in Scotland as are those of Bruce and Wallace; and there are few men who have had a more fortunate entrance on the public stage than general Graham. The comparative narrow extent of Scotland, and the frequent intermarriages of families, have rendered the whole of Scotland, as it were, one home or family mansion; each being in some way allied to the other, and having all at least a small share in the achievements of each other. This circumstance, indeed, may account for that national spirit, and that adherence and sympathy with each other, which so eminently characterize them; and the same reason may likewise account for their greater patriotism and warmer love even of the soil and name of their country.

The general, who is the subject of the present note, is a descendant of the renowned Graham who made the first breach in the famous wall of Severus, between the rivers Forth and Clyde. He was a general in the army of king Fergus II. against the Romans and Britons; was married to a lady of the royal house

Even after the French were routed, and when their defeat and slaughter might have been rendered much more complete by immediate and close pursuit, the Spanish commander in chief never offered to put his troops

of Denmark; was regent of Scotland; and guardian to his grandson king Eugene II. William de Graham, from whom this family may be traced from father to son to the present time, was one of the witnesses at laying the foundation of the abbey of Holyrood house by king David I. in 1125. David de Graham was appointed one of the regents of Scotland on the death of Alexander III. (1285,) during the absence and minority of Margaret the Maiden of Norway. Sir John de Graham, the faithful friend of the renowned sir William Wallace, fell at the battle of Falkirk, in 1298, fighting valiantly for the liberties of Scotland against a superior force. From this time until the days of the celebrated marquis, this family produced many eminent patriots both in church and state.

Thomas Graham, now general Graham, was born in 1750, at the family seat of Balgowan, he was the third son of Thomas Graham by lady Christian Hope, sister to the earl of Hopetown; the present earl of Hopetown and general Graham being first cousins. The two brothers of general Graham died very young, leaving him the only son and heir of his father. In 1774, he paid his addresses to the honourable Miss Cathcart, a daughter of lord Cathcart, who had three daughters, all of whom married in one day; the one to the duke of Athol, another to the late lord Stormont, afterwards earl of Mansfield, and the third to Mr. (now general) Graham.

With this lady Mr. Graham continued to live nearly eighteen years a life of domestic happiness; but at the close of that period her declining health rendered it necessary for him to accompany her to the south of France. She left her native country, however, only to die in a foreign land; for her decline was so rapid, that she died before reaching land in Hieres Bay. Mr. Graham now became a solitary wanderer in search of consolation. The war with France had not as yet broken out, and he had therefore an opportunity of visiting a considerable part of the south of France, by which he obtained a local knowledge which very shortly after became of equal advantage to him and to his country. Upon the breaking out of the war he went to Gibraltar, and in the officers of the garrison he found a society which, in some degree, diverted his grief.

At Gibraltar Mr. Graham fell in with lord Hood, who commanded the fleet on the Mediterranean station. Lord Hood was in daily expectation of entering on an enterprize as dangerous as it was promising, which had been long preparing, and which was

troops in motion for that purpose. This conduct naturally gave rise to strong indignation and complaint on the part of the British. The Spanish general endeavoured

now nearly matured. As it was generally understood that the object of it was the south of France, Mr. Graham offered his services as a volunteer, and was accepted. The fleet at length sailed upon its meditated object (Toulon), and Mr. Graham accompanied it.

Having entered into a secret correspondence with the inhabitants of Toulon, lord Hood was invited to make his appearance, which he did off the port of Toulon on the 23rd of August, 1793. His lordship immediately issued a declaration, inviting the inhabitants to raise the standard of royalty, to dismantle the ships in the harbour, and give him a temporary and provisional possession of the forts and town; engaging upon his own part, under these conditions, to assist and support them with his majesty's forces by sea and land, and upon the return of peace or of a legitimate government to restore the port, forts, and stores, &c. to France. These terms were accepted by the town council, and on the 28th of the same month, his lordship took possession of the town, and proclaimed Louis the XVIIth as the lawful king of France.

Throughout the whole of the actions, when the French republican army attacked Toulon, Mr. Graham particularly distinguished himself; and after that place was captured by the French, Mr. Graham returned to England, where he raised the ninetyeth regiment.

His next military service was in the Austrian army, in the course of which, in the year 1796, he was shut up with general Wurmser, in Mantua, and only escaped being comprehended with him in the capture, by cutting his way through in a night sortie on the 29th of December, in the same year. This escape has always been considered as desperate as it was gallant.

The next service of general Graham was in the capture of the island of Malta under general Pigot in the year 1800. This place sustained a siege of two years, and then the commander-in-chief (general Vaubois) found it necessary to capitulate. Colonel Graham continued in active service till the peace of Amiens, which restored him, in common with all the military to a temporary inactivity.

Upon the infraction of the peace of Amiens, colonel Graham again entered upon active service, and he accompanied sir John Moore, in his expedition to Spain. Sir John Moore, however, was not received by the Spaniards as he expected he should have been, and he sent colonel Graham to Madrid for the purpose of reconnoitring, and transmitting him a detailed

deavoured to vindicate himself, and even to throw blame on the British for not having obeyed his orders! The cortes at first seemed disposed to punish general La Pena, and ordered him into arrest; but afterwards liberated him, and in the course of a few months actually took him again into employ.

The French general employed by Bonaparte for the purpose of carrying into execution his plan of getting possession of the principal places in Spain was Suchet, a man of uncommon enterprize and activity. One of the first places which he attacked was Tarragona*.

By

detailed account of the true state of things. Accordingly colonel Graham reported, that Morla had made an agreement with the French, who had thereby got possession of the Retiro and Prado of Madrid; that Castellar, the captain-general, and all the military officers of rank, had refused to ratify the agreement, and had left the town and brought away sixteen guns. Shortly after this, sir John Moore thought it necessary to retreat; and after the battle of Corunna, colonel Graham returned to England, with a great increase of reputation, and with such a direct recommendation from sir John Moore, that it was deemed necessary to promote him.

With respect to general Graham's conduct in Spain, it is only needful to say, that the principal actions in which he has been engaged are amply detailed in the course of this work, to which we refer.

General Graham, who is now in his sixty-fifth or sixty-sixth year, is a person of great opulence; for John Graham, of Balgowan, his ancestor, upon account of his loyalty and the assistance which he gave to king James of Scotland, against the conspiracy of the earl of Gowrie, obtained from that monarch several lands belonging to that nobleman, viz. Nether Pitcairns, Craighall, half lands of Monedy, half lands of Legelurie, and half of Codrai Cele Mill, with the patronage of the kirk of Monedy; the charter bearing date the 21th of August, 1584; to all which general Graham succeeded on the death of his father. Added to this, by the death of the late marquis of Annandale, the mother of general Graham received one hundred thousand pounds,—a circumstance which accounts for his opulence.

* Tarragona is an ancient and strong town of Catalonia, with a harbour, a bishop's see, and an university. It was built by the Phœnicians, and was very powerful in the time of the Romans. There are many monuments of antiquity here, particularly inscriptions and the ruins of magnificent buildings. It is now surrounded

By the accounts of the French themselves the defence of this place was obstinate and well managed, and the capture of it cost them dear. The following is an abstract of the account of the taking of Tarragona, given in the London Gazette of the 17th of August, 1811:

Admiralty Office, Aug. 17.

This gazette contains a copy of a dispatch from sir C. Cotton, with inclosures from capt. Adam, of the *Invincible*; capt. Codrington, of the *Blake*; and lieutenant colonel Green. They detail the operations in Catalonia up to the 1st of June, and give some interesting but melancholy details of the siege of Tarragona.—Capt. Adam states in his dispatch, that when it was intended to substitute the regiment of Almeria for that of Iberia, which had hitherto been in that fort, the enemy found means to mingle himself with that regiment, and got possession of the *Olivo* without firing a shot, making nine hundred prisoners. Lieutenant-colonel Green mentions, that the small advanced work on the sea-beach, called the *Francoli*, was destroyed in four hours by the batteries thrown up in the night of the 6th. The conduct of the Spanish troops on this occasion is highly commended: all the men who occupied the *Francoli*, to the amount of about one hundred and forty five, being either killed or wounded, and the officer in command having left the fort the last person. The enemy afterwards made several attempts to carry the works which protect the communication between the sea and the town; but by the vigilance and bravery of brigadier Sarsfield were repulsed with considerable loss; and in one instance, though the enemy had rallied three times, he was

rounded with walls, which were built by the Moors, and is also defended by regular works. It is neither so large nor so populous as it was formerly; for though there be room for two thousand houses within the walls, it does not contain above five hundred, which are all built with large square stones. It carries on a great trade, and is seated on a hill on the Mediterranean Sea, two hundred and twenty miles E. by N. of Madrid.

com-

completely defeated in his object. The third is from captain Codrington of the *Blake*, and relates to the succours conveyed into Tarragona by the *Invincible* and *Blake*, consisting of four thousand men, and a considerable quantity of powder, ball-cartridges, &c.

Captain Codrington of the *Blake* says, that the French were carrying on the works near the Fuerte-Real battery, from which they would quickly be enabled to breach the wall of the town. In the mean time they were destroying the custom-house, the large stores, and all the building of the Puerto. The exertion and ability of the French, in besieging this place he believes never to have been exceeded.

Blake, off Tarragona, June 29.

Sir, Yesterday morning, at dawn of day, the French opened their fire upon the town; about half past five in the afternoon a breach was made in the works, and the place carried by assault immediately afterwards. From the rapidity with which they entered, I fear they met with but little opposition: and upon the Barcelona side a general panic took place. Those already without the walls stripped and endeavoured to swim off to the shipping, while those within were seen sliding down the face of the batteries; each party thus equally endangering their lives more than they would have done by a firm resistance to the enemy. A large mass of people, some with muskets and some without, then pressed forward along the road, suffering themselves to be fired upon by about twenty French, who continued running behind them at only a few yards distance. At length they were stopped entirely by a volley of fire by one small party of the enemy, who had entrenched themselves at a turn of the road, supported by a second a little higher up, who opened a masked battery of two field-pieces. A horrible butchery then ensued; and shortly afterwards the remainder of these poor wretches, amounting to above three thousand, tamely submitted to be led away prisoners by less than as many hundred French. The launches and gunboats went from the ships the instant

instant the enemy were observed by the *Invincible* (which lay to the westward) to be collecting in their trenches; and yet so rapid was their success that the whole was over before we could open our fire with effect. All the boats of the squadron and transports were sent to assist those who were swimming or concealed under the rocks; and notwithstanding a heavy fire of musketry and field-pieces, which were warmly and successfully returned by the launches and gun-boats, from five to six hundred were then brought off to the shipping, many of them badly wounded.

I cannot conclude my history of our operations at Tarragona, without assuring you that the zeal and exertion of those under my command, in every branch of the various services which have fallen to their lot, have been carried far beyond the mere dictates of duty. The *Invincible* and *Centaur* have remained with me the whole time immediately off Tarragona; and captains Adam, White, and myself have passed most nights in our gigs, carrying on such operations under cover of the dark as could not have been successfully employed in the sight of the enemy: I do not mean as to mere danger, for the boats have been assailed with shot and shells both night and day, even during the time of their taking off the women and children, as well as the wounded, without being in the smallest degree diverted from their purpose. It is impossible to detail in a letter all that has passed during this short but tragic period. But humanity has given increased excitement to our exertions; and the bodily powers of captain Adam have enabled him perhaps to push to greater extent that desire to relieve distress which we have all partaken in common.

Our own ships, as well as the transports, have been the receptacle of the miserable objects which saw no shelter but in the English squadron; and you will see by the orders which I have found it necessary to give, that we have been called upon to clothe the naked, and feed the starving, beyond the regular rules of our service. Our boats have suffered occasionally from the
shot

shot of the enemy, as well as from the rocks from which they have embarked the people; amongst others, the barge of the Blake, which however I was so fortunate as to recover, after being swamped and upset in consequence of a shot passing through both her sides, with the loss only of one woman and child killed out of twelve, which were then on board in addition to her crew. But the only casualty of importance which has happened in the squadron is that which befel the Centaur's launch on the evening of the 28th; and I beg to refer you particularly to the observations of captain White respecting lieutenant Ashworth, whose conduct and whose misfortune entitle him to every consideration.

(Signed)

EDWARD CODRINGTON.

Captain Codrington further states, that he had received intelligence that general Contreras was wounded and made prisoner, and that the general personally distinguished himself; that the governor (Gonzalez), with a handful of men, defended himself to the last, and was bayoneted to death in the square near his house; that man, woman, and child, were put to the sword upon the French first entering the town, and afterwards all those found in uniform or with arms in their houses; and that many of the women, and young girls of ten years old were treated in the most inhuman way; and that after the soldiers had satisfied their desires, many of them, it was reported, were thrown into the flames, together with the badly wounded Spaniards: one thousand men had been left to destroy the works; the whole city was burnt to ashes, or would be so, as the houses were all set fire to; the only chance in their favour was the calm weather and the sudden march of the French by which some houses might escape.

Two general memorandums of captain Codrington here follow. They direct, that in consequence of Tarragona having been taken by assault, by which numbers of the troops, with many of the inhabitants

and their families are reduced to distress, and quite naked; the different ships on board which they are shall supply them with such necessary articles of clothing as decency and humanity require, and also subsistence.

After the capture of Tarragona, the French directed their efforts to retake Figueras. This strong and important place they had lost, partly by want of provisions, and partly by the garrison's (consisting principally of Germans and Italians) not being disposed to defend it obstinately. The French, in order to retake it, were obliged to employ such a number of men, as might effectually prevent supplies being introduced, and even after the Spanish garrison were reduced to the utmost distress for want of provisions, they continued to defend it with great bravery. In the beginning of August famine had made great progress among them; they had attempted in vain to destroy the works of the besieging army; and they now seemed disposed if possible to make a desperate attempt, and breakthrough with the bayonet. But the French works were too complete and too strong: a formidable line of circumvallation more than four thousand toises in extent surrounded the town. On the night of the 16th of August the garrison, with Martinez, the commandant, sallied out. He reached as far as the first abbatis, when his progress was checked, four hundred of his men were killed, and the rest compelled to re-enter the fortress. On the morning of the 19th he surrendered at discretion, and three thousand five hundred men, and nearly three hundred and fifty officers, were made prisoners.

One of the most numerous and best appointed armies which the Spaniards had, during 1811, was the army of Murcia under general Freyere. In order that this army might be sufficiently strong to cope with marshal Soult in the south of Spain, general Blake had marched in the middle of August to form a junction with it. But Soult having intelligence of this proposed juncture, pushed on with eight thousand

sand men, and attacked general Freyere at two different points at the same time. General Freyere himself, with the division under his immediate command, behaved with the greatest courage, and repulsed that part of the enemy which directed their attacks against him; but the attack of the French on the other points was completely successful. This success was occasioned principally by a large body of Spaniards under general Quedra, consisting of upwards of six thousand men, not arriving at their post. In consequence of the defeat of this wing of the Spaniards, their victory in the other point was rendered of no avail, and the whole army was compelled to retreat. Their line being broken, part of the army was left unprotected, and fell victims, after a most heroic resistance. Although the defeat of the Spaniards was complete, and their retreat rapid, yet during the whole of it, for nearly thirty-seven leagues, general Freyere evinced great military talents, and prevented the consequences from being nearly so disastrous as they otherwise must have been.

To return: after the fall of Tarragona, Suchet directed his march into Valencia, for the purpose of besieging the capital of that province: a city, both from its population and its situation, second in importance only to Madrid itself. But previous to the French general's being able to sit down before Valencia *, it was necessary that he should make himself

. master

* Valencia is the capital of the province or kingdom of the same name. It is an ancient, populous, and flourishing city, containing, according to the most authentic information, about eighty thousand inhabitants. It is delightfully situated on the banks of the Guadalavir. The cathedral of Valencia was formerly a Moorish mosque. The town house, the palace of Ciutta and that of the Deputation, with several monuments of antiquity, deserve particular attention. The streets are very narrow, but there are many handsome buildings; nevertheless, the city is not so grand as might be expected from its being the capital of the richest and most fertile province of Spain. The windows of the houses, a few years ago were generally unglazed; and those

master of the castle of Saguntum, a place famous in the history of the Roman wars in Spain. On the 23d of September, the siege of this important out-work of Valencia was begun; but from the nature of the ground, and other circumstances, the French advanced very slowly, and under great disadvantages and difficulties. On the 18th of October, a practicable breach being made, an assault was ordered, but the besiegers were repulsed with considerable loss. New batteries were now formed, and every preparation made for a second assault, when general Blake resolved to advance, and make an attempt to relieve it. For this purpose he collected a large force, amounting to about twenty thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry, and composed of the army of Murcia, the army of Valencia, and the guerillas.

On the 25th of October Blake commenced his attack on the besieging army; and Suchet acknowledges, in his official report, he soon experienced that he had far different troops to contend against from those he had formerly conquered. Soon after the commencement of the action, Blake manœuvred so masterly as to outflank the French on both sides: in this situation Suchet determined to direct his efforts against the Spanish centre; and by this means he succeeded in separating the two wings; the right wing, however, at the same time continuing to advance and to drive the French before them. The principal place of contest, in this part of the battle, was the village of Pugol, in which the Spaniards fought with great bravery, and hand to hand with their enemies. The left wing of the Spaniards, in the mean time, was by no means so successful; but having stretched itself so far out as

which were decorated with glass, were glazed with the coarsest materials. Of late, however, the windows of some hundreds of the houses have been glazed. Living is said to be very expensive at Valencia, provisions being at an exorbitant price for a provincial town. Trade and manufactures flourish here; the principal among the latter is that of silk, which is spun by the women and children.

to be greatly weakened, it was driven back with great loss. The centre, also, being weakened by the extension of the two wings, could not stand the charge of the French, but gave way. This defeat of the left wing, and of the centre, rendered the success of the right wing of little or no avail. In this situation the Spanish army formed itself into squares, and commenced their retreat. The enemy pursued, and repeatedly broke the body into which the retreating army had formed itself, which always formed again, till at length they reached a deep ravine, where the French gave over the pursuit. In this battle the Spaniards lost nearly two thousand men, and eight pieces of cannon: the loss of the French was but trifling in comparison of the Spaniards.

Suchet lost no time after the battle of Saguntum in summoning the garrison of that fort to surrender; and by means of a deceit, allowable in war, that of representing his own victory as more complete, and the loss of the Spaniards as greater than it actually was, he persuaded the governor to accept the terms he offered; by which the garrison, consisting of two thousand five hundred and seventy-two men, were made prisoners of war. Blake after his defeat returned with his army to protect the city of Valencia, against which Suchet also directed his march.

It is impossible to notice the operations of the other Spanish corps in different parts of the Peninsula, even of those which were composed of regular troops, and still less of those which were formed of the guerillas. The latter under several of their leaders, particularly in Catalonia, were very successful in cutting off small bodies of the French; and even in penetrating into and plundering the frontiers of France. Of the regular small corps, that under general Ballasteros was the most active, and harrassed the French extremely in the south of Spain. The destruction of this general, if possible, was deemed a matter of such moment, that a very superior French force was dispatched after him, which compelled him to take refuge

fuge under the guns of Gibraltar. Here he continued in safety till the enemy retired, when he again commenced his harrassing attacks.

The cause of Spain this year suffered a very heavy and severe loss by the death of the marquis de Romana. His death was occasioned by the constant fatigue of body and vexation of mind which he had suffered from the time he entered Spain with his army. There can be no doubt that he was much disappointed, both with respect to the actual state of preparation and force which he found, and with respect to the proceedings of the Spanish government. Before his death, most of those soldiers who had accompanied him from Denmark had fallen in the defence of their country; and shortly after his decease, the army which he commanded was surprized, and nearly all cut to pieces in the vicinity of Badajoz*.

Such were the military transactions and events in the Peninsula during the year 1811. It requires a very minute, connected, and impartial examination of them, before it can be determined, whether, upon the whole, taking every thing into consideration, the cause of the Spaniards advanced towards a prosperous issue, or receded from it. It cannot be denied or concealed, that the French were in possession of more towns, and those of much more consequence, than they were at the close of the year 1810. Indeed, with the exception of Cadiz and Valencia, (and the exception with respect to the last cannot be quoted long after the commencement of the year 1812,) the French may be considered as occupying all the principal places in Spain: their progress indeed was slow, attended with much difficulty, interrupted by many reverses, and purchased at a very heavy expense; but still they made progress.

* Badajoz is a large and strong town of Estremadura in Spain, of which province it is the capital. It is the see of a bishop, and is famous for a bridge built by the Romans over the river Guadiana. Badajoz is 12 miles S. E. of Elvas, and 175 S. by W. of Madrid.

During the year 1811, the guerilla system was carried to a much greater extent, was adopted in almost every part of Spain, and was attended with great success. The difficulties under which the French laboured for want of provisions and stores were greatly augmented by the intrepidity and activity of the guerillas; and it is not too much to assert, that by them the French lost more men than they did in regular engagements with the Spanish armies.

In the course of the year 1811, the British army beat the French at Almeida, Albuera, and Barrosa; they destroyed great numbers of Bonaparte's best soldiers, and lowered the characters of his generals. These victories must also have produced effects beneficial to the cause of Spain, in Spain itself; and beneficial to the cause of subdued Europe.

The cortes met and deliberated upon state affairs in their way, but there is no necessity to dwell long upon their proceedings during the year 1811: it is an ungrateful subject, and must weary and disgust every real friend to the cause of Spain. As far as addresses to their countrymen, written with great force and eloquence, and pointing out the duties and sacrifices required of them, in the most energetic and persuasive manner, could be of service, the cortes performed their duty. In all other respects, they either did nothing, or did what was manifestly injurious to their country.

The following manifesto of the cortes-general and extraordinary, to the Spanish nation, explains the views, policy, and feelings of that people:

“Spaniards!—If the cortes extraordinary, assembled by your free and deliberate choice, and which has been installed solemnly in the royal Isle of Leon, has not before this day regularly addressed you, it was from the conviction it felt that its character and object should manifest themselves to you by its provident, just, and necessary decrees and declarations, rather than by studied professions and declarations. To act, and not to profess was its sacred duty. Applying itself with undivided heart and hand to the regeneration and well being of the state, the congress, declaring and acknowledging the sovereignty of the nation; solemnly swearing in the

the name of all the people to preserve the same for Ferdinand VII. king of Spain and the Indies; sanctioning the constitutional division of three estates; abolishing arbitrary and unjust rules; re-establishing the freedom of thought in its original purity; restoring to the citizen one of the most sacred rights of political liberty—that of a free press; forming a new government on a compact and vigorous system; and endeavouring to strengthen the edifice of the state by constitutional laws, which they are engaged in framing:—in these urgent and laudable occupations, the cortes were diligently engaged, when a novel and most extraordinary rumour, vague, and hardly credited in its commencement, but soon, perhaps, through the machinations of the common enemy, obtained extensive credit, resounded in all parts of Spain, as well as in many other quarters, and imperiously called for the most serious attention on the part of the national congress.

Beware, O Spaniards, that the tyrant of Europe, panting to subjugate us, now adds treachery and artifice to the unheard-of violence by which he has goaded you into this defensive war; and, considering the ardent force of your love and loyalty for your adored sovereign, he endeavours to contravene these sentiments, by insidiously pretending to make restitution to the outraged Spaniards, and to compassionate the state to which he has now reduced them. But think not, Spaniards! that tyrants are ever beneficent without some insidious motive. Ferdinand may be sent to Spain, but he will be surrounded by armed Frenchmen, and by Spaniards who suffer themselves to be seduced by the artifice, or intimidated by the menaces, of Bonaparte. He would come as one of the family of this monster, either by means of an union with a foreign princess, or as an adopted son of Napoleon; he would come to administer to the will of this execrable protector, by endeavouring to obtain a peace of his dictation, or, in other words, to effectuate the ruin and subjugation of the Peninsula. Such is the substance of these rumours; considerations in which are at once compromised the honour and decorum of your king—the independence and sovereignty of your nation—and the dignity and salvation of the monarchy. The extravagant request of adoption, which is already said to have been made in the name of Ferdinand, and which is inserted in those public papers in the pay of Bonaparte, leaves no room to doubt of the design of the usurper to degrade and vilify their lawful sovereign in the eyes of Spaniards, for the purpose of forwarding his iniquitous designs. Thus you see the moment is arriving, perhaps

perhaps is not far distant, when the nation may be placed in a situation as perilous and complicated as that which gave birth to its heroic insurrection, and in which it would have to display a similar grandeur and nobleness of character.

The cortes, in considering this most important subject, are fully aware of the grand character of the people whom they represent, of the worthy and noble example which they hold forth to the rest of Europe, and of the splendid hopes opposed to the gloomy horrors which are involved in this terrible contest. They feel that Spaniards must be aware, that the war into which the outrageous tyranny of the Gallic despot has goaded them, must be carried on without compromise or relation, and with accelerated force. What can be the object of such a species of conciliation? It will not, Spaniards, be for that of your happiness and repose, or to make reparation for the various insults and accumulated injuries inflicted upon you! No: the souls of tyrants are never actuated by the impulse of virtue. Napoleon is instinctively malignant. This has been terribly exemplified with respect to us already. He again seeks to enslave us, to render us the unhappy instrument of his insatiable ambition. Your admirable patriotism, courage, and constancy, have hitherto disconcerted his iniquitous projects. Spain has successfully resisted him, to whose triumphal car all the kings of Europe succumb. The subtle tyrant has self-consulted a project for subjugating Spain: he feels the ruling virtue of genuine Spaniards is that of loyalty to their sovereigns. He beholds the unpractised Ferdinand in his power; he conceives the expedient of sending him to Spain in the insidious character of an adopted son; but in effect as a degraded instrument. He knows his influence, and hopes to bring about a tranquil submission by his means. He sees that America already acknowledges his sway; but should this illustrious and devoted missionary be unsuccessful, he sees at least that the Spaniards will be divided, and the seeds sown of dissension and distrust, and thinks that the wavering and unprincipled among us will excuse their desertion, under the pretext of adhering to the fortunes of Ferdinand.

But, Spaniards, all these insidious machinations will vanish like the mists before the sun of your rectitude and true interests. Let us continue loyal to Ferdinand. What nation has ever given such proofs of loyalty to its sovereign? [*Here a variety of instances are cited.*] But, suppose Bonaparte should prevail on the captive prince to enter Spain; will he be the same? No; Ferdinand Napoleon can never be Ferdinand de Bourbon. No; he would be the servile instrument

of the Corsican Attila, encircled by atrocious Gauls, and degraded Spaniards instead of free and generous subjects. His identity would no longer exist. You would never become the deceived victims of such an illusion, and the crown which the tyrant would apparently restore, would form a new emblem of mockery and insult.

Political independence and social felicity were our objects when, at Aranjuez, we tried to seat on the Spanish throne a prince idolized by us for his amiable and benevolent disposition. Such are still the objects of the Spanish people, for which they have already sustained a three years sanguinary warfare, and have latterly convened the extraordinary cortes of the Spanish monarchy. To defend the country against its actual enemies, and to secure its future independence, is the universal wish of the people, and the sworn duty of their representatives; they wish for a monarchical constitution, but one free and equitable, as now contemplated by those representatives! Napoleon is deceived as to our real objects. Spaniards combat not for vain glory, or for undefined or unjust objects; our political independence, domestic tranquillity and freedom, and the integrity of our territories, are our real and only objects.

Let us announce to all Europe, that Spaniards contemplate with astonishment and admiration the spirited and generous exertions of our allies. Let us express our gratitude to our brethren in America, who have with such enthusiastic loyalty asserted the cause of the mother country, and present such a striking contrast to the vile assassins of the crafty tyrant. Let us evince to the world, that the immense power of our common enemy will not avail against the impregnable barrier of your heroic virtue, though he should take advantage of the helpless situation of a young and unpractized prince, and convert him personally into the blind instrument of his atrocious projects.

The cortes, the legitimate interpreters of your wills in this terrible crisis, swear solemnly, in your name, before the Supreme Being, in presence of all the nations of the earth, and of the august and beneficent ally in particular, not to lay down their arms, nor afford the enemy a moment of repose, nor to enter into any concert or agreement with him, until he shall previously have evacuated the territories of Spain, and those of our neighbouring and illustrious ally, Portugal! Unite with us in this solemn oath, all ye respectable clergy who wish to maintain the cause of our altars, and our holy religion; all ye ennobled Spaniards, if ye pretend, in imitation of your ancestors, to defend the throne and the
country;

country; and all ye industrious and commercial citizens, and proprietors of every description, repine not at any sacrifices ye may make for objects so justly dear to you: recollect and consider the barbarous and profane atrocities of your relentless enemy! If any among you prefer wearing the mark of inglorious slavery in your unmanly foreheads, let him fly the land of heroic freedom, and on him be the indignant curses of the nation.

“Given at the royal Isle of Leon, the 9th of January, 1811.

“ALONSO CANEDO, President.

“JOSE MARTINEZ, Dep. Sec.

“JOSE ASNAREZ, Dep. Sec.”

We have already noticed that general La Pena, who behaved so ill at the battle of Barrosa was acquitted by the cortes; and uncandid reflections were even thrown out on the conduct of general Graham.

Mr. Wellesley, our ambassador in Cadiz, used every effort to induce the cortes to re-organize the Spanish armies, but without effect; and when he proposed that British officers should be placed over them, or rather should be joined in the command with the Spanish officers, an outcry was immediately raised, that Britain was aiming by this proposed measure at the independence of Spain.

There were evidently two grand objects that the cortes ought from the first moment of their meeting to have directed their attention and efforts to the accomplishment of; the best method of rendering their armies complete, and properly organized, officered, and supplied; and the removal of every kind of oppression, which either kept down the efforts and the spirits of the people, or which rendered them indifferent or averse to the expulsion of the French. The Spanish armies were repeatedly beaten by the French; the causes of their defeat were easily seen; they were pointed out to the cortes. Britain supplied the means, as far as lay in her power, to put the armies on a better footing; and every thing that was required for that purpose, the cortes could easily have managed. Yet no change took place; nothing was done.

Many persons anticipated from the proceedings of the cortes, the infusion of a greater portion of spirit and enterprize into the people of the Spanish nation. Before they met, they observed that it could hardly be expected that the people of Spain would fight against Bonaparte, when their ancient constitution was denied them; but that when their representatives were assembled, and were acting in their behalf, they would then come forward in a cause they knew to be their own. One of the first acts of Bonaparte, after he obliged the Spanish monarch to make over his crown to him, was to abolish the inquisition; this was the act of a tyrant; but it was done from politic motives; and yet the cortes, the representatives of a people fighting for their liberty, had neither the justice, the wisdom, or the policy, to imitate this act of Bonaparte. It will scarcely, be believed, that in the cortes of Spain, in the nineteenth century, assembled as they were for the purpose of assisting their countrymen in becoming free, the inquisition should have been praised and defended.

It may be easily conceived that the character and proceedings of the cortes filled the Spaniards with indignation and alarm. They saw month after month, and year after year passing away; their armies dispersed and defeated, the French ravaging and desolating their country, and gaining possession of their principal cities, and the efforts of their allies the English checked, paralised and even thwarted; while the cortes, and the men in whose hands the administration of affairs was lodged, spent their time in frivolous disputes, or in enacting decrees that would have suited the state of Spain in the fifteenth century, but were irrelevant or injurious at the beginning of the nineteenth; that might have become the ministers of Philip the Second, but were out of character, when proceeding from the representatives and governors of a nation fighting for its liberty.

And yet by a strange but not unusual inconsistency, a constitution for Spain was presented to the cortes, and

and approved by them, on the 19th of August, which in many of its articles, and in its very spirit and principle, bordered on the very extreme of liberty; while the proposal to abolish the inquisition, to strike the shackles off commerce, and to place the American colonies on an equal footing with respect to civil and political privileges with the mother country, was received with aversion and alarm. The two sections consisted of two hundred and forty-two articles, and the following are the principal heads of the constitution.

PRELIMINARY AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES.

“Spain belongs to the Spanish people, and is not the patrimony of any family.

“The nation only can make fundamental laws.

“The Roman catholic and apostolic religion, unmixed with any other, is the only religion which the nation professes or will profess.

“The government of Spain is an hereditary monarchy.

“The cortes shall make the laws, and the king shall execute them.

SPANISH CITIZENS.

“The children of Spaniards, and of foreigners married to Spanish women, or who bring a capital in order to naturalize themselves to the soil, or establish themselves in trade, or who teach any useful art, are citizens of Spain.

“None but citizens can fill municipal offices.

“The rights of citizenship may be lost by long absence from the country, or by condemnation to corporeal or infamous punishments.

THE KING.

“The person of the king is inviolable and sacred.

“He shall sanction the laws enacted by the cortes.

“He may declare war, and make peace.

“He shall appoint to civil and military employments on the proposal of the council of state.

“He shall direct all diplomatic negotiations.

“He shall superintend the application of the public revenue, &c.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE KINGLY AUTHORITY.

“The king shall not obstruct the meeting of the cortes in the cases and at the periods pointed out by the constitution, nor embarrass or suspend the sittings, &c.

“All who may advise him to any such proceedings shall be holden and dealt with as traitors.

“He

“ He must not travel, marry, alienate any thing, abdicate the crown, raise taxes, nor exchange any town, city, &c. without having first obtained the permission of the cortes.

“ Don Fernando VII. is declared by the cortes king of Spain, and after his decease, his legitimate descendants shall succeed to the throne.

“ The king shall be a minor until he has completed the age of eighteen years.

“ The eldest son of the king shall be called prince of the Asturias, and as such, shall, at the age of fourteen, take an oath before the cortes, to maintain the constitution, and to be faithful to the king.

“ During a minority, a regency shall be formed, which shall superintend the education of the young prince, according to the orders of the cortes. The regency shall be presided over by the queen mother, if she be in life, and shall be composed of two of the oldest deputies of the cortes, who shall be replaced from year to year, and of two counsellors of the council of state, chosen in the order of their seniority.

“ The cortes shall fix the salary proper for the support of the king and his family, and shall point out the places destined for his recreation, &c.

“ The infantes may be appointed to all employments, but cannot be magistrates, nor members of the cortes, and must not leave the kingdom without the permission of the said cortes.

“ There shall be eight secretaries of state, including two for South and North America; they shall be responsible for the affairs of their respective departments, and the remuneration which they shall receive shall be determined by the cortes.

“ A council of state shall be formed, consisting of forty members, four of this number are to be grandees of Spain, of acknowledged merit and virtue; four ecclesiastics, of which two shall be bishops; twelve Americans; the remaining twenty members to be chosen from among the most respectable citizens of the other classes of the community. The council shall meet every year on the 1st of March, and shall sit during three months. This period can only be extended on the request of the king, or for some reason of great urgency. In such cases the session may be prolonged, but not beyond one month.

“ The election of the cortes shall take place conformable to the mode prescribed by the constitution, and one deputy shall be chosen for each seventy thousand souls.

“ The

“The sittings of the cortes shall be opened by the king, or in his name, by the president of the deputation of the cortes, which ought to remain permanent, in order to watch over the fulfilment of the constitution.”

If the enactment and promulgation of this or any similar constitution had a tendency, in the present circumstances of Spain, to rouse the people to greater exertions, or to place the armies on a better footing, the time of the cortes would have been spent in framing and discussing it; but it may fairly and rationally be conjectured that the direct and immediate removal of the grievances actually complained of by the people would inspire more zeal, than the remote prospect of a constitution built on the most free, abstract principles; and it certainly would be much more wise to take effectual measures to secure their countrymen from the presence and the power of the French armies, and thus to regain their national independence, before they determined on the constitution, which was to guarantee their civil and political liberties.

CHAPTER X.

ALTHOUGH the affairs of Spanish America may be supposed by some not to have any immediate connection with the war in the Peninsula, yet as the different transactions in the Spanish colonies have arisen out of the troubles in Europe, it is absolutely necessary, that a full account of the war may be given, that we dedicate a portion of our labours to the history of the troubles in Spanish America.

In our narrative of the proceedings of the cortes of Spain, and in the remarks which we judged it proper to make on those proceedings, we abstained from noticing their conduct towards the Spanish colonies in America. This we did because we considered it proper to devote a separate chapter of our work to the transactions and events which occurred in those colonies

colonies ; and in the course of this narration, the proceedings of the cortes respecting them would naturally and regularly fall under our cognizance.

We cannot but be aware how extremely difficult it is to gain information on this subject, and that consequently our account of those disturbances which have agitated, and which still continue to agitate nearly the whole of the Spanish transatlantic possessions, must on some points be inaccurate, and in others defective : but the subject is one of so great importance, that we have determined to undertake it notwithstanding the scantiness of the materials. It is indeed of importance, not merely because it involves the history of a large and one of the fairest portions of the globe ; a portion which bids fair one day to become the seat of liberty, civilization, and knowledge ; but, because, by attending to the conduct which the cortes in Spain pursued towards the Spanish colonies in America, we shall gain a further insight into their character, and additional proofs of their imbecility and unfitness for the situation they fill.

It might, indeed, have been supposed that the government of a nation which had taken up arms for the defence of its liberty and independence, which had suffered severely from tyranny and oppression ; and which had called upon the inhabitants of Spain, if they valued their national honour and well-being, to stand forth in defence of their country, would have behaved with liberality and justice at least, to those who were under their sway in every part of the world. Even had they not been induced by a desire of acting consistently, and from principle, to bestow upon others what they claimed for themselves, yet policy and prudence appeared to point out a line of conduct, conciliatory at least, towards the Spanish colonies in America. In the struggle in which Spain was engaged, great exertions were to be made, great expenses incurred, and great difficulties were to be overcome ; in all these respects the good-will and co-operations of her American colonies might be of great service to her,

her. On them in a great measure the principal part of her commerce depended; from them she received her supplies of money, now so absolutely necessary for the maintenance of her forces, and, consequently, for her success against the armies of France.

The provisional governments of Spain, however, which successively ruled that country since the breaking out of the war, appear to have acted towards the Spanish colonies in a manner inconsistent, not only with justice, but with policy. Bonaparte on the other hand, at the very time that he formed his designs against the mother country, did not neglect adopting such means as he thought most likely to secure his power in the Spanish colonies; or at least, as would separate them from Spain in case he did not succeed against her. For a short time the knowledge of these machinations of France induced the supreme junta to hold out to the colonies the prospect of concessions, and the participation of the rights and privileges of the mother country; but these promises were never fulfilled: on the contrary, all the grievances under which the colonies laboured, and the existence of which had alienated their minds from Spain, were still continued, and were even increased, extended, and augmented. One of the grievances most loudly and generally complained of was, that all the places of honour and emolument in Spanish America were bestowed on Europeans who crossed the Atlantic, apparently for the sole purpose of gratifying their ambition, or enriching themselves at the expense of the colonies: this grievance was amazingly increased during the provisional governments of the mother country.

But, notwithstanding the causes for discontent, alienation, and dissatisfaction, which existed in Spanish America, and which were rather augmented than diminished by the provisional government, the colonies warmly participated at first in the cause of the mother country. Great as their reason was for complaint against Spain, they disliked France still more; and

the apprehension or prospect that Bonaparte should subdue the country from which they sprang gave them great uneasiness and alarm. At this period, therefore, had the provisional governments acted towards them with a common measure of caution, policy, or justice; had they cherished, instead of cooling and repressing the zeal for the cause of the mother country, which the Spanish colonies evinced; it is highly probable that the disturbances under which they have suffered, and still suffer, would not have taken place.

The very dread of French influence and power acted in a very considerable degree in producing the convulsions in Spanish America: for being convinced that Don Emanuel Godoy, the prince of peace, was a creature of Bonaparte, they looked with suspicion on all whom he sent out to America to fill places of trust and power; and afterwards when the prince of Peace was removed, the weak and unsuccessful proceedings of the supreme junta infused a suspicion into the minds of the colonists, that those also who were sent out by them were by far more attached to the interests of France than to the welfare of their native country.

In the present state of the public mind, irritated and restless, not knowing in whom to repose confidence, or by what marks to distinguish their friends from their enemies, news arrived that the French had gained possession of Seville, and that the central government was dissolved. This intelligence acted on both parties; on those who were attached to the mother country, but who dreaded French influence and power, and on those who were eager to separate from Spain, in such a manner as to rouse them both into a state of activity and exertion; and though their motives and views were diametrically opposite, they co-operated to produce the same effect, the dissolution of the government. The first party augured from the success which the French had experienced in Spain, that their partizans (among whom they reckoned the
members

members of the government) would put forth all their manœuvres and strength to further the plans and objects of Bonaparte; while the other party, convinced that the mother country was now destined to become a province of France, or at least, that she was in such a state of alarm and weakness, that she could no longer support her authority in her colonies, determined to seize the moment thus propitious to their views of national independence. This was the state of the province of the Caraccas in the spring of 1810. The government of this province, finding itself either deserted or attacked by all parties, gave way; and a provisional junta was formed. Still, however, the party who were eager for independence disguised their sentiments: they pretended that they acted from the same motives, and with the same views as those who suspected the government of being attached to France, and who on that account, solely brought about its dissolution. In a very short time afterwards, their real sentiments were avowed; and they seized the earliest opportunity to carry their designs into execution.

The conduct, however, of the regency in Spain was much more calculated to favour, than to overturn the designs of those who aimed at the independence of the colonies. The central junta had solemnly and expressly declared, that the colonies of Spain had a just claim to equal rights and privileges with the mother country; but this was merely a declaration: for, when the government came to act, they forgot their declaration, and treated the transatlantic possessions in all respects as dependent colonies, destitute of those rights and privileges which they had held out to them. In short, in every respect their conduct towards them, was regulated by the principles on which the old government of Spain had acted in its worst times. Viceroys, captain-generals, and judges were sent out with the same authority and instructions as heretofore. But, there was yet another circumstance in the conduct of the regency, more ex-

traordinary and unaccountable, and which served to keep alive in the breasts of those colonists who were attached to the mother country, all those suspicions which the behaviour of the provisional juntas had created: not a few of those who were sent out with power and instructions had taken the oaths of fidelity and allegiance to Joseph Bonaparte. This was extremely favourable to the views of those who aimed at separation and independence; since every thing which tended to alienate the public mind from the regency, and consequently from the mother country, paved the way for the execution of their designs.

Still, as if the regency had not done enough to create dissatisfaction and suspicion in the colonies, they had recourse to another most objectionable measure. By the old laws of Spain the colonies could not under any circumstances trade with any foreign country: all their commodities were obliged to be sent directly and exclusively to Spain. Soon after the regency was established, the island of Cuba remonstrated against this law, and procured a decree, by which the colonies were permitted to trade with foreign nations in articles of their own production; against this the merchants of Cadiz remonstrated; the regency weakly and foolishly yielded to their remonstrances, and in a very few weeks after this decree was passed, it was repealed, under the most absurd pretence that it was a *forgery*. Could any thing tend more to mark the weakness and imbecility of the regency than this?

While the people of the Caraccas were still angry and disappointed by these proofs of imbecility, tyranny, and impolicy of the regency, intelligence arrived that all who had countenanced or adhered to the late revolutionary proceedings were proclaimed traitors; and that the ports were to be in a state of blockade till the province should acknowledge, not merely Ferdinand VII. but that the regency at Cadiz were his only true and legitimate representatives. In order to support this bold and odious measure, the regency,

gency, to complete the proofs of their folly and imbecility, dispatched a lawyer of the name of Catavania, who, afraid to take up his abode in the Caraccas, advanced no further than Porto Rico; and from thence issued his proclamations, which were extremely impotent and of no avail in any other respect, but in provoking and alienating the minds of the colonists.

That party in the Caraccas, which had long entertained the design of separating the province from the mother-country, now conceived that the time was completely arrived when they could easily and safely carry their design into execution; for this purpose, they summoned a general congress of delegates from all the principal towns and districts which were favourable to their views. This congress met at Caraccas on the 2d of March, 1811. As it was still necessary, for some time at least, to preserve the appearance of loyalty and attachment to their sovereign, they took the oath of fidelity to Ferdinand VII. and declared their wish and resolution to continue connected and in amity with the mother country. At this conjuncture Miranda made his appearance; he had been long ambitious to bring about and secure the independence of the Spanish colonies; hitherto his attempts had not been successful, he was therefore eager to avail himself of these circumstances and events so favourable to his plans; and having procured himself to be elected for one of the most inconsiderable towns in the province, his influence and spirit soon began to manifest themselves. Before he appeared to animate and direct the insurrection, it had been marked with great mildness and moderation; and the movers and first leaders of it were content in cautiously and gradually advancing towards the attainment of the objects they were desirous to attain and secure: but far different was the character of the insurrection, and the behaviour of the leading members of the congress, after Miranda gained access to it.

One of the first fruits of this change of character appeared in the deputies, who so lately had renewed their

their oath of fidelity to Ferdinand, abjuring his authority; declaring themselves, and their country at the same time, absolved from all dependence upon, or allegiance to, the crown of Spain; while they constituted the provinces, of which they were deputies, into free and independent states, under the title and designation of the limited provinces of Venezuela*.

* The province of Venezuela in South America, is bounded on the East by Caraccas, on the South by New Granada, on the West by the Rio de la Hacha, and on the North by the North Sea. But the provinces now in revolt extended over a large space of territory. The province of Venezuela abounds with wild beasts and game, producing plenty of corn twice a year, with fruit, sugar, and tobacco; and the best cocoa plantations in America are found in the provinces of Venezuela and the Caraccas. There are likewise very good meadows for cattle. The province of Venezuela spreads round a gulph of the same name, that reaches nearly thirty leagues within land; and the middle of this country is taken up by a lake twenty leagues long, and thirty broad, with a circumference of eighty, and deep enough for vessels of thirty tons: it communicates with the gulph by a strait, on which is built the city of Maracaybo, that communicates its name both to the lake and the strait, which is defended by several forts, which were attacked in the seventeenth century by sir Henry Morgan, the whole coast laid under contribution, and the city of Maracaybo ransomed. The length of this province is about three hundred miles, and its breadth is nearly equal. It had its name from the small lagoons, which make it appear like Venice at the entrance of the lake. This province was the scene of great cruelties in 1528, when upwards of a million of Indians were massacred by some Germans, who were at length extirpated by the natives. This massacre was renewed in 1550, when it was again depopulated, and a great number of black slaves were brought from Africa, and was one of the principal epochs of the introduction of negroes into the West Indies. Soon after a revolt of the negroes was the reason of another massacre, and Venezuela became again a desert. At present it is inhabited by upwards of one hundred thousand inhabitants, who feed vast quantities of European sheep. They cultivate tobacco and sugar, which are esteemed all over America. They manufacture also several kinds of cotton stuffs: and in this province are gold sands, with many populous towns. Its capital is of the same name, or Coro, (which some distinguish as two;) and it stands near the sea coast, about fifty miles South East of Cape St. Roman.

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The following is a copy of the Declaration of Rights of the Provinces of the Caraccas :

“ The supreme congress of Venezuela, in its legislative session for the province of Caraccas, taking into consideration, that to the neglect and disregard of the rights of man, which have hitherto prevailed, must be ascribed all those evils which this people have endured for three centuries past ; and actuated by the desire of re-establishing those sacred principles on a solid basis, has resolved, in obedience to the general will, to declare, and doth now solemnly declare, in the presence of the universe, these rights inalienable ; to the end that every citizen may at all times compare the acts of the government with the purposes of the social institutions ; that the magistrate may never lose sight of the rules by which his conduct must be regulated ; and that the legislator may in no case mistake the objects of the trust committed to him.

SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE.

“ 1. The sovereignty resides in the people, and the exercise of it in the citizens, by the medium of the right of suffrage, and through the agency of their representative legally constituted.

“ 2. Sovereignty is by its essence and nature imprescriptible, inalienable, and indivisible.

“ 3. A portion only of the citizens even with the right of suffrage, cannot exercise the sovereignty ; every individual ought to participate by his vote in the formation of the body which is to represent the sovereign authority ; because all have a right to express their will with full and entire liberty. This principle alone can render the constitution of their government legitimate and just.

“ 4. Any individual, corporate body, or city, which attempts to usurp the sovereignty, incurs the crime of treason against the people.

“ 5. The public functionaries shall hold their offices for a definite period of time, and the investiture with a public function shall not attach any other importance or influence than what they acquire in the opinion of their fellow citizens, by the virtues they may exercise whilst occupied in the service of the republic.

“ 6. Crimes committed by the representatives and agents of the republic shall be not passed over with impunity ; because no individual has a right to become more inviolable than another.

“ 7. The law shall be equal for all, to punish crimes, and

to reward virtues, without distinction of birth or hereditary pretensions.

RIGHTS OF MAN IN SOCIETY.

“ 1. The purpose of society is the common happiness of the people, and government is instituted to secure it.

“ 2. The felicity of people consists in the enjoyment of liberty, security, property, and equality of rights in the presence of the law.

“ 3. The law is formed by the free and solemn expression of the general will, declared by agents whom the people elect to represent their will.

“ 4. The right to declare their thoughts and opinions, through the medium of the press is unrestrained and free, under responsibility to the law for any violation of the public tranquillity, the religious opinions, property and honour of the citizen.

“ 5. The object of the law is to regulate the manner in which the citizens ought to act upon occasions, when reason requires that they should conduct themselves not merely by their individual judgement and will, but by a common rule.

“ 6. When a citizen submits his actions to a law which his judgement does not approve, he does not surrender his right nor his reason, but obeys the law because he should not be influenced by his own private judgement against the general will to which he ought to conform. Thus the law does not exact the sacrifice of reason, nor the liberty of those who do not approve it, because it never makes an attempt upon liberty, unless where the latter violates social order, or swerves from those principles which determine that all shall be governed by one common rule or law.

“ 7. Every citizen cannot hold an equal power in the formation of the law, because all do not equally contribute to the preservation of the state, to the security and tranquillity of society.

“ 8. The citizens shall be ranged in two classes; the one with the right of suffrage, the other without it.

“ 9. Those possessing the right of suffrage are such as are established in the territory of Venezuela, of whatever nation they may be, and they alone constitute sovereignty.

“ 10. Those not entitled to the right of suffrage are such as have no certain place of residence; those without property, which is the support of society. This class, nevertheless, enjoys the benefits of the law, and its protection, in as full a measure as the other, but without participating in the right of suffrage.

“ 11. No individual can be accused, arrested, or confined, unless in cases explicitly pointed out by law.

“ 12. Every

“ 12. Every act exercised against a citizen, without the formalities of the law is arbitrary and tyrannical.

“ 13. Any magistrate who decrees or causes an arbitrary act to be executed, shall be punished with the severity the law prescribes.

“ 14. The law shall protect public and individual liberty against oppression and tyranny.

“ 15. Every citizen is to be regarded as innocent, until he shall have been proved culpable. If it become necessary to secure his person, unnecessary rigour for the purpose shall be repressed by law.

“ 16. No person shall be sentenced or punished without a legal trial, in virtue of a law promulgated previously to the offence. Any law which punishes crimes committed previous to its existence, is tyrannical. A retro-active effect assumed by the law is a crime.

“ 17. The law shall not decree any punishment not absolutely necessary, and that shall be proportionate to the crime, and useful to society.

“ 18. Security consists in the protection afforded by society to each of its members, for the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property.

“ 19. Every individual possesses the right to acquire property, and to dispose of it at will, unless his will be contrary to a previous compact, or to law.

“ 20. No kind of labour, art, industry, or commerce, shall be prohibited to any citizen, save only such establishments as may be required for the subsistence of the state.

“ 21. No one can be deprived of the least portion of his property without his consent, except when the public necessity requires it, and then under the condition of a just compensation. No contribution can be required and established, unless for the general utility. Every citizen entitled to suffrage, has the right, through the medium of his representatives, to advise and consult on the establishment of contributions, to watch over their application, and to require an account of the same from those he has elected as his representatives.

“ 22. The liberty of claiming one's rights, in the presence of the depositories of the public authority, in no case can be withheld, nor confined to any particular citizen.

“ 23. There is individual oppression, when one member of society is oppressed; there is also the oppression of a number, when the social body is oppressed. In these cases the laws are violated, and the citizens have a right to demand the observance of the laws.

“ 24. The house of every citizen is an inviolable asylum. No one has a right to enter it violently ; except in cases of conflagration, deluge, or application proceeding from the same house ; or for objects of criminal proceedings in the cases and with the essentials determined by law, and under the responsibility of the constituted authorities who have issued the decree. Domiciliary visits, and civil executions, shall take place only in open day, in virtue of the law, and with respect to the person and object expressly pointed out in the act authorising such visitation and execution.

“ 25. Every foreigner, of whatever nation he may be, shall be received and admitted into the state of Venezuela.

“ 26. The persons and properties of foreigners shall enjoy the same security as the native citizens, provided always that they acknowledge the sovereignty and independence, and respect the catholic religion, the only one in this country.

“ 27. The foreigners who reside in the state of the Caraccas, becoming naturalized and holding property ; shall enjoy all the rights of citizenship.”

DUTIES OF MAN IN SOCIETY.

“ 1. The rights of others, in relation to each individual, have their limit in the moral principle which determines their duties, the fulfilment whereof is the necessary effect of the respect due to the rights of each of the individuals. Their basis are these maxims:—“ Render to others the good which you would they should render unto you.” “ Do not unto another that which you do not wish to be done unto you.”

“ 2. The duties of every individual with respect to society, are : to live in absolute submission to the laws—to obey and respect the legal acts of the constituted authorities—to maintain liberty and equality—to contribute to the public expences—to serve the country in all its exigencies—and, if it becomes necessary, to render to it the sacrifice of property and life : in the exercise of these virtues consists genuine patriotism.

“ 3. Whoever openly does violence to the laws—whoever endeavours to elude them—declares himself an enemy to society.

“ 4. No one can be a good citizen, unless he be a good parent, a good son, a good brother, a good friend, and a good husband.

“ 5. No man can be a man of worth, unless he be a candid, faithful, and religious observer of the laws : the exercise of private and domestic virtues is the basis of public virtue.

DUTIES OF THE SOCIAL BODY.

“ 1. The duty of society with respect to its individual members is the social guarantee. This consists in the obligation on the whole to secure to every individual the enjoyment and preservation of his rights, which is the foundation of the national sovereignty.

“ 2. The social guarantee cannot exist, unless the law clearly determines the bounds of the powers vested in the functionaries; nor when the responsibility of the public functionaries has not been expressly determined and defined.

“ 3. Public succour is a sacred duty of society; it ought to provide for the subsistence of the unfortunate citizens, either by ensuring employment to those who are capable of acquiring means of subsistence, or else by affording the means of support to such as cannot acquire it by labour.”

A civil war with all its horrors and cruelties now commenced: each party proscribed the other, and inflicted the most summary punishment on those who fell into their power. Many persons were arrested and thrown into prison on suspicion; some were banished; others put to death; and in short all those scenes which characterized and disgraced the commencement of the French revolution, were acted in the Carraccas, with equal violence and ferocity, though in a more confined theatre. The European and creole families in general, were naturally disposed to resist these proceedings; they of course felt the power and vengeance of Miranda and his partizans. Valencia *, which is principally inhabited by old creole families, at the commencement of the insurrection, had sent deputies to the congress; but afterwards disapproving of their proceedings, and especially of the declaration of independence, it deserted the party of Miranda. To punish it for this defection, he marched against it with a large body of troops; and inflicted on its inhabitants a most severe punishment.

* Valencia in South America, is situated near the western extremity of the Toncarigua lake, about 45 miles South of Porto Cavallo.

It must naturally be supposed, that these disturbances and violent proceedings alarmed the government of the neighbouring provinces. On their first breaking out, the viceroy of Santa Fé de Bogota*, ordered in the most strict and peremptory manner, that all communication should be closed and cut off between his government and the insurgents: but his efforts to guard the provinces subject to his jurisdiction from the spreading and overwhelming evil were unavailing. In them the same causes existed, which had existed in the Caraccas, and produced there a separation from the mother country and a civil war: one party was fearful and suspicious of their magistrates and governors, as attached to the French interest; while another party were desirous of shaking off the authority of Spain. Under such circumstances, great caution, prudence, and moderation were necessary in order to preserve the public peace: unfortunately these qualities did not exist. On the contrary, the corregidor of Socono, actuated by a rash and violent spirit, ordered the troops under his command to fire upon the populace, who had assembled, unarmed, but mutinous. Thus was the spark set to the inflammable materials, which had been long accumulating, and the insurrection broke out and spread with the utmost rapidity. The inhabitants of the neighbouring district, having learned the outrage which the corregidor had committed against the people of Socono, came into the town in great numbers; and having compelled him to take refuge in a convent, starved him into a surrender. This town now threw off its dependence and allegiance; appointed a junta; and transmitted to the government of Santa Fé an account and vindication of its proceedings. Nearly at the same time the populace of the capital of this pro-

* Santa Fé de Bogota is looked upon as the capital of Terra Firma in South America. It stands on the east bank of the Magdalena, where the viceroy resides, in the seat of the courts in the province of New Granada. It is the see of an archbishop, and has an university. Santa Fé is 362 miles south of Carthagena.

vince had manifested strong symptoms of disaffection and tumult; the viceroy therefore, unable to put down by force of arms the insurgents of Socono, or Soconusco*, consented that they should establish a junta, of which he was appointed the president.

It was but a very short time after these proceedings in Santa Fé, that the insurgents appeared disposed to retain the show of allegiance to Ferdinand VII. but an event which took place at Quito, and which excited universal detestation throughout Spanish America, made them throw aside the mask, and avow their determination to be free and independent of the crown of Spain; this event, so extremely fatal to the cause and character of the mother country, was the massacre at Quito of a great number of the principal creoles of that city, by a body of troops under the direction and in the service of the viceroy of Lima. As soon as intelligence of this massacre reached Santa Fé, the viceroy was deprived of his situation and authority, both as president of the junta and governor of the province. In order to follow the revolutionary course regularly and completely, the ancient name of New Granada was changed into Cundinamarca. The insurgents of this province, however, still stopped short of the proceedings of the Caraccas; for though they abjured the provisional governments of Spain, they acknowledged Ferdinand VII. as their legitimate sovereign: this remnant of loyalty so much displeased the insurgents of the Caraccas, that they remonstrated with

* Socono, or Soconusco, is a province of Guatemala, or Old Mexico. It extends for seventy leagues along the coast of the South Sea, being bounded on the North by Chiapa, on the East by Vera Pas and Guatemala Proper, and on the West by the Pacific Ocean and part of Tlascala. This is a very hot and unhealthy country, storms being frequent, and the rainy season of long continuance, namely, from April to September; so that those who travel into the countries S. E. or N. W. of it, must take a circuitous rout, on account of floods from the mountains. The soil does not produce much corn, but it abounds with indigo and cocoa, which are transported by sea to all other parts of New Spain.

them on the subject, declaring that they would acknowledge no form of government but what they made for themselves.

The events which have occurred in the province of Buenos Ayres *, afford another proof and example of the

* As the town and province of Buenos Ayres have of late years become greatly the subject of conversation, it may not be improper to give a full description of them in this place by way of note.

Buenos Ayres then is a bishopric and government under the jurisdiction of the audience of Charcas, in the empire of Peru. It begins S. E. of that province, and extends to all the countries under the temporal government of the same name; westward it extends to Tucumana, and terminates on Paraguay; and is bounded on the South by the Land of Magelhaens. Its countries are watered by the Rio de la Plata, and were discovered by Juan Diaz de Solis, who lost his life by the treachery of the Indians. Its capital is called Nuestra Senora de Buenos Ayres, and was founded by Don Pedro de Mendoza in 1535. It is said that cattle abound here so much, that horses are no other cost to the owner than the trouble of taking them. Flesh provisions are so cheap and good here that they were frequently given gratis with the hide, which used to be esteemed the only valuable part of the beast. The trade in hides is the principal branch of commerce at Buenos Ayres; and a finer country for fish, and all kinds of game, cannot be conceived.

The city of Buenos Ayres is situated near Cape Blanco, on the South side of the Rio de la Plata, fifty miles from the mouth of that river. It is called Buenos Ayres from the salubrity of its air. The cathedral is a spacious and elegant structure; and the chapter is composed of the bishop, dean, arch-deacon, and two canons. Here are several convents, and a royal chapel in the castle, where the governor resides. The principal square is very large, and built near the little river. Like most towns situated on rivers, its breadth is not proportioned to its length. The front answering to the square is the castle where the governor constantly resides, and with the other forts has generally a thousand regular troops.

The houses, formerly of mud walls, thatched with straw and very low, are now much improved; some being of chalk, and others of brick, having one story besides the ground floor, and most of them tiled. The number of houses are estimated at upwards of four thousand, and the inhabitants at about seventeen thousand, one-fourth of whom are whites. The climate here is very little different from that of Old Spain; and both American and European fruits arrive to great perfection here, and they are

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the mischief and evil which have resulted from this revolutionary spirit. The town of Buenos Ayres had many peculiar causes of complaint against the government of Old Spain, besides causes which operated

in great abundance. There are indeed violent tempests of wind and rain, accompanied with dreadful thunders and lightnings ; insomuch that the inhabitants, though used to them, are filled with terror and consternation ; but in summer the dreadful heats are sometimes mitigated by the gentle breezes, which constantly begin about eight or nine o'clock in the morning. The city is surrounded by a spacious and pleasant country ; and from those delightful plains the inhabitants are furnished with such abundance of cattle, that there is no place in the universe where meat is cheaper or better.

The farthest bay to the East is called Maldonado, which is twenty-seven miles from Cape Santa Maria : the other bay is called Montebideo, or Monte Video, from a mountain which overlooks it about sixty miles from the cape. Within the government of Buenos Ayres are three other cities, viz. Santa Fé, Las Corientes, and Monte Video. Part of the towns of the missions of Paraguay belong to the diocese of Buenos Ayres ; those which formerly belonged to the government of Paraguay having been separated from it. The jesuits here are extremely rich.

The commerce of Buenos Ayres is very extensive ; and indeed it is so great, that no other part in the Spanish colonies can boast of an equal quantity of traffic ; for the most valuable commodities are brought from the most distant provinces in the Spanish dominions, in order to their being exchanged for European goods. The principal are, Vigona wool from Peru, copper from Coquimbo, gold from Chili, and silver from Potosi. From the towns of Corientes and Paraguay, the former 750, and the latter 1500 miles from Buenos Ayres, are brought hither the finest tobacco, sugars, cotton, thread, yellow wax, and cotton cloth, which is greatly used at Buenos Ayres by the slaves and other domestics : from Paraguay, also, the herb so called, and so highly valued, being a kind of tea drank all over South America by the better sort of people, which one branch of commerce is computed to amount to a million of pieces of eight annually, which are all paid for by goods in exchange. The goods for which these commodities are principally exchanged are mostly European, and consist in knives, guns, scissars, ribbands, taffaties, silk stockings, English hats, and English baize and coarse cloth. All these commodities are carried through this vast extent of country, in little waggons, though between Corientes and this place there are no less than six great rivers, in passing which the cattle are trained to swim, and the goods are taken over in floats. The commerce
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rated on her, as well as on the rest of Spanish America. The greatest number of its inhabitants are merchants; of course the absurd restrictions placed upon the commerce of her colonies by Spain were severely felt by them; and as the articles which they export are chiefly of a perishable nature, whatever suspends or interrupts commerce must fall heavily on them. Suffering from these circumstances, they had frequently complained of the monopoly of the mother country, as pressing on them with peculiar severity; nor were the other inhabitants of Buenos Ayres without their grievances and cause of complaint against

between Peru and Buenos Ayres, is chiefly for cattle and mules. Such as are concerned in the former, go first to the governor, and ask his leave to drive a herd of cattle into Peru, which, it is said, is never refused when backed by a present of some thousand pieces of eight. The next thing is to take thirty or forty thousand wild cows out of the royal pastures, which is performed by persons who follow that business for a livelihood, and who deliver these creatures at about three pieces of eight per head, about fifteen shillings. At that rate thirty thousand cattle may come to nearly one hundred thousand pieces of eight, and at market they may possibly produce about three hundred thousand pieces.

The commerce in mules is carried on by factors, which are sent by the merchants of Peru, who obtain the governor's licence by a considerable present; and then address themselves to the natives and inhabitants, specifying the number and the times when they shall be delivered. At the appointed times they receive their marks, and stamp them with a hot iron between the shoulders, being from that time to be maintained at their expence. These cost about three or four pieces of eight each, and are driven by pretty quick journies to Salta, about two-thirds of the way to Potosi. There they winter, and are fatted with great care. When they are in full flesh they are driven to Potosi, where they are sold for from seven to nine pieces of eight per head; but such as are driven to Peru or farther, bring forty or fifty pieces of eight, and sometimes rise to even a hundred.

Buenos Ayres, by its distance from the sea, labours under many inconveniences, which are augmented by the dangerous navigation of the Rio de la Plata, and the rocks and shoals which prevent ships of burthen from coming up to it: to remedy which a settlement has been formed on an excellent harbour in the bay of Maldonado, near the mouth of the great river. This, which may be considered as the port of Buenos Ayres, will, in all probability become its rival, and the staple of the trade of Paraguay.

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the mother country. Creoles of the oldest families, and of the highest rank and character, saw themselves deprived of the offices of the state, in order that they might be filled by men of very doubtful character, of mean rank, and destitute of talents, from Old Spain. In short, at Buenos Ayres, as in every other part of Spanish America, the conduct of the government of Spain was the same; and it is difficult to pronounce or ascertain whether it was more unjust or impolitic; whether it was more calculated to injure the colonies or the mother country; whether it was the result of extreme folly or of extreme wickedness, or of both combined.

It is not indeed to be wondered at, that in the town of Buenos Ayres the revolution was brought about and completed without any difficulty or resistance. The viceroy either perceiving objection and resistance useless, or disposed to coincide with the principles and views of the insurgents, gave up his authority with the greatest facility; but it was otherwise in the other parts of the province: they did not feel so acutely and extensively as Buenos Ayres the oppression of the mother country; nor were the inhabitants in general so much inclined to the principles on which the revolutionists of Buenos Ayres acted. This difference of opinion and conduct was principally visible at Monte Video*; the town recognised the regency of Cadiz; a civil war commenced between it and Buenos Ayres; and while the latter besieged Monte Video by land, Monte Video, aided by the Spanish marine, the presence and influence of which had at first induced it to acknowledge the regency of Cadiz, threatened Buenos Ayres from the river. In the midst of this civil war, the British admiral and the British naval officers on that station, had a difficult and delicate task to execute: they were applied to by both parties,

* Monte Video is a city in the province of Buenos Ayres in South America, on the bay from which it derives its name, with a particular corregidor, as the governor's lieutenant.

but very judiciously declined taking part with either ; contenting themselves with protecting the British ships and merchants.

Besides Monte Video, Cordova *, another town in the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, about five hundred miles from it, in the interior, became the scene of a counter-revolution, under Liniers and other adherents of Spain. On many accounts this counter-revolutionary party was dreaded by the insurgents of Buenos Ayres ; the leader of it, Liniers, was a person of great influence and considerable talents, he was also deservedly popular at Buenos Ayres. Many attempts were made to gain him over, but these failing, a large body of troops was dispatched from Buenos Ayres against Cordova ; on their approach, the leaders of the counter-revolution, apprehensive either that the people were not able to cope with regular forces, or suspicious of their steadiness and attachment, precipitately fled, and attempted to reach the frontiers of Peru. In this attempt, however, they did not succeed ; they were pursued and taken ; and without even the form of trial put to immediate death. Liniers surrendered himself ; but this did not save his life ; for two days after his surrender, he was shot through the head.

In the meantime, the viceroy of Lima, having received information of the revolutionary proceedings at Buenos Ayres, determined to crush them if possible : for this purpose he raised a considerable army, and marched towards the Andes. The army sent from Buenos Ayres to attack Cordova heard of the approach of the viceroy while they were at that city ; and having completely succeeded in the object for which they were sent, their leader resolved to ad-

* Cordova is situated in a marshy, though rich and fertile ground, and the inhabitants carry on a considerable trade in grain, fruits, honey and wax, cotton, and sugars, with Peru, it lying in the road to Buenos Ayres. The inhabitants, who are numerous, are much employed in the manufacturing of cotton cloth, which they send chiefly to Potosi.

vance and meet the viceroy of Lima. The hostile armies met at Suipacha, in the beginning of November, 1810; an action took place, and the insurgents were victorious; the consequence and the reward of their victory was, the possession of Potosi, and of the greater part of the upper provinces. The army of Peru, however, though defeated was not destroyed, nor even greatly weakened or discouraged: they rallied; and on the 10th of June, 1811, completely defeated and dispersed the army of Buenos Ayres at Desaguedro.

Yet the state of the Spanish provinces in America was such, that no permanently beneficial effects to the counter-revolutionists could arise from their victories; for while they were pursuing or defeating one hostile army, another rose up: the victorious army of Peru were prevented from pursuing their advantage and regaining possession of the country which they had lost in November, 1810, by the intelligence that an insurrection had broken out at Arequipa* on the South

* Arequipa is a considerable city of Peru, in the valley of Quilca, twenty leagues from the sea, and is a very considerable place, both on account of the goodness of the soil, which produces corn and wine, and likewise for the convenience of carriage by the river Chila, which runs through the city, falls into the Pacific Ocean, and forms a commodious harbour at its mouth, which is called Arauta, from whence all sorts of merchandize are carried up to Arequipa: nor is this place less wealthy on account of the silver mines, which are not above fourteen leagues distant. The country in which it stands is greatly subject to earthquakes, and in its neighbourhood is a dreadful volcano. The houses are handsomely built of stone, and vaulted; and though not all of an equal height, they are generally lofty, commodious, finely decorated without, and elegantly furnished within. The temperature of the air is so remarkably mild, that there is never an excess of heat or cold, and the surrounding fields are perpetually covered with verdure and enamelled with flowers. What greatly contributes to the health of the inhabitants is their care in keeping the streets clean by means of canals, by which all the filth is washed away. Arequipa is very populous, and many noble families reside there. It is the see of a bishop, under the metropolitan of Lima, from whence it is situated about 100 leagues.

Sea, against which it was judged expedient that they should immediately proceed.

But the war between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video continued, and was carried on with great exertion and implacability. We have already mentioned that the English wisely preserved a strict neutrality; at the same time they conducted themselves in such a manner, as for some time to prevent the hostilities from becoming violent and cruel. For a considerable length of time Buenos Ayres seemed to gain upon Monte Video, although the latter by her superiority at sea, and consequent command of the navigation of the river, frequently distressed Buenos Ayres very much. In the beginning of 1811, affairs took a different turn, and assumed a different aspect. The regency sent out Elio, an officer of marine, a man of great activity and resolution, but of a very violent temper and character: he at first attempted to persuade the junta of Buenos Ayres to receive and recognize him as viceroy of the province; but failing in this attempt, he attacked their ships, destroyed their commerce, menaced the city itself with bombardment, and threatened to call in a Portuguese army from the Brazils to assist him in his designs, and in the support of his authority. He did not, however, content himself with these open and spirited measures; he also had recourse to intrigue, and contrived to introduce or secure partizans in Buenos Ayres itself. The junta found themselves in a most critical and perilous situation; they were threatened by an hostile army from without, and surrounded within by men whom they could not trust, and who were ready to betray the city into the power of Elio. In this emergency they recalled an army which they had dispatched to the Portuguese frontier of Paraguay, and sent it against Monte Video; and banished all Europeans who could not find security for their good behaviour and peaceable deportment.

After various success, the army of Buenos Ayres, at one time, blocking up and bombarding Monte Video,

Video, and the fleet of Elio, at another time, threatening Buenos Ayres, a suspension of hostilities was agreed upon; but it was extremely doubtful whether it could lead to a permanent peace or accommodation. On the one hand the character of Elio was adverse to such a termination; though a man of more talents and activity than those the government of Old Spain generally send out to their American colonies, yet his ambition, or rather, perhaps, his violence, seemed to stand in the way of all accommodation, not preceded or built upon a total acquiescence on the part of the junta of Buenos Ayres, with all his demands.

The province of Chili is the only part of the Spanish possessions in America. in which the government had passed without opposition, violence, or tumult from those in whose hands it had been lodged by the mother country, into the possession of the great creole families, who may fairly be considered as forming the aristocracy of the colony. Ignorant as we are of the particular circumstances in which Chili was placed, at the time when intelligence was received that Spain had been invaded by Bonaparte; that the sovereign and his son were both prisoners; and that the French arms were likely to succeed in conquering the Peninsula; and being also destitute of precise and full information respecting the parties which existed in that province, the views by which they were actuated, and the influence and operation which their views under the circumstances of the mother country, would have on their proceedings and conduct; it is extremely difficult to point out the cause which has exempted Chili from those convulsions which have agitated the other parts of Spanish America. It is probable, however, that as Chili is, comparatively speaking, not so rich as the other parts of the Spanish transatlantic possessions, fewer men of desperate fortunes would be sent into it by the Spanish government; and it would at the same time be less the object of the schemes and ambition of Bonaparte. Hence the suspicion and dread of French intrigue and power would not exist
and

and operate so widely or strongly in it. Besides, being not nearly so much within the reach of that party who had acquired romantic notions of liberty and independence, it would also be freed from the violent measures which in other parts of the Spanish colonies, they had attempted, and in some degree succeeded in carrying into execution. The natural result of the change of government in Chili having been brought about without resistance or violence, was, that the persons who obtained the supreme power, used it with great moderation.

One of the most important colonies which Spain possesses in America is that of Mexico; and this colony has suffered dreadfully from civil war. In the year 1808 the viceroy of Mexico, Harngaray, was arrested and deposed by one part of the inhabitants; while the other party espoused and endeavoured to support his authority. 'This conduct towards the viceroy seems to have proceeded, rather from some dislike towards him, arising from circumstances connected with his personal administration, than from his connexion with the central junta of Spain; for this junta, instead of expressing their disapprobation of the conduct of those who deposed him, and sending out orders that he should be reinstated in his authority, approved of and rewarded them for what they had done. By this strange behaviour of the junta, that party which had supported the viceroy, and which might naturally have been considered as the party attached to the mother country, declared their enmity to Spain in the most unequivocal language, and by the most decidedly hostile conduct. They soon found their partizans increased. Mexico had long and severely felt the impolitic and unjust measures of Spain; she had been inundated by men sent from thence, in order to retrieve or make their fortunes by the plunder and oppression of the colonists. The creoles were neglected; and, as if neglect were not enough to irritate and alienate them, their hopes and expectations were repeatedly raised by the Spanish government, and then

then dashed to the ground. Had the Spanish government been actually desirous of disgusting and separating the Mexicans entirely from the mother country, they could not have done it more effectually than by the whole tenour of the conduct they adopted.

The intelligence of the defeat of the Spanish armies by the French operated in the same manner in Mexico as it did in other parts of Spanish America. Those who wished to preserve their connexion with, and their dependence upon, the mother country, thought they should best effect their purpose, by alienating themselves from those who exercised the provisional government in Spain; because they regarded them, either as the emissaries of Bonaparte, or as totally disqualified, if honest and patriotic, by their want of talents from saving their country from his power; while those who had long indulged a secret wish to throw off the yoke of Spain, thought this a most favourable opportunity to declare and carry into effect their designs, when the Spanish government was so weakened and occupied at home, that they had neither leisure nor ability to attend to the affairs of the colonies. It was thus no difficult matter for the party who wished to separate entirely and permanently from Spain, to make use of the influence and even of the efforts of those, who only wished to declare their dissatisfaction with the conduct of the provisional government.

While things were in this critical state, an insurrection broke out, in September 1810, at Dolores, a town in the province of Guanaxueato, in the middle of the mining district of Mexico. This insurrection was begun, spread, and headed principally by the priests; afterwards several lawyers and military officers joined it; and the latter brought over some regiments of militia. This insurrection spread rapidly and widely: in a short time more than half the province was overrun by the insurgents or had joined them. Upwards of forty thousand men were in arms; and though they were repeatedly defeated, they constantly rallied and appeared with undiminished numbers.

In the month of November, they advanced with great confidence and in great force against the city of Mexico * itself; they had previously taken the populous

* Mexico is a large country of North America, which is likewise called New Spain. It is bounded on the North by New Mexico, on the East by the Gulph of Mexico and the North Sea, and on the S. and W. by South America and the South Sea, being above two thousand miles long, and from sixty to six hundred broad. It is divided into twenty-three provinces, the principal of which is that of Mexico, and contains many mines of gold, silver, iron, and alum: besides Indian corn, cabbage-trees, cocoa nuts, vanillas, plantains, pine-apples, cochineal, and several other fruits, gums, and drugs proper to the climate. Before the Spaniards went to Mexico the inhabitants had no animals of any sort exactly like those in Europe. It is governed by a Spanish viceroy, who is changed every five years, and as the Inquisition had great power here, the people either all are, or profess to be papists. In general it is a mountainous country, intermixed with many rich valleys; but the highest mountains are near the South Sea, many of which are volcanoes. The eastern shore is a flat level country, full of bogs and morasses, overflowed in the rainy season. The hills between the mountains and the flat country are best inhabited, because there the air is most temperate. The revenues arising from Mexico are vastly great, which arise from the fifth part of the gold and silver, and from the duties and customs, as well as the lands of the crown.

The town of Mexico is the capital. It was a very flourishing place before the Spaniards entered the country, and was seated on an island in a salt-water lake, to which there was no entrance, but by three causeways, above two miles in length each. It is said that it contained about eighty thousand houses, with several large temples, full of rich idols, and three palaces where the emperor of Mexico resided. It was taken by Fernando Cortez in 1521, after a siege of three months. As the Mexicans defended themselves from street to street, it was almost ruined, but afterwards rebuilt by the Spaniards. It is said, that it now contains about forty thousand houses, which are built of stone and brick, to which they have added a suburb of nearly three thousand houses, which are inhabited by the native Americans. Mexico is a very handsome place, with large, clean, wide streets, in which are a great number of magnificent structures, palaces, churches, and convents. It is the usual residence of the viceroy of New Spain, and has a royal audience, a tribunal of the inquisition, a mint, an archbishop's see, an university, and a printing house. It is a common saying, that there are four beautiful things to be seen at Mexico, namely, the women, the rich dresses, the coaches and horses,

lous town of Guanaxueato, and been received as friends by the inhabitants of Valladolid. Their expectations of gaining possession of Mexico arose more from the power and intrigues of their partizans within the city than the numerical force of their army. But in these expectations they were egregiously mistaken; for while affairs were in this critical state, Venegas arrived from Spain, as viceroy of Mexico. He was a man peculiarly fitted for the management of the government at this period; for he was possessed in an eminent degree of activity, firmness, and energy. He was at the same time cool, prudent, and cautious; uniting these qualities in an extraordinary degree; never permitting them to interfere with each other; always able to perceive when circumstances called for one set of qualities or the other. He soon detected the partizans of the insurgents within the city of Mexico: he watched all their movements: he thwarted all their measures; so that they had no opportunity to be of the least service to the army that was advancing against the city. At this period, too, the influence of superstition was called in; the archbishop threatened to excommunicate all who had joined the insurgents, if they did not immediately desert them: this kept back their partizans within the city, and even thinned the ranks of their army. Venegas, however, did not depend entirely upon these measures; he col-

horses, and the streets. The goldsmiths here are immensely rich, and it carries on a great trade to Europe by St. John de Uloa, and to Asia by Acapulco. The city of Mexico was overflowed by an inundation in October 1629, in which forty thousand persons were drowned. This obliged the Spaniards to make a great conduit through a mountain, in order to empty the lake; which being done, part of the town became seated on dry land, without walls, or any other defence. Mexico is supplied with sweet water by an aqueduct of three miles in length, supported by arches, under which people may walk. The Spaniards do not make a tenth part of the inhabitants, the other nine being Negroes, Mulattoes, native Americans, and a mixture of them all. Mexico is two hundred miles E. N. E. of St. John de Uloa, on the North Sea, and two hundred N. E. by N. of Acapulco on the South Sea.

lected as many troops as he could, and entrenched them without the city for its defence: the insurgents, disappointed in not being supported by their partizans, and afraid to cope with an army strongly entrenched, and headed by such a leader, marched away without attempting any thing. Venegas immediately took measures for pursuing them; and in his pursuit displayed great ability: he never attacked them, but when he was certain of success; while all his movements harassed and baffled them. He thus drove them before him, and greatly weakened as well as dispirited their troops. At length, in March 1811, the principal leaders of the insurrection, their army being greatly reduced by defeat and desertion, were surprised at Saltillo. Notwithstanding all these disasters, the spirit still existed, for within a very short period after the battle of Saltillo, a body of twelve thousand insurgents were collected near Queretaro, and they were defeated likewise.

It would appear that Venegas had used his victories with great cruelty: he had inflicted the most severe and barbarous punishments upon such of the insurgents as fell into his hands. Indeed the civil war in Mexico was attended with greater slaughter and cruelty than in other parts of Spanish America: in this province the jealousy and hatred existing between the Europeans and the creoles is very great; and when this jealousy and hatred was increased, and found room and opportunity to operate without restraint during the civil commotions, it may easily be supposed that their effects would be dreadful in the extreme. The country was laid waste: every thing was destroyed that could be destroyed: houses, plantations, and even the miners suffered; so that even if tranquillity were restored, of which though the prospect was more likely, it is still distant and uncertain, many years must elapse, much labour and capital must be expended, before the country will resume its former condition, or the inhabitants be restored to their former wealth and comforts. The destruction of the
mines

mines is principally to be deplored; it must necessarily require a great outlay of money before they can be put into a condition again to be wrought with ease, advantage, and profit: and they will be unproductive at the very time when the mother country stands most in need of their wealthy produce.

We have thus given a short sketch of the occurrences in Spanish America since the commencement of the war in the Peninsula: for the materials of this sketch we have been principally indebted to a most judicious and able article in the 37th Number of the *Edinburgh Review*; and as the views of the author respecting the independence of the Spanish colonies are evidently the result of much knowledge and thought, and are distinguished by their moderation and good sense, we shall conclude this chapter by transcribing that part of the article alluded to, which contains them.

“We shall in a few words state our reasons for thinking that it is not for the interest of the Spanish colonies to declare themselves independent, or to separate entirely from the mother country, unless compelled to it by the unreasonable obstinacy of the government of Cadiz, or by the complete conquest of Spain by the armies of France.

“In the first place, it is clear that independence of the mother country is not to be attained at present by the colonies, without a civil war and all its consequences; such as the devastation and destruction of the country, the interruption of all peaceful industry, divisions, and animosities among the inhabitants, military tyranny and usurpation, or, what is worse, subserviency to some foreign power, not less rapacious than Spain, and more jealous of her dependencies. The numbers of Europeans, in America, who would resist so great a revolution, unless forced upon them by necessity; the power which they possess; the union that subsists among them; the influence they derive from property, from intermarriages and other connexions with creole families; their activity and habits

of business; the respect in which they are held by the inferior casts, and by the creoles themselves; and even the ideas of their own superiority in which they have been accustomed to indulge,—render them, though the smaller party, a formidable body, which ought not in prudence to be exasperated. Oppression may be so galling, and grievances so intolerable as to overcome all these considerations: but an empty name is not worth the purchasing with present war and future discord.

“ In the second place, the sudden change from dependent colonies to sovereign states is a transition too great and too abrupt to be unattended with danger. The Spanish colonies have never been entrusted with any part of their internal administration; and are therefore quite unpractised in the government of their affairs. A nation may be compelled by circumstances to pass at once from the custody of a master to the free and absolute direction of its own concerns. But there will be less hazard when the change of the steps that lead to it are gradual. Freedom to be well enjoyed must not be seized immaturity. The way to profit of conjectures favourable to liberty, is not to do all that is possible at the moment, but to attempt no more than the necessities of the time require, and the state of public opinion warrants.

“ Lastly, the character and composition of society in America greatly increase the difficulty and augment the danger of a thorough revolution in its government. The property of the country is chiefly in the hands of creoles and Europeans; while the majority of the population consists of Indians, mulattoes and mestigos. These casts are not more distinguished from one another by differences of physical constitution and appearance, than alienated by sentiments of mutual prejudice and aversion. The court of Madrid, with that narrow policy which so long distinguished it, sought to preserve, rather than to extinguish these differences; and with regret we observe in the late proceedings of the cortes a disposition in some of its members to perpetuate

petuate them *. But supposing the contrary system adopted, and the most effectual means employed for eradicating every cause of antipathy and discontent from the colonies, it must be a work of time to consolidate such mixed and discordant materials as compose the present population of America. In the meanwhile, will the pride of the creole admit the Indian and mulatto to a real equality with himself? Will the hatred and jealousy of the inferior casts suffer the political power of the state to become the exclusive patrimony of the whites? On what foundation shall we raise the new political structures that are to adorn America? If property is made the sole basis of political power, how will the subordinate casts be reconciled to a system which will leave them naked and unprotected, at the mercy of their old task-masters and oppressors? If population is preferred, and mere numbers regulate the government, what security against the gross ignorance and blind fury of an uneducated multitude, invested with the whole political power of the state? So far from wishing to see America totally independent of the mother country, we are convinced that nothing is so essential to her welfare, as an authority respected by her inhabitants, because it does not emanate directly from themselves.

“The dangers of discord and division arising from the mixed population of America, are greatly aggravated by the discussions in which the revolutionists have imprudently indulged, in support and vindication of their independence. Will it be believed that among the charges against the mother country by Carraccas, her advocates have urged the excesses committed by the Weltzers in the sixteenth century? If such old accounts are still open, what a reckoning have the cortes to settle with the posterity of Atahualpa and Guatimozin? The revolutionists justify their resistance to the mother country by appealing to the

* See the speech of Quintana, and the proposition of Arguelles, on the representation of the colonies in the cortes.

natural right of freemen to choose their government. We shall not enter into a discussion with them about the limits or application of that principle, but merely ask them, whether, after insisting on such arguments, they mean to accommodate their practice to their theory. If they should have recourse to artifice or chicane for the purpose of excluding their sable or copper-coloured brethren from an equal participation of political power, do they suppose, that, fresh from these lessons of natural right, the degraded casts will submit quietly to the disfranchisement? And superior as these are in numerical population, if admitted to a political equality with the whites, will they not in effect be their masters! That the practice and theory of the revolutionists may be found at variance, when they come to settle their government is a supposition not altogether gratuitous but probable from many parts of their conduct. Principles urged with the greatest confidence against the mother country appear to them to have lost their virtue, when directed against themselves. The first junta of Buenos Ayres exclaimed against the regency of Cadiz as an illegitimate and usurped authority, but endeavoured by trick and delay to prolong its own dominion over the distant towns of Rio Plata. If the principles of natural right make it lawful for the people of Caraccas to separate from Spain, why have not the people of Valencia an equal right to separate from Caraccas? What right has Caraccas to form a constitution for herself that does not equally belong to Coro and Maracaybo? Such, however, is the inconsistency of human conduct, that the leaders of Caraccas who plead their natural rights against Spain, have punished the Valencians as rebels, and are collecting and equipping armies to reduce Coro and Maracaybo to subscribe to their confederation.

“The eager friends of American independence will accuse us of partiality to the mother country in these remarks. We fear the politicians of Cadiz will be still

still more offended with us for the observations that are to follow :

“ Anxiously then, as we desire that the connection between Spain and her American dominions should not be dissolved while Spain maintains her struggle for independence, we are so thoroughly convinced that America is entitled to a full and complete redress of her grievances, that if the mother country refuses to comply with her just petitions, we think the colonists ought to persevere in their insurrection, and obtain by force that redress for the past, and security for the future, which pride and avarice withhold from them. That independence will be the natural result of such a conflict, if successful on the part of the colonists, we too plainly see ; and it is for that reason we entreat those who have authority in Spain, while it is yet time, to stop the progress of the war by just concessions to their subjects.

“ These concessions, however, if they are meant to be a suitable offering to America, must neither be few nor inconsiderable. In the first place, her government must be placed in such hands, that whatever may be the fate of Spain, the independence of America will be secure. The majority of persons in the service of the state, in the army, in the law, in the church, in the collection of revenue and other subordinate departments of government, must be native Americans, or Europeans long settled in the country, who have an interest in its safety and welfare equal to that of its native inhabitants. In the second place, the commerce of America must be free. The Americans must have a right to trade directly with all countries in amity with the crown of Spain, paying such duties as their own provincial assemblies, and not the cortes of Cadiz, shall impose. Protecting duties may be necessary in some parts of America for their own manufactures ; but these will vary in their nature and amount, according to the circumstances of the different provinces, of which none can judge so well as their local legislatures. It moves our indignation to hear

hear the hypocritical lamentations of the merchants of Cadiz over the ruined manufactures of America. Compassion for whom, they would persuade us, is their chief reason for withholding freedom of trade from the colonies. We hardly dare ask ourselves, whether these are the same persons who used to procure orders from Madrid to root out the vines and burn the looms of America, lest they should interfere with the lucrative commerce of the mother country. In the third place, the malversations and corruptions of the courts of law, and the abuses and excesses of the executive branches of administration, must be corrected and punished in America, by tribunals independent of the crown. In the fourth place, America must impose her own taxes; grant and appropriate her own revenue; receive an account of its expenditure from the servants of the crown; and increase or diminish its amount at the discretion of her representatives.

“To carry this system of conciliation into effect, there must be provincial legislatures in America, invested with the sole power of imposing taxes; and, with the consent of the crown, of making laws. These assemblies will be chosen by the people, but summoned by the king. Annual taxes and an annual meeting bill will secure their regular convocation. A representation founded on property will not exclude the inferior casts from political power and consideration, and yet leave, in fact, to the whites, where it can best be lodged, a preponderance in the legislature: while the authority and influence of the crown will secure to the Indians and mulattoes, a protection and defence against oppression. The visionary and impracticable scheme of representing America in the cortes of Spain must be abandoned, and with it all pretensions to legislative authority in the mother country over her colonies. The crown will in that case be the sole bond of political union between Spain and America, and in return for so many sacrifices from the mother country, America must consent, that, till the exercise

exercise of the royal authority shall be restored in the person of the monarch, the executive power established in the Peninsula shall be recognized in the colonies. The connexion of Spain with America will be the same with that of Great Britain and Ireland before the Union; supposing a law to have been passed in Ireland, as was once proposed, that whoever was regent of Great Britain should *ipso facto* be regent of Ireland. Such a connexion is, perhaps, not the most desirable form of government for either party: but, in the present circumstances of both, it is preferable to a complete separation and a civil war. Let the experiment be tried in Mexico, Peru, and Guatimala, where the mother country still retains her authority, though it rests on slippery and precarious foundations. Let the same conditions be offered to the insurgent provinces; and if they refuse such reasonable terms of accommodation, let war be made upon them; but in the mean time, let Spain reserve her troops in Gallicia for a different enemy."

CHAPTER XI.

AS the Allies were greatly successful in the Peninsula against the French forces during the year 1811, the campaign commenced very early in the year 1812. Lord Wellington formed such a comprehensive plan of operations, that, had his means and opportunities been commensurate, it is very probable that he would have been able to drive the French armies beyond the Pyrenees * before the close of the year. At first complete success seemed highly probable: Marmont had dispatched a considerable force into the south of Spain to succour and support Suchet, who had begun his career as a general there with great eclat by the capture of Valencia. To counter-balance the loss of this important place, the French had suf-

* See above, p. 13.

ferred a severe defeat in an attempt which they made on Tariffa

The following correct journal of the siege of Tariffa by the French is so honourable to colonel Skerrett and his brigade*, that we have peculiar pleasure in inserting it :

December 2, 1811.—The following order was this day issued: “The commanding officer having received information that the enemy is about to attack this post, he desires that the detachment may be in momentary readiness to turn out, and assemble at the alarm post: on the bugle sounding, *turn out the whole.*

“In case of alarm, the troops will form in the front of the convent door, in columns of companies, left in front, three companies of the 47th regiment will remain to the garrison of the convent, the cavalry will form on the left of the infantry, the artillery on the road immediately on the outside of the town gate, the troops in the town, exclusive of the garrison in the street leading to the gate, will be under arms, and march out at seven o'clock to-morrow morning, with their rations of bread.

“The different marches and evolutions made by those brigades, while a part of the garrison accompanied them, regarding the works on the island, and lieutenant-general Campbell, foreseeing the necessity of strengthening the place, directed, that as the completion of the works on the island was of the first importance, the detachment under Major King, and that under colonel Skerrett, should on no account be employed so as to interfere with this object; that men were to be employed from each detachment, to carry on the works on the island, and in those parts of the town where the chief engineer may deem it necessary, the duty of reconnoissance to be performed by the cavalry alone, and in the most circumspect manner, taking every precaution to avoid ground from which they can be annoyed by infantry, the senior officers to apply to general Copens for a party of the guerillas, being well adapted for this service from their knowledge of the country.”

* Colonel Skerrett's brigade consisted as follows: The 2nd battalion of the 47th regiment, commanded by major Broad, five hundred and seventy men strong; the 2nd battalion of the 87th, under colonel Gough, about five hundred and sixty men; a brigade of six pounders, under captain Hughes of the royal artillery; a squadron of the 2nd German hussars, (about seventy men,) under captain Wense; and a company of the 95th rifle regiment, captain Jenkins.

Agreeably

Agreeably to the tenour of the above, colonel Skerrett made the following disposals:

December 5. Captain Smith, royal engineers, was to attend to the construction of the traverses on the island, the redoubt near the sea-gate, and the covert-way on the postern, at Xarrier's gate.

Major King was to take on himself the command of the island, with three hundred British, and two hundred Spaniards, detaching one hundred (fifty of each) to San a Catalina; one hundred of the 47th regiment, under captain Campbell was ordered to garrison the convent. Captain Mitchell, of the royal artillery, took the command of the artillery in town, and detached one officer to the island.

Captain Hughes, royal artillery, took the command of his guns. About this time general Copens demanded that the keys of the town should be given up to him, and colonel Skerrett nearly acceded to his request; but it having been represented to him by major King, that colonel Brown had always, during his command, kept possession of the keys; first, to guard against any treachery; secondly, as the brother of the governor was in the French service; and, thirdly, as it was more conformable to the honour of the British nation. The keys remained, therefore, in the hands of the British officers commanding at the sea-gate; and colonel Skerrett issued the following order:

December 9. Brigade order—"The keys of the town are to remain in possession of the British officers at the sea-gate, until the final orders from his excellency lieutenant-general Campbell are received with respect to them. This officer is merely to keep charge of the keys for form's sake; he is in every other respect under the order of the Spanish commandant of the guard, and of the Spanish general. The guns of the brigade were retired every night under the island, and the men were put under cover as much as possible, the weather being extremely wet."

December 16. Intelligence having been received, that the enemy had broke up before Gibraltar, and marched upon Los Barrios and Port-llana, that sixteen pieces of cannon, sixteen pounders, had entered Vejer; that the enemy had collected at Medina Sidonia large quantities of stores, and a besieging train, and that the French cavalry picquets, supported by chasseurs, had made their appearance at Retina and La Luz, the following orders were given out:

"It is necessary to acquaint the garrison at Tariffa, that the enemy is advancing to this place; and that the governor of Gibraltar, and the commander at Cadiz, have perfect confidence in the bravery and good conduct of the troops.

“Colonel Skerrett has to direct, that each officer will exert himself to the utmost, so that the fatigues and duties of the soldiers may be rendered as light as possible. Colonel Skerrett is therefore satisfied they will be supported with cheerfulness.”

December 18. The brigade marched with two hundred and fifty of the garrison, and took up a position on a rising ground in front of the opening, near the convent of La Luz. The hussars, 2d battalion King's German legion, commanded by lieutenant Coque, the light company of the 95th, with the light companies of the 47th and 87th regiments, in reserve, under command of colonel Skerrett, marched towards Facinas, for the purpose of reconnoitring. The cavalry had some skirmishing with the enemy, whom they met in the wood of Batine, near the broken bridge; but colonel Skerrett having obtained all the information he could, sent captain O'Donaho, 47th regiment, his aid-de-camp, to retire the troops, and towards the evening returned to town.

Thursday, 19. At nine o'clock the enemy, to the amount of four thousand, marched through the pass of Port-llana, and remained on the hills, near the convent of La Luz. About fifteen hundred cavalry came into the plain, and pushed twenty forward to a small bridge, on the west, a short distance from the town; but seeing a strong picquet of the 87th regiment, posted on a rising ground, they retired rapidly to La Luz. Our cavalry being sent out to oppose them, pursued them to the woods near La Luz, when much skirmishing took place.

Major King went out to make a reconnoissance this morning, but general Copens, who commanded the cavalry, seeing the enemy in great force, withdrew the cavalry. One of our hussars was severely wounded, and two of the Spanish hussars killed.

The enemy took possession, towards evening, of the surrounding hills, and lighted above one hundred and fifty fires, for the purpose, it is supposed, of misleading our gun-boats, who, under the command of captain Carrol, royal navy, kept up a brisk fire of round shot and grape, at the pass of Lapena, and at the hills near the beach. Meantime a working party of the enemy were engaged in constructing a battery, *en barbette*, against our gun-boats, which, under the command of lieutenants Rooke and Cobb, of the navy, much annoyed them, while endeavouring to clear away the blockade, at the pass of Lapena, and in forming a road for their ordnance.

Major King reinforced Santa Catalina with fifty men, a guard of forty were placed over the guns, and the artillerymen were ordered to remain during the night with their guns.

The picquets, both cavalry and infantry, were doubled, with orders to fall back as soon as necessary. Half the garrison, including the officers, were ordered to sleep dressed and accoutred. Captain Campbell, at the convent, was placed particularly on the alert. Seventy marines, under captain Thompson, royal marines, landed from his majesty's ship *Stately*, and were placed on the island, under the command of major King.

Friday, 20. This morning, at day light, the company of the 95th, under captain Jenkins, the light companies of the 47th and 87th regiments, with the brigade of guns, under captain Hughes, of the royal artillery, sallied, with the picquets in reserve, under command of Major Broad, 47th regiment; and, notwithstanding a severe fire from the enemy's field pieces, kept them in check, while our field artillery did great execution. Our troops retired gradually, pressed by superior numbers, the enemy moving forward in two columns; one column to the amount of three thousand, pursued the Algeziras road, extending their chasseurs as far as the sea, to the eastward of the town. Another column of about two thousand, extended to the westward. Our cavalry, riflemen, light companies, and artillery, were withdrawn gradually to the rising ground, to the north-east, when the two columns uniting to the north west, and still advancing, the whole of our troops retired within the walls, with the exception of a few Spanish tirailleurs, who did great execution from behind the aloe hedges, below the walls. These also retired towards evening, on which the enemy's cavalry advanced with great boldness, but were suddenly put to flight by a volley of musketry from the picquets of the 47th regiment, under the command of major Broad.

During all this manœuvring of the enemy, and as they continued to draw their line of circumvallation closer, they were much annoyed by the bursting of several shells, from two ten-inch mortars on the island, directed by lieutenant Robe, royal artillery. These shells were seen to do terrible execution, and the enemy must have suffered severely from them, one of them having burst in the centre of a column.

The enemy had two howitzers, and one four pounder, which they placed behind a hedge; and, by the bursting of a shell from one of them, one artillery driver, and eight artillery horses were killed.

Captain Hughes, on his part, blew up an ammunition box, which slackened their fire for some time; but recovering from this shock, another shell from the enemy killed fourteen Spaniards, who had formed in rear of our guns! The enemy exposed themselves very much towards evening, but seemed
checked,

checked, and, as we afterwards learnt, were much astonished at our obstinacy and perseverance.

A retreat being ordered, the town was closely invested, as the night fell in. The enemy must, however, have suffered considerably from our guns, to which they were, in the course of this day, much exposed. The British lost one killed, and thirty wounded, of which the 95th rifle company lost the one killed, and twelve of the wounded. The Spaniards lost forty. The tirailleurs of the Spaniards were very much exposed, through the whole of the day, to the fire of the enemy's field pieces, and behaved extremely well.

Saturday, December 21. The guards of the town were ordered to be taken regimentally, and the commanding officers of each corps were held responsible for that part of the wall, or works, where their guards were, which was to become their alarm posts.

The cavalry and staff horses were sent to the island for the purpose of being embarked the first opportunity. At daylight, the company of the 95th, and the flank companies of the 47th and 87th regiments sallied, and advanced three hundred paces in front of the north-east side of the town, and drove in the advanced picquets of the enemy. Shortly after, they were ordered by colonel Skerrett to retire, which they effected without loss. The guns on the island played the whole day on the enemy's lines, and did great execution; the men were busily employed in throwing up traverses, and also in making, on the east side of the island, beds for two ten-inch mortars, which had arrived from Gibraltar. Through the whole of this night, many shot and shells were thrown towards the enemy.

Sunday, 22. This morning, before day-break, by the direction of major King, the light company of the 11th regiment, sallied from its position at Santa Catalina, and dislodged a French picquet from a small house on the sea-beach to the westward. They killed eleven men of the 16th Légère, and took one serjeant prisoner. They had two men slightly wounded.

This affair calling up the whole regiment of the 16th Légère, which kept the enemy's right flank, captain Wren was obliged to retire. The advance of the French regiment, in its turn, called out our flank companies, with one light six-pounder, under the command of lieutenant Haines, royal artillery, and they advanced, and drove the French regiment from a strong position, which it had taken up in front of the convent, and threatened to take possession of the west hill, near the town. This movement brought out the whole of the enemy's line, who exposed themselves very much to the fire of

of our guns, which, directed by captain Mitchell, royal artillery, did great execution. The gun-boats, at that moment laying off the western coast, must also have much annoyed them. We had one man killed, and three wounded. In this contest colonel Gough, of the 87th regiment, led on his flank companies.

The serjeant, prisoner, on being examined by colonel Skerrett, gave the following intelligence: he said, the advance of the imperial army was commanded by general Leval, and consisted of the 16th, 27th, and 43d regiments of *Legère*, with a reserve of the 43d, 94th, and 96th regiments of the line: also the 16th, one squadron of the 21st, and one squadron of the 5th light dragoons. He said they had eleven thousand men, and eighteen pieces of cannon, long sixteen-pounders, two of which had passed Lapena on the night of the 20th; also two howitzers; the whole under the command of marshal Victor.

The prisoner appeared well informed, and was a native of Toulouse, he intreated not to be given up to the Spaniards. Being asked if he thought his countrymen would take the town, he replied coldly, " 'Tis a positive order from Napoleon, our emperor, that we should do so; and he generally provides means adequate to the end." As he was slightly wounded in the head, he was taken to the hospital, and every possible attention paid him.

Monday, 23. Captain Searle, of the *Druid*, and captain Carroll, royal navy, commanding the flotilla, surveyed the coast on the island, for the purpose of procuring a place for our embarkation, should we be obliged to evacuate both town and island. We had good information, that the depôt of mules, limbers, and heavy artillery of the enemy, were behind the pass of Lapena, not having been able to come through. A continued fire of shot and shell was therefore kept up from the island; and our guns, directed by lieutenants Robe and Hodges, royal artillery, were well served, and were seen to do great execution. Towards evening, a few Spanish riflemen moved from the convent, and drove in the enemy's advanced sentries, but retired at the close of day.

This night, at ten o'clock, colonel Skerrett having informed major King that the enemy intended storming the island and town, made the following disposition. Captain Wren, 11th infantry, was placed on the alert, at Santa Catalina, and reinforced with fifty men; a picquet of one captain and fifty men was placed on the causeway, to communicate with Santa Catalina; captain Carew, 82d regiment, was placed on the left flank of the island, it being considered the most vulnerable

vulnerable point; and captain Vavasour constructed a temporary work on the pier, and placed two loaded carronades at the entrance. The island, too, was reinforced by eighty-six men of the 47th regiment, who lined the parapet. The whole lay on their arms till broad day-light, when the enemy not appearing, they were dismissed.

Tuesday, 24th. At day break it was discovered that the enemy had made his approaches within four hundred yards, and immediately opposite the north-east tower. A constant fire was kept up during the day, from the towers, and also from the twelve-pounders, on the island, annoying their workmen considerably. Many were seen to be carried out of the enemy's trenches, killed or wounded.

Colonel Skerret ordered the quarter-master to bring all his stores from the town to the island. He also directed the assistant-commissary, Mr. Dubre, to form his depôt of provisions there. An express arrived this morning from Cadiz, which conveyed orders to colonel Skerrett to embark his brigade; and had this order been carried into effect, it would have been a great blow to the united cause, and injurious to the British name and character!

During this night a council of war was held, when major King, and captain Smith, were firm in the opinion, that the town should *not* be evacuated. A Paysano, who deserted from the enemy, declared that the shot and shells, which had been thrown from the island this day, had killed two hundred of the enemy.

In the course of this day, colonel Skerrett went to the island, to look out a place of security on the west of it, for the purpose of embarking.

Wednesday, December 25. During the night, the enemy advanced their approaches into the valley, and also broke ground on the hill opposite the east tower, at four hundred yards distance.

An unremitted fire was kept up during the night, from four ten-inch mortars on the island; two having been landed and placed on beds, in the course of the preceding day, notwithstanding it rained incessantly.

The enemy shewed, on the summit of a hill, at regulated distances, pyramids of *socks à terre*, through which they fired musketry and wall pieces.

Bombardier William Doyle, of captain Mitchel's company, royal artillery, was wounded by a wall piece, in the left shoulder, and part of the back, and afterwards died of his wound. This man arrived from Cadiz but a few days before the investment, and had been slightly wounded at Tariffa the last time it was attacked, when lieutenant-colonel Brown commanded.

A French officer was killed by one of the 95th regiment, while in the act of reconnoitring.

Thursday, December 26. Last night the enemy strengthened his approaches at all points, and advanced one hundred and fifty yards nearer to the east and north-east towers. At both places they opened a fire from a number of wall pieces, which they unremittingly continued during the day, pouring their bullets over the town. They did little damage, captain Smith having completely covered the men from the fire.

At ten o'clock, a column of the enemy was seen moving down to the west flank, when colonel Skerrett immediately ordered all the men of the brigade, at work on the island, to return to the town, and also the twenty-four-pounders, and the mortars to keep up a constant fire on the enemy's works; which order was so fully complied with, that lieutenant Robe, royal artillery, found he had expended an immense quantity of shells, and had only three hundred and fifty left. Notwithstanding a continued heavy rain, the men went on cheerfully with their work, and strengthened greatly the left flank of the island.

Friday, December 27. The enemy continued working at their trenches, and were annoyed in the usual manner from the walls, the towers, and the island, both with cannon and musketry.

In the event of a retreat, the 47th regiment were ordered into the castle, to defend it. The Spanish troops were to form at the sea-gate, and the 87th and 95th, on the ground near their own quarter. The Spanish troops were to retire through the gate first, instantly followed by the 87th regiment; those corps were to form between the sea and Santa Catalina, there to wait for the 47th regiment, and to be particularly careful not to fire on the troops retiring by the streets. The convent troops, should they not have been retired before, were to join the 87th; or, should they meet with difficulty, were to follow up the troops retiring through the gates. The artillery, after destroying the guns, were to fall in with the 47th, which corps was to protect their retreat. All the guards were to retreat, on their own corps, when ordered to do so. Major Broad was to have a strong guard, to shut and secure the gate.

The enemy this day rolled down several long sixteen-pounders from the hill, in front of Mr. Nunez's house.

Saturday, December 28. Notwithstanding a very rainy and tempestuous night, the enemy continued working at their trenches, but were, as usual, annoyed by the continued fire from the town and island. They advanced their approaches

considerably nearer to the east, and north-east towers, under cover of the night, and continued working during the day.

Sunday, December 29. At three o'clock, captain Wren was directed, by major King, to surprise a picquet of the enemy, which lay on a rising ground near the western shore. He was to march an hour before day-light. Captain Wren, with his light company, accordingly sallied out, on the morning of the 29th, but it being bright moon-light, a French sentinel saw him, and having fired, gave the alarm, which turned out their whole line. The sentinel was immediately killed, and several of the enemy shared his fate, captain Wren being well supported by lieutenant Davenport, 82d regiment, who volunteered on that occasion, and lieutenant Welstead, with fifty of the 82d regiment. The enemy, advancing under the range of the guns, suffered severely from a well-directed fire from the east tower, under captain Mitchell, which covered the retreat of captain Wren, to Santa Catalina. Lieutenant Guantee, assistant quarter-master general, was badly wounded; his loss was felt severely, being a most useful and accomplished officer; lieutenant Stanton, 11th infantry, was slightly wounded, with one serjeant and five privates of the same corps, dangerously. This was the whole of our loss in this brilliant affair.

At ten o'clock, the enemy opened a fire from two batteries; the one intended for breaching, consisted of four sixteen, and two twelve-pounders, situated in the valley, and nearly opposite the Retiro tower, at the distance of three hundred yards; and the other, about one hundred yards in rear of the first, consisted of two eight inch howitzers, and one twelve pounder. The latter commenced its fire against the boats at anchor in the eastern bay, (the wind then blowing westerly,) and they were soon obliged to cut their cables, and put to sea. It then threw shot and shells to almost every part of the island, but the men being at work at the traverses, received but little damage. Two of the female inhabitants, who had taken refuge on the island, were wounded, and one of them lost a leg. Several horses and mules were also destroyed on the island, by the bursting of shells.

A heavy firing was kept up by these two batteries till evening, when the enemy established a breach in the wall, to the right of the Retiro tower, about five feet wide; but captain Smith, of the royal engineers, had taken his measures so effectually, that the front of the breach was the least practicable part; an enemy, having on entering, to descend fourteen feet into a narrow street, barricadoed on each side, well flanked, and armed with temporary *chevaux de frize*, made of the iron-balconies, which, according to the custom

of Spain, fortunately happened to be numerous in the town, and answered admirably for the purpose.

The eastern tower was yet untouched, but the enemy approached it by sap, within at least fifty yards. During all this day, the men being ordered to keep under cover, both at the town and the island, our loss was trifling. Some of the inhabitants, however, in their retreat to the island, were killed and wounded, by the bursting of the enemy's shells.

The sixteen pounder, on Gasman's tower, and a thirty-two pound carronade, were spiked by captain Hughes, of the royal artillery; a circumstance which, being whispered among our troops, they were filled with indignation, and expressed much apprehension and discontent, lest they should be ordered to abandon the town, without having a fair set-to with the enemy. Whence the order proceeded, is unknown, but general Copens appeared highly enraged when he was informed of it.

Monday, December 30. All this morning the enemy continued firing from both his batteries; and by ten o'clock had enlarged the breach to twenty-three yards.

About noon a large column of the enemy moved to the rear of the suburbs, and seemed to threaten Santa Catalina and the island. Lieutenant Robe, royal artillery, therefore kept up a heavy fire, as usual; but by some accident, one of the twenty-four pounders recoiled from its frame, and was disabled for that day.

About half past twelve, a flag of truce was discovered, with difficulty, for the atmosphere was extremely foggy and thick. It brought the following summons from general Leval:

Summons from General Leval to the fortress of Tariffa; and the answer to the same, from camp-marshal Copens.

“CAMP BEFORE TARIFFA, Dec. 30, 1811. The General of Division, Baron of the Empire, Superior Officer of the Legion of Honour, Grand Cross of the Order of Charles Frederic, commanding the troops besieging Tariffa—

“To the Governor of that Fortress.

“SIR—The defence made by the fortress under your command has sufficiently established that fair name, which is the basis of military honour. I do not doubt, but that, convinced of the uselessness of a longer resistance, you will endeavour to avert the fatal consequences with which your obstinacy may be attended to the city and inhabitants of Tariffa.

“A breach has been opened since yesterday, and within a few hours it will be practicable; make then your choice, between an honourable capitulation, and the horrors of an impending assault. I flatter myself that you will admit my first

proposition, if you reflect, that the same honour which prompts you to resistance, at the same time imposes it as a duty upon you to spare the lives of a whole population, whose fate is in your hands, rather than see them buried amidst the ruins of their town. Be pleased, Sir, to accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

LEVAL.

“ P. S. I beg leave to inform you, that I can give you but two hours, to send your answer.”

Answer.—To General Leval.

“ TARIFFA, Dec. 30, 1811, a quarter past two in the afternoon.—SIR, When you propose to the governor of this fortress, to admit a capitulation, because the breach will shortly be practicable, you certainly do not know THAT I AM HERE.

“ When the breach shall be absolutely practicable, you will find me upon it, at the head of my troops, to defend it;—then we will negotiate.

“ I am your’s, FRANCISCA DE COPENs.

“ P. S. Be pleased not to send any more flags of truce.”

The truce lasted till three o’clock, when the enemy commenced firing at the breach, but did not enlarge it, most of the balls passing through into the houses which lay opposite.

Every preparation was made for defending it in case of attack. The 87th regiment, from the arrangements made on the 21st instant, had the charge of the eastern wall and Retiro gate, where the breach was; and on observing a great bustle in the enemy’s lines, on the morning of the 31st, the following arrangements were made:

Tuesday, December 31. The 87th regiment flanked the breach to the north and south, leaving two companies in reserve, to bayonet the enemy, should they have leaped the wall, which was fourteen feet lower on the inside, than the outside.

Captain Livesey, with one hundred of the 47th, was posted on the east tower, completely flanking any advancing column. Thus they stood, and cool determination sat upon their countenances.

Thus prepared, and both sides big with expectation, at eight o’clock the enemy moved forward from their trenches in every direction.

A party of two thousand grenadiers and voltigeurs, the chosen troops of their army, moved by the bed of the river, in front of the breach.

When colonel Gough saw them advancing, he drew his sword, and throwing away the scabbard, ordered his band, which was stationed in the rear, to strike up the favourite

Irish

Irish air of *Garry-one*. The men immediately cheered, and poured a most galling and tremendous fire on the advancing column. They were well seconded by the 47th, who lined a wall descending from the south-east tower, and completely flanked the column.

The enemy halted for a moment, as if stunned by the fall of those around; then advanced with desperation, as if to escape the fire they were then receiving. They ran to the edge of the breach, but, finding it impracticable, they hurried off under the wall to the right, and made a dash at the portcullis. Those being well barricaded, the enemy were again deceived; and observing the dreadful fate of hundreds of their companions, they faced about, and fled with precipitation.

Seeing them fly, colonel Gough (though slightly wounded) called out to his band, to "*play Patrick's day*," and this national air so inspirited his men, that it was scarcely possible to restrain them from following the routed French up to their very trenches.

The artillerymen placed in the houses poured volleys of hand grenades upon those who turned to the right, and who, to retire in security, fled by the wall. A six pounder too, under the command of captain Mitchell, royal artillery, on the north east tower, flanked the column, and throwing many rounds of case shot, added to the dismay and destruction of the enemy.

One of the 87th regiment, who was restrained with difficulty from pursuing the enemy, cried out, "Colonel, I only want to *tâche'em* what it is to attack the *aiglers*!" (alluding to the badge of honour his regiment obtained by taking an eagle from the eighth regiment of French grenadiers at the battle of Barossa). "Well! I'll go in; but the next time they come, we'll give'em *Garry-one to glory* again.

The enemy being thus repulsed, and miserably routed, sent in a flag of truce, to obtain leave to bury their dead, which was granted. It was indeed a piteous sight to see nearly two hundred wounded men, crawling under the breach; thirty were brought into the town, as well as nine wounded officers, who had fallen immediately under the breach.

The two leading officers of the column, seeing it give way, remained under the wall, to the left, where they were taken prisoners, after the heat of the fire was over. They declared they saw at least five hundred men fall in the attack.

Our loss, considering the heavy fire we were exposed to, was not great. A Spanish lieutenant-colonel, two British officers, lieutenant Langly, royal engineers, and lieutenant Hall, 47th, and seven rank and file, were killed. Three officers

ficers, lieutenant Hill, 47th, and lieutenant M'Carroll, and ensign Waller, of the 87th, one gunner, and thirteen rank and file were wounded.

Towards evening, colonel Skerrett issued the following: "Colonel Skerrett most sincerely congratulates the British garrison, on the glorious result of the affair of to-day. Two thousand of the enemy's best troops attacked the breach, and were totally defeated with immense loss. On our side, all behaved nobly; but the conduct of lieutenant colonel Gough, and the 87th, whose good fortune it was to defend the breach, surpasses all praise."

Wednesday, January 1, 1812. The new year commenced with a dreadful storm, the wind blowing strong from the eastward; two Spanish gun-boats were wrecked, under the guns of the island, being full of male and female fugitives from the town, of whom forty-two unhappily perished! Fifteen men were taken off a rock, where the waves impetuously dashed over them, by the exertions of the officers and men stationed on the island, under the directions of lieutenant Julian Rovary. On this occasion, John Layton, a private in the 82d regiment sprung off a rock, and saved the lives of two Spaniards, who were just perishing, at the risk of his own.

The unfortunate inhabitants, who had fled from the town at the approach of the enemy, being huddled on the eastern side of the island, were completely overwhelmed by the foaming surge. They lost the whole of their property, and many of them their lives. The rocks were strewed with their remains, and a scene of woe presented itself, that might have softened the heart even of the obdurate and relentless tyrant whose frantic ambition has been the sole cause of such a multiplicity of horrors and mischiefs!

The rain and storm continuing with unremitted violence, the enemy made no further attempt on the breach. They poured a few dead shells into the town and island, which gave us reason to believe that their ammunition had suffered from the inclement weather.

Several Spaniards having been seen to desert this day, the officer at the convent Santa Catalina, and every other guard, were ordered to fire on all Spaniards attempting to pass towards the enemy's line.

Thursday, January 2. This day was ushered in by torrents of rain, which lulled the tempest, that, during the night, had blown up several of the tents on the island, and exposed both officers and men to the merciless storm.

The enemy did not make any further attempt on the breach,
or

or move any of his guns, which we supposed he would have done, in order to effect some other breach.

A flag of truce came in during the day, for the purpose of bringing money and clothes to the wounded French officers. After one of them they made particular inquiry : he was said to be a person of distinction, and a page to the *ci-devant* empress Josephine.

At four o'clock this day two regiments of infantry, and one of cavalry, were seen moving towards the pass of La-pena; their purpose supposed to be that of bringing up more ammunition.

Friday, January 3. Last night, at the convent, a company of the 47th regiment, under the command of captain Campbell, sallied on that part of the enemy's trenches, near the north-east tower, and took away some intrenching tools. They found the lower trenches of the enemy so deluged, that they had been abandoned by their picquets.—The weather cleared up, and thirteen deserters came in, who declared that the French force had been eleven thousand five hundred; that marshal Soult was at the convent of La Luz, having been sent for by marshal Victor, in consequence of two regiments refusing again to storm; and of the dreadful state of the weather which had excited mutinous expressions among their allies.

Another flag of truce came in, for leave to bury the dead, which was granted.

An officer arrived with intelligence that general Ballasteros had embarked the day before at Algeziras, for Tariffa, with two thousand of the choicest of his troops, but had been prevented from sailing, by the inclemency of the weather. Upon it being discovered that the enemy were removing their guns higher up, and it being supposed that it was for the purpose of making another breach, application was made to lieutenant-general Campbell for a reinforcement, for the purpose of defending it.

About four o'clock, the flotilla of gun-boats arrived with the light companies of the 9th regiment on board, who were landed immediately.

Captain Carroll, royal navy, took, on his passage from Gibraltar, fifteen deserters on board, from off a cliff, near the bay of Warmersea; one of whom reported, that fifty poles, and an officer had deserted to Algeziras, having defeated a cavalry picquet that had been sent by the enemy to bring them back.

Two deserters came in this day, from whom we learnt, that general Leval had with him sixteen pieces of artillery, twelve of which are in battery. They represented the condition of the

the French to be deplorable. They said they had but little bread issued since the 30th December; that they had one thousand sick in the convent of La Luz; that, from an apprehension of a mutiny, general Leval had sent for marshal Soult to assist him; and that, from the swelling of the rivers, they had no chance either of receiving supplies, or of effecting their retreat.

January 4. The same party of the 47th regiment made another sally last night, and having found the trenches, as before, deserted, brought away some intrenching tools, and a wall piece.

In the course of the night arrived from Gibraltar, four Spanish gun-boats laden with ammunition, and bringing the light company of the 82d regiment, under command of captain Vincent. They were landed about four in the morning of the 4th, and immediately marched into town, where they were attached to the 47th regiment. About an hour after the 82d light company landed, there arose one of those dreadful hurricanes to which this part of the straits is subject. Three of the boats, laden with ammunition, were driven ashore, and great apprehensions were entertained for his majesty's ship *Stately*, which lay at anchor about two miles to the westward of the island. However, she rode it out.

One of those boats being cast on shore, a mile from the enemy's advanced picquet to the west, and they having been seen possessing themselves of another wreck higher up, apprehensions were entertained by major King, that the ammunition might fall into the enemy's hands; he therefore dispatched lieutenant Field, acting town adjutant, to order out the light company of the 11th, and fifty of the 82d, who were at that time at Santa Catalina, to march to the beach, and flank the wreck. This he did, and then reporting to lord Proby the circumstance, his lordship went to see the situation of the wreck, and ordered that the garrison of Santa Catalina should flank the wreck, while the 82d light company should carry off, or destroy, the stores and ammunition. The boat having four carronades on board, they were spiked. The orders of his lordship were executed amidst torrents of rain, and the companies returned to their respective stations.

Towards evening, a column of the enemy were seen advancing from La Luz; and from a deserter, who came in about that time, we learned, that the enemy proposed attacking us at the three points at once, viz. the island, the town, and Santa Catalina; and, should they fail in this effort, they were then determined to retreat.

About an hour after night, the enemy accordingly approached

proached close to the eastern wall, and poured a quantity of musketry into the town, but being warmly received by the guards on the wall, they retired; not, however, without exciting a considerable degree of alarm, and the whole of the troops marched to their respective alarm posts; but they soon returned to their quarters.

At midnight the enemy manifested another attack, by firing on all sides of the town; when the troops were again called out, and the three points of defence prepared for their reception. Suddenly the firing ceased, and every thing remained quiet, till an hour before day-light, when, from a particular movement, *it was found, that the enemy had made his retreat at midnight.*

The guerillas, the 95th, and light companies, advanced immediately to the trenches; nothing, however, was in view at the dawn of day, but the enemy's rear guard, which was warmly pursued by the 95th and the light companies, supported by the grenadiers. They followed the flying enemy as far as the river Salada, and found its banks, as it had been in the year 1339, strewed with the bodies of these modern Saracens.

The light companies returned, bringing with them a few prisoners and deserters, who complained bitterly of their sufferings, during the siege, from scanty food, and inclement weather.

The abandoned trenches exhibited immense quantities of carts, limbers, and intrenching tools; some destroyed, others left whole, and fit for immediate use. The enemy, notwithstanding their panic, found time, however, to spike their guns, and to burn the wheels of many of their limbers. The buried cannon, the broken machines of war, and the ghastly dead lying around, or floating in the waters, afforded a melancholy picture of the horrors of war, and of the folly of that infatuation and presumption, which led the enemy to despise the courage of British troops, and bring on themselves so much disgrace and misery.

Upon our return from the pursuit of the enemy, colonel Skerrett issued the following orders:

TARIFFA, *January 9, 1812.*—"G. O. As the action part of the campaign at Tariffa has been brought to a glorious issue, colonel Skerrett feels it a bounden duty, in justice to the brave troops he has had the honour and happiness to serve with, to bear testimony to the following acts of bravery and good conduct, and to offer his best acknowledgements to the officers concerned; to all of which he has been an eye witness. He will submit the detail to the lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar, that, in addition to captain Mitchell, of the royal artillery, and captain Wren, 11th regiment, who appears in

the general orders of the 5th of January, the officers mentioned in it may be made known to his royal highness the commander-in-chief.

“ To lieutenant Cocque, of that admirable corps, the 2d hussars, king’s German legion, and the officers and soldiers of that detachment, (captain Wense being at that time seriously ill,) who, in a reconnoitring party, within half a mile of the enemy’s camp, three times put to flight an equal number of French dragoons sent to oppose him, although those dragoons were flanked by a very strong picquet of infantry, posted in a wood, within half-musket shot; and under a heavy fire, the hussars continued, with a most singular coolness, a long time.

“ To captain Hughes, commanding the artillery, who, with the officers and men under his command, on the 20th December, the day on which the town was closely invested, kept the immense force of the enemy in check, for near an hour, with the two guns under his command, and did considerable execution. To captain Jenkins, and his company of the 95th regiment, who, at the same time advanced against a very superior force of the enemy’s troops, and drove them, keeping them in check during the time the guns were in motion: had captain Jenkins been allowed to advance, his company alone would probably have taken the enemy’s field pieces in front of them. To major Broad, who commanded the picquets of the 47th and 87th regiments on that day; and who assisted in keeping the immense force of the enemy in check, and who advanced on the enemy, and repulsed them. And to captains Levesey and Summerson, of the light companies of the 47th and 87th regiments; and to lieutenant Haines, of the royal artillery, who, on the 22d December, made a sortie with a field piece, and with the greatest intrepidity drove a very superior force of the enemy’s light troops from their strong position in front of the convent, a fire from the gun doing great execution.

“ To captain Levesey and the officers and men of the light company of the 47th regiment, and the remaining officers and men of his detachment, amounting to one hundred of the 47th regiment, who, in the first instance, defended the east tower, and flanked the right of the breach, during the assault; and who, with admirable coolness, kept their position under a heavy fire from the cannon and musketry, and afforded, on that distinguished occasion, the most essential service. To the zeal and activity of captain Campbell, 47th regiment, who, with a very small detachment, twice entered the enemy’s intrenchments, and brought away a wall-piece, and a great many intrenching tools. And particularly to that

active

active, intelligent, and brave officer, lieutenant Guantee, deputy-assistant-quarter-master-general, who has been present, and engaged in almost the whole of the above affairs, and the loss of whose services, colonel Skerrett sincerely regrets. Colonel Skerrett is happy to bear one testimony to the zeal and bravery of major Broad, 47th regiment, who has offered himself on almost every occasion, on public service. To brigade-major Banbury, and captain O'Donahoe, of my personal staff, who have always shewn the greatest zeal and activity, the last of whom has been wounded.

“ To lieutenant-colonel Proby, 1st guards, colonel Skerrett is on every occasion highly indebted, for the great assistance he has afforded him, for his military experience, great zeal, and activity: in most of the above affairs his lordship has been personally present.

“ To major King, of the 82d regiment, and to captain Thompson, royal marines, all forming the garrison of the island; and to captain Wren, of the 11th regiment, who commanded the redoubts of Santa Catalina, during the whole of the siege, colonel Skerrett is much indebted for their zeal and activity, for the assistance they have afforded the town, and for the fire kept up from the island, on the enemy's lines.

“ The royal marines will join their ship at the earliest opportunity.

“ Colonel Skerrett cannot part with this valuable detachment, without requesting captain Thompson, with his officers and men, to accept his best thanks for their services, their zeal, and good conduct, and the good humour with which they bore all their hardships and fatigue, on a species of service so new to them.

“ Colonel Skerrett is happy to bear testimony of the zeal and exertions of Mr. Deputy-assistant-commissariat-general Kobre, and the officers of his department; as also to surgeon Harper, as long as he continued at the head of the medical department; and to all the medical officers under him, since the period of this brigade leaving Cadiz.”

Thus ended a siege of seventeen days, during seven of which there was apparently a practicable breach, the wall in front of the besieged town, being but one yard thick, and incapable of bearing heavy artillery. From the first day it had been battered in breach, and was capable of returning little opposition, but in musketry. It was demonstrated, therefore, that the weakest points, when gallantly defended, can check the progress of *boasting Invincibles*. In fine, it appeared, that the losses suffered by the enemy in this fruitless attempt on this poor post, might safely be computed at

about two thousand five hundred men, exceeding that of the garrison they assailed*.

[In consequence of the gallantry displayed by the 2nd battalion of the 47th regiment, in the defence of Tariffa, his royal highness the prince regent was pleased, in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, to approve of the word "TARIFFA" being borne upon the colours and appointments of the 47th regiment. This was dated War Office, June 22, 1812.]

From the French papers it appears that Suchet, after the battle of Saguntum, advanced with his centre to the suburbs of Valencia, and was employed nearly a month in waiting the arrival of reinforcements and artillery, and collecting the other requisites for the siege. On the 26th, the line of Blake's army was attacked; and his cavalry being routed, the infantry were pursued to the intrenched camp of Manissa and Quarte; which being subsequently forced, the cannon, baggage, and caissons, were all taken, the army of Blake cut off from the road to Murcia, and obliged to throw itself into Valencia. During these operations, two English frigates, with some gunboats, kept up an incessant fire, in order to retard the progress of the French; but they retired upon finding affairs in a desperate situation. The French then attacked a number of small intrenched camps, took two stand of colours, thirty pieces of cannon, with one hundred caissons and waggons; and the Spaniards, in their flight, are said to have been pushed into the marshes of Albufera, where many of them perished. On the evening of the 25th of December, Valencia was invested on all sides. On the 2d of January, 1812, the trenches were opened before the new town of Valencia, which was six thousand toises in extent,

* We have inserted this long account of the defence of Tariffa, because it diversifies the subject, and reflects the highest honour on colonel Skerrett, and the officers and men employed under him. Tariffa is a town of Spain, in Andalusia, and in the diocese of Cadiz, with a castle. It is but a poor place, with few inhabitants, and is seated on an eminence in the straits of Gibraltar, 17 miles W. S. W. of Gibraltar.

with the extremities of the right and left touching Guadalaviv. The fortifications were three years in erecting, and were defended by a large ditch. The walls of the old town are represented in the French account to be mere garden walls. Blake, in this situation, foreseeing the fall of the place, made an attempt with twelve thousand men to retire, in the night from Valencia; but was prevented, with the loss of four hundred men. More than one thousand five hundred men afterwards deserted from Blake, who abandoned the line of fortifications. On the 6th, Suchet offered the Spanish general a capitulation, which was refused. Between the 6th and ninth, two thousand seven hundred bombs were thrown into the town, batteries mounted ready to make a breach in the interior defences, lodgements effected in the two last houses of the suburbs, with mines prepared under two of the principal gates of the town. Dreading the effects of an assault to a population of upwards of two hundred thousand people, Blake desired a capitulation for the town and army, which was signed on the 9th of January; the troops surrendering as prisoners of war, and the property of the inhabitants to be respected. On the 10th, the army and garrison, consisting of eighteen thousand men, marched out and laid down their arms, including eight hundred and ninety-three officers, and twenty-two generals, among whom were Zayas and Lardizabel, generals O'Donnell and Blake. In Valencia were found three hundred and seventy-four pieces of artillery, one hundred and eighty thousand pounds of powder, three millions of cartridges, &c. Mr. Tupper, the English consul, escaped from Valencia on the 3d of January.

The first enterprize of lord Wellington was the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo: indeed it was necessary to gain possession of this place and of Badajoz, before he could regularly commence the plan of operations which he had laid down. About the same time that his lordship invested Ciudad Rodrigo, he dispatched general Hill against general Dombrowski, who was stationed

stationed at Merida*; from the information which had been received, there was reason to hope that the enemy's troops would have been surprised in this place; but general Dombrowski, being advised by his advanced guard of the approach of the British, left Merida in the night-time. Disappointed in this attempt, general Hill next turned his attention and directed his march against general Drouet, who commanded the 5th corps at Almandralijo: the enemy, however, did not wait his approach, but retired upon Zafra†, leaving behind them a considerable quantity of provisions and ammunition; among which were four hundred and fifty thousand pounds of wheat. The French general retreated upon Llerena; and general Hill, finding that it would be impossible to follow him with any prospect of success, returned to Merida.

Lord Wellington begun the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 8th of January. During the time that the French had possession of this place they had greatly strengthened it: on the hill of St. Francisco they had constructed a redoubt, and had fortified three convents in the suburbs, which were connected with this redoubt: lord Wellington therefore directed his attention and efforts, in the first place, to obtain possession of the work on the hill of St. Francisco, since, before this was reduced, no progress could be made in the attack on the town. As it was of the utmost consequence to impress on the minds of the besieged a high idea of British valour, and besides of equal moment that the siege should be pushed on with the greatest alacrity, both that time might be afforded

* Merida is a strong town of Estremadura in Spain, and was built in the time of the Romans before the birth of Christ. At this place are some fine remains of antiquity, particularly a triumphal arch, but it is not now equal to what it was formerly. It is seated in an extensive and fertile plain, forty-seven miles East of Elva, and forty-five South by East of Alcantara.

† A small, but strong town of Estremadura, with a good castle. It is seated at the foot of a mountain, near the river Guadaxiera, twenty miles South West of Medina.

for the completion of the plan of the campaign, and that Marmont might not be reinforced before the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, it was resolved to carry this outwork by storm: accordingly the 52d regiment was employed for that purpose, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Colbourne: the attack was made shortly after it was dark; and in a very short time the redoubt was in our possession. Two captains and forty-seven men were made prisoners; the remainder were put to the sword. The loss of the British was not, as might have been expected from the nature of the attack, severe; there being only six men killed, and fourteen men and three officers wounded. In consequence of the success of this enterprize, lord Wellington was enabled to break ground within six hundred yards of the place.

Lord Wellington's besieging army was employed between the 15th and the 19th in completing the second parallel: as soon as this was done, the batteries opened a fire on the place with such effect as to make practicable breaches in one of the walls: it was now determined to storm the place, notwithstanding the approaches had not been advanced so near as it was generally deemed requisite they should before such a mode of attack was resorted to. In order to conduct the attack with the best prospect of success, five different columns were employed. Notwithstanding breaches were made before the attempt to storm, there were yet such impediments and difficulties as required the full display and exercise of British valour to surmount and overcome: the approaches, as has been already noticed, had not been carried to the outward extremity of the glacis, and the counterscarp of the ditch was still entire; but in half an hour all obstacles were overcome. Lord Wellington had intended that the column under general Pack should make a false attack; but such were the impetuosity and zeal of the troops employed on this service, and such the enterprize and skill of their leaders, that the intended false attack was converted into a real one; and the advanced guard,

guard, under the command of major Lynch, actually followed the French from the advanced works into the *fausse braze*, and took prisoners all who opposed them.

The principal breach in the body of the place was stormed, in a most gallant and undaunted manner, by major Ridge, of the 2d battalion of the 5th regiment, in conjunction with the 94th regiment under the command of lieutenant-colonel Campbell: by this means they not only effectually covered the advance from the trenches of the brigade under major-general M'Kinnon, but actually changed the arrangement of the operation, and preceded them in the attack.

The French garrison resisted for a long time with great obstinacy and gallantry; nor, indeed, did they submit till the British troops were in possession of, and actually drawn up on, the ramparts of the place. The loss on both sides was very great. Just as major-general M'Kinnon had led his troops up to the breach, he was unfortunately blown up by the accidental explosion of one of the enemy's magazines; and major-general Craufurd, as he was leading on his light division to the storm, received a severe wound, from the effects of which he died on the 24th. It was generally supposed that the people of Castile were very lukewarm in the cause of their country; but from them lord Wellington, in his official dispatches, in which he gave an account of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, said that he received considerable assistance, and bore witness that they invariably showed their detestation of French tyranny, and their desire to contribute by every means in their power to remove it. To the conduct of the German troops also, which have often been so unfairly represented in this country, he bore his willing and flattering testimony: the first line battalion of the German legion carried the convent of Santa Cruz, and thus materially assisted the attack on Ciudad Rodrigo.

So soon as Marmont understood that lord Wellington had regularly invested this place, he began to
gather

gather in the troops around him, and to make such preparations and movements as indicated a resolution to march to its relief: this circumstance was well known to lord Wellington, and induced him to storm it, rather than to carry it by a regular siege. Marmont, aware of the bravery and strength of the garrison, and of the numerous obstacles which the outworks, as well as the town itself, must present, does not seem to have entertained the slightest or most distant apprehension that it could be reduced in such a very short space of time, and in so summary a manner. Before, however, he had advanced sufficiently near to encourage the garrison, or draw off the attention and force of lord Wellington from his enterprise, Ciudad Rodrigo was in the possession of the English; and in the official account of its capture, which Marmont transmitted to France, he expressed such a degree and kind of surprise and astonishment at its speedy reduction, as rather complimented the skill and bravery of the British than censured the commander of the place.

Ciudad Rodrigo was taken on the 19th of January. The French governor, general Barnier, about seventy-eight officers, and one thousand seven hundred privates were taken prisoners, and one hundred and fifty-three pieces of ordnance, including the heavy train belonging to the French army; and great quantities of stores and ammunition were found in the place.

On the 8th of January, when lord Wellington invested Ciudad Rodrigo*, he lost, in taking a redoubt before that fortress, six rank and file killed, and one captain, two lieutenants, and seventeen rank and file wounded. By the return of killed and wounded at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, between the 9th and 14th of January, it appears, that there were, of the British and Portuguese army, one captain, two serjeants, twenty-six rank and file killed; and one major, three

* Ciudad Rodrigo is a strong and considerable town of Leon in Spain, seated in a fertile country, on the river Aguada. It is forty miles S. W. of Salamanca, and one hundred and fifteen W. of Madrid.

lieutenants, one ensign, six serjeants, and one hundred and seventy-nine rank and file wounded. And of the Portuguese there were five rank and file killed, and one lieutenant, and thirty-five rank and file wounded. And between the 15th and 19th of the same month, the British loss was, one serjeant, twenty-five rank and file killed; and four captains, five lieutenants, three serjeants, and one hundred and thirty-three rank and file wounded. The Portuguese loss was one serjeant, fifteen rank and file killed; and two lieutenants, and seventy-seven rank and file wounded. So that the grand total of the loss before Ciudad Rodrigo was eighty-one killed, and four hundred and seventy wounded.

Lord Wellington had taken care that the fortifications of Ciudad Rodrigo should be put in a good state of repair, and had reason to believe that Marmont meant no serious attack upon it, he ordered part of his army to proceed to Badajoz, the siege of which he next resolved to undertake. Badajoz had for some time been blockaded by general Hill with between twelve and fifteen thousand men: along with him was the Portuguese army under marshal Beresford; which, by the unremitting and judicious attentions of that officer, had been brought to a very creditable and useful degree of discipline and steadiness.

Lord Wellington having reduced Ciudad Rodrigo in a much shorter space of time than the enemy apprehended, it was to be supposed that they would take early measures to prevent, if possible, Badajoz from falling into our hands. But, in order to attempt this with any prospect of success, it was necessary for the French to concentrate their forces, as lord Wellington had under his command nearly sixty thousand British troops, besides Spaniards and Portuguese. Lord Wellington, in planning and conducting this enterprize, was equally aware, as when he invested Ciudad Rodrigo, of the necessity and advantage of vigorous and decisive measures. He was sensible, if he carried Badajoz by storm, his loss would be very considerable: but he

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would

would thus gain time; and the probability was, that his loss would in the end be greater if he prosecuted the siege in a regular manner, and during the prosecution of it was obliged to fight the enemy.

About the middle of March, lord Wellington had regularly and completely invested Badajoz; forming his first parallel within two hundred yards of the out-work called La Picurina: his lordship conducted the operations of the siege in person, with the 3d, 4th, and light divisions on the left of the river: in the mean time sir Thomas Graham crossed the Guadiana with three divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, and marched on Santa Martha and Valverdi; while sir Rowland Hill, with two divisions and a brigade of cavalry, moved upon Merida. In consequence of these movements, general Drouet retired to Homaschos, in order to preserve his communication with the division of the French army which was stationed at Llerena. The attack on Badajoz was carried on on the north-west side only; and every thing was done with the greatest rapidity, under the immediate superintendence and direction of lord Wellington. Nor were the enemy idle: Philippon, a general of distinguished reputation in the French service, especially as an engineer, commanded the place; and he left no means untried by which he could strengthen the fortifications, or impede the progress of the siege. On the 19th of March the garrison made a sortie with two thousand men: the right flank of the British works was their object in this sortie: but they were driven in with considerable loss by major-general Bowes. The centre of the besiegers being completed, the place was first fired into on the 25th of March, from twenty-eight pieces of ordnance in six batteries, at the distance of about two hundred yards; and on the night of that day the fort of Picurina was carried by storm: an instance of activity, promptitude and dispatch rarely equalled in the siege of any place. This fort was defended by two hundred and fifty men, and attacked by about double that number: the greater

part of the enemy were either killed or wounded : the loss of the British was proportionably great. From the 18th to the 26th of March, the British and Portuguese loss was nine officers, five serjeants, one drummer, one hundred and fourteen rank and file killed ; thirty-four officers, twenty serjeants, two drummers, four hundred and thirty rank and file wounded ; eleven rank and file missing. In consequence of the capture of fort Picurina, lord Wellington was enabled to open his second parallel within three hundred yards of the body of the place. The rapidity and success with which he had thus far proceeded would have been still greater, had it not been for incessant and heavy falls of rain.

By the 6th of April three breaches, which were regarded as practicable, had been effected ; and lord Wellington determined to commence the assault that night : the plan for the attack was conceived with great skill, and executed with equal bravery and success. Lieutenant-general Picton was ordered to attack the castle of Badajoz by escalade ; he had under his command the 3d division ; the ravelin of St. Roque, which was on the left, was to be attacked by a detachment from the 4th division under major Wilson : the remainder of this and of the light division, under the command of major-general Colville, were ordered to attack the breaches which had been effected in the bastions of La Trinidad and of Santa Maria, and in the curtain by which these bastions were connected. A false attack, as in the case of Ciudad Rodrigo, was also resolved upon : the management of this was committed by lord Wellington to lieutenant-general Leith, who was instructed to convert it into a real one if circumstances should prove favourable.

About ten o'clock at night, lieutenant-general Picton proceeded to his destination, and the other divisions soon followed him : notwithstanding major-general Kempt, who led this attack, was wounded in crossing the river, the troops carried the castle by escalade, and established themselves in it, in the short
space

space of an hour and a half. The enemy offered an obstinate resistance, which, however, only stimulated the zeal and bravery of the assailants. About the same time the ravelin of St. Roque was carried by a detachment of two hundred men under major Wilson, of the 48th regiment, who, being assisted by major Squire of the engineers, established themselves within that work. The fourth and light divisions met with much more serious obstacles and difficulties: they advanced as far as the covered way before they were perceived by the enemy; and two of the bodies, which belonged to these divisions, descended without difficulty into the ditch: as soon as this was accomplished, the assault of the breaches was attempted; but here they were stopped: the enemy had prepared such obstacles at the top and behind the breaches, and offered so determined a resistance, that the assailants found all their efforts in vain to establish themselves within the place. Repeated attempts were made, which were met by the same obstacles and the same determined resistance: at last, at twelve o'clock at night, despairing of success in this quarter, and it being known that general Picton had gained possession of the castle, they were drawn off, after having sustained very great loss both in officers and men.

The intended false attack under general Leith was more fortunate: the troops engaged in it, having turned an outwork, gained the ditch; and, climbing the adjoining bastion, established themselves in the town itself; thus imitating their brethren at the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, and converting a false attack into a real one.

The castle, which commands the town, and the town itself, being in our possession, the governor, general Philippon, retired to fort St. Christoval, with his staff and the remainder of his garrison: all further resistance, however, being in vain, he surrendered on the morning of the 7th. At the commencement of the siege the garrison consisted of five thousand men, one thousand two hundred of whom were killed or wounded

ed during the operations, besides those lost in the assault of the place. The total loss of the British and Portuguese army during the siege was seventy-two officers, and nine hundred and sixty-three rank and file killed; three hundred and six officers, and three thousand four hundred and eighty-one rank and file wounded; and sixty-three missing.

The following is an account of the ordnance, ammunition, and small arms, found in the city of Badajoz *, when taken by assault by the allied army under the command of lord Wellington, April 6, 1812.

Thirty-nine twenty-four pounders, nineteen sixteen pounders, seventeen twelve pounders, three nine pounders, twelve eight pounders, four six pounders, and thirty-nine four pounders, all Spanish brass guns.

Seven twelve inch, five ten inch, and seven six inch Spanish brass mortars.

Of ammunition and small arms there were five thousand four hundred and eighty-one muskets with bayonets, one hundred and sixty three thousand musket cartridges, ten tons of loose musket balls, twelve thousand pounds of gunpowder, twenty-three thousand six hundred and fifty twenty-four pounder round

* Badajoz is the capital of Spanish Estremadura, and a frontier town against Portugal. It stands upon an eminence, on the south side of the Guadiana, and is divided into the Upper and Lower town. It is not a large place, but has good houses, pretty broad streets, fine churches, some convents, and an extensive college. The bishop, who has a yearly income of sixteen thousand ducats, is a suffragan to the archbishop of Santiago. Its fortifications are antique; but it has some modern outworks, a castle fortified in the modern taste, called St. Michael; and on the farther side of the river the castle of St. Christoval, which particularly covers the old Roman stone bridge over the river, that is seven hundred paces long, fourteen broad, and is quite strait. In the time of the Romans this town was called Colonia Pacensis, and Pax Julia, or Pax Augusta, which last name the Moors corrupted into Bax Augos, out of which was at last formed Badajoz. In the years 1658 and 1705 it was unsuccessfully besieged by the Portuguese: in the latter siege they were in conjunction with some of the confederates. The neighbouring country is extremely fruitful, and its flocks of sheep yield very fine wool. Badajoz is twelve miles East of Elvas, and one hundred and eighty South West of Madrid.

shot,

shot, three thousand two hundred eighteen pounder ditto, twelve thousand eight hundred and forty-seven sixteen pounder ditto, three thousand one hundred and sixty-seven twelve pounder ditto, twenty-two thousand eight hundred and fifty eight pounder ditto, fifty six pounder ditto, twenty thousand four pounder ditto, three hundred and eleven twenty-four pounder grape shot, ten eighteen pounder ditto, sixty sixteen pounder ditto, thirty sixteen pounder case shot, one hundred and eighty-three four pounder ditto, one hundred and fifty sixteen inch shells filled, seventy sixteen inch empty shells, sixty twelve inch ditto, one hundred and sixty-five ten inch ditto, one hundred eight inch ditto, seventy-five six inch ditto.

Thus fell Badajoz into our possession; and notwithstanding the severity of our loss, it was a very valuable and important acquisition; and it was captured at a very critical conjuncture of affairs: for Soult was fast approaching to its relief with all the forces he could collect in Andalusia and the neighbouring provinces; while Marmont, in the north, was threatening Ciudad Rodrigo. No blame can therefore be fairly imputed to lord Wellington for storming the place; indeed the attack could no longer be delayed. The success which attended our operations against Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz sufficiently proves how much superior we are to the French in taking towns as well as in the field. The trenches before Badajoz were open only twelve days: on the 25th of March the place was first fired on: on the same evening fort Picurina was taken; and on the 6th of April the place was carried by assault. Soult, on the other hand, spent forty days with open trenches before Badajoz; and at the end of that period only Imaz had been reduced: it ought, however, to be noticed, that his force on this occasion was much smaller than that which lord Wellington had before it; as it amounted only to twelve thousand men. But even when this circumstance is taken into the account, the merit of the British must be allowed to be much greater than that
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of the French : there was consummate skill displayed in planning the operations of the siege, and infinitely greater bravery in the assault. It may indeed be safely asserted, that on no occasion was British bravery manifested to greater advantage, or more necessary, than in the assault of Badajoz : for the garrison, under the direction of general Philippon, had almost exhausted the means of defence, which were not only very numerous and varied, but of such a formidable nature as would have appalled most troops, and rendered all their efforts unavailing.

No sooner was Badajoz in our possession, than lord Wellington advanced with two divisions in quest of Soult, who had pushed forward with such rapidity, and under such unfavourable circumstances, as to have lost a great number of his men. As soon as he heard of the fate of the place, which he had hoped to have relieved, he retrograded ; still harassed by the Spanish guerillas, who hung on the rear and flanks of his army. Marmont continued inactive before Ciudad Rodrigo, being completely disappointed in the expectation, that he evidently formed, of drawing off lord Wellington from his operations before Badajoz, to relieve that place. The fall of Badajoz, indeed, seems to have alarmed the enemy very much, and to have disconcerted their plans : it even affected the operations of Suchet in Valencia, and induced him to make such preparations as would enable him to evacuate that province with the greatest ease and celerity, if circumstances should render it necessary.

Notwithstanding the rapidity with which Soult retreated when he received intelligence of the fall of Badajoz, he was not able entirely to escape lord Wellington. His rear was closely followed by the British cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, who came up with two thousand five hundred of the enemy's horse on the evening of the 11th of April near Villa Garcia, on the confines of Estremadura. Sir S. Cotton dispatched two brigades to attack them, under the command of major-general Le Marchant and colonel Ponsonby :
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the French could not withstand the impetuosity of the attack, but were almost immediately overthrown, flying in great disorder and confusion towards Llerena*. About one hundred and fifty of them were made prisoners, and their loss in killed and wounded was very considerable. On the part of the British about fifty were killed and wounded.

Soult's army left Llerena on the 11th of April, and evacuated the province of Estremadura entirely. Lord Wellington, having thus driven Soult to such a distance, and having ascertained that his army was in such a condition that it could not act offensively for some time, turned his thoughts towards Castile. Marmont still lingered near Ciudad Rodrigo, though as yet he had made no serious or regular attempt against that place, and in approaching Almeida he had sustained some loss. It was not therefore from any apprehension respecting the designs or the power of Marmont that lord Wellington turned his thoughts towards Castile, but this step was necessary to bring about the accomplishment of the plan of the campaign that he had formed when he first commenced it. As soon as Marmont understood that his lordship was proceeding towards the north, he broke up from before Ciudad Rodrigo, and advanced as far as Castel Branco; but from this place he again retreated. Indeed in most of the movements and operations of this general, at this period of the campaign, there seems to have been a great degree of uncertainty and indecision, arising probably from the ignorance in which he was of the force and movements of lord Wellington.

No movements of any consequence took place, for some time after this, either by the British army or that of the enemy. Lord Wellington established his headquarters at Fuente de Guinaldo; Marmont at Sala-

* Llerena is an inconsiderable city of Spanish Estremadura, belonging to the order of Santiago, and is situated in a fruitful country, at the foot of the Sierra Morena. It is fifty-four miles N. E. of Seville, and forty-nine S. E. of Merida.

manca; Drouet at Aguaza; and Soult at Seville: but though lord Wellington was stationary for a short time, and appeared inactive, his plans were silently but regularly carrying into execution. The first object of his lordship was to cut off the line of communication between the French army of Portugal and that before Cadiz: for this purpose it became necessary either to destroy or gain possession of the bridge of Almaraz, on the eastern frontier of the province of Estremadura. All the other bridges across the Tagus, below that of Arzobispo, had been destroyed; so that, if this enterprise were successful, the armies of the south and of Portugal would be unable to support the operations of each other. On this enterprise general Hill was dispatched: on reconnoitring the bridge, he found it extremely strong: works had been thrown up, by the French, on both sides of the river; on the southern side of which the castle and redoubts of Mirabete further protected it: by means of these defences, the only road by which the bridge could be approached was rendered very dangerous. On the left bank of the river there was a tête-du-pont; and above it a large and well-constructed fort, containing nine pieces of cannon and a garrison of nearly five hundred men. On a height immediately above the bridge another fort had been erected, which flanked and added greatly to the defence of that place.

General Hill had no sooner reconnoitred the bridge, and ascertained what mode and place of attack would present fewest obstacles and difficulties, than he ordered the two flank columns of his army to be provided with ladders, with an intention that they should escalate the forts if circumstances proved favourable. This part of the plan was formed under the idea and expectation that these columns would reach the point of attack before day-light, and thus take the enemy by surprise; but, owing to the difficulties which they had to encounter in their march, they did not arrive in time, and this mode of attack was necessarily abandoned. It was now resolved to penetrate to the bridge
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by the mountain path, though by pursuing this route it would not be possible to make use of the artillery. On the evening of the 18th part of the army moved forward; but, though they had to march only six miles, the columns could not be formed for the attack before day-light. It was, however, impossible now to recede, or to change the plan of attack; and general Hill, trusting to the valour of his troops, ordered the immediate assault of the fort which protected the works on the left bank of the river. The enemy were fully aware of the design, and prepared and determined to resist it with all their force: they opened a heavy and well-directed fire from their artillery and musquetry; but to this the British paid no attention: their thoughts were solely fixed on carrying the fort by assault: nearly at the same time it was escaladed in three places. Still the enemy resisted, and continued a most destructive fire; and it was necessary, after having established themselves in the place, for the British to have recourse to the bayonet: a charge was accordingly made; the garrison could not stand it, but fled through the several entrenchments, and endeavoured to escape across the bridge: this, however, was impracticable; as those on the opposite side of the river, for their own protection, had cut it in several places: the consequence was, that many of them leaped into the river, and thus perished.

As soon as the enemy on the right bank perceived the fate of their comrades, and the success of the British, a panic seized them, and they abandoned fort Ragusa, flying in the greatest confusion towards Naval Moral.

The prisoners taken on this occasion amounted to two hundred and fifty-nine, including the governor, one lieutenant-colonel, and fifteen other officers: a considerable quantity of provisions was also found in the forts near the bridge. The loss of the British was two officers and thirty-one rank and file killed, and thirteen officers and one hundred and thirty-one rank and file wounded.

The name of the places taken by general Hill in the

neighbourhood of Almaraz were Fort Napoleon and Fort Ragusa. The following is a statement of the effects taken at these forts:

Fort Napoleon.—Brass ordnance mounted—four twelve-pounders, one six-pounder, one four-pounder, three six-inch howitzers.

Tête-du-Pont.—Brass ordnance mounted—two six-pounders, one ten-inch howitzer.

Fort Ragusa.—Brass ordnance mounted—three twelve-pounders, two six-pounders, one six-inch howitzer.

Total. Seven twelve-pounders, five six-pounders, one four-pounder, one ten-inch howitzer, four six-inch howitzers.—18.

A considerable proportion of powder in barrels and cartridges fixed to shot: but as the magazines were blown up immediately after the capture by order of lieutenant-general Hill, and every thing destroyed, the exact quantity was not ascertained.

One hundred and twenty thousand musket-ball cartridges, three hundred six-inch shells, three hundred and eighty rounds of case-shot of various calibre, four hundred and thirteen muskets with bayonets, twenty large pontoon boats, composing the bridge, with timber, complete, sixty carriages for removing the same, and also for the conveyance of heavy timber. Likewise, a large proportion of rope of various dimensions; also anchors, timber, tools, and every thing complete, on a large scale, for keeping the bridge and carriages in a state of repair. And the following provisions: rations—bread thirty-three, biscuit twenty-nine thousand nine hundred and sixty-one, rice sixty-five thousand nine hundred and sixty-one, vegetables two thousand five hundred and fifty-four, salt twenty-three thousand nine hundred and twenty-six, oil four thousand four hundred and twenty-eight, wine one thousand seven hundred and eighteen, brandy twenty-seven thousand eight hundred and fourteen, live cattle sixteen thousand eight hundred

hundred and forty-eight, salt meat eighteen thousand and eighty-six.

By the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and the bridge of Almaraz, the enemy received sufficient proof of the superiority of the British soldiery: they had been beaten, where they possessed every possible advantage of situation; fortresses had been carried without artillery: "we had had only English breasts with English hearts behind them, to oppose to French batteries with great guns behind them, and we had proved superior." What higher praise can be bestowed?

The French were aware of the importance of the bridge of Almaraz; and Marmont himself, in order to protect it from the attack of general Hill, moved from his position at Salamanca to the south-east, about fifty miles, as far as Fontlevroi: but in this case, as well as in his attempt to save Ciudad Rodrigo, he miscalculated the rapidity of British enterprise; and having learnt the success of general Hill he returned to his former quarters, and employed himself in throwing up additional defences round the city. The importance attached by the French to the bridge of Almaraz was evinced by another circumstance: Soult ordered the officer who commanded there to be shot, for having suffered it to fall so soon and so easily into the hands of general Hill.

Lord Wellington did not remain long inactive at Fuente Guinaldo.

The army under his command crossed the Agueda on the 13th of June, and marched forward in three columns, the troops under Don Carlos d'Espana forming a fourth; and the whole arrived upon the Valmusa, a rivulet about six miles from Salamanca*, on the

* Salamanca, the Urbs Vettonum of the Romans, is a very ancient city of Leon, on the river Tormes. It is of a circular form, built on three hills and two vallies, having fine prospects on every side. In its walls are thirteen stately gates, with handsome towers in its circuit. The number of streets are said to be one

the 16th. The enemy shewed some cavalry, and a small body of infantry, in front of the town on that day, and manifested a design to hold the heights on the south side of the Tormes, but their cavalry were immediately driven in by the earl of Wellington's; and the enemy evacuated Salamanca on the night of the 16th, leaving a garrison of about eight hundred men in the fortifications which they had erected on the ruins of the colleges and convents which they had demolished. By the fire from these they protected the passage of the Tormes, by the bridge; and the allied troops crossed that river on the morning of the 17th by two fords which are in the neighbourhood.

The forts were immediately invested by the sixth division, under the command of major-general Clinton, and having been accurately reconnoitred, it was found necessary to break ground before them: this was done on the night of the 17th; major-general Clinton conducted the operations. It is impossible to describe the joy of the people of the town upon our entrance. They had been suffering for more than three years, during which time the French, among other acts of oppression, destroyed thirteen of twenty-five convents, and twenty-two of twenty-five colleges which existed in this celebrated seat of learning. The enemy retired by the road to Toro, their rear-guard was then about fifteen miles from Salamanca on the same night, and they retired again on the morning of the 18th by the same road.

one hundred and sixty-two, with five hundred houses, some of which are very grand, and seventeen noble squares. Here is the greatest university in Spain, having twenty-five colleges, most of which are noble structures, and well endowed: the great public schools in particular are very magnificent. The university has sometimes reckoned seven thousand students. It generally maintains seventy-five professors, with plentiful salaries, and has produced a vast number of men eminent in all kinds of literature; so that persons of distinction and merit, not only send their sons to be educated here, but are proud to visit it themselves and make some stay in it. It is the see of a bishop; and its cathedral a handsome building, has ten dignitaries, &c. It is one hundred and fourteen miles W. of Madrid.

After

After his retreat from Salamanca, marshal Marmont collected his army on the Douro between the 16th and 19th of June, with the exception of general Bonnet's division and some small garrisons; and he moved forward from Fuente Sabuco on the 20th. Earl Wellington formed the allied army, with the exception of the troops engaged in the operations against the forts in Salamanca (which he had entrusted to the direction of major-general Clinton,) on the heights extending from the neighbourhood of Villares to Morisco; and the advanced posts of the cavalry and infantry retired upon the army in good order, and without material loss. The enemy remained in front of the allies on that night, and during the 21st, and during that night they established a post on the right flank of the allied army, the possession of which by them deprived us of an advantage which might eventually have been of importance.

"I therefore," says lord Wellington, "requested lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham to attack them in that post on the 22d, with the troops on the right, which he did with those of the seventh division, which were the reserve of the right, under the command of major-general Hope and major-general de Bernewitz. The enemy were driven from the ground immediately with considerable loss; our troops conducted themselves remarkably well in this affair, which took place in the view of every man of both armies.

"The enemy retired during that night; and on the following evening they posted themselves with their right on the heights near Cabeza Velloso, and their left on the Tormes at Huerta; their centre at Aldea Rubia. The object of the enemy in this movement being to endeavour to communicate with the garrisons in the forts of Salamanca by the left of the Tormes, I changed the front of the army, and placed the right at St. Martha, where there is a ford over the Tormes, and the advanced posts at Aldea Lingua. I sent major-general Bock's brigade of heavy dragoons

across the Tormes, in order to observe the passages of the river.

“ The enemy crossed the Tormes at Huerta about two o'clock of the morning of the 24th, in considerable numbers of cavalry, infantry, and artillery; and there was every appearance of a general movement in that direction. The conduct of major-general Bock's dragoons was conspicuously good upon this occasion; they did every thing in their power to make known the enemy's movement, and opposed their advance vigorously, under many disadvantages, in order to afford time for the dispositions necessary to be made on the occasion.

“ As soon as I was certain that the enemy had crossed the Tormes, I requested lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham to cross that river with the first and seventh divisions; and I sent over major-general Le Marchant's brigade of cavalry; and I concentrated the remainder of the army between Morisco and Cabrerizas, keeping the advanced posts still at Aldea Lingua. At about noon the enemy advanced as far as Calvarissa de Abaxo; but, observing the disposition made for their reception, they retired again in the afternoon to cross the Tormes to Huerta; and they have since remained in the position which they occupied on the 23d.

“ The siege of these forts has not advanced with the rapidity which I expected; although from the pains taken, and the expence incurred in their construction, I was prepared to meet with some difficulties, and provided an equipment accordingly; the difficulties are of a formidable nature, and the forts, three in number, each defending the other, are very strong, although not of a regular construction.

“ We have breaches open in the convent of St. Vincente, which is the principal work; but these cannot be attacked in security till we shall have possession of the Fort St. Cayetano. Major-general Clinton made an attempt to carry that work by storm on the night of the 23d instant, the gorge having
been

been considerably damaged by the fire of our artillery. This attempt unfortunately failed, and I am concerned to add, that major-general Bowes was killed. He was so eager for the success of the enterprise, that he had gone forward with the storming party, which consisted of a part of his brigade, and was wounded; and after his first wound was dressed he returned again to the attack, and received a second wound, which killed him. Our loss in officers and men was likewise considerable."

The ammunition to enable the allies to carry on the attack of the forts having arrived at Salamanca in the afternoon of the 26th, the fire was immediately recommenced upon the gorge of the redoubt of St. Cayetano, in which a practicable breach was effected at about ten o'clock on the morning of the 27th, and they had succeeded nearly about the same time in setting fire to the buildings in the large fort of St. Vincent, by the fire from which the approach to St. Cayetano by its gorge was defended. Directions were then given that the forts of St. Cayetano and La Merced should be stormed; but some little delay occurred, in consequence of the commanding officers of those forts in the first instance, and afterwards the commanding officer of St. Vincent having expressed a desire to capitulate after the lapse of a certain number of hours. As it was obvious that these propositions were made in order to gain time, till the fire of St. Vincent should be extinguished, the British officer refused to listen to any terms, unless the forts should be instantly surrendered; and having found that the commanding officer of St. Cayetano, who was the first to offer to surrender, was entirely dependent upon the governor of St. Vincent, and could not venture to carry into execution the capitulation which he had offered to make, directions were given that this fort and that of La Merced should be stormed forthwith. These operations were effected in the most gallant manner by detachments of the sixth division, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Davies of the

36th regiment, under the direction of major-general Clinton. The troops entered the fort of St. Cayetano by the gorge, and escalated that of La Merced; the British loss was but trifling.

The governor of St. Vincent then sent out a flag to notify the surrender of that fort on the terms that had been offered him, viz. The garrison to march out with the honours of war; to be prisoners of war; and the officers to retain their personal military baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks; and notwithstanding that the 9th regiment of Caçadores had actually stormed one of the outworks of St. Vincent, and were in possession of it, it was deemed expedient to accept the fort by capitulation on those terms, and to stop the attack.

Major-general Clinton commanded the attack against these forts, which was carried on with great vigour and ability; and he mentioned in strong terms of commendation the conduct of the general officers, officers, and troops employed under his command. Among these we particularly notice colonel Hinde of the 32d, lieutenant-colonel Davies of the 36th, captain Owen of the 61st, brigade-major Hobart, and ensign Newton of the 32d regiment, who distinguished himself in the attack of the night of the 23d instant, and volunteered to lead the advanced party in the attack of the 27th. He likewise mentioned in strong terms lieutenant-colonel May, who commanded the artillery under the direction of lieutenant-colonel Framingham, and the officers and soldiers of the royal and Portuguese artillery under his command; lieutenant-colonel Burgoyne, lieutenant Reid, and the officers of the royal engineers; and major Thompson of the 74th regiment, who acted as an engineer during these operations.

The enemy had been employed for nearly three years in constructing these works, but with increased activity for the last eight or nine months. A large expence had been incurred; and these works sufficiently garrisoned by about eight hundred men, and
armed

armed with thirty pieces of artillery, were of a nature to render it quite impossible to take them, excepting by a regular attack; and it was obvious that the enemy relied upon their strength, and upon their being sufficiently garrisoned and armed, as they had left in St. Vincent large depôts of clothing and military stores of every description. The allies were mistaken in their estimate of the extent of the means which would be necessary to subdue these forts; and were obliged to send to the rear for a fresh supply of ammunition; this necessity occasioned a delay of six days.

The enemy withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes as soon as they heard of the fall of the forts of Salamanca. The operations against the forts of Salamanca were carried on in sight of marshal Marmont's army, which remained in its position, with the right at Cabeza Velloso, and the left at Huerta, till the night of the 27th instant, when they broke up, and retired in three columns towards the river Douro; one of them directing its march upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas. The allied army broke up the following day, and encamped upon the Guarena on the 30th.

In the forts of St. Vincent, St. Cayetano, and La Merced at Salamanca, were taken seven hundred and six officers and privates.

Lord Clinton, aid-de-camp to the earl of Wellington, arrived on the morning of the 6th of August, at Downing Street, with dispatches addressed by his lordship to earl Bathurst, dated the 21st, 24th, and 28th of July, of which the following are extracts:

Cabrerizos, near Salamanca, July 21, 1812.

“ In the course of the 15th and 16th the enemy moved all their troops to the right of their position on the Douro, and their army was concentrated between Toro and San Roman. A considerable body passed the Douro at Toro, on the evening of the 16th, and I moved the allied army to their left on that night, with an intention to concentrate on the Guarena. It was totally out of my power to prevent the enemy from passing the Douro at any point at which he might think it ex-

pedient, as he had in his possession all the bridges over that river, and many of the fords; but he re-crossed that river at Toro, in the night of the 16th, moved his whole army to Tordesillas, where he again crossed the Douro on the morning of the 17th; and assembled his army on that day at La Nava del Rey, having marched not less than ten leagues in the course of the 17th. The 4th and light divisions of infantry, and major-general Anson's brigades of cavalry, had marched to Castrejon on the night of the 16th, with a view to the assembly of the army on the Guarena, and were at Castrejon under the orders of lieutenant-general Sir Stapleton Cotton, on the 17th, not having been ordered to proceed farther, in consequence of my knowledge that the enemy had not passed the Douro at Toro; and there was not time to call them in between the hour at which I received the intelligence of the whole of the enemy's army being at La Nava, and day-light of the morning of the 18th. I therefore took measures to provide for their retreat and junction, by moving the 5th division to Tordesillas de la Orden, and major-general Le Marchant's, major-general Alten's, and major-general Bock's brigades of cavalry at Alaejos. The enemy attacked the troops at Castrejon, at the dawn of day of the 18th, and Sir Stapleton Cotton maintained the post, without suffering any loss, till the cavalry had joined him. Nearly about the same time the enemy turned by Alaejos the left flank of our position at Castrejon. The troops retired in admirable order to Tordesillas de la Orden, having the enemy's whole army on their flank or in their rear; and thence to the Guarena, which river they passed under the same circumstances, and effected their junction with the army. The Guarena, which runs into the Douro, is formed by four streams, which unite about a league below Canizal, and the enemy took a strong position on the heights on the right of that river, and I placed the 5th, 4th, and light divisions, on the opposite heights, and had directed the remainder of the army to cross the Upper Guarena at Vallesa, in consequence of the appearance of the enemy's intention to turn our right. Shortly after his arrival, however, the enemy crossed the Guarena at Carteillo, below the junction of the streams, and manifested an intention to press upon our left, and to enter the valley of Canizal. Major-general Alten's brigade of cavalry, supported by the 3d dragoons, were already engaged with the enemy's cavalry, and had taken, among other prisoners, the French general Carriér; and I desired the honourable lieutenant-general Cole to attack, with major-general William Anson's, and brigadier-general Harvey's brigades of infantry (the latter under the command of colonel Stubbs), the enemy's

enemy's infantry, which were supporting their cavalry. He immediately attacked and defeated them with the 27th and 40th regiments, which advanced to the charge with bayonets, colonel Stubbs' Portuguese brigade supporting, and the enemy gave way; many were killed and wounded; and major-general Alten's brigade of cavalry having pursued the fugitives, two hundred and forty prisoners were taken. The enemy did not make any further attempt on our left; but having reinforced their troops on that side, and withdrawn those which had moved to their left, I brought back ours from Vallesa. On the 19th, in the afternoon, the enemy withdrew all the troops from their right, and marched to their left by Tarragona, apparently with an intention of turning our right. I crossed the Upper Guarena at Vallesa and El Ulmo with the whole of the allied army in the course of that evening and night; and every preparation was made for the action, which was expected on the plain of Vallesa on the morning of the 20th. But shortly after day-light the enemy made another movement in several columns to his left, along the heights of the Guarena, which river he crossed below Canta la Piedra, and encamped last night at Babila-fuente and Villamela; and the allied army made a correspondent movement to its right by Cantalpino, and encamped last night at Cabeza Velloso, the 6th division, and major-general Alten's brigade of cavalry being upon the Tormes at Aldea Lengua. During these movements there have been occasional cannonades, but without loss on our side. I have this morning moved the left of the army to the Tormes, where the whole are now concentrated; and I observe that the enemy have also moved towards the same river, near Huerta. The enemy's object hitherto has been to cut off my communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy abandoned and destroyed the fort of Mirabete, on the Tagus, on the 11th instant; and the garrison marched to Madrid, to form part of the army of the centre. They were reduced to five days provisions."

Flores de Avila, July 24, 1812.

"MY aid-de-camp, captain lord Clinton, will present to your lordship this account of a victory which the allied troops under my command gained in a general action fought near Salamanca on the evening of the 22d inst. which I have been under the necessity of delaying to send till now, having been engaged ever since the action in the pursuit of the enemy's flying troops. In my letter of the 21st I informed your lordship, that both armies were near the Tormes; and the enemy crossed that river with the greatest part of his troops in the afternoon by the fords between Alba de Tormes and Huerta, and

and moved by their left towards the roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo. The allied army, with the exception of the 3d division and general D'Urban's cavalry, likewise crossed the Tormes in the evening by the bridge of Salamanca, and the fords in the neighbourhood; and I placed the troops in a position of which the right was upon one of the two heights called Dos Arapiles, and the left on the Tormes below the ford of Santa Martha. The 3d division and brigadier-general D'Urban's cavalry were left at Cabrerizos, on the right of the Tormes, as the enemy had still a large corps on the heights above Babilafuente, on the same side of the river; and I considered it not improbable, that finding our army prepared for them in the morning, on the left of the Tormes, they would alter their plan, and manœuvre by the other bank. In the course of the night of the 21st I received intelligence, of the truth of which I could not doubt, that general Chauvel had arrived at Pollos on the 20th, with the cavalry and horse artillery of the army of the north, to join marshal Marmont; and I was quite certain that these troops would join him on the 22d or 23d at the latest. During the night of the 21st the enemy had taken possession of the village of Calvarasa de Ariba, and of the height near it called Nuestra Senora de la Pena, our cavalry being in possession of Calvarasa de Abaxo; and shortly after day-light detachments from both armies attempted to obtain possession of the more distant from our right of the two hills called Dos Arapiles. The enemy, however, succeeded, their detachment being the strongest, and having been concealed in the woods nearer the hill than we were, by which success they strengthened materially their own position, and had in their power increased means of annoying ours. In the morning, the light troops of the 7th division, and the 4th Caçadores belonging to general Pack's brigade, were engaged with the enemy on the height called Nuestra Senora de la Pena; on which height they maintained themselves with the enemy throughout the day. The possession, by the enemy, however, of the more distant of the Arapiles, rendered it necessary for me to extend the right of the army in Potence to the heights behind the village of Arapiles, and to occupy that village with light infantry; and here I placed the 4th division, under the command of the honourable lieutenant-general Cole; and although, from the variety of the enemy's movements, it was difficult to form a satisfactory judgement of his intentions, I considered that, upon the whole, his objects were upon the left of the Tormes: I therefore ordered the honourable major-general Pakenham, who commanded the 3d division, in the absence of lieutenant-general Picton, on account of ill health, to move across the
Tormes

Tormes with the troops under his command, including brigadier-general D'Urban's cavalry, and to place himself behind Aldea Tejada; brigadier-general Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry, and Don Carlos D'Espana's infantry having been moved up likewise to the neighbourhood of Las Torres, between the 3d and 4th divisions.

“ After a variety of evolutions and movements, the enemy appears to have determined upon his plan about two in the afternoon; and under cover of a very heavy cannonade, which did us but very little damage, he extended his left, and moved forward his troops, apparently with an intention to embrace, by the position of his troops, and by his fire, our post on that of the two Arapiles which we possessed, and from thence to attack and break our line; or at all events to render difficult any movement of ours to our right. The extension of his line to his left, however, and its advance upon our right, notwithstanding that his troops still occupied very strong ground, and his position was well defended by cannon, gave me an opportunity of attacking him, for which I had long been anxious. I reinforced our right with the 5th division, under lieutenant general Leith, which I placed behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th division; and with the 6th and 7th divisions in reserve; and as soon as these troops had taken their stations, I ordered the honourable major-general Pakenham to move forward with the 3d division, and general D'Urban's cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, under lieutenant-colonel Hervey, in four columns, to turn the enemy's left on the heights, while brigadier-general Bradford's brigade, the 5th division, under lieutenant-general Leith, the 4th division, under the honourable lieutenant-general Cole, and the cavalry, under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, should attack them in front, supported in reserve by the 6th division, under major-general Clinton, the 7th division, under major-general Hope, and Don Carlos D'Espana's Spanish division, and brigadier-general Pack should support the left of the 4th division, by attacking that of the Dos Arapiles, which the enemy held. The 1st and light divisions occupied the ground on the left, and were in reserve. The attack upon the enemy's left was made in the manner above described, and completely succeeded. Major-general the honourable Edward Pakenham formed the third division across the enemy's flank, and overthrew every thing opposed to him. These troops were supported in the most gallant style by the Portuguese cavalry under brigadier-general D'Urban, and lieutenant-colonel Hervey's squadrons of the 14th, who successfully defeated every attempt made by
the

the enemy on the flank of the 3d division. Brigadier-general Bradford's brigade, the 5th and 4th divisions, and the cavalry under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, attacked the enemy in front, and drove his troops before them from one height to another, bringing forward their right, so as to acquire strength upon the enemy's flank, in proportion to the advance. Brigadier-general Pack made a very gallant attack upon the Arapiles, in which, however, he did not succeed, except in diverting the attention of the enemy's corps placed upon it, from the troops under the command of lieutenant-general Cole, in his advance. The cavalry under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton made a most gallant and successful charge against a body of the enemy's infantry, which they overthrew and cut to pieces. In this charge major-general Le Marchant was killed at the head of his brigade; and I have to regret the loss of a most able officer. After the crest of the height was carried, one division of the enemy's infantry made a stand against the 4th division, which, after a severe contest, was obliged to give way, in consequence of the enemy having thrown some troops on the left of the 4th division, after the failure of brigadier-general Pack's attack upon the Arapiles, and the honourable lieutenant-general Cole having been wounded. Marshal Sir William Beresford, who happened to be on the spot, directed brigadier-general Spry's brigade of the 5th division, which was in the second line, to change its front, and to bring its fire on the flank of the enemy's division; and I am sorry to add, that while engaged in this service, he received a wound, which I am apprehensive will deprive me of the benefit of his counsel and assistance for some time. Nearly about the same time lieutenant-general Leith received a wound, which unfortunately obliged him to quit the field. I ordered up the 6th division under major-general Clinton, to relieve the 4th, and the battle was soon restored to its former success. The enemy's right, however, reinforced by the troops which had fled from his left, and by those which had now retired from the Arapiles, still continued to resist; and I ordered the 1st and light divisions, and colonel Stubbs's Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, which was re-formed, and major-general William Anson's brigade, likewise of the 4th division, to turn the right, while the 6th division, supported by the 3d and 5th, attacked the front. It was dark before this point was carried by the 6th division, and the enemy fled through the woods towards the Tormes. I pursued them with the 1st and light divisions, and major-general William Anson's brigade of the 4th division, and some squadrons of cavalry under lieutenant-general

general sir Stapleton Cotton*, as long as we could find any of them together, directing our march upon Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, by which the enemy had passed on their advance; but the darkness of the night was highly advantageous to the enemy, many of whom escaped under its cover, who must otherwise have been in our hands. I am sorry to report, that owing to this same cause, lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton was unfortunately wounded by one of our own sentinels, after he had halted.

“We renewed the pursuit at break of day in the morning with the same troops, and major-general Bock’s, and major-general Anson’s brigades of cavalry, which joined during the night; and having crossed the Tormes we came up with the enemy’s rear guard of cavalry and infantry, near La Serna; they were immediately attacked by the two brigades of dragoons, and the cavalry fled, leaving the infantry to their fate. I have never witnessed a more gallant charge than was made on the enemy’s infantry by the heavy brigade of the king’s German legion, under major-general Bock, which was completely successful; and the whole body of infantry, consisting of three battalions of the enemy’s first division were made prisoners. The pursuit was afterwards continued as far as Penedera last night; and our troops are still following the flying enemy. Their head-quarters were in this town, not less than ten leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours last night; and they are now considerably advanced on the road towards Valladolid by Arevalo. They were joined yesterday on their retreat by the cavalry and artillery of the Army of the North. It is impossible to form a conjecture of the enemy’s loss in this action; but from all reports it is very considerable. The number of dead on the field is very large.

“Captain lord Clinton will have the honour of laying at the feet of his royal highness the Prince Regent, the eagles and colours taken from the enemy in this action.”

Olmedo, July 28, 1812.

“THE army have continued their march in pursuit of the enemy since I addressed you on the 24th instant, and we have continued to take many prisoners. A part of the enemy’s army crossed the Douro yesterday, near Puente de Douro, and the remainder, their left wing, were in march towards

* In consequence of the services of sir Stapleton Cotton on this occasion, his royal highness the Prince Regent; was pleased, in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, to nominate and appoint lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart. to be an Extra Knight of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath.

the bridge of Tudela this morning at nine o'clock, when I last heard from our advanced posts. The main body of the allied army is this day on the Adaja and Zapardiel rivers in this neighbourhood, the light cavalry being in front, in pursuit of the enemy. It appears that Joseph Bonaparte left Madrid on the 21st, with the Army of the Centre, supposed to consist of from ten to twelve thousand infantry, and from two to three thousand cavalry, and he directed his march by the Escorial, upon Alba de Tormes. He arrived at Blasco Sancho, between Avila and Arevalo on the 25th, where he heard of the defeat of marshal Marmont, and he retired in the evening; and between that time and the evening of the 26th, he marched through Villa Castin to Espinar. A non-commissioned officer's patrol of the 14th light dragoons and the 1st hussars, from Arevalo, took in Blasco Sancho on the evening of the 25th, shortly after Joseph Bonaparte had left the place, two officers and twenty-seven men of his own cavalry, who had been left there to follow his rear-guard.

The enemy's rear guard were overtaken at La Serna, attacked and thrown into disorder; the cavalry flying in all directions, leaving the infantry to their fate. Such was the defeat and dismay of the enemy, that they fled with the utmost precipitation, abandoning every thing that could impede their progress; and in less than two days after the battle the remains of Marmont's army had nearly reached Valladolid. When Marmont found that lord Wellington was retreating before him, he had sent for all the reinforcements that could be spared: Joseph Bonaparte accordingly had marched from Madrid with the army of the north, but he was too late; he had the mortification to meet that army defeated, disgraced, and ruined, which he expected to have joined and assisted in the defeat of the British.

In the battle of Salamanca, eleven pieces of cannon, two eagles, and six colours, were taken: one general, three colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, one hundred and thirty officers of inferior rank, and upwards of seven thousand soldiers, were made prisoners. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was immense. Marmont himself was wounded early in the battle: four general officers were taken in the pursuit, besides the one that was made prisoner in the battle: and three, among whom was Bonnet, were wounded.

Our loss was severe, amounting to six hundred and ninety-four killed, four thousand two hundred and
seventy

seventy wounded, and two hundred and fifty-six missing. Major-general Le Marchant was killed; and lieutenant-generals Cotton, Leith, and Cole, and major-general Alten, were wounded.

Such was the battle of Salamanca; which, whether we consider it in reference to the uncommon sagacity displayed by lord Wellington* in taking advantage of the injudicious movement of his adversary; the promptitude and skill with which the plan and arrangements were formed, at this critical moment; the intrepidity and success with which all these arrangements were executed; or the final issue of the whole; must be deemed the most decisive proof of the superiority of British military talent and bravery; and a battle to which the sons of Britain may always appeal with the proudest feelings, as challenging a comparison with any that history records.

The operations of his majesty's squadron upon the north coast of Spain were eminently serviceable to the allied army in their engagements with the French forces under general Marmont. Sir Home Popham, in a letter to the right honourable lord Keith, dated from on board the Venerable in the harbour of St. Andero, August 2, 1812, says, "I have the honour to enclose, for your lordship's information, a copy of a letter which I have just received from Sir Howard Douglas. I feel a great degree of satisfaction that the earl of Wellington should have so handsomely marked his approbation of the services of the squadron which your lordship has placed under my orders, and I am not a little happy at having anticipated the wishes of his lordship." The letter to which Sir Home Popham refers is as follows:

* "Whitehall, August 18, 1812.—His royal highness the Prince Regent has been pleased, in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, to grant the dignity of a Marshal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland unto the right honourable Arthur earl of Wellington, knight of the most honourable military order of the Bath, and the heirs male of his body lawfully begotten, by the name, stile, and title of Marquis Wellington, in the county of Somerset."

*“ Medina del Campo, Sunday,
August 2nd, 1812.*

“ The army is advancing; head quarters at Cuellar. The enemy still retiring, having abandoned Valladolid with four thousand sick and wounded, and stores, ammunition, &c. We are now a part of the allied army. I had an opportunity, in a long conference with lord Wellington, of giving a detailed account of your operations; and am happy to inform you, that his lordship is fully satisfied of the use they have been of to his movements. An intercepted letter from Caffarelli proves this, by stating, in answer to an order he had received to join Marmont, that a British armament being on the coast, he could not detach a single man; indeed some troops which he had already sent, were recalled on our appearance.

“ H. DOUGLAS.”

By other dispatches from Sir Home Popham, it appears, that the squadron under his orders being off Guetaria, an attack was intended to be made upon that place, and two companies of royal marines were landed, under major Williams, accompanied by general Carrol, for the purpose of reconnoitring; but some parties of the enemy being discovered crossing the hills, and the guerillas, whose co-operation had been expected, being engaged with the enemy in a different quarter, the plan of attack was relinquished, and the marines re-embarked, but without loss. The guerillas had been employed in an action with a detachment of the enemy conducting eighty prisoners from Asturias. One hundred and thirty of the enemy are stated to have been killed, and fifty taken, who had been left wounded on the field of battle, and the Spanish prisoners were liberated. On the 6th, Sir Home Popham arrived off Castro, where a twenty-four pounder, and a company of marines had been landed by Sir George Collier from the *Surveillante*, to assist colonel Longa in an attack on the place. Information was, however, received of the approach of two thousand five hundred French troops, whose ar-
rival

rival obliged Longa to retire, and the parties landed from the squadron were again re-embarked without loss. In the evening the enemy were seen marching into the town.

On the 7th the enemy were driven from the town by the fire of the squadron, and took post on the hills, and preparations were made for a landing, and attack on the castle on the following morning, which accordingly took place on the 8th, when the commandant of the castle surrendered with one hundred and fifty men, the remainder of the enemy's force having marched towards Lerido. Twenty-six guns of different sizes were found in the town and castle of Castro; those in the former were withdrawn, and the latter was put into a state of defence, and garrisoned by the marines and Spanish artillerymen of the Iris, captain Christian.

On the 10th the squadron proceeded off Puerta Galletta, to co-operate in an attack upon it with the Spanish troops under Longa; and on the 11th much firing was kept up against the batteries; but the enemy being found to be stronger than the Spaniards had expected, the attack was abandoned. During the morning, captain Bloye of the Lyra, landed with a party of marines, and knocked off the trunnions of the guns in the Bagona battery, and destroyed one mounted on a height. On the 12th the Venerable anchored off Castro, which had been feebly attacked by the enemy the evening before; one of the imperial guards was wounded, and brought in a prisoner. On the 15th, the enemy's moveable column having been drawn by a feint to Santona, from whence it could not reach Guetaria, in less than four days, another attack was intended to be made upon the latter place, in concert with the guerillas under Don Gaspar, and with the promised aid of one of the battalions under General Mina. Early in the morning of the 18th, one twenty-four pounder under lieutenant Grove, and a howitzer under lieutenant Lawrence, of the marine artillery, were landed from the Venerable, and mounted on a hill to the westward of Guetaria, under the directions of captain Malcolm,

colm, of the Rhin. while the honourable captain Bouverie landed with two guns (one short twenty-four-pounder and one twelve-pounder carronade) from the Medusa, and after many difficulties in drawing them up, mounted them on the top of a hill to the eastward. The Venerable's guns began firing at noon, and continued till sun-set, when those of the enemy on that side were silenced; and the Medusa's were put in readiness to open on the following morning. During the night, however, intelligence was received of the approach of a body of French troops, which afterwards proved to be a division of between two and three thousand men, that had just arrived at Saint Sebastian from France, and was immediately sent forward by forced marches to Guetaria. The uncertainty with respect to the enemy's force, and the disposition of the guerillas to oppose their advance, prevented the re-embarkation of the guns and men landed from the squadron, until the retreat of the Spaniards, after some skirmishing with the superior numbers of the French, in which the latter are stated to have suffered severely. Captain Bouverie then destroyed the two guns from the Medusa, and re-embarked with all his men, and every thing belonging to the guns. Captain Malcolm was detained longer, by a message brought to him by one of Don Gaspar's aid-de-camps, stating that the enemy had been beaten back, and urging him to remain in his battery; finding, however, that the enemy was advancing fast, he gave orders to re-embark, and brought off his party, with the exception of three midshipmen and twenty-nine men, who were taken prisoners, but fortunately without having one man killed or wounded. Sir Home Popham had sent to propose an exchange of the men taken on this occasion, for some of the French prisoners on board the squadron, and was in hopes of succeeding in this proposal. The Spaniards lost a captain of artillery, and had a serjeant and ten men badly wounded. Those in want of surgical aid were received on board the Venerable. The detachment
expected

expected from general Mina's army arrived the morning after the action, and joined Don Gaspar, having marched eighteen Spanish leagues in two days.

The joy and expectation created in England, when intelligence of the victory of Salamanca arrived were exceedingly great: the long protracted and long wished-for consequence of all our efforts in the Peninsula was now fondly anticipated as near at hand: nor were this joy and expectation without reasonable grounds. When the victory which we had gained at Salamanca was compared with the other victories which British valour had won in the Peninsula, there were many important circumstances which distinguished it, and seemed to promise that its results would be more decisive and lasting. In all our previous victories, we had done little more than repulse the enemy: they had attacked us, and we had kept our ground—bravely kept our ground, doubtlessly; but the consequence amounted to little more. In some cases we had pursued them for a short way; but they had invariably retired in such order, and so soon recovered their numerical superiority, or taken up such a strong position, that the fruits of our victory were confined to the advantages we gained on the field of battle: glory and honour by these battles we had gained in abundance: we had even gained more—we had disciplined our troops; so that they had become equal in this respect to those of the enemy. We had given them a feeling of superiority: we had obtained opportunities of proving or increasing the skill and experience of our officers. But the nation still anxiously looked for the time when they would reap all the advantages of this improved discipline and skill; and when the proud feeling of superiority which our officers and soldiers felt would have full play, and be crowned with its due triumph and reward:—this time came, when the battle of Salamanca was fought. The French army—before the battle, confident of its superior numerical strength, led on by a general in whom it placed the greatest reliance for brave and prudent skill,

skill, and witnessing the English army, as if sensible that it was unable to cope with it, retiring before it—was beaten; and beaten in such a manner, and to such a degree, that it not only suffered a loss of nearly one-third of its numbers on the field of battle, but fled, thus weakened, in the utmost disorder and confusion. The battle of Salamanca, therefore, on the part of the English, promised not a barren victory; and even those who, while they gloried in the former battles which their countrymen had gained in the Peninsula, lamented that they seemed not to forward the grand objects, either of rousing the Spaniards, or of expelling the French, acknowledged that now their hopes were sanguine on these points, and that they confidently expected that lord Wellington would be the saviour of the Peninsula.

On the other hand, those who had continually talked of the zeal of the Spanish nation, but who, when they were called upon to prove that zeal by its effects, had excused the Spaniards by appealing to the state of their country, occupied and oppressed by the enemy, now acknowledged that, as lord Wellington had, as it were, annihilated one of the main armies of that enemy, if the Spaniards did not step forward and exert themselves effectually in their own cause, their opinion of them would undergo a change, and their hopes of the deliverance of the Peninsula would become languid.

To military men the battle of Salamanca was particularly interesting and instructive: the manœuvres of both the armies for several days before the battle discovered great skill, under the direction and guidance of great caution and mutual apprehension on the part of the generals: but the superior merit, both in the manœuvres previous to the battle, in the manœuvre with which the British commander commenced the engagement, and in the evolutions during it, was undoubtedly on the side of lord Wellington. His object and interest were to retreat; his skill and attention, therefore, were directed to conduct his retreat in such a manner,

a manner, as not only to prevent Marmont from attacking him to advantage, but also to profit by any mistake which his adversary might commit. He had therefore to watch the army of the enemy, at the same time that he was directing the movements and operations and providing for the safe and effectual retreat of his own. The object and interest of Marmont were to press on lord Wellington, but not so closely as to bring on a battle where situation and circumstances were unfavourable: he was sensible of the skill and caution of lord Wellington, and of the bravery of the British troops: this skill and caution he hoped to confound and perplex by the variety of his manœuvres; and if he could succeed in this object, he trusted that his great numerical superiority would be a match for the superior bravery of the British army. The line of retreat offered Marmont frequent opportunities of manœuvring in such a manner as to conceal from lord Wellington what his real object was; whether he intended seriously to commence a general attack on the British army; and, if such were his serious intention, on what point the attack would take place. But Marmont was not equal to the execution of the plan he had laid down: this plan required not only to be successful, but that it should not prove detrimental to the party who had formed and were executing it; that while the attention of the British commander was diverted and distracted, the French army should not be put in a dangerous situation. Marmont seems to have thought that he could, by the variety and rapid change of his movements, so utterly and deeply fill the thoughts of lord Wellington for the protection and safety of his own army, that he would not be able to direct any active thought against the French army. In this Marmont under-rated the powers of lord Wellington's mind; and it is from a reference to this circumstance that we are best able to estimate the great merit of lord Wellington in the victory which he gained at Salamanca. This circumstance distinguished it far above

his former victories, not less than its consequences did; and this circumstance rendered it particularly interesting and instructive to military men. In his former victories, lord Wellington had not room for the full display of his military genius: they had been won as much by the discipline and valour of his troops, as by his own talents; since those talents, from the circumstances in which the battles were fought, could only exert themselves in the evolutions necessary during the battles; whereas at Salamanca there was ample room for the display and exercise of military genius of the highest order and rarest kind. It has always been considered as a decisive proof of Moreau's* military talents, that in his celebrated retreat from Germany, he conducted it with such skill as to be able more than once to turn on his pursuers, and to check their progress by a partial defeat: but he was never able completely to defeat and disperse the pursuing army. In this respect, therefore, lord Wellington's merit and military character seem superior to Moreau's, since he actually engaged and destroyed that very army before which he was retreating. In the official account which the French published of the battle of Salamanca, they in a manner acknowledged the superior skill of the British general;—an acknowledgement which, in all the former defeats they had suffered from him, they had been unwilling to make. The circumstance to which they principally attribute their disasters at Salamanca, is the mistake of one of the subordinate generals; but of this mistake it is evident, from their own account, that lord Wellington took not only the most prompt but the most effectual advantage. Here, then, both parties agree; and from the acknowledgement of our enemies we are justified in claiming for lord Wellington all that merit which

* General Moreau had joined the army of the allies in Germany, on the renewal of hostilities between France and the northern powers, in 1813, was severely wounded in a dreadful action with the French forces in September that year, and died of his wounds in a few days.

a military man can derive from being superior to his opponent (and that opponent a man of no mean fame) in quickness and comprehension of mind; and in claiming for the British soldiers that merit which can be derived from the display and exercise of that degree of discipline and bravery which were necessary to answer the expectation, and to carry into full and glorious execution the plans of their commander.

As soon as Joseph Bonaparte, who had proceeded from Madrid with the army of the centre, in the hope of being able to effect a junction with Marmont before his engagement with lord Wellington, perceived that he was too late, and that, in consequence of the battle of Salamanca, it would be necessary to change his plans, he returned to Segovia, after his advanced guard had reached Venta de San Raphael. His object was, by this retrograde movement, to draw lord Wellington off from the further pursuit of Marmont's army, and thus afford them an opportunity of maintaining themselves upon the Douro. The British general, however, penetrated this design, and did not permit himself to be diverted from his main object. The rear guard of the defeated army remained in some strength on the left of the Douro during the 28th and 29th of July; but they were attacked, and compelled to join the main body near Villa Vanez, abandoning Valladolid. As soon as the army of Portugal had been thus driven completely from the Douro, lord Wellington's object was to prevent a junction between it and the army of the centre: while, therefore, part of the British forces continued the pursuit of the army of Portugal, lord Wellington himself, at the head of the remaining forces, directed his movements against Joseph Bonaparte: both the French armies retired as the British advanced, the army of Portugal in the direction of Burgos, and Joseph Bonaparte in such a direction as plainly proved he meant to abandon Madrid*, and to retire upon Toledo

* Madrid is the capital of New Castile, and of all Spain. It is the royal residence, and lies in the middle of a large sandy plain, surrounded

Toledo and Aranjuez. In order, however, to delay the advance of the British, he left some forces in the pass of the Guadarama: these forces were attacked by the Portuguese, who succeeded without difficulty in

surrounded with hills, but has neither wall nor ditch round it. The little river Mazanares lies on its W. side, over which king Philip II. built a long and stately stone bridge at Segovia, which cost him two hundred thousand ducats. The number of streets here are said to be four hundred, which are broad and strait, ornamented with statues and marble fountains; and since his present majesty's accession, have been neatly paved, but are badly lighted. The houses are lofty, but built of brick, and with lattice windows, mostly of canvas, or some slight oiled cloth. The rich have theirs glazed in casements or sashes; but these are taken down in summer, and a thinner sort put up to let in the fresh air. Here are fourteen stately squares, one of which, called Place Mayor, or the large market-place, would be a fine square were it kept clean; but it is commonly crowded with small stalls and provisions. Here are celebrated the bull-baitings in memory of their victories and successes, for which reason the stately uniform houses in it have balconies and galleries to each story for the convenience of the spectators, the whole supported by an arched cloister or colonade. Here also are exhibited other public shows, it being spacious enough to contain fifty thousand spectators; at which times, the women especially adorn themselves in the most magnificent manner, and have sumptuous equipages. The balconies and fronts of their houses are set off with rich tapestry, carpets, pictures, and every thing beautiful, and in the night with a variety of wax-candles and tapers; and then only the fair sex are allowed to appear unveiled. The houses of the nobility have no courts before them, but stand even with the street; yet they are mostly built of stone in an elegant taste, and very richly furnished, especially with plate. In Madrid are one hundred and sixty thousand inhabitants, eighteen parishes, fifty-seven monasteries and nunneries, a great number of chapels, twenty-two hospitals and charitable foundations. Among these, the general hospital for all nations and distempers seldom has less than five hundred patients, and sometimes one thousand, with one hundred persons who attend on them. Its yearly revenue is thirty thousand ducats; besides, the sums that come in by charitable gifts, contributions, legacies, and other private ways, are reckoned still greater. Provisions in Madrid are generally plentiful, very good, and not dear; and the continual residence of the court here occasions a brisk trade. There is an academy founded by Philip IV. and a public library. The Prado much resembles the Boulevards at Paris, in being without the city, and because the company take an airing there in their carriages.

The

in gaining the pass: yet a very short time afterwards these same Portuguese troops, when ordered to attack a large division of French cavalry, were seized with an unaccountable panic, and in their retreat threw the troops in their rear into disorder. It is, however, but justice to the Portuguese officers to mention, that on this occasion they behaved with the greatest gallantry.

The following are extracts from lord Wellington's dispatches relative to his entry into Madrid, dated the 13th and 15th of August, 1812:

“ HAVING, says his lordship, found that the army under marshal Marmont continued their retreat upon Burgos, in a state not likely to take the field again for some time, I determined to bring Joseph Bonaparte to a general action, or force him to quit Madrid. Accordingly I moved from Cuellar

The want of order and method in the plan of the new palace, is made up by a profusion of painting and gilding: the building is square, with a court in the centre, round which is a gallery in the manner of a cloister; the chapel is elegant, and well decorated; there are some fine ornaments of marble of La Manche. Here are three royal palaces, namely, the one on the W. side of the city, which stands high, El Buen Retiro, at the end of the Prado, a majestic palace, adorned with the costliest furniture, and paintings of the greatest masters: its gardens are a perfect paradise. The third palace is the Casa del Campo, of the duke of Mediraceli, a building void of taste. There are no hackney-coaches at Madrid; but carriages may be hired at eight or nine French livres per day; and calashes drawn by men, at twenty shillings or a piezzetta, the fare. The Prado is delightfully shaded with regular rows of poplar trees, and watered with twenty-three fountains. The great church is sumptuous and magnificent, both within and without; as also the monasteries, town-hall, &c. The houses of the higher rank amount to about twelve thousand, as do those of the lower sort, or rather more; and the whole circuit of the town is reckoned nine miles. The royal cabinet of natural history, which was opened by the king's orders in 1775, contains a great many valuable curiosities. Madrid is governed by a corregidor or supreme judge, something like our lord mayor, but chosen by the king; he is not a merchant, or tradesman, but a gentleman at least, and well versed in the law. Under him are forty-one regidores, not unlike our aldermen, who compose his counsel, and act as judges under him. Madrid lies five hundred and ninety-one miles S. W. of Paris, six hundred and twenty in the same direction from London, two hundred and eighty-nine E. of Lisbon.

on the 6th instant. We arrived at Segovia on the 7th, and at St. Ildefonso on the 8th, where I halted one day, to allow the right of the army more time to come up. No opposition was made to the passage of the troops through the mountains; and brigadier-general D'Urban, with the Portuguese cavalry, and the 1st light battalion of the king's German legion, and captain M'Donald's troop of horse artillery had been through the Guadarama pass since the 9th. He moved forward on the morning of the 11th from the neighbourhood of Galapagas, and supported by the heavy cavalry of the king's German legion from Torre lo Dones, he drove in the French cavalry, about two thousand in number, and placed himself at Majalahonda, with the Portuguese cavalry, and captain M'Donald's troop, and the cavalry and light infantry of the king's German legion at Las Royas, about three quarters of a mile distant. The enemy's cavalry which had been driven off in the morning, and had moved towards Naval Carnero, returned about five in the afternoon, and brigadier general D'Urban having formed the Portuguese cavalry in front of Majalahonda, supported by the horse artillery, ordered the cavalry to charge the enemy's leading squadrons, which appeared too far advanced to be supported by their main body. The Portuguese cavalry advanced to the attack, but unfortunately turned about before they reached the enemy; and they fled through the village of Majalahonda, and back upon the German dragoons; leaving behind them, unprotected and unsupported, those guns of captain M'Donald's troop, which had been moved forward to co-operate with the cavalry. By the activity of the officers and soldiers of captain M'Donald's troop, the guns were however moved off; but owing to the unfavourable nature of the ground over which they were moved, the carriage of one was broken, and two others were overturned; and these three guns fell into the enemy's hands. The Portuguese dragoons having fled through Majalahonda, were rallied and re-formed upon the heavy dragoons of the king's German legion, which were formed between that village and Las Royas. The German cavalry charged the enemy, although under many disadvantages, and stopped their further progress; but I am sorry to say, that they suffered considerable loss, and that colonel Jonqueires, who commanded the brigade, was taken prisoner. The left of the army was about two miles and a half distant, at the Puente de Ratamar, on the Guadarama river, and colonel Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry and a brigade of infantry of the 7th division having moved forward to the support of the troops in advance, the enemy retired upon Majalahonda as soon as they observed

observed these troops ; and night having come on they retired upon Alcorcon, leaving our guns at Majalahonda. The army moved forward yesterday morning, (the 12th,) and its left took possession of the city of Madrid, Joseph Bonaparte having retired with the army of the centre by the roads of Toledo and Aranjuez, leaving a garrison in the Retiro. It is impossible to describe the joy manifested by the inhabitants of Madrid upon our arrival ; and I hope that the prevalence of the same sentiments of detestation of the French yoke, and of a strong desire to secure the independence of their country, which first induced them to set the example of resistance to the usurper, will induce them to make exertions in the cause of their country, which will be more efficacious than those formerly made."

Madrid, August 15, 1812.

" I HAVE the pleasure to inform your lordship, that the garrison of the Retiro surrendered by capitulation yesterday ; and I have now the honour to enclose a translation of the capitulation. We invested the place completely on the evening of the 13th ; and in the night, detachments of the 7th division of infantry, under the command of major-general Hope, and of the 3d division of infantry, under the command of major-general the honourable E. Pakenham, drove in the enemy's posts from the Prado and the Botanical Garden, and from the works which they had constructed outside of the park wall ; and having broken through the wall in different places, they were established in the palace of the Retiro, and close to the exterior of the enemy's works, enclosing the building called la China. The troops were preparing in the morning to attack those works, preparatory to the arrangements to be adopted for the attack of the interior line and building, when the governor sent out an officer to desire to capitulate ; and I granted him the honours of war, the baggage of the officers and soldiers of the garrison, &c. as specified in the enclosed agreement. I enclose a return of the strength of the garrison, which marched out yesterday at four o'clock, on their road to Ciudad Rodrigo. We have found in the place one hundred and eighty-nine pieces of brass ordnance, in excellent condition ; nine hundred barrels of powder ; twenty thousand stand of arms ; and considerable magazines of clothing, provisions, and ammunition.— We have likewise found the eagles of the 13th and 51st regiments, which I forward to England, to be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, by my aid-de camp, major Burgh. I enclose returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the affair at Majalahonda on the 11th instant, and of the loss in the attack of the works of the Retiro.

" Trans-

“ Translation.—Capitulation proposed by general the earl of Wellington, commander-in-chief of the allied army, and accepted by colonel la Fond, commandant of the fort of la China, 14th August, 1812.—Article I. The garrison shall march out of the fort with the honours of war, and shall lay down their arms on the glacis.—Article II. The garrison, and persons of every description in the fort, shall be prisoners of war.—Article III. The officers shall be allowed to retain their swords, their baggage, and their horses, according to the number allowed them by the regulations of the French army; and the soldiers shall keep their knapsacks.—Article IV. The magazines of the fort of every description shall be delivered to the officers of the respective departments, and the French commandants of artillery and of engineers, shall furnish lists of the contents of each dépôt. The plans of the fort shall also be delivered to the commanding officer of the British engineers.—Article V. This capitulation shall take place at four o'clock in the afternoon, and the gates of the fort shall be occupied by the troops of the allied army as soon as this capitulation is ratified.—Signed on the part of general the earl of Wellington,

“ F. SOMERSET,

“ *lieutenant-colonel, and military-secretary.*

Ratified, WELLINGTON.

“ Signed on the part of colonel la Fond, R. DE LA BRUNE.

“ This capitulation is ratified by the
colonel commanding la China.

LA FOND.

“ The amount of prisoners of war taken at the fort de la China, in the Retiro, and in the general hospital la Atocha, on the 14th August, 1812. Total taken at the fort, two colonels, four lieutenant-colonels, twenty-two captains, thirty-five subalterns, seven staff, three civil officers, one thousand, nine hundred, and eighty-two serjeants, drummers, and rank and file, forty-six horses and mules. Total taken at the general hospital, one captain, five subalterns, sixteen civil officers, four hundred and twenty-nine serjeants, drummers, and rank and file. General total taken, two thousand, five hundred, and six.—Besides the above, six rank and file British; six officers, and one hundred and forty-four rank and file, Spaniards, were re-taken in fort la China. Lord Wellington's loss on this occasion was only one rank and file killed, and sixteen wounded.

“ And by the return of ordnance, ammunition, and stores, found in the redoubt of la China, on the capitulation on the 14th instant, it appears that there were one hundred and eighty-nine pieces of ordnance, twenty-one thousand, nine hundred, and twenty-one round shot of sorts. One thousand,

and, one hundred, and forty-eight shells, empty, of sorts. Four thousand, nine hundred, and fifty-seven case shot of sorts. One thousand, eight hundred, and four shells for howitzers, of sorts. One hundred and sixty-five empty grenades, twenty-six thousand, four hundred, and thirty-eight balls, cast-iron sorts, one hundred and forty-nine gun and howitzer carriages, ditto, six beds for mortars ditto, twenty-two thousand, six hundred, and seventy-seven muskets, of several kinds, serviceable and repairable, one carbine, one hundred and twenty-three musketoons, four hundred and fifty-three pistols. Six thousand, seven hundred, and thirty-six bayonets of sorts, one thousand, four hundred, and thirty swords of ditto, twenty-nine spontoons, five hundred and ten powder barrels, seven thousand, eight hundred, and five cartridges of sorts, filled for guns. Three millions, four hundred, and fourteen thousand, eight hundred, and twenty ball cartridges, six thousand blank ditto, for exercise, three hundred and five thousand, and thirty-four flints, two hundred and nine thousand, one hundred and sixty lbs. lead of sorts, six pontoons of wood, with carriages and apparatus, seventy-six cascons of different descriptions, eighty-three waggons, carts, forges, and other carriages."

Besides which there was a great quantity of engineers, stores.

"It is impossible," observes lord Wellington in his official dispatch, announcing his entry into Madrid,—
 "it is impossible to describe the joy manifested by the inhabitants of Madrid upon our arrival; and I hope that the prevalence of the same sentiments of detestation of the French yoke, and of a strong desire to secure the independence of their country, which first induced them to set the example of resistance to the usurper, will induce them to make exertions in the cause of their country which will be more efficacious than those formerly made*."

Without

* It is totally impossible to give any adequate description of the rapturous joy with which the army and its illustrious commander were received by the inhabitants. In all periods of the history of Spain, the people of Madrid, from some cause or other, have peculiarly manifested a lofty and generous courage; and even in the most unfavourable times, have expressed themselves with a freedom the more honourable, inasmuch as it was the more dangerous. In the war of the succession, between the two

Without doubt the British army and the British nation had a right to expect that the Spaniards would

claimants of the house of Austria and Bourbon, Charles of Austria obtained a temporary possession of the capital, and was proclaimed king by the party who espoused his cause. The people of Madrid, however, having previously espoused the part of his rival, Philip of Bourbon, did not desert him, at least so far as the expression of their feelings went, even in the most desperate state of his affairs. A contemporary historian thus describes the regal procession of Charles through the streets of Madrid: "His majesty and train, immediately after being crowned, moved through the principal streets; and it being the custom of the Spaniards to salute their kings upon these occasions, by a display of all their richest garments, carpets, and silk hangings, from their balconies; by flags, music, and the acclamations of handsome women, his majesty and train certainly expected their own share. But they were sorely and grievously disappointed. Every door and window was shut up and barred as if it was a deep rainy midnight. No flags, no music, no women, no acclamations, no spectators. The king's train waved their own hats, and made some huzzas, but they received no answer, and it became so mournfully ridiculous, that the king himself said, 'This will never do—they will not have me for their king.' And his majesty was never afterwards very warm in the effort, and he gave up the game to king Philip, more in despair, than that he was actually beaten."

And yet Charles had at this period the possession of the capital with his army. "But when king Philip afterwards made his entry, the very stones almost seemed animated, and there was nothing but light, life, music, and joy; dancing and flags, women and men embracing each other, and balconies, streets, and churches dressed in all the richest embroidery of embossed gold and silver, &c. &c." These passages are not quoted literally; but we remember to have read passages equivalent thereto, and that they struck us at the time as eminently characteristic of a noble and generous-minded people.

It would be a difficult task to present the reader with a suitable description of the joy, which the inhabitants of Madrid evinced on the entrance of lord Wellington into their city, after it had been evacuated by Joseph Bonaparte on the present occasion. Suffice it to say, if we may be allowed to indulge in metaphor, that the brightest effulgence of a midsummer sun, shining down upon the bounty of a benevolent Providence, on fields clothed with the gorgeous pride of harvest, and nature dressed in all her array of fruits and flowers, has not an air of more cheering gaiety, and of more pointed brilliancy, than had the general aspect and countenance of the population of Madrid upon this entrance of their brave deliverer.

now exert themselves with energy: their capital had been again put into their possession—won for them by the blood and at the expence of their allies—while they had scarcely yet acted or suffered in their own cause with any degree of vigour, perseverance, or success. What had been thus gained for them, it was not assuredly too much to expect that they would use their utmost and combined endeavours to preserve. It had been said, that the Spanish nation were as one man in their detestation of the French, and in their love of their own individual and national independence; and yet, we might ask, when had such detestation and such love been so utterly without visible signs or corresponding conduct? Britain was willing to make every allowance for the degradation their national character had so materially suffered during a long series of weak monarchs: yet in the course of nearly four years of revolutionary warfare, energy ought to have been infused into their character; their talents and virtues, if they had any, ought certainly to have emerged from the obscurity in which they had so long lain. Britain was willing to make due allowance for their want of military discipline and experience, and for the hostile armies by which they were overwhelmed: but, in four years, discipline and experience, one would imagine, ought to have been acquired; and the prowess of the British troops had proved that the common enemy was not invincible:—they had done more—by the battle of Salamanca, they had dispersed one of the principal armies of the French emperor, and opened a field for the exertions of the Spaniards themselves.

But a few days before lord Wellington entered Madrid, a large body of troops under general Maitland arrived at Alicant from Sicily; it was expected that their arrival would hasten the consummation of the plan now generally supposed to be practicable, that by keeping Suchet and Soult in check in the south of Spain, these generals would not be able to advance against lord Wellington, and thus his lord-

ship would have ample time and opportunity to complete his operations in the north. But before general Maitland's force could be effectual, it was necessary that it should be joined by the Spaniards; and unfortunately, just about the time of its landing, the Spanish general O'Donnel was completely defeated by the French under general Harispe: in consequence of this, the enemy were enabled to block general Maitland up in Alicant*. This army during the whole of the campaign was utterly useless, sometimes from the disasters of the Spanish, or the obstinacy of their generals, and sometimes from the inexperience and inactivity of its own commander; so that it continued at Alicant, exciting the indignation of the British nation, and the ridicule of the enemy.

The first fruit of the victory of Salamanca was the restoration of Madrid to the Spaniards: the second was the raising of the siege of Cadiz. Soult, who commanded the French armies in Andalusia, and upon whose position in the neighbourhood of Seville the safety of the force that besieged Cadiz depended, thought it prudent, as soon as he heard of the battle of Salamanca, and of the advance of lord Wellington

* Alicant is a large sea-port town in the province of Valencia in Spain. It is seated between the mountains and the sea, and is defended by a castle which has generally been deemed impregnable. The port is also defended by three bastions, well furnished with artillery. This place was formerly greatly annoyed by the predatory visits of the Algerine pirates, and to guard the inhabitants against the attacks of these maulauders, watch-towers were erected, to give notice of the approach of an enemy's ship. It was taken from the Moors in the year 1264. The castle was taken by the English in the year 1706, and held out during a siege of two years, before it was retaken by the French and Spaniards, and at last it surrendered upon honourable terms, after part of the rock was blown up on which the castle stood, and the governor killed. The houses are lofty and well built, and the inhabitants carry on a good trade, particularly in wine and fruit. It is seated on the Mediterranean, on a bay of the same name, thirty-seven miles north-east of Murcia, and seventy-five south of Valencia.

to Madrid, to make preparations for evacuating that part of Spain. His situation was indeed critical; and though he was undoubtedly a general of very considerable talents, and had under him a numerous army, yet he was sensible that only quickness of movement could extricate him from his difficulties. General Hill with a large British force was on the confines of Estremadura; a Spanish army was on the Niebla; and Ballasteros, constantly active, and constantly repairing his defeats with his zeal, perseverance, and activity, was on the Ronda. Besides these hostile troops with which Soult was in a manner surrounded, it was necessary for him either to keep open a direct and constant communication with the lines before Cadiz, or to withdraw the forces from the siege of that city altogether. He was not long in determining on his plan: before he moved, he addressed his army in language which, for its sincerity, was rather unusual from a French general. He acknowledged that "misfortunes had befallen the imperial eagle,"—alluding to the defeat of Marmont's army; but he cheered and animated his own troops with the belief, that they were destined to avenge these misfortunes. After this address, Soult moved in such a manner as indicated an intention to evacuate Andalusia; and, as a consequence of this movement, the French troops before Cadiz raised the siege of that city.

By a letter from major-general George Cooke, dated Cadiz, August 26, it appears, that the enemy abandoned his positions and works opposite to Cadiz and the Isle of Leon, on the night of the 24th, and morning of the 25th of August, except the town of Porto Santa Maria, where a body of troops remained till the middle of the day, and then withdrew to the Cartuga. The French left a very numerous artillery in the several works, and a large quantity of stores and powder; and although most of the ordnance had been rendered useless, the French appear to have retired from their position with more precipitation than

than the British commander could have expected. A considerable body of cavalry was brought down previous to the retreat commencing. The towns of Puerto Real and Chiclana were then occupied by detachments of Spanish troops, and a party of the 2nd Hanooverian hussars.

It may not be improper in this place to state the condition of Spain at the period of the evacuation of Cadiz: Gallicia, Leon, and the Asturias were completely freed from the dominion and the presence of the French: the enemy had made such movements in Biscay for the purpose of joining the remains of Marmont's army, as indicated the plan of abandoning that province: Madrid, the greater part of New Castile, and La Mancha, by the victory of lord Wellington, had been freed from the yoke of oppression: Soult was evacuating Andalusia: the French still retained Murcia and Valencia, where Suchet, a general of very great enterprise, and hitherto of very great success, commanded a considerable body of troops: in Navarre, the partizan Mina was indefatigable in attacking the enemy; he harassed them continually; he cut off their straggling parties and their provisions; he had even in more than one instance penetrated into France, carrying into the country of the enemy desolation and terror; Arragon was partly freed from the French, and partly occupied by them: the Catalans were distinguishing themselves for that spirited and active warfare that had handed down the name of their ancestors with such honour; and though they had not been able to free their province from the French, yet they had rendered their abode in it most destructive.—Such was the picture of Spain at this time, and when viewed in this light it was certainly most flattering and promising. But it is necessary to place it in another point of view, and to consider the forces which the enemy still possessed in the Peninsula, and the means which the British and Spaniards had to drive them out of it. The view we have just taken of Spain proves that the French had not yet been able to
effect

effect their purpose: it proves, that of a considerable part of the country they had no possession, and that the country which they actually did possess was held on a very precarious tenure. But this view says more for the spirit and activity of the guerillas than of the regular army of Spain: and though the guerillas might be able to prevent the French from conquering the Peninsula, they would never of themselves be able to drive them out of it.

The force of the enemy, even after the defeat which they suffered at Salamanca, may be estimated at one hundred and thirty thousand: these troops were under general Clausel, (who with general Caffarelli had taken the command of the wreck of Marmont's army,) Suchet, Soult, and Joseph Bonaparte.

Hitherto the French had injured their cause by their armies not acting together in the execution of one plan; this blunder they now seemed determined to avoid. Soult, in evacuating Andalusia, evidently intended to press forward on Madrid; while Marmont's army, now collected and reinforced by troops from Biscay, &c. advanced in the direction of Burgos: lord Wellington they thus hoped would be placed in a critical situation, and be compelled to retire from Madrid in order to attack or watch the army of Marmont. But before the French could execute this plan, it was necessary they should make great sacrifices: one they had already made, in raising the siege of Cadiz. As soon as the British troops in this city were set free, they marched in the direction of Seville, for the purpose of harassing Soult's retreat. This general seems to have had some intention of defending and preserving Seville, and accordingly he left his rear guard, consisting of about three or four thousand men, in that city; but upon the approach of the British from Cadiz they evacuated it: and thus the capital of Andalusia was restored to the Spaniards.

The following is extracted from the dispatch of colonel Skerrett, dated Seville, August 28, 1812:

"I HAVE," says colonel Skerrett, "the honour to report the movements of the detachment under my orders; the re-

sult of which, the capture of the city of Seville by assault, defended by eight French battalions and two regiments of dragoons intrenched, will, I trust, be considered as honourable to the allied arms, and serviceable to the cause of Spain. On the 24th instant, (August,) general Cruz Mourgeon commanding the Spanish troops, and myself, judged it advisable to make a forward movement on Seville: for this purpose it was advisable to force the enemy's corps of observation of three hundred and fifty cavalry and two hundred infantry, at St. Lucar el Mayor. I marched from Manzanilla with eight hundred troops, composed of the 1st regiment of guards, the 87th, and the Portuguese regiment, brigadier-general Downie, accompanied with six hundred Spanish troops. The Spanish column attacked on the right, and the British and Portuguese on the left. The French were driven through the streets with precipitation, leaving some killed, wounded, and prisoners. We took post at San Lucar without the loss of a man. On the 26th instant, general Cruz and myself having judged that it would be attended with the most beneficial effects, both on the public opinion and in saving the city from being plundered, if the French could be precipitated in their retreat from Seville; the allied troops, in consequence, marched for this purpose, and arrived at the heights of Castillejos de la Cuesta, immediately above Seville, on the morning of the 27th, at six o'clock. The Spanish troops formed our advance. The French advance was driven in; the cavalry retired, leaving the infantry in the plain, which last were charged by the Spanish cavalry, who made many prisoners. The Spanish troops attacked a redoubt on our left, and lost a good many men. The columns advanced into the plain, by which movement this redoubt was turned, and its communication cut off; the Spanish troops under general Cruz took the right, and made a detour to arrive and attack on that flank of Triana (the suburbs of Seville.) I ordered the redoubt to be masked by a detachment of the 20th Portuguese regiment, and advanced a field piece with some troops, to keep in check the enemy's fire at one of the gates of the city opposite to us; and after giving sufficient time for the Spanish column to arrive, the British and Portuguese troops advanced to the attack in front; the cavalry and artillery advanced at a gallop, supported by the grenadiers of the guards, and the infantry following. The enemy abandoned the gate: we entered the suburbs, and advanced near to the bridge of Seville with as much rapidity as possible, in hopes of preventing its destruction, which would have rendered it extremely difficult for us to succeed. We were checked by the fire of grape-shot and musketry at the turning of the street.

street. The grenadiers of the guards advanced to our support, and drove every thing before them. At this moment part of the Spanish column arrived; we advanced to the bridge under a heavy fire; captain Cadoux, of the 95th, with great judgement made a flank movement on our left; captain Roberts, of the artillery, brought up with rapidity two guns; a heavy fire of cannon and musketry was soon brought to bear on the enemy, who were driven from their position on the other side of the river, and from the bridge, which they had only in part destroyed. The grenadiers of the guards, and some Spanish troops, led the columns that crossed the bridge. A general rout ensued, and the enemy were driven through the streets, which were strewed with their dead, and pursued at all points, leaving behind them valuable captures of horses, baggage, and money. It is difficult for me to express the joy of the people of Seville*. The inhabitants, under the fire
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* Seville is an ancient, large, rich, populous, and very handsome city of Spain. It is the capital of Andalusia, and is one of the most considerable places in the Spanish monarchy. This city is seated in a large plain, near the river Guadalquiver, and occupies more ground than Madrid, though it has not so many inhabitants: there being only twenty-four thousand families in the city, and about three thousand in the suburbs. It is of a circular form, and its fortifications consist of strong walls, flanked with lofty towers. The Moors built an aqueduct six miles in length, which is still to be seen. The cathedral church is the largest in Spain, and stands in the middle of the city: its roof is extremely high, and is supported by two rows of stately columns: it is one hundred and seventy-five feet in length, and eighty in breadth, and its chapels are built in the antique manner. The steeple is of very curious workmanship, and exceedingly lofty, consisting of three towers, one above another, with galleries and balconies. Besides the cathedral, there are several other churches, particularly those belonging to religious houses. They reckon eighty-five benefices, and three thousand five hundred chaplains. The convent of St. Francis is the most curious, and is adorned with a very handsome public square, in the midst of which is a fine fountain. It contains one hundred and sixty monks, besides one hundred and forty strangers of the same order; the church is built in the Gothic taste. The cloister is supported by marble pillars, and is embellished with good paintings. The university of Seville consists of many colleges, where the professors live at their ease, enjoying rich stipends. Near the cathedral is the royal palace called Alcazar, which was partly built by the Moors after the antique, and partly in the modern taste by king Pedro: it is a mile in extent, and is flanked with large, square, strong towers, built with stones

of the French, brought planks to lay across the bridge; and their acclamations and vociferous marks of joy, added to the immense crowd, rendered it extremely difficult for the officers to advance through the streets with their columns. The vast extent of this city, the exhausted state of the troops who had advanced in double quick time for three miles, and the want of cavalry, rendered it impossible to continue the pursuit beyond the town.—Such was the rapidity of our attack, that this victory over a French division, and the passage of a bridge which the enemy had materially destroyed, with his infantry and artillery, formed on the banks of the river, was achieved with a loss that appears almost incredible. I have only to regret the loss of one officer, lieutenant Brett, royal artillery, who was killed, gallantly fighting his gun, at the bridge. The intrepidity of this valuable officer was observed by the whole detachment. The loss of the enemy must have been very great. We have taken several officers, and near two hundred prisoners.

taken from the ancient temple of Hercules. Some connoisseurs assert, that this structure has not its equal in Europe. The exchange where the merchants meet is behind the cathedral, and is a square building of the Tuscan order, each front being one hundred feet in length, and three stories high. The suburb stands on the other side of the river, over which there is a long bridge, supported by boats. The town-house is adorned with a great number of statues, and there is a large square before it, with a fine fountain in the middle. There are one hundred and twenty hospitals richly endowed, and the physicians are ordered to spare no cost to cure their patients. The pleasant situation of Seville, near the sea, renders it one of the most trading and rich cities in Spain. The East and West India companies have their houses here, where they are obliged to register themselves and their merchandize: their ships indeed stop in the harbour of Cadiz, but their lading is carried from thence to Seville. At the mint of Seville all the gold and silver is coined, there being above six hundred men employed in the mint. The common people are unpolite, but the gentlemen and principal citizens quite otherwise. The women are handsome, addicted to gallantry, and often deceive their husbands, notwithstanding their vigilance. The country about it is extremely fertile in corn, wine, and every thing else that contributes to the pleasure of life; and there is vast plenty of oil. To the west of the river there is a grove of olive trees which extends for several miles. The Spaniards commonly say, "Ouen no ha visto Sevilla, no ha visto maravilla:" that is, "He who has not seen Seville, has not seen a miracle." It is forty-miles from the sea, one hundred and twelve W. of Granada, and two hundred and twelve S. by W. of Madrid.

In consequence of general Marmont's army resuming offensive operations, lord Wellington judged it prudent to leave Madrid on the 1st of September : it was hoped, however, that the army under general Hill would be sufficient to protect the capital from any force that marshal Soult might bring against it. Lord Wellington had been blamed, and with some appearance of reason, for continuing inactive in Madrid for such a length of time. From his lordship's character we must suppose, that though he was not engaged in military operations, he was not therefore idle ; that during his stay in the capital he was employed in organizing the civil affairs of Spain, and in endeavouring to enable the Spaniards to draw all the beneficial effects from the restoration of their capital which it was capable of affording. But it may be questioned, whether all attention to civil affairs on the part of lord Wellington ought not to have been postponed till the enemy were completely driven out of the Peninsula ; and at any rate, whether the possibility of Madrid again falling into their hands ought not to have been carefully avoided.

On the 7th of September lord Wellington arrived at Valladolid*, and on the 10th he moved on to Cigales ;
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* Valladolid is an ancient, large, and handsome city of Old Castile, and the capital of a principality of the same name. It is the see of a bishop, and the seat of an university. It is surrounded with strong walls, embellished with handsome buildings, large public squares, piazzas, and fountains. It is large and populous, containing eleven thousand houses, with fine long and broad streets, and large high houses, adorned with balconies. The market place, called El Campo, is seven hundred paces in circumference, surrounded with a great number of convents, and is the place where the fairs are kept. There is another square in the middle of the city, surrounded with handsome brick houses, having under them piazzas where people may walk dry in all weathers. Within these piazzas merchants and tradesmen keep their shops ; all the houses are of the same height, being four stories ; and there are balconies at every window, of iron gilt. In the whole there are seventy monasteries and nunneries, the finest of which is that of the Dominicans, remarkable for its church, which is one of the most mag-

on the 12th he established his head-quarters at Torquemada. The French army retired slowly before him, being never more than two leagues in advance. As lord Wellington had been obliged to quit Madrid and return to the north of Spain, he seemed resolved now to complete that which it was supposed he had completed before—the destruction or expulsion from the Peninsula, of Marmont's army; he therefore pushed on in pursuit of them with as much celerity as possible. They took the line of Burgos: it was therefore thought necessary to reduce that place before the pursuit of the enemy was followed up. Soon after lord Wellington advanced into the north of Spain, he was joined by the Gallician army; and the number of troops that actually joined him, compared with the strength which that army was represented to be of, will abundantly serve to point out how little reliance can be placed on the statements of the Spaniards respecting the condition or the strength of their armies. The Gallician army was always represented to consist of thirty thousand men; and these troops were said to be well disciplined, well provided with every thing, and commanded by able and experienced officers. In fact, only ten thousand infantry and three hundred

nificent in the city. The kings resided a long while at this place, and the royal palace, which still remains, is of very large extent, though but two stories high; within are fine paintings of various kinds, and at one of the corners a curious clock made in the same manner as that of Strasburg. Besides this there are several other places which a traveller ought to visit; not to mention those belonging to noblemen, nor the houses of rich citizens, which have all their particular beauties. There are other public squares, which we have not room to describe; and therefore we shall only take notice, that another of them is surrounded with one hundred and thirty churches, chapels, convents, and hospitals; and that the town-house stands on one of the sides. The house of the inquisition is an odd sort of a structure, for there are no windows, but a few holes to let in the light. The environs of the city are a fine plain covered with gardens, orchards, vineyards, meadows, and fields. It is seated on the rivers Esciarion and Pisaerga, near the Douro, fifty-two miles S. W. of Burgos, eighty S. E. of Leon, and ninety-five N. by W. of Madrid.

cavalry

cavalry joined lord Wellington; and his lordship soon found that he had been deceived, not only respecting the numerical strength of this army, but also respecting the efficiency of the men and officers. The situation of Spain was now again critical: the French had succeeded in their plan so far, as to have obliged lord Wellington to quit Madrid. This city was indeed not left uncovered, as general Hill on the 14th of September had already advanced to Truxillo*, and was hastening to its defence: but, on the other hand, Soult joined by Joseph Bonaparte was collecting such reinforcements as might render it doubtful whether Madrid would be safe, even under the protection of general Hill. Such was the state of the centre of Spain at this time; nor was the situation of the north in reality less critical: the remains of Marmont's army, though collected and reinforced, were not able, indeed, to make a successful stand before lord Wellington; and if his lordship could speedily reduce Burgos, he might advance against them, and compel them to retreat even to the Pyrennees before they could resume offensive operations. Every thing, however, depended upon the fall of Burgos; and to this object, therefore, lord Wellington directed his attention and efforts.

On the 16th of September, Marmont's army, about twenty thousand strong, took up a very favourable position in a valley through which lord Wellington must pass, in order to reach Burgos: on the following day they were driven from it to the heights close to the city, through which they retired in the course of the night. Nothing now prevented the British commander from commencing his operations against Burgos; the city was incapable of defence: but the

* Truxillo is a considerable town of Estremadura, which was taken from the Moors about the middle of the thirteenth century. It is seated among mountains, on the south side of a hill, at whose top there is a strong citadel. It is near the river Almont, one hundred and seventeen miles S. E. of Madrid, and sixty-five S. W. of Toledo.

French had rendered the castle very strong; and this castle effectually commanded the neighbouring river and roads. Besides fortifying the castle, the enemy had strengthened the adjoining hill of St. Michael's with out-works: these it was necessary to carry before the fortress could be reduced. As lord Wellington was anxious to lose as little time as possible before this place, he ordered the out-works on the hill of St. Michael's to be stormed: these orders were executed with great bravery and success on the 19th of September: but as it was done in the night, there was some mistake and confusion in the manœuvres, in consequence of which the British loss in killed and wounded amounted to upwards of three-hundred men; and of five hundred French who were stationed in the works, only sixty-three were taken. The capture of these works enabled lord Wellington more accurately to ascertain the strength of the castle of Burgos; and it was discovered to be in such a state of defence as threatened a long and formidable resistance.

Burgos,* which long continued to enjoy splendour and pre-eminence as the capital of Old Castile, has for the last two centuries declined from its prosperity, and is now a gloomy irregular town, containing only about eight or nine thousand inhabitants. It is surrounded by walls, and built on a declivity, forming the right bank of the river Arlanzon, over which are thrown three stone bridges connecting the town with the pleasant suburb of la Beza. On the brow of the adjacent hill stands an ancient castle, which had been repaired and strengthened with works by the French; and beyond this is another small hill called St. Michael's, whereon a horn-work had been erected, which was carried by storm. The castle is a lofty square building of solid masonry, and commands the hill of St. Michael's, which in return overlooks the outer de-

* Burgos is ninety-five miles E. by S. of Leon, and one hundred and seventeen N. of Madrid.

fences of the former. Adjoining to the castle is a church, which the French converted into a fort; and both these are included within three distinct lines of circumvallation, the whole forming a fortress of an oblong figure. All these three lines it was necessary successively to carry, before the castle could be taken. After getting possession of St. Michael's hill, our engineers directed their approaches on the right, and erected a battery, which commanded the outer line of the works connecting the fortress with the town. This line was escaladed on the night of the 22d, at two points, by a British and Portuguese detachment; the former of whom advanced so far, that on the failure of the Portuguese attack it was not without great difficulty withdrawn. The commander of the fortress had long acted under Caffarelli, and had received positive orders to hold out to the last; the importance of the post being strongly felt by both parties. Until it was reduced, the French army might remain safely at Briviesca, a walled city only six leagues distant, and separated from the plain of Burgos by a lofty mountain; at the next stage beyond which, on the road towards France, is the tremendous pass of Pancorbo, securing the approach to the Ebro.

One of the mines which had been prepared under the exterior line of the castle of Burgos, was exploded at midnight of the 29th of September, and effected a breach in the wall, which some of the party, who were destined to attack it, were enabled to storm; but, owing to the darkness of the night, the detachments who were to support the advanced party, misled their way, and the advance were driven off the breach before they could be effectually supported. The breach effected by the mine was not of a description to be stormed, except at the moment of the explosion; and it was necessary to improve it by fire, before the attempt could be repeated. But all our endeavours to construct batteries in the best situation to fire upon the wall failed, in consequence of the superiority of the enemy's fire. In the mean time another mine had
been

been placed under the wall, which was ready on the 4th of October, and a fire was opened from a battery constructed under cover of the horn-work. The fire from the battery improved the breach first made; and the explosion of the mine, at five o'clock the same evening, effected a second breach. Both were immediately stormed by the second battalion of the 24th regiment, under the command of captain Hadderwick, who had been ordered into the trenches for that purpose; and our troops were established within the exterior line of the castle of Burgos. This operation was effected without suffering a very severe loss.

The enterprise and determination of the governor of the castle of Burgos were soon manifested in a manner that proved very prejudicial to the operations of the besiegers: two sorties were made on the head of the sap, between the interior and exterior lines; and in each of these sorties the British works were materially injured. In the last sortie, which took place at three in the morning of the 8th of October, major Cocks, field officer of the trenches, was killed in the act of rallying the troops who had been driven in. Lord Wellington considered his loss, as one of the greatest importance to the army, and to his majesty's service. Notwithstanding the success of these sorties, the besiegers established themselves within one hundred yards of the enemy's interior line, and effected a breach in another part of the same line, where the troops established themselves: at the same time, mines were carrying on under ground with great dispatch. This promptitude and energy, joined to the recollection of what the British had done before Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, led the nation to the confident hope that they should soon hear of the fall of Burgos, and of the advance of lord Wellington in pursuit of Marmont's army.

On the 11th of October the new mine which had been formed was exploded, the breaches were immediately formed and the lines escaladed by our troops: the guards and the infantry of the German legion suc-

ceeded so far as to enter the works; but they were unable to sustain the heavy fire from the castle, and were compelled to retire with the loss of about one hundred men. In the mean time Souham, who had taken the command of Marmont's army, was advancing in very considerable force, with an evident intention of raising the siege, or of compelling lord Wellington to fight at a disadvantage.

Dispatches were received from the marquis of Wellington, dated Cabeçon, the 26th and 28th of October, and Rueda the 31st of October, and 3d of November, from which the following is extracted :

"I have been so much occupied," says his lordship, "by the movements and operations of the army since the 18th of October, that I have not been able to write on the subject. The operations of the castle of Burgos continued nearly in the state in which they were on the 11th till the 18th of that month. Having at that time received a supply of musket ammunition from St. Andero, and having, while waiting for that necessary article, completed a mine under the church of St. Roman, which stood in an outwork of the second line, I determined that the breach which we had effected in the second line should be stormed on that evening, at the moment this mine should explode; and that at the same time the line should be attacked by escalade. The mine succeeded, and lieutenant-colonel Browne lodged a party of the 9th Caçadores, and a detachment of the king's German legion, under major Wurmb, carried the breach, and a detachment of the guards succeeded in escalading the line; but the enemy brought such a fire upon these two last detachments, from the third line, and the body of the castle itself, and they were attacked by numbers so superior, before they could receive the support allotted to them, that they were obliged to retire, suffering considerable loss. Major Wurmb was unfortunately killed. It is impossible," continues his lordship, "to represent, in adequate terms, my sense of the conduct of the guards and German legion upon this occasion; and I am quite satisfied that if it had been possible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, these troops would have maintained them. Some of the men stormed even the third line, and one was killed in one of the embrasures of that line; and I had the satisfaction of seeing, that if I could breach the wall of the castle we should carry the place. Another mine was com-

menced under the second line from the church of St. Roman, of which we remained in possession. The enemy had on the 13th moved forward a considerable body of infantry, and six squadrons of cavalry from Briviesca to reconnoitre our outposts at Monasterio. They attacked the picquet at the bridge in front of that town, but were repulsed by the fire of a detachment of the infantry of the Brunswick legion. In this affair, lieutenant-colonel the honourable Frederick Ponsonby, who commanded at Monasterio, was wounded, but not severely. I had long had reports of the enemy's intention to advance for the relief of the castle of Burgos with the army of Portugal, reinforced by troops recently arrived from France, and with that part of the army of the north which was disposable; and they did advance in considerable force against the post at Monasterio on the evening of the 18th. The subaltern of the Brunswick legion, who commanded a picquet in St. Olalla, disobeyed his orders in remaining in that village upon the approach of the enemy, and he was taken with his picquet. The enemy consequently obtained possession of the heights which command the town of Monasterio, and our outpost was obliged to retire on the morning of the 19th to the Burgos side of the town. I assembled the troops, excepting those necessary for carrying on the operations of the siege, as soon as it appeared by the enemy's movement of the 18th, that they entertained serious intentions of endeavouring to raise it, and placed the allied army on the heights, having their right at Ibeas, on the Arlanzon, the centre at Rio Vena and Magaradas, and the left at Soto Pallachio. The enemy's army likewise assembled in the neighbourhood of Monasterio. They moved forward on the evening of the 20th with about ten thousand men to drive in our outpost at Quintana Palla, and Olmos. The former withdrew by order, but the latter was maintained with great spirit by the Chasseurs Britanniques. Seeing a fair opportunity of striking a blow upon the enemy, I requested lieutenant-general sir Edward Paget to move with the first and fifth divisions upon the enemy's right flank, which movement having been well executed, drove them back upon Monasterio, and our posts were replaced in Quintana Palla. On the morning of the 21st I received a letter from sir Rowland Hill, of the 17th, in which he acquainted me of the enemy's intention to move towards the Tagus, which was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was likely to become so by an army. The castle of Chinchilla had surrendered on the 9th instant. The enemy's force in Valencia was supposed to amount to not less than seventy thousand men, a very large proportion of which, it was

was expected, would be disposable for service out of that kingdom. I had desired lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that he could not maintain himself in it with advantage; and it was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the corps under my command might not be insulated, in consequence of the movements which he should find himself under the necessity of making; I therefore raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 20th, and moved the whole army back towards the Douro. I felt severely the sacrifice I was thereby obliged to make. Your lordship is aware that I was never very sanguine in my expectations of success in the siege of Burgos, notwithstanding that I considered success was attainable, even with the means in my power, within a reasonably limited period. If the attack made on the 22d or the 29th had succeeded, I believe we should have taken the place, notwithstanding the ability with which the governor conducted the defence, and the gallantry with which it was executed by the garrison. Our means were limited; but it appeared to me, that if we should succeed, the advantage to the cause would be great, and the final success of the campaign would have been certain. I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops during the siege of Burgos, particularly with the brigade of guards. During the latter part of the siege the weather was very unfavourable, and the troops suffered much from the rain. The officers at the head of the artillery and engineer departments—lieutenant-colonel Robe, and lieutenant-colonel Burgoyne, and lieutenant-colonel Dickson, who commands the reserve artillery, rendered me every assistance: and the failure of success is not to be attributed to them. By their activity, we carried off every thing in the course of one night, excepting the three eighteen-pounders destroyed by the enemy's fire, and the eight pieces of cannon which we had taken from the enemy on the night of the 19th ultimo in the storm of the horn-work. Having sent our cattle to meet the equipment expected from Santander, we had not the means of moving the latter. The enemy was not aware of our movement, and did not follow us till late on the 22d, when ten thousand men encamped on this side of Burgos. The British army encamped at Celada del Camino and Hornillos, with the light cavalry at Estepan and Baniel. We continued our march on the following day, the right of the army to Torquemeda, the left to Cordevilla, at which place we crossed the Pisuerga. The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear guard consisted of two light battalions of the king's German legion, under

colonel Halkett, and of major-general Anson's brigade of cavalry : and major-general Bock's brigade was halted at the Venta del Pozo to give them support. The whole under the command of lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton. Don Julian Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzon ; and the party of guerillas, heretofore commanded by the late Martinez, on the hills on the left of our rear guard. Major-general Anson's brigade charged twice with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy was detained above three hours by the troops under lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that village. The rear guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the guerillas on the left having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear guard of major-general Anson's brigade, and four or five squadrons of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss, and lieutenant-colonel Pelly, of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse shot, was taken prisoner. The delay occasioned by this misfortune enabled the enemy to bring up a very superior body of cavalry, which was charged by major-general Bock's and major-general Anson's brigades, near the Venta del Pozo, but unsuccessfully, and our rear guard was hardly pressed. The enemy made their charges on the two light battalions of the king's German legion, formed in squares, but were always repulsed with considerable loss, by the steadiness of these two battalions. They suffered no loss, and I cannot sufficiently applaud their conduct, and that of colonel Halkett, who commanded them. The exertions and conduct of lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton, and of the officers and staff attached to him throughout this day, were highly meritorious, and although the charge made by the cavalry was not successful, I had the satisfaction of observing great steadiness in their movements. Major Bull's troop of horse artillery, under major Downham, and captain Ramsay, distinguished themselves. The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Duenas and its left at Villa Muriel, and the first battalion first guards joined us from Corunna. I halted here on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa Muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the fifth division of infantry, under the command of major-general Oswald, in the absence of lieutenant-general Leith, on account of indisposition. I had directed the third battalion of the royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over the Carrion at that place, but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point, that lieutenant-

nant-colonel Campbell thought it necessary to retire upon Villa Muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed major-general Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion with the right of the fifth division. The bridge of Villa Muriel was destroyed; but the enemy discovered a ford, and passed over a considerable body of infantry and cavalry. I made major-general Pringle, and major-general Barnes attack these troops under the orders of major-general Oswald; in which attack the Spanish troops co-operated, and they were driven across the river with considerable loss. The fire upon the left had been very severe throughout the day; from which we suffered a great deal; and major-general don Miguel Alava was unfortunately wounded while urging on the Spanish infantry in the pursuit of the enemy. I broke up this morning from the Carrion, and marched upon Cabeçon del Campo, where I crossed the Pisuerga. The enemy appeared to be moving in the same direction from Duenas.

By the return of killed and wounded of the army under the command of his excellency general the marquis of Wellington, in the siege of the castle of Burgos, from the 11th to the 17th October, 1812, it appears that there were one serjeant, twenty-seven rank and file, killed; and one captain, one lieutenant, two ensigns, three serjeants, sixty-six rank and file, wounded. And by the return of the killed and wounded in the siege of the castle of Burgos, from the 18th to the 21st of October, it appeared that there were ninety-six rank and file, killed; and seventy-four rank and file, wounded.

In a dispatch dated Cabeçon, October 28, 1812, his lordship says,—“ Since I wrote to you upon the 26th, I have had an opportunity of seeing the enemy’s whole army, as they placed themselves opposite to us, on the Pisuerga, yesterday. They are certainly in very great strength. The army of Portugal has received a reinforcement of ten thousand men, including cavalry, from France: and there were two divisions of infantry with this army belonging to the army of the north. The cavalry of the army of the north is with the army of Portugal, and they have at least five thousand good cavalry. No event of importance has occurred since the 26th. The enemy formed their army in the plain in our front yesterday. They cannonaded different parts of our line without doing any injury, excepting that lieutenant-colonel Robe, of the royal artillery, was wounded severely, but not dangerously.”

Again.

Again.—“The enemy crossed the Carrion on the 26th and 27th, and formed their army on the heights near Cijales, on the last of those days, opposite our position on the left of the Pisnerga, and their advanced guard about two miles in front of their main body, and half that distance from Cabeçon. On the 28th, they extended their right, and endeavoured to force the bridges of Simancas and Valladolid, the former of which was defended by colonel Halkett, with his brigade of the seventh division, and the latter by lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie, with the remainder of the seventh division. At length colonel Halkett, being hard pressed, blew up the bridge. He at the same time detached the Brunswick Oels’ regiment to Tordesillas, towards which quarter the enemy detached troops on the evening of the 28th. As soon as I found that this was the case, I thought it proper to break up from the Pisnerga and to cross the Douro, which object was effected without difficulty on the 29th instant, by the bridges of Puente, Douro, and Tudela. The bridge of Tordesillas was destroyed on the enemy’s approach to that town, on the evening of the 28th, and I had sent orders to the regiment of Brunswick Oels to take post on its ruins, in such manner as to prevent the enemy from repairing the bridge. I had the mortification, however, of learning, on the night of the 29th, that this regiment had been obliged to abandon its post, and as I had seen the enemy’s whole army in march towards Tordesillas on that evening, it was obvious that no time was to be lost. I therefore marched the army at an early hour yesterday morning to their left, and posted the troops on the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas, immediately opposite, and near the bridge of Tordesillas. We found the bridge nearly repaired on our arrival, but the enemy had made no attempt to pass it, and they had then no large assembly of troops in that neighbourhood. Some of them marched towards Valladolid, and others towards Toro. Letters from lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill of the 29th, announced that the Tagus was every where fordable, and the enemy had passed a small body of troops over at Fuente Duenas. Sir Rowland Hill had collected his troops on the Jacamah.” And again in a dispatch dated *November 3, 1812*.—“I take the opportunity of the return of the messenger Myers to Corunna, to inform you that the army have continued in the position in which I placed them on the 30th of October; and the enemy have made no attempt to pass the Douro. The bridge of Tordesillas is repaired, and they are employed in the repair of that of Toro. Their troops are extended along the Douro, from the latter place to Valladolid. In the mean time, the troops under

lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill will arrive this day and to-morrow on the Adaja. The general received my orders to break up from his position on the Jacamah on the 29th, and he intended to carry them into execution on the morning of the 30th. He had intended to destroy the Puente Larga, but the mine failed; and the enemy having collected a large body of troops between the bridge and Aranjuez, they immediately attacked our post on the bridge, but were repulsed with considerable loss by the 2d battalion 47th regiment, and a detachment of the 95th, under the command of colonel Skerret. These circumstances delayed the march from the right of lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill's position till the evening of the 30th, but he has since continued it without being molested by the enemy. The building called la China, in the Retiro, and all the guns, stores, &c. which that work contained, that had not been carried away, were destroyed before the troops were withdrawn from Madrid. The Spanish divisions of don Carlos d'España and Comte de Penne Villemur are with lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill. A small body of the enemy's troops were at Valde Moro on the 31st, and entered Madrid at 10 o'clock on the morning of the 1st instant."

By a dispatch from marquis Wellington, dated Pitiegua, November 7, 1812, it appears, that "the enemy repaired the bridge at Toro at a much earlier period than his lordship expected. He therefore desired sir Rowland Hill to continue his march by Fontiveros upon Alba de Tormes; and as soon as he found that sir Rowland Hill was sufficiently forward, he broke up on the morning of the 6th of November, from the position which he had held in front of Tordesillas since the 30th of October, and he marched towards the heights of St. Christoval, in front of Salamanca." The enemy had not pressed at all upon the rear of the troops under lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill, nor had those on the Douro followed the march of the troops under his lordship's command: he concluded that therefore the two corps would unite, which, in consequence of the situation of the Douro, he could not prevent."

In a dispatch dated Ciudad Rodrigo, November 19, the marquis of Wellington says, "The troops under the command of lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill crossed the Tormes, at Alba, on the 8th instant, and those under my command took their position on the heights of St. Christoval de la Cuesta on the same day: brigadier-general Pack's brigade occupying Aldea Lengua, and brigadier-general Bradford's Cabreizos on the right; and the British cavalry covering our front. I had desired lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill

Hill to occupy the town and castle of Alba, with major-general Howard's brigade of the second division, leaving lieutenant-general Hamilton's Portuguese division on the left of the Tormes, to support those troops; while the second division was posted in the neighbourhood of the fords of Eneinas and Huerta; and the third and fourth divisions remained at Calvarassa de Ariba in reserve. On the 9th the enemy drove in the picquets of major-general Long's brigade of cavalry, in front of Alba; and major-general Long was obliged to withdraw his troops through Alba on the morning of the 10th. In the course of the day, the enemy's whole army approached our positions on the Tormes, and they attacked the troops in Alba with twenty pieces of cannon, and a considerable body of infantry. They made no impression on them, however, and withdrew the cannon and greater part of the troops on that night, and this attack was never renewed. I enclose lieutenant-general Hamilton's report to sir Rowland Hill of the transactions at Alba, which were highly creditable to the troops employed.* From the 10th till the 14th the time was
passed

* The following is the substance of lieutenant-general Hamilton's letter to sir Rowland Hill, dated Alba de Tormes, November 11, 1812.—“I have the honour to report the steps I have taken to carry into effect your instructions for the defence of this place, which, I am happy to say, have obliged the enemy to withdraw the greatest part of the forces opposed to us; and I feel almost confident we shall be able to retain our position as long as you deem expedient. I yesterday (November 10) garrisoned and provisioned the castle, and by the exertions of captain Goldfinch of the engineers, it is put into as good a state as circumstances will admit; he is continuing to strengthen it. I have appropriated to each regiment a district of this town, and the commanding officer has barricaded the streets and buildings in a very judicious manner. Brigadier da Costa and Campbell's brigades are in our position on the left bank of the Tormes. Brigadier Campbell reports his having caused the enemy some loss, in their attempt to pass a ford near his position. Lieutenant-colonel Tulloh has made so good an arrangement of his two brigades of guns, that, united with the position of the two brigades of infantry on the left bank of the Tormes, I consider my flank secure. Early yesterday morning major-general Long, commanding the cavalry in front, reported that the enemy were advancing in great force. I was therefore induced to retire the cavalry. About ten o'clock the enemy appeared on the heights in considerable force of cavalry, and a few infantry, covering, as I conceived, a reconnaissance of several officers of rank. About two o'clock the enemy's force was increased to fifteen squadrons, and six thousand
infantry,

passed in various reconnoissances, as well of the fords of the Tormes, as of the position which the troops under my command occupied on the right of that river, in front of Salamanca; and on the 14th the enemy crossed that river in force, at three fords near Lucinas, about two leagues above Alba. I immediately broke up from St. Christoval, and ordered the troops to move towards Arapiles; and as soon as I had ascertained the direction of the enemy's march from the fords, I moved with the second division of infantry, and all the cavalry I could collect, to attack them; leaving lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill with the fourth, and lieutenant-general Hamilton's divisions, in front of Alba, to protect this movement, and the third division in reserve on the Arapiles, to secure the possession of that position. The enemy, however, were already too numerous, and too strongly posted at Mozarbes to be attacked; and I confined myself to a cannonade of their cavalry, under cover of which I reconnoitred their position. In the evening I withdrew all the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba to the Arapiles, leaving a small Spanish garrison in the castle, and having destroyed the bridge. In the course of the night and following morning I moved the greatest part of the troops through Salamanca; and placed lieutenant-general sir Edward Paget with the first division of infantry on the right, at Aldea Tejada, in order to secure that passage for the troops over the Zunguen, in case the movements of the enemy on our right flank should render it necessary for me to make choice

infantry, and twenty guns, including six six-inch howitzers, which immediately commenced firing, and continued until it was dark. The enemy's light troops advanced close to the walls we had hastily thrown up; but from the cool and steady conduct of the 51st regiment, colonel Stewart; 71st regiment, the honourable colonel Cadogan; the 92d colonel Cameron; general Howard's brigade, the enemy dared not attempt the town. About eight o'clock in the evening I was repeatedly informed that the enemy's infantry was considerably increasing, which induced me to order three battalions of brigadier da Costa's brigade into town, leaving his other battalion for the protection of the fords. The enemy during the night withdrew their artillery, and I have left a small force of cavalry and infantry, who keep up a smart fire. I have to regret the loss of a considerable number of men, but which I trust you will not deem great, when you consider the heavy and incessant fire of artillery for so many hours. The loss of the Portuguese was while on duty this morning, and I have real pleasure in reporting their steady and animated conduct." In this affair at the Alba de Tormes the British army lost twenty-one rank and file killed, and ninety-two wounded.

either of giving up my communication with Ciudad Rodrigo or Salamanca. On the 15th, in the morning, I found the enemy fortifying their position at Mozarbes, which they had taken up the night before; at the same time that they were moving bodies of cavalry and infantry towards their own left, and to our communications with Ciudad Rodrigo. It was obvious that it was the enemy's intention to act upon our communications; and as they were too strong, and too strongly posted for me to think of attacking them, I determined to move upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore put the army in march in three columns, and crossed the Zunguen, and then passed the enemy's left flank, and encamped that night on the Vamusa. We continued our march successively on the 16th, 17th, 18th, and this day, when part of the army crossed the Agueda, and the whole will cross that river tomorrow. The enemy followed our movement on the 16th, with a large body, probably the whole of the cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry, but they did not attempt to press upon our rear. They took advantage of the ground to cannonade our rear guard, consisting of the light division, under major-general Charles Alten, on the 17th, on its passage of the Huebra, at San Munez, and thereby occasioned some loss. The troops have suffered considerably from the severity of the weather, which, since the 15th, has been worse than I have ever known at this season of the year. I am sorry to add, that we have had the misfortune to lose lieutenant-general sir Edward Paget, who was taken prisoner on the 17th. He commanded the centre column, and the fall of rain having greatly injured the roads and swelled the rivulets, there was an interval between the fifth and seventh divisions of infantry. Sir Edward rode to the rear alone, to discover the cause of this interval, and, as the road passed through a wood, either a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had got upon the road, or he missed the road, and fell into their hands in the wood. In my dispatch of the 7th instant, I communicated my opinion of the strength of the enemy, from the reports I had received, and from what I had seen. I have since learnt that general Caffarelli, with the army of the north, remained joined with the army of Portugal. Joseph Bonaparte left Madrid on the 4th instant, and arrived at Penaranda on the 8th, leaving at Madrid the civil authorities of his government, and a small garrison. These authorities and troops evacuated Madrid on the 7th, and marched for Castile; and colonel don Juan Palarea the Medico took possession of that city. Your lordship will have seen general Ballasteros's letter of the 24th of October, to the regency, from which you will observe, that he had
disobeyed

disobeyed the orders of government, given to him at my suggestion, to march into la Mancha and hang upon the enemy's left flank, because the regency and Cortes had offered me the chief command of the Spanish armies. The whole of the enemy's disposable force in Spain was therefore upon the Torines in the middle of this month; and they were not less than eighty thousand men, but more probably ninety thousand; of these, ten thousand were cavalry; and as the army of Portugal alone had one hundred pieces of cannon, it is probable that they had not less in all the armies than two hundred pieces."

By the return of killed, wounded, and missing of the army under the command of his excellency general the marquis of Wellington, K. B. in the movements of the army from the 22d to the 29th of October, 1812, inclusive, it appears that the grand total of British and Portuguese loss was, two captains, two lieutenants, fourteen serjeants, two drummers, one hundred and seven rank and file, seventy-four horses, killed; three lieutenant-colonels, two majors, six captains, twenty-three lieutenants, ten ensigns, one staff, thirty-five serjeants, three drummers, four hundred and thirty-nine rank and file, sixty-five horses wounded; one lieutenant-colonel, one major, two captains, two lieutenants, two ensigns, twelve serjeants, two drummers, two hundred and twenty-one rank and file, fifty-nine horses, missing.

The campaign of 1812, may now be considered as finally closed, and the army moved towards the places appointed for its cantonment; the marquis of Wellington fixing his head quarters at Frenada; from which town the following circular letter was addressed to the commanding officers of battalions, dated November 28, 1812.

"SIR,—I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c. which are already in progress, by different lines of communication, to the several divisions and brigades.

"But besides these objects, I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the generals and other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service, but I am concerned to have to observe, that

the army under my command has fallen off, in this respect, in the late campaign, to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster, it has suffered no privations, which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships, excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

“It must be obvious, however, to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity; and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred.

“Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on the rear by the enemy. We must look, therefore, for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army, to some cause besides these resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

“I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

“I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers of the army; and I am quite certain that as their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution, the orders which have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

“Unfortunately, the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced many to conceive, that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which, of all others, every rule for the regulation and controul of the conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field equipments, and his horse and horse-appointments, for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions, and the regulation

tion of all that belongs to his food, and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

“ These are the points, then, to which I most earnestly intreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army, regarding the constant inspection and superintendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments; and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority; and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty, by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the officers. By these means, the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to punishments by the senate of courts martial, will be prevented; and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages, of which there are too many complaints, when they know that their officers and their non-commissioned officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them.

“ The commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant real inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article, and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view both should be inspected daily.

“ In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and lamented in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the French soldiers cooked, in comparison with those of our army.

“ The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of every other description, the want of attention of the officers to the orders of the army, and to the conduct of their men; and their consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c. to be cooked, and it would soon be found, if this practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named as it ought to be, equally as for the parade, that cooking would no longer

longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.

“ You will of course give your attention to field exercise and the discipline of the troops. It is very desirable that the soldiers should not lose the habits of marching; and the division should march ten or twelve miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the divisions, should be dry. But I repeat, that the great object of the attention of the general and field-officers must be, to get the captains and subalterns of the regiments to understand, and to perform the duties required from them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored, and maintained during the next campaign.—I have the honour, &c.

“ Frenada, November 28, 1812. “ WELLINGTON.”

To —, or the officer commanding the —

Marshal Soult's corps was estimated at forty-five thousand men; Joseph Bonaparte's at twelve thousand; and Suchet's at fifteen thousand: but as it was necessary to keep a strong force in Valencia and Murcia, the army when advanced under Soult against Madrid probably did not exceed fifty-thousand men. General Souham, who was following lord Wellington, had about thirty-five thousand effective men, of whom about three thousand were cavalry. With respect to the British, about eighteen thousand men, consisting of the first, fifth, sixth, and seventh divisions, were with lord Wellington: besides these British troops, his lordship had with him two Portuguese brigades, and a few Spanish troops: the whole of the British cavalry were also with him, except one brigade of English dragoons, the German hussars, a heavy brigade, and a Portuguese brigade, amounting altogether to two thousand men who were with sir Rowland Hill. This general had under him about twenty-thousand effective British, consisting of the second, third, and fourth divisions, besides a large corps of Portuguese, and about five thousand Spaniards who had accompanied colonel Skerret from Seville. The British ministry were aware that it would be impossible

sible for lord Wellington to carry on the siege of Burgos, and defend himself against the French army under Souham, at the same time; and therefore they had sent up reinforcements to him. But, in conformity to their usual plan, these reinforcements were sent out by piece-meal, and too late to be of any service; for a considerable part of them which had been landed at Corunna, and had begun their march towards Burgos, were compelled to return to the former place, in consequence of the raising of the siege of the latter city, and of the advance of the French forces.

Bitter and dreadful was the disappointment of the British nation, when they learnt that the capital of Spain was again in the hands of the enemy; that the siege of Burgos was raised, and that the hero of Salamanca was obliged to act on the defensive, and was actually pursued by that army which he had beaten. Blame was thrown on ministers by most people, and on lord Wellington by a few: it was said that the war in the Peninsula had been starved; that a miserable œconomy had prevented us from reaping the fruits of the victory of Salamanca; that if ten thousand men had been sent out to reinforce lord Wellington's army immediately after that victory, when the whole mechanism of the French military government in Spain was unhinged, that mechanism could never have been repaired;—whereas the army of Marmont, driven to the very banks of the Ebro, had there doubled his numbers by reinforcements from France; and Soult, who in consequence of that victory had been compelled to evacuate Andalusia, was now in a state to pursue general Hill, after having retaken Madrid. With respect to the conduct of lord Wellington, it was said that his delay at Madrid had given time and opportunity for the enemy to recruit their armies, and to digest their plans; and that he had not displayed his usual prudence and circumspection in conducting the siege of Burgos: he had formed a very erroneous estimate of its strength; and relying on this estimate, he had attempted

attempted to take it before his heavy artillery had come up:—when he was made sensible that it was much stronger than he had conjectured, he endeavoured to make up for his want of artillery, by the gallantry of his troops; thus sacrificing many valuable lives, and weakening his army, already inadequate to cope with the force that was marching against them. There is some truth in these remarks; but the principal cause of this adverse turn of affairs seems to have rested with ministers: if ever there was a period when the whole disposable force of the British empire might have been put forth, in the cause of Spain, with any prospect of permanent and decisive success, it was immediately after the battle of Salamanca, when not only was the principal army of France dispirited and dispersed, but the plans of the enemy must have been entirely broken through: if at this time lord Wellington had had the command of such a numerous army as would have enabled him at once to have pursued the beaten enemy to complete destruction, or till they had crossed the Pyrennees, and to have advanced and taken possession of Madrid, the French forces in the south of Spain must have been placed in a most perilous situation. The grand object of our ministers, while they think proper to continue the war in Spain, ought to be to rouse the Spanish people and government; to convince them that Britain is superior to France, not only in the field of battle, but in conducting a whole campaign. But these objects cannot be secured, if our successes are but temporary, if the Spaniards cannot depend upon our keeping what we gain. This was of most material consequence as it respected the capital of Spain: if rescuing it from the French had a tendency to rouse and encourage the Spaniards, assuredly permitting it to fall again into the hands of the enemy must have depressed their hopes of success, and their confidence in Britain, much lower than it had been before lord Wellington entered Madrid. Lord Wellington, in his official dispatch, after announcing that he had raised the siege of Burgos, expresses his disappointment

appointment in very plain language. "I felt severely the sacrifice I was thereby obliged to make:" in another place he mentions his "limited means," intimating that, if his force had been larger, he should not have been compelled to raise the siege. During the retreat which his lordship thus reluctantly commenced, the British army displayed its wonted steadiness and bravery; the French pressing close upon it, and at one time with such superior force as to oblige one part of the British army to change its route. On the 27th of October the British were posted on the left of the Pisuerga, and on the same day the French crossed the Carrion and formed their army on the heights opposite to the British position. On the following day they endeavoured to gain possession of the bridges, with such superior force, that it was judged prudent to blow up one of them, and break up from the Pisuerga and cross the Douro; which was effected with little loss. The enemy still pressed hard on the British. Lord Wellington had given orders for a German regiment to take post on the ruins of the bridge of Tordesillas, but this regiment was obliged to give way. No time was now to be lost, the enemy's whole army was in march towards Tordesillas. Lord Wellington, in this crisis, resolved to occupy some heights between Rueda and Tordesillas, and opposite the ruins of the bridge. While his lordship was retreating in this direction, he had sent orders to general Hill to break up from his position on the Jacama on the 29th of October, and to arrive on the Adaga by the 3d or 4th of November: these orders were punctually obeyed, and on the 5th the two British armies joined at Rueda. Nothing now prevented the junction of Soult and Souham; and accordingly having effected this, they directed their movements in such a manner as they hoped would enable them to turn the flanks of lord Wellington's army: for this purpose their main body advanced to Toro and Zamara, to turn the left flank, and Soult marched on Avila to turn the right. In consequence of these

movements, lord Wellington put his whole force in motion, and retired on Salamanca: his lordship hoped that he should be able to maintain the strong heights of St. Cristoval, in front of that city: but the united armies of Soult and Souham were so very superior, and pressed on him so hard, that he was obliged to evacuate it, and to continue his retreat.

At this time the French were posted at Alba, and lord Wellington, thinking they might be attacked with advantage, made preparations and movements with that object: but on reconnoitring their position more closely and attentively, he found it exceedingly strong, both by nature and art, and he observed at the same time that their cavalry was moving in such a direction as threatened to cut off his communication with Ciudad Rodrigo: on this place, therefore, his lordship marched, crossing the Zunguen in three columns, and passing the enemy's left flank. During this movement general sir Edward Paget was taken prisoner: he commanded the centre column; and the roads having been much injured by the heavy and continual rains, there was an interval between the 5th and 7th divisions of infantry. Sir Edward rode to the rear alone to discover the cause of this interval, and, missing his road, fell into the hands of the enemy.

While the French were thus pressing upon the British army, and depriving them of part of the fruits of the victory of Salamanca, the Spaniards were of little service. The Spanish government indeed had appointed lord Wellington generalissimo of their forces, and in this capacity his lordship had suggested the propriety of general Ballasteros marching his troops into La Mancha, and hanging upon the enemy's left flank. Had this been done, in all probability the fortune of the war would have been changed:—at any rate, had Ballasteros obeyed these directions, the British force, which had come from Sicily, and which was still inactively cooped up in Alicant, might have been set free, and acted in unison with lord Wellington. But Ballasteros positively refused to
obey

obey the orders which were sent to him, or to acknowledge lord Wellington as his commanding officer, or as generalissimo of the Spanish forces: he complained in bitter and indignant terms,—that after having brought his army into a state of comparatively good discipline—after having much increased its numbers,—and after having been indefatigable and often successful in his attacks on the enemy, he should now be deprived of his command, and placed under the orders of a foreigner. Of Ballasteros's patriotism there can be no doubt; but, like too many of the Spanish generals and nobles, there was something in his feelings and mind superior to the love of his country: he permitted a mean jealousy to rankle in his bosom: he preferred seeing his country desolated, perhaps subdued by the French, to seeing it liberated, if that liberation were to be effected by a foreign power. The Spaniards either were not able, or knew not how, to effect their own deliverance; for upwards of four years they had been struggling against the French, and would have been repeatedly overwhelmed, had it not been for British co-operation—if co-operation it may be called, where the British did every thing, and the Spaniards, if active, were as frequently active to no purpose, or even to the injury of their cause, as to its benefit. Yet, notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding they witnessed what the Portuguese troops had been made under British officers, they refused to follow their example; and the conduct of Ballasteros, though censured and punished by the government, was applauded by many leading men, and his fate pitied.

The marquis of Wellington continued to retire before the enemy till he arrived at the place from which he had commenced the campaign at the beginning of the year. In vain did marshal Soult attempt to harass his retreat, or to compel him to fight under disadvantageous circumstances: the British general discovered that his talents were equal to what necessity now required of him; and though the weather was dreadful,

and from this cause it was computed that more suffering was endured by the army than during the retreat of Sir John Moore, yet there was no disorder or confusion; nothing was lost, nor could the enemy boast of a single trophy.

At the close of this campaign, which began with such splendour, which held out such flattering expectations, and which terminated without any other substantial benefit but the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, it may not be improper to take a view of the forces of the contending parties, since their numbers were increased on both sides subsequently to the last estimate which we gave of them, and they were likewise now differently disposed. Exclusively of the armies which were wholly occupied by the desultory warfare of the Spaniards, viz. those of Caffarelli, Decaen, &c. in Biscay, Navarre, Arragon, and Catalonia, the French forces opposed to the English were about one hundred and four thousand men; of these seventy-two thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry were under the command of Soult, who directed the armies which were formerly under Joseph Bonaparte and Souham. Suchet, in the south of Spain, still retained with him eighteen thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry. Opposed to these were, at the utmost, sixty-six thousand British, German, and Portuguese. Lord Wellington and general Hill had under them thirty-one thousand British and Germans, viz. twenty-seven thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry: besides these, there were with those generals twenty-one thousand Portuguese, making up their army fifty-two thousand: at the close of the campaign, reinforcements were coming to lord Wellington from Great Britain and Sicily, which would increase his army to nearly sixty thousand men. The British army, which had been so long blocked up at Alicant, was placed under the command of general Clinton, and was calculated at about six thousand men. Of the French army, a large proportion were very young, being of the last class of conscripts; among

among the prisoners taken were boys of sixteen years of age.

With respect to the equipment of the opposing armies, the French were much superior in point of artillery. Soult alone had one hundred and eighty pieces of cannon with him. In point of cavalry, the French were undoubtedly numerically superior to the British; but the British cavalry were as certainly individually superior to the French. So far as regarded the provisions of the armies, it is to be remarked that, though in the country of an ally, the British found much more difficulty in obtaining full and regular supplies than the French did. This arose from two causes: in the first place, the commissariat of the French is on a better footing, there is more plan and arrangement in it, as well as more experience and activity, than in the British. It may be admitted, that by the exertions and suggestions of lord Wellington the British commissariat had been much improved: new regulations of essential necessity and service had been introduced. Indeed, on its old footing, it would have been absolutely impossible that the military operations of the Peninsula should have been carried on even on a small scale, and for a short period of time; but then there were some radical faults in the commissariat, which all lord Wellington's attention could not remove*. So necessary
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* See the marquis of Wellington's circular letter on the subject. In the Royal Military Chronicle for April 1813, p. 452. is a letter from an officer who served in Spain and Portugal, on the subject of the British commissaries, which we shall here insert. As a motto to this letter the following passage is prefixed: "The emperor [of Germany] pays four millions to his commissaries and is plundered of only two.—I am plundered of my four millions, but instead of paying an army of commissaries, I have all fighting men in my army."—FREDERICK THE GREAT.

"Sir,—I have long intended to send you a few hints on the British commissariat, that occurred to me during my service in Spain and Portugal, in which, let me premise, I am alone influenced by the good of the service, and not from any motive of private pique or personal resentment,—and in the onset, too, let me candidly

is influence considered at the fountain-head of government, that all regard to the public service or benefit is

candidly state, that, generally speaking, that department has been conducted with intelligence, zeal, and activity, and has deserved the thanks of the army: but it has, nevertheless, abounded with peculation, or how is it possible that almost every assistant commissary, who has been serving on the Peninsula the last three or four years, has amassed a private fortune of fifteen or twenty thousand pounds!!! Yet this is a well known fact. You will excuse me using the appellation "Assistant Commissary" without making generals of them, as it appears among soldiers a profanation of that term to apply it to a dealer in beef and biscuit, or a pen and ink man: and, indeed, our friends, the officers of engineers, have great cause to rejoice, that from the late alteration in their uniform they cannot in future be taken for commissaries. In his majesty's instructions to the commissariat there is the following clause, which I extract from the publication of Le Mesurier: "You are faithfully and honestly to perform and discharge the duty and trust herein reposed in you, and you are not directly or indirectly to derive the smallest advantage whatever beyond your stipulated pay; except the regular allowances of provisions and articles usually furnished from the department of the quartermaster and barrack-master general (if such should at any time be allowed you) under pain of immediate dismissal, and to be subject to such other punishment as a court martial shall inflict." *Qui habet aures audiendum audiat!** This is tolerably strong and explicit. The pay of an assistant commissary is fifteen shillings a day, with very liberal allowances, which is surely sufficient, when you consider that they are never in danger, and, as they give no security, incur no great responsibility. I do not mean to include the military commissaries, having never had an opportunity of judging of them by their works: nor did I ever hear of any of them making a fortune. They are not, possibly, let into all the arcana and secrets of the trade. It an absolute truth, that an assistant commissary on a march had no less than seventy-three public mules, that is to say, hired by government, to transport his private baggage, besides five ox-wains, and a very tolerable private stud, subsisted from the public stores!!! I heard from a commissariat clerk, that there were four of these same mules laden with plate, fourteen with wines, &c. and the rest with provisions and other good things, "not to be sneezed at" in a campaign in Portugal! The hire of a mule, with its rations, could not amount to less than ten shillings per diem, exclusive of the muleteer and his subsistence!!! And be it remembered, that *at that time rations for one mule only* were allowed between two subalterns!!! Some of the means by which their fortunes have been made, I will humbly endeavour to point out, and, having broken the ice, leave it

* "He who hath ears to hear let him hear!"

is frequently abandoned, for the sake of securing or extending it; and persons were appointed to the commissariat, under the operation of this disgraceful cause, by no means qualified to fulfil the duties of their situation, in respect either of talents, experience, or knowledge. In the second place, the English commissariat, were it formed on the most perfect plan, and constantly and completely filled by persons who were both willing and able to carry that plan into regular and full execution, could never be so efficient as a French commissariat: the English have too many scruples about them: they hesitate and

it to abler hands. It frequently happens, that soldiers being ordered from the different hospital depôts to the army, or passing through them, have to draw their rations where there is an order, that, to prevent drunkenness, there shall be but one day's wine or spirits issued to them, though possibly it may be three or four days' march to the next commissariat station. The ration return, notwithstanding all the orders that can be issued, is almost invariably made out for the three or four days, the longest period, and the same number of days' wine or spirits:—but the commissary, having too conscientious a regard for the health of the men, as constantly enforces the order—unless by an oversight it may be omitted once in fifty times. By this means the commissary gets a return for three or four days' wine or spirits, and issues for one! Who pockets the difference? In the offices of corn I have likewise seen this trick played on a more extended scale, and to greater advantage. The muleteers and their cattle are generally foraged from the English commissariat stores. I have known an order that they should only receive rations for four days where they had to perform a march of eight, thereby limiting them to half rations. Their returns too were invariably made for eight. This netted something handsome, no doubt, and there could be no difficulty in making the cheque tally with the return, nor could it well be discovered, as these orders often issue from the chief commissary of the station, on a scarcity, or the apprehension of one. The rascalities practised by the Portuguese commissariat, in adulterating and watering the wine and spirits, are too proverbially infamous to call forth my notice:—I have seen the wine put into tubs for days before it was issued, and consequently as dead as ditch water, to enable them to operate upon it the more commodiously. There are some branches of this trade that do not appear to be well understood by the unsuspecting and illustrious mind of the commander of the forces, &c.

“*A Friend to Justice and the British Army.*”

doubt.

doubt, and feel qualms of conscience when they should act; they beg the inhabitants to supply them with provisions, when they should seize them; and thus they are not only imposed upon, but they are unable to procure the necessary supplies in time. While war exists, it ought to be conducted in that manner which will ensure success; for this is obviously the only method by which it can be terminated, and the blessings of a safe and honourable peace restored: it is therefore a blind and paltry humanity, which would shrink at the commission of some violence, if by that violence much greater cruelty and misery could be avoided or shortened.

Let us contrast the conduct of the French and British in the Peninsula, with respect to the mode in which they obtained supplies from the country. The French at once, with the utmost promptitude, took what they wanted, and paid for it at their own price: the inhabitants, knowing this, did not attempt to deny or conceal what they had; they knew it would be of no avail; that, in fact, they would be thus injuring themselves, since they would, in this case, obtain no payment for what was taken from them. The English, fighting in the cause of Spain, naturally believed that the Spaniards would cheerfully contribute to the support of their army; they therefore contented themselves with asking for supplies, and paid liberally for them: but the Spaniards, though very willing that we should fight for them, and very anxious to get rid of the French, were not equally disposed to assist the cause of their own battles, or to contribute to their own deliverance, if sacrifices were required of them. The consequence was, that in every campaign that the British have hitherto fought in the Peninsula, the French army has been, on the whole, well supplied, while the British has been generally short of supplies.

But we have been drawn away by this subject from the main purpose of our present sketch, which was to exhibit the comparative force and the situation of the contending

contending armies in the Peninsula at the close of the year 1812. We have already noticed the main armies; but there are others to which we must pay some attention, in order to render our statement correct.

The army of Galicia, which, to the number of about ten thousand men, we noticed as having joined lord Wellington, separated from him when active operations ceased, and marched into the province from which it takes its name, where it went into winter-quarters. A Spanish division, under the command of don Carlos d'Espagna, was placed in Ciudad Rodrigo, and near it. This important fortress was also guarded by Murillo's brigade, and by a body of cavalry under Penne Villamur. The British ministry, in order to reinforce lord Wellington, had sent out the life guards,—a body of men, it would have been supposed, by no means fit for active service, especially in such a country as the Peninsula, where great hardships were to be undergone, supported by very spare diet: this remark is at least as applicable to the horses as the men. However, they were sent, either because they were thought fit for the service, or because there were no other forces that could be spared. At the close of the year they had not joined lord Wellington, though they had arrived in Portugal; and having been sent at such an unfavourable season, both men and horses had suffered very much during the voyage.

Such was the relative state of the hostile forces in the Peninsula at the close of the year 1812: and from this account it will be perceived that the French had still a very formidable force, and were in fact much superior to the allies: there were other circumstances, too, which either rendered their situation better, or lord Wellington's worse. In the first place, the whole plan of the war seemed to have been changed on the part of the French. We have before remarked on the contrast exhibited by the plan which Bonaparte followed in Spain, and the plan on which he conducted his military operations in other parts of

Europe. The distinguishing characteristic in all the military plans where he himself had been engaged in their execution, was simplicity, and the aiming with all his force at one object; that object, indeed, of the greatest importance, the attainment of which brought with it all other minor objects. But in Spain his forces were divided and scattered: it was abundantly obvious, that till the English were decidedly beaten and driven out of the Peninsula, he could not expect to obtain what he desired; and yet, instead of bearing down with all his forces against the British army, he never met them with a much superior force, but directed part of his attention and means against them, and part against the Spaniards, who must have fallen if the British had been subdued. This plan was acted on, till Soult took the command in Spain: he immediately abandoned it, and bore down with all the disposable force against lord Wellington, fortunately without success as to his main object: but the excellence of this new plan was clearly shown, by his being enabled, when acting according to it, to strip lord Wellington of nearly all his conquests, and to compel him to retire to the borders of Portugal. In the second place, lord Wellington was exceedingly perplexed and harassed for want of money: at the close of the campaign, his army was above five months in arrear of pay; and all he could raise in Madrid, even on the condition of repaying it in a month, was twenty thousand pounds. Money is justly regarded as the sinew of war; and in the Peninsula is must be so in an especial manner. The arrear of pay due to the army was comparatively of little moment; while they were so busily employed in marching and fighting, they had not much occasion for money: but for the purchase of provisions, especially with an inadequate commissariat, a supply of money was indispensably requisite.

Such was the state of the Peninsula at the close of the year 1812; for upwards of four years it had been the scene of warfare, and that warfare did not appear
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to be approaching to a termination. The Spanish government learnt no wisdom by experience; they displayed no energy in their councils; their time was occupied in frivolous debates, or in drawing up addresses to the people and the army, the sentiments and tone of which formed a striking contrast to their suspicious or lukewarm conduct. The Spanish generals succeeded one another in the command of the trifling armies which Spain had on foot, without improving the discipline of those armies: in short, no talent arose equal to the situation, or the salvation of the country; nor was any activity displayed, except by the guerillas. Had it not been for them and the British, the Peninsula must long since have fallen under the French yoke. As it is, the revolution there affords the singular but melancholy sight of a nation fighting in defence of their independence, without any of those high qualities of mind or soul which will enable them either to obtain that independence, or fully to value and relish it if it were obtained.

CHAPTER XII.

IN our last chapter we brought our history of the war in the Peninsula to the close of the campaign of 1812, and left the allied army under the command of the marquis of Wellington in its cantonments about Frenada, and the places in its neighbourhood; but the campaign of 1813 did not commence very early in the year.

By a dispatch from lord Wellington, dated Frenada, February 24, 1813, it appears, that after the French army had retired across the Tormes, and their troops had taken up their cantonments, those on the Upper Tormes collected again on the 19th of February, from Piedraheita, Congosta, El Barco, and Avila; and that on the morning of the 20th, a body of about fifteen hundred infantry and one hundred ca-

valry, under the command of the general of division Foix, endeavoured to surprize and attack lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill's post at Bejar, consisting of the 50th regiment and 6th Portuguese Caçadores, which troops were under the command of lieutenant-colonel Harrison of the 50th. The surprize did not succeed; and the enemy were repulsed with loss; and were pursued across the bridge on the road to Congosto, by the 6th Caçadores, under major Mitchell. After this the French collected at Benavente a body of about five or six thousand men from their garrisons on the Douro, and shortly afterwards made an incursion beyond the Esla towards Puebla de Sannabria.

On the 26th of February, lieutenant-general Sir John Murray took the command of the division of the Mediterranean army serving on the eastern coast of Spain. On the 3rd of March, when reconnoitring the position of Alcoy, Sir John says, it became necessary to drive in the advanced posts. The enemy lost in the action one officer, and about twenty men killed and wounded. The possession of Alcoy appeared to him to be of importance; and having had an accurate view of the position, he thought it possible, in carrying the place, to cut off the corps stationed there. With this intention, on the 6th, he directed the march of a part of the army on Alcoy, and attacked that post on the morning of the 7th; but by the unfortunate delay of the column which was destined to cut off his retreat, the enemy effected their escape; but, says he, if this column had arrived but a quarter of an hour before, not a man could have got off. Sir John Murray further declares, that the advanced guard of the column destined to attack the enemy in front drove him about six or seven miles, when he found the soldiers so much fatigued, that even had he wished, he could not have pressed them further. The country over which the enemy retired was extremely favourable for him, and certainly might have been better defended. On this account he was enabled to dispose of
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his killed and wounded. The loss on the part of the allied army was inconsiderable.

By a dispatch from Sir John Murray to the marquis of Wellington, dated Castalla, March 23, Sir John says, that he occupied Alcoy with a strong division of the allied army; and that, in consequence of this movement, marshal Suchet quitted Valencia, and assumed the command of the troops, in person, on the right bank of the Xucar.

About the beginning of May, the marquis of Wellington was about to commence the active business of the campaign. At length, every due preparation being completed, the Spanish and Portuguese forces disciplined and organized, and the whole army equipped and appointed beyond any former example, the allied force was put in motion; and the head quarters, on the 24th of May, were transferred from Frenada to San Monias. The following day the allied army continued its route towards Salamanca. The active operations of the campaign may therefore be considered as having commenced from this period.

The allied force was composed of the armies of the three nations—the British, the Portuguese, and the Spanish. The amount of the British force, cavalry and infantry included, which were actually in the field with the marquis, was not less than forty-eight thousand men; the whole of whom, under the admirable administration of the medical department, were reported effective. It is indeed nearly the best praise of the commander of the forces, that he considers the health and comfort of his men, as the requisite conditions of their efficacy, and that, in expecting to be well served by his instrument, he has paved the way by a due regard to its qualities of serving. This army, and, in fact, the whole allied force, was under the command of the marquis of Wellington, a general, who by a long and unbroken course of victory, and by a reputation, ratified by fortune, renders it unnecessary to add any thing concerning him but his name; for who, we would ask, is there in the whole

whole of Europe, who is not now most effectually acquainted with him by his actions? The second in command was lieutenant Graham, a general, who, by his meritorious services has overtook many who had entered on the course of a military life earlier, adds another to those eminent examples in our history, that the best qualities of a commander, if not of a courtier, are great natural talents, a sober and collected judgement, and a heroic and generous nature. Sir Rowland Hill, who may be considered as the third in command, is an officer of known talent and alacrity, and his military qualities are seconded by such a singular degree of private worth, as to excite in his men an attachment almost approaching to enthusiasm. The other generals of the divisions are all worthy of their respective commands; and are second in order of reputation only because fortune has not placed them first in the opportunities of service.

The amount of the Spanish force, which accompanied the commander in chief, or which was sufficiently near to co-operate with him, was about thirty-eight thousand men; of which generals Castanos and Giron, with the Gallician army, composed about eighteen thousand, the two leaders, Longa and Murillo, about twelve thousand, and Don Julian and other partizans, about ten thousand. It is but justice, in the present instance, to acknowledge, that the discipline and the military character of these troops were now very little inferior to the British and Germans, and in every respect superior to those of the enemy. It had been the labour of the marquis of Wellington, during the long interval of the winter cantonments, to form them to this state of efficiency; and they commit an equal injustice against our illustrious commander himself, and against the known valour of the Spanish nation, who either totally put them aside in their estimate of the allied force, or reckon as mere numbers what have been so laboriously formed.

The Portuguese portion of the allied army at the commencement

commencement of this campaign may be estimated at about twenty-eight thousand; and the same observation may be extended to them, which is above applied to the Spaniards. They were in a condition, both with respect to discipline and numbers, which might have justified the hopes of any commander; and with the single exception of the cavalry charge, (for which they are certainly totally unsuited either to give or receive,) they were not inferior to their companions in arms of the other nations. It would appear invidious to add, that this character must be limited to those corps which were commanded by British officers. This effect of our officers is, indeed, worthy of perpetual remembrance. So powerful was this influence of example, or perhaps this effect of confidence, that the introduction of one British officer nationalized, as it were, a whole corps, and rendered a Portuguese and a British division effectually the same.

The effective strength of the whole allied army, in the field with lord Wellington at the commencement of the campaign, was therefore little short of one hundred and twenty thousand men; and it is certainly not too much to assert, that there was not an individual amongst them, whether Spanish or Portuguese, who was inferior in any military quality to the soldiers of the enemy.

If such were the amount of the force actually in the field with the noble marquis, the other portions of the allied armies, which were at this time in position in other parts of the Peninsula, must not altogether be omitted in this estimate, inasmuch as either in the way of diversion, or by having parts of the intended general operation assigned to them, they were effectually competent members of the aggregate of the allied strength. This force was of three kinds, namely, the Spanish regular armies, the Guerillas, and the Alicant expeditionary army under Sir John Murray.

The Spanish armies, which by their own governments are designated numerically, either according to the order in which they were raised, or to the acknowledged

1 ledged precedence of the provinces, are seven in number, and composed all together a force of about one hundred and thirty thousand men. The Catalonian army, denominated the first army, about eight thousand effective men, was under the command of general Copons, and was at this period (May 1813) in its own province. The second and third armies (the armies of Murcia and Valencia) composed together a force of about eighteen thousand, and were in Valencia, under the command of general Elio and the duke del Parque. The army of Andalusia, or the fourth army, was about sixteen thousand men, and was marching under the Conde Ebisbal (general O'Donnel) to take part in the operations beyond the Douro. The army of Estremadura, or the fifth army, amounted to about ten thousand, and was commanded by general Mosolus. The sixth army was that of Gallicia, and amounted to twenty thousand effective men; and the seventh was that of Asturias, about five thousand, under generals Castanos and Mendizabel, added to a corps under Esparia, of about four thousand, composed the total of the Spanish regular force; of which about forty-six thousand were with the army of lord Wellington, and the remainder either marching up, or occupied as above related.

The Guerilla force was estimated by lord Wellington at twenty-five thousand men; of which the principal divisions (and which were at least equal to the regulars) were under Mina, Duran, the Empecinado, and Don Julian Sanches. Mina, Duran, and Don Julian, with about eighteen thousand men, were at this time fully occupied in Navarre and Arragon; and most successfully employed in defending those provinces from the ravages of the French.

The third branch of the absent force of the allies was the expeditionary army of Alicant under Sir John Murray. This force amounted to about fifteen thousand, of which five thousand were British and Germans; the remainder Maltese and Calabrians. As
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the strength of an army consists more in the military qualities, than in the mere numerical amount of the soldiers, it is a matter of justice to add, that it is the general character of the Maltese, that they are more troublesome to their commanders than to the enemy. The Calabrians, however, are of two species—the one actually Calabrians, whom discipline, the English drill, and the English officers, have rendered good soldiers; the other Sicilians, upon whom all labour is thrown away. With this kind of deduction, the marquis rated the expeditionary army under Sir John Murray as equivalent to ten thousand bayonets.

Such, therefore, was the amount of the force, either actually with the marquis, or employed in distant quarters, with which the allies were about to open the campaign. It remains now to take a cursory view of that of the enemy.

There were five French armies at this period in the Peninsula, namely, those of the North, of the Centre, of Portugal, of the South, and of Arragon. The army of the North, under general Clausel, did not exceed fourteen thousand men; and that of the centre, under king Joseph and marshal Jourdan, was about the same number, and that of Portugal scarcely ten thousand. The army of the South, formerly Soult's army, but now under general Gazan, was estimated at fifteen thousand; and the army of Arragon, under marshal Suchet, about twenty-two thousand. The four first armies were all that the enemy could oppose in front to the advance of the marquis; marshal Suchet, and the commanders in Catalonia, being sufficiently occupied in maintaining that province. These commanders were generals Decaen, La Marque, and Maurice Mathieu, all officers of experience, but who having to maintain themselves against the Catalonian army and Guerillas on one flank, and against the British expeditions on the other, could not spare a battalion to the operations on the Douro.

Upon a comparison of the allied and enemies' force, two conclusions (and which will at first excite surprize) are instantaneously evident, viz. In the first place, that the marquis of Wellington, for the first time during his command in the Peninsula, had to begin the campaign with the most decided superiority of force; and, secondly, that the army now immediately about him, and which he was leading to the Douro and Ebro, was actually nearly the double of that which the enemy could by any possibility oppose to him. The allied army, when assembled on the Escla, was not short of one hundred and ten thousand men; the French armies, which fought at the battle of Vittoria, did not exceed fifty-three thousand. Let not this statement, however, mislead into an inference injurious to the just reputation of our army and its illustrious commander: for the merit of lord Wellington may be said to consist chiefly in two points: first, that by his careful formation, organization, and even elementary drilling of the Spanish and Portuguese troops, he rendered them nearly as effective as his own battalions; and thereby, by his own genius and resources, created that superiority which he possessed; and, secondly, that having thus obtained a superior force, he has known so well how to use it; and has exhibited himself the same master in offensive warfare, which every former campaign has exhibited him in defence.

With respect to the plan of the campaign of the present year, (1813,) it was evidently formed upon this relative statement of the two armies. Under these circumstances, to speak summarily, the plan of the campaign had three points, namely, First, by means of a direct and flank movement, to pursue the enemy before them to the Pyrennees. Secondly, to endeavour, by means of the flank movement, to overtake them; and to reap the fruits of the superiority of the allied force by bringing the enemy to battle. Thirdly, to destroy the magazines and depôts, and to clear the provinces of Biscay, Navarre, and Arragon.

Previously

Previously, however, to lord Wellington's commencing active operations he received intelligence from lieutenant-general Sir John Murray, (dated from his head-quarters at Castalla, April 14, 1813,) of the allied army under his command, having defeated that of the enemy on the 13th, which was commanded by marshal Suchet in person. It appears that the French general had, for the purpose of attacking Sir John Murray's army, for some time been employed in collecting his whole disposable force. His arrangements were completed on the 10th, and on the morning of the 11th, he attacked and dislodged, with some loss, a Spanish corps, posted by general Elio at Yecla, which threatened his right, while it supported our left flank. In the evening he advanced in considerable force to Villena, and captured, on the morning of the 12th, a Spanish garrison, which had been thrown into the castle by the Spanish general, for its defence. On the 12th, about noon, marshal Suchet began his attack on the advance of this army, posted at Biar, under the command of colonel Adam; whose orders were to fall back upon Castalla, but to dispute the passage with the enemy: this he did with amazing skill for five hours, although he was attacked by a force infinitely superior to that which he commanded. The enemy's advance occupied the pass that evening, and colonel Adam took up the ground in the position which had been allotted to him.

At noon on the 13th, the enemy's columns of attack were formed, composed of three divisions of infantry, a corps of cavalry of about one thousand six hundred men, and a formidable train of artillery. The position of the allied army was extensive. The left was posted on a strong range of hills, occupied by major-general Whittingham's division of Spanish troops, and the advance of the allied army under colonel Adam. This range of hills terminates at Castalla, which, and the ground to the right, was occupied by major-general Mackenzie's division, and the 58th regiment, from that of lieutenant-general

Clinton. The remainder of the position was covered by a strong ravine, behind which lieutenant-general Clinton was stationed, supported by three battalions of general Roche's division, as a column of reserve. A few batteries had been constructed in this part of the line, and in front of the castle of Castalla. The enemy necessarily advanced on the left of the position. The first movement he made was to pass a strong body of cavalry along the line, threatening the right, which was refused. Of this movement no notice was taken: the ground to which he was pointing was unfavourable to cavalry; and as this movement was foreseen, the necessary precautions had been taken. When this body of cavalry had passed nearly the half of the line of our infantry, marshal Suchet advanced his columns to the foot of the hills, and certainly his troops, with a degree of gallantry that entitles them to the highest praise, stormed the whole line, which was not less than two miles and a half in extent. But gallant as was the attack, the defence of those heights was no less brilliant: at every point the enemy was repulsed; at many with the bayonet. The French suffered severely, and were pursued for some distance by our troops, who drove him, after an obstinate struggle, with precipitation on his battalions of reserve upon this plain. The cavalry, which had slowly advanced along our right, gradually fell back to the infantry.

Having united his shattered battalions with those which he kept in reserve, marshal Suchet took up a position in the valley; after which the allied army formed in his front, covering the right flank of the allies with the cavalry, while the left rested on the hills. The army advanced in two lines to attack him, but the French general did not choose to risk a second action. Indeed the line of the allies was scarcely formed, when he began his retreat, and the allies could effect nothing more than driving him into that pass with defeat, which he had exultingly passed in the morning. The action terminated at dusk, with a

distant

distant but heavy cannonade. The allies then returned to their former position at Castalla, after the enemy had retired to Biar; from which place he continued his retreat to Villena, which he quitted on the morning of the 14th in great haste, directing his march upon Fuente de la Higuera and Onteniente.

In this action the marshal Suchet commanded in person, and the generals Harispe, Hubert, and Robert commanded their respective divisions. The loss on the part of the enemy was severe, amounting to upwards of two thousand five hundred killed and wounded; while that of the allies was but trifling in comparison. The total loss of the allies was one hundred and forty-five killed, four hundred and eighty-one wounded, and forty-two rank and file missing.

By the Valencia Gazette Extraordinary of April 15, it appears, that on the above occasion marshal Suchet had collected an army of eighteen thousand men, among whom were two thousand horse. After his retreat he was briskly pursued, and was supposed to have lost nearly five thousand of his troops, and the number of the enemy abandoned and taken by the peasantry and the allies was great. During the action no prisoners were made, because no quarter was given.

The marquis of Wellington had given orders to the different corps to march towards Salamanca, and by a dispatch from his lordship, dated Carvajales, May 31, 1813, it appears, that the British troops arrived on the 26th at Salamanca, where they found the enemy still in the town, with one division of infantry and three squadrons of cavalry, with some cannon of the army of the south, under the command of general Villatte. On the approach of the allies, the enemy evacuated the town, but they waited longer than they ought to have done upon the high ground in the neighbourhood, by which they afforded an opportunity for the cavalry, under generals Fane and Victor Alten, (the former of whom crossed the Tormes at the ford of Santa Martha, and the latter
at

at the bridge,) to do them a great deal of injury in their retreat. Many were killed and wounded, and the allies took about two hundred prisoners, seven tumbrils of ammunition, some baggage, provisions, &c. The enemy retired by the road of Babila Fuente, and near Huerta were joined by a body of infantry and cavalry on their march from Alba. I then, says lord Wellington, ordered our troops to discontinue the pursuit, our infantry not being up. Major-general Long, and brigadier-general Morillo, in command of the Spanish division, attacked Alba, from which place the enemy retired.

In the course of the 27th and 28th, his lordship established the troops which had marched from the Agueda and Upper Estremadura, between the Tormes and the Douro, under the command of lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill; and on the 29th, his lordship set off to join the troops at Carvajales, and arrived that day at Miranda de Douro, and on the 31st at Carvajales. Here he found the troops on the Esla, under the command of Sir Thomas Graham, as he had intended, with their left at Tabara, and in communication with the Gallician army, their right at Carvajales, and all the arrangements made for passing the Esla. The greatest part passed that river on the morning of the 31st, the cavalry by fords, and the infantry by a bridge, which it was necessary to throw over the river, as it was so deep, that some men even of the cavalry, were lost in the passage. The English huzzars, who crossed first, took an officer and thirty men prisoners near Valdeperdiccas.

The enemy evacuated Zamora, and our patrols have been in that town. The troops which were there fell back upon Toro, where they had one division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry.

At length the French army, commanded by king Joseph Bonaparte, and having marshal Jourdan as the major-general of the forces, took up a position on the night of the 19th of June, in front of Vitoria,

toria*, the left of which rested on the heights which end at Puebla de Arlanzon, and extended from thence across the valley of Zadora, in front of the village of Arunez. They occupied with the right of the centre a height which commanded the valley of Zadora, and the right of their army was stationed near Vittoria, and was destined to defend the passages of the river Zadora, in the neighbourhood of that city; and they had a reserve, in the rear of their left, at the village of Gomecha.

The nature of the country through which the army had passed since it had reached the Ebro, had necessarily extended the columns of the allies, and the marquis of Wellington halted on the 20th of the same month, in order to close them up, and moved the left to Margina, where it was most likely it would be necessary. The noble marquis, in his dispatch, dated Salvatierra, June 22, 1813, says, "I reconnoitred the enemy's position on that day, (the 20th,) with a view to the attack to be made on the following morning, if they should still remain in it. We accordingly attacked the enemy yesterday, (the 21st,) and I am happy to inform your lordship, (earl Bathurst), that the allied army, under my command, gained a compleat victory; having driven them from all their positions, having taken from them one hundred and fifty-one pieces of cannon, four hundred and fifteen waggons of ammunition, all their baggage,

* Vittoria, a considerable town of Biscay, in Spain, and capital of the province of Alava. It is surrounded with double walls, and in the principal square are the town-house, two convents, several well-built houses, and the middle is adorned with a fine fountain. The large streets are bordered with fine trees, which are a good defence against the heat of the sun. There are very rich merchants here, who carry on a great trade in hardware, which they send to different parts of the kingdom. They also deal in wool and wines, particularly in sword blades, which they make in large quantities. It is seated at the end of a pleasant plain, fertile in corn and grapes, thirty-two miles S. E. of Bilbao, forty miles S. W. of Tolosa, and one hundred and fifty-five N. of Madrid.

provisions,

provisious, cattle, treasure, &c. and a considerable number of prisoners."

The operations of the day commenced by lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill obtaining possession of the heights of La Puebla, on which the enemy's left rested; which heights they had not occupied in great strength. He detached on this service one brigade of the Spanish division under general Murillo; the other brigade being employed in keeping the communication between his main body, on the high road from Miranda to Vittoria, and the troops detached to the heights. The enemy, however, soon discovered the importance of the heights, and reinforced their troops there to such an extent, as that lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill was obliged to detach, first, the 71st regiment, and the light infantry battalion of major-general Walker's brigade under the command of the honourable lieutenant-colonel Cadogan, and successively other troops to the same point, and the allies not only gained, but maintained possession of these important heights throughout their operations, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy to retake them. The contest here, however, was very severe, and the loss sustained considerable. General Murillo was wounded, but remained on the field; and the honourable lieutenant-colonel Cadogan died of a wound he received*. In him his majesty has lost an officer of great zeal and tried gallantry, who had already acquired the respect and regard of the whole profession, and of whom it might be expected, that, if he had

* On the 7th of July, earl Bathurst particularly mentioned, in the House of Lords, the death of the honourable lieutenant-colonel Cadogan. "A braver, or more meritorious officer," said his lordship; "this country never produced.--When he received that wound in the engagement which soon after proved mortal, he desired his soldiers to bear him to a neighbouring eminence. There he leaned his back against a tree, and continued to gaze over the battle until his eyes were closed for ever!"--The same circumstances were alluded to in the House of Commons by lord Castle-reagh.

lived, he would have rendered the most important services to his country.

Under cover of the possession of these heights, Sir Rowland Hill successively passed the Zadora at La Puebla and the defile formed by the heights and the river Zadora, and attacked and gained possession of the village of Sabijana de Alva, in front of the enemy's line, which they made repeated attempts to regain. The difficult nature of the country, however, hindered the communication between the different columns of the allies moving to the attack from their various positions on the river Bayas at so early an hour as the marquis expected; and it was late before he knew that the column composed of the 3rd and 7th divisions, under the command of the earl of Dalhousie, had arrived at the station appointed for them.

The 4th and light division, however, passed the Zadora immediately after Sir Rowland Hill had taken possession of Sabijana de Alava, the former at the bridge of Tres Puentes; and almost as soon as these had crossed, the column under the earl of Dalhousie arrived at Mendouza; and the 3rd division, under lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Picton, crossed at the bridges higher up, followed by the 7th division, under the earl of Dalhousie.

These four divisions, forming the centre of the army, were destined to attack the heights on which the right of the enemy's centre was placed, while lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill should move forward from Subijana de Alava to attack the left. The enemy, however, having weakened his line to strengthen his detachments in the hills, abandoned his positions in the valley as soon as he saw the disposition of the allies to attack it, and commenced his retreat in good order towards Vittoria; and the allied troops continued to advance in admirable order, notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground.

In the mean time, lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham, who commanded the left of the army, consisting of the 1st and 5th divisions, and generals Pack's

and Bradford's brigades of infantry, and generals Bock's and Anson's brigades of cavalry, and who had been moved on the 20th to Margina, moved forward from thence to Vittoria, by the high road from that town to Bilboa. He had besides with him the Spanish division under colonel Longa; and general Giron, who had been detached to the left under a different view of the state of affairs, and had afterwards been recalled, and had arrived on the 20th at Orduna, marched that morning from thence, so as to be in the field in readiness to support lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham, if his support had been required.

The enemy had a division of infantry and some cavalry advanced on the great road from Vittoria to Bilboa, resting their right on some strong heights covering the village of Gamarra Major. Both Gamarra and Abechuco were strongly occupied, as *têtes-de-pont* to the bridges over the Zadora at these places. Brigadier-general Pack, with his Portuguese brigade, and colonel Longa, with the Spanish division, were directed to turn and gain the heights, supported by major-general Anson's brigade of light dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry, under the command of major-general Oswald, who was desired to take the command of all these troops.

So soon as the heights were in our possession, says the marquis of Wellington, the village of Gamarra Major was most gallantly stormed and carried by brigadier-general Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, which advanced in columns of battalions, under a very heavy fire of artillery and musketry, without firing a shot, assisted by two guns of major Lawson's brigade of artillery. The enemy suffered severely, and lost three pieces of cannon.

The lieutenant-general then proceeded to attack the village of Abechuco, with the 1st division, by forming a strong battery against it, consisting of captain Dubourdieu's brigade and captain Ramsay's troop of horse artillery, and, under cover of this fire, colonel Halkett's brigade advanced to the attack of the village,

lage, which was carried, the light battalion having charged and taken three guns and a howitzer on the bridge. This attack was supported by general Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry.

During the operation at Abechuco, the enemy made the greatest efforts to repossess themselves of the village of Gamarra Major, which were gallantly repulsed by the troops of the 5th division, under the command of major-general Oswald. The enemy had, however, on the heights on the left of the Zadora, two divisions of infantry in reserve, and it was impossible to cross by the bridges till the troops which had moved upon the enemy's centre and left had driven them through Vittoria. The whole then joined in the pursuit, which was continued by all till after it was dark.

The movement of the troops under lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham, and their possession of Gamarra and Abechuco, intercepted the enemy's retreat by the high road to France. They were then obliged to turn to the road towards Pampeluna; but they were unable to hold any position for a sufficient length of time to allow their baggage and artillery to be drawn off. The whole, therefore, of the latter, which had not already been taken by the troops in their attack of the successive positions, taken up by the enemy in their retreat from their first position on Arunez and on the Zadora, and all their ammunition and baggage, and every thing they had, were taken close to Vittoria. I have reason to believe, says the marquis, the enemy carried off with them one gun and one howitzer only.

The army under Joseph Bonaparte consisted of the whole of the armies of the South and of the Centre, and of four divisions, and all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, and some troops of the army of the North. General Foix's division of the army of Portugal was in the neighbourhood of Bilboa, and general Clausel, who commanded the army of the North, was near Logrono, with one division of the army of

Portugal, commanded by general Topin, and general Vandermassen's division of the army of the North.

In a subsequent dispatch, dated Trienyeen, June 24, the marquis of Wellington informs us, that in the pursuit he had taken the only remaining gun the enemy had, and that the remains of the French army had entered Pampeluna with only one howitzer.

By the return of killed and wounded it appears that the grand total was, one lieutenant-colonel (Cadogan), ten captains, fourteen lieutenants, seven ensigns, one staff, nineteen serjeants, five drummers, six hundred and eighty-three rank and file, ninety-three horses, killed; two general staff, nine lieutenant-colonels, nine majors, fifty-nine captains, one hundred and three lieutenants, forty-one ensigns, seven staff, one hundred and fifty-eight serjeants, fourteen drummers, three thousand seven hundred and sixty-eight rank and file, sixty-eighty horses wounded.

In the sittings of the Cortes, at Cadiz, on the 1st of July, senior Golfin proposed that the most heartfelt thanks should be given to lord Wellington and all the chiefs and troops, allied or national; that *Te Deum* should be sung, salvoes of artillery, illuminations, &c. &c. This was approved by acclamation.

Senior Creus said, as was the case after the battle of Arapiles, I propose that a commission from the congress proceed to compliment his Britannic majesty's minister, brother to the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, to be distributed among our victorious and allied armies: which was agreed to.

Senior Rees proposed, that an allegorical medal be struck to perpetuate the most glorious action of Vitoria, which insures the salvation of Spain, and that a portion of them be sent to the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, to be distributed among the victorious and allied armies.—This proposition was not admitted to a discussion on account of there not being means to defray the expences of them.

The following day (July 2,) the Conde de Torino gave an account to the congress of the proceedings of the

the deputation from the Cortes, which the day before went to congratulate his Britannic majesty's ambassador, on account of the celebrated victory of the 21st of June. He stated, that the marquis of Villa Franca addressed the ambassador, who replied in terms the most honourable to the Spanish troops, for the share they had in the victory.

Senior R. Olmeda, in the name of his province of Chareas, and of the city of Plata, offered to defray the expence of a medal in honour of the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, on which should be a bust of him.—This was approved without discussion.

The marquis of Wellington's dispatches were then read to the Cortes; after which,

Senior Arguelles said, although the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo does not require fresh proofs to be convinced of the pure sentiments of gratitude which animate the congress in respect to the illustrious captain, I think that the time is now arrived, when the Cortes should bestow upon him a territorial property, as it has already elevated him to the first rank of civil order; I therefore propose, first, that the Cortes bestow upon the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo a territorial property of the national domains, administered on account of the national finances; for which purpose the regency will propose to the Cortes what it conceives suitable to the merits of the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the generosity of the Spanish nation; and, secondly, that the title of succession which shall be prepared, shall contain the following words: "In the name of the Spanish nation, in testimony of its most sincere gratitude."

The battle of Vittoria, in which the allies under the command of the marquis of Wellington, gained so compleat a victory over the French army, commanded by king Joseph in person and marshal Jourdan, and the consequences which resulted from that victory are so great and important, that we deem it necessary to dilate a little upon the subject, which is so extremely gratifying to the heart of every Englishman.

In all the preceding battles which have been fought by our brave armies in the Peninsula, there has been a something which has, for the most part, detracted from their interest, and rendered their importance of but little value. The battle of Talavera, though glorious, was disastrous in its results. A mere negative success attended the actions of Vimeira and Busaco—and even the great battle of Salamanca, which called forth such exultation in the year 1812, was succeeded by retreat, and the loss of the Spanish capital: but the victory of Vittoria, which we now contemplate, was unclouded by any such disasters, for it differed most essentially from every one that preceded it. An army of sixty thousand men sacrificing its all, and escaping with merely its personal equipments, is a spectacle remaining for this age to behold. It is, therefore, no wonder, that the British nation and its allies, hope to derive from it the most important consequences, particularly that of freeing the Peninsula from its invaders, and of re-establishing the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies. And, indeed, so great have been the conquests of the allies since the battle of Vittoria, that the French armies were first driven to the Pyrennees, which separate France from Spain, where they made a stand, under marshal Soult, but were at length compelled to abandon their positions, in October, and the marquis of Wellington entered into France; but of this we shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

It was about a month previous to the battle of Vittoria, that the marquis of Wellington broke up from the quarters he had so long occupied on the frontiers of Spain; and on the 26th of May the army arrived at Salamanca, where the allied forces, for the first time this campaign, came in contact with the enemy, whom they overtook, taking some prisoners, a few ammunition waggons, and some provisions. The French retreated rapidly, but in good order; and did not neglect any thing which might impede the progress of the allies. At length, on the 19th of June, they

they took up their positions in front of Vittoria, their left resting upon Puebla, and extending across the valley of Zacora, in front of the village of Arunez. Their right was stationed near Vittoria, and destined to defend the passages of the river Zadora. Their reserve was at the village of Gomicha. The French force was estimated at sixty thousand men, but the allied army was much greater. At length after a most dreadful conflict, the French were cut off from the high road to France, and driven through the town of Vittoria towards Salvatierra and Pampeluna. Here they were compelled to abandon their artillery, provisions, military chest, and baggage and ammunition waggons, with about thirty thousand pounds sterling; and nine thousand head of cattle became the property of the victors. The route of the French was now general, and vast numbers of prisoners would, in all probability have been attended by a proportionate number of officers, had not this general abandonment of artillery, &c. taken place.

Amid the crowd of fugitives King Joseph had a very narrow escape. He was soon recognized, and closely pursued by a detachment of cavalry led by the marquis of Worcester. Captain Wyndham, who was in the pursuit, fired two pistol shots at the carriage in which Joseph was seated; but the latter having succeeded in passing a mill dam, where the French had contrived to obstruct the pursuit, he mounted his horse and escaped at full gallop, leaving all his personal effects behind him. So much, indeed, were the French concerned for their personal safety, that even general Jourdan escaped with the loss of his marshal's baton, which captain Freemantle, who brought the marquis of Wellington's dispatches, was directed to present to the Prince Regent in London*.

The

* The following is the copy of a letter from the Prince Regent to the Marquis of Wellington, on receiving Marshal Jourdan's baton, which was taken at the battle of Vittoria, in return for which his royal highness sent his lordship that of a British Field Marshal:

The loss of the French in the famous battle of Vittoria has been variously stated; but it appears from the most authentic accounts, that it amounted to about twelve thousand men. Indeed, so compleat was the rout of the enemy, that all the women belonging to the French army were taken prisoners, but they were immediately restored by Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington. The loss of the enemy would not have been so great, had it not been for the admirable movement made by sir Thomas Graham, who, by getting possession of the villages of Gamarra and Abechuco, cut off the enemy's retreat from the high road to France, and more difficult road to Pampeluna*.

The

"MY DEAR LORD,

Carlton House, July 3, 1813.

"Your glorious conduct is beyond all human praise, and far above my reward; I know no language the world affords worthy to express it. I feel I have nothing left to say, but devoutly to offer up my prayers of gratitude to Providence, that it has in its omnipotent bounty blessed my country and myself with such a General. You have sent me among the trophies of your unrivalled fame, the staff of a French Marshal, and I send you in return that of England. The British army will hail it with enthusiasm, while the whole universe will acknowledge those valorous efforts which have so imperiously called for it. That uninterrupted health, and still increasing laurels, may continue to crown you through a glorious and long career of life, are the never-ceasing and most ardent wishes of, my dear Lord, your very sincere and faithful friend.

"The Marquis of Wellington."

"G. P. R."

The Marquis of Wellington, by his elevation to the rank of a Field Marshal, takes precedence of all the generals in the British service; and most deservedly acquires considerable additional emolument: his pay now becomes double that of a general, amounting to twenty pounds per day, which the regular contingencies of the service will increase nearly as much more.

* The town of Pampeluna was anciently called Pompeiopolis, because it was built by Pompey. It is a large city, the capital of Navarre in Spain, and is a very rich bishopric. Pampeluna is situated in the Pyrennees, and is an exceedingly strong place, being defended by two castles, one of which is on a rock. It is also the seat of an university. Its squares are handsome, and it is adorned with shops full of rich merchandize. There is a famous hand-mill here, which is very useful in case of a siege. The celebrated Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the order of Jesuits,

The army under general Clausel advanced to the neighbourhood of Vittoria after the battle, and having ascertained what had taken place, he immediately turned off with all speed to La Guadia, and from thence to Tudela on the Ebro.

It appears very clear, that if the French had made any attempt to save their baggage, ammunition, &c. their whole army would probably have been taken prisoners. They therefore wisely abandoned every thing which might impede their progress; and this may account for their loss in killed and prisoners not bearing a due proportion to the magnitude of their defeat. By a reference to the Map which accompanies this work, the situation of the French in the fortress of Pampeluna may be duly appreciated.

It is worthy of remark, that the battle of Vittoria was fought nearly on the same spot with another, in which a victory obtained by the English restored a legitimate sovereign to the throne of Spain. Within sight of the enemy's positions on the 21st of June, and only a few miles higher on the same stream, the Zadora, stands the village of Navareta, where, on the 31st of April, 1367, Edward the Black Prince totally defeated Henry the Bastard, and in consequence seated Don Pedro on the throne of Castile. Froissart, who gives a lively description of this engagement, observes of sir John Chandos, the most eminent among the English knights, that "he never thought during the day of making any prisoners; but was solely occupied in fighting and pushing forward." The most striking passage, however, in his account, is that in which he describes the approach of the two armies towards each other, when "a little before they met, the Prince of Wales, with eyes and hands uplifted towards Heaven, exclaimed—"God of truth, the Father of Jesus

being wounded in this city while it was besieged by the French in 1521, took occasion thereupon to leave the army for the church. Pampeluna is seated in a very fertile plain, on the river Arga, forty-two miles S. of Bayonne, and one hundred and sixty-seven N. E. of Madrid.

Christ, who hast made and fashioned me, grant, through thy benign grace, that the success of this battle may be for me and my army; for thou knowest, that in truth I have been solely emboldened to undertake it in the support of justice and reason, to reinstate the king upon his throne, who has been disinherited and driven from it, as well as from his country." This zealous prayer was immediately followed by the onset, the Prince crying aloud, "Advance, banners, in the name of God, and St. George."—"At the commencement," says the old historian, "the French and Arragonians made a desperate resistance, and gave the good Knights of England much trouble;" but at last, "when all the divisions of the Prince were formed into one large body," the enemy "could no longer keep their ground, but began to fly in great disorder;" and Henry (the Usurper) "perceiving his army defeated, without hope of recovery, called for his horse, mounted it, and galloped off among the crowd of run-aways." The English pursued them through the town of Najaca, where they gained considerable plunder, "for King Henry and his army had come thither with much splendour; and after the defeat, they had not leisure to return to place in security what they had left behind them in the morning."

There is likewise a curious coincidence in some circumstances respecting the Most Noble Order of the Garter, which the splendid battle of Vittoria agreeably refreshes the recollection of. On the same field two Knights of that Order distinguished themselves and their country: these two are the first and the last in the list of these illustrious Knights. Edward the Black Prince, the first Knight, gained a signal victory on the same ground, (above stated,) as the Marquis of Wellington, the last Knight, did; and the very heights, the neglect or inability to defend which principally contributed to the success of that glorious day, are still called the English Hills.

On the 7th of July, in the House of Commons, lord Castlereagh entered into a long detail of the late
glorious

glorious victory of Vittoria, and concluded by moving, that the thanks of the house be given to the Marquis of Wellington, which passed unanimously*.

The thanks of the house were also voted *nem. con.* to the General Officers, &c. under his command, (Generals sir Rowland Hill, sir Thomas Graham, the earl of Dalhousie, generals Stewart, Oswald, G. Murray, Vandeleur, Lowry, Cole, baron Bock, &c. &c.) and to the non-commissioned officers and privates of the army.

Thanks were likewise voted in the same manner to marshal Beresford, and the Portuguese officers and army, and the Spanish officers and army: those thanks to be communicated to them by the marquis of Wellington.

On the 12th of the same month, lord Castlereagh said, that he should on the following day, move for the erection of monuments to the memory of two brave and distinguished officers, who fell at the battle of Vittoria, and who were not general officers: he meant colonels Myers and Cadogan.

Accordingly the next day lord Castlereagh, pursuant to the notice he had given the preceding day, moved for the erection of monuments to the memory of four brave officers, who fell while heroically fighting for their king and country. The first distinguished individual he should mention was general Bowles, who so gallantly headed the storming party of Salamanca, and whose various services had justly gained for him a high eminence. After being wounded he returned to his duty: and the house would doubtless think the proposal of a monument within the spirit of their regulations. The next officer was sir William Myers, who fell at Albuera. That victory certainly called for, and received the thanks of parliament; but although sir William Myers did not hold the rank of a general officer, he commanded a brigade on that me-

* The thanks of the House of Lords were voted on the 6th of July.

morable occasion. He commanded the fusileers, who so bravely attacked the enemy, and returned covered with glory, but leaving half their number on the field of battle. He should now mention the honourable colonel Henry Cadogan, who so much distinguished himself in the action of Fuentes de Honor, for which he was celebrated by the marquis of Wellington. In the last day of his life, he equally proved himself a bright ornament of his profession. At the great battle of Vittoria, he had no wish, after receiving his wound, but to see the conclusion of the British triumph, and to behold the termination of that splendid success of our gallant army. Lastly, he had to mention another officer, (and though it be not connected with the war in the Peninsula, we see no reason to omit it,) who fell, acting entirely on a less extensive scale, and, therefore, not having such brilliant opportunities; this was major-general Brock, whose peculiar merits were the result of a manly and noble character, which infused a spirit and an emulation into the minds of the inhabitants of a distant province, which impressed upon them a just feeling of their interests in their connection with Great Britain, and an equally just disposition to defend Canada against the invasion of the enemy. His services were also eminently distinguished in the field, by the discomfiture of the corps under the American general Hull, though superior in numbers. The noble lord then moved for an address to the Prince Regent, praying his royal highness to direct the erection of a monument, in the cathedral church of St. Paul, to the memory of major-general Bowles, who fell at the assault of Salamanca on the 17th of June, 1812; which was carried unanimously.—His lordship then moved similar addresses for monuments to the memory of major-general Brock, who fell on the 13th of October, 1812, at Kingstown in Upper Canada; to sir William Myers, who commanded a brigade at the battle of Albufera, and fell on the 16th of May, 1812; and to colonel the honourable Henry Cadogan, who lost his life at the memorable

morable battle of Vittoria, when a victory was gained under the command of the marquis of Wellington. These motions were all carried unanimously.

That the English nation should feel highly gratified by the splendid victory obtained by their forces over the French at Vittoria is by no means surprising; and as a proof of the general sense of the people of England on this glorious occasion, a court of Common Council of the city of London was held on the 12th of July, for the purpose of voting thanks, &c. to Field Marshal Wellington, and the army serving under him, for their brilliant achievement at the battle of Vittoria.

Mr. Jacks opened the business; and after briefly advertng to the splendid career of his lordship's military life, from the battle of Assave in India, to the excessive braveries of Vimeira, Talavera, Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, and, finally, that of Vittoria, in the Peninsula; moved the thanks of the court to his lordship, for the wisdom and energy with which he had conducted the campaign in Spain, and especially for the splendid and decisive victory of Vittoria, by which the French dominion in that country was completely destroyed: which was carried unanimously.

Mr. Jacks then moved the thanks of the court to sir T. Graham, sir R. Hill, the earl of Dalhousie, generals Picton, Stewart, Cole, and the other officers of the British army, for their great exertions on the 21st of June: which was also carried unanimously.

The following resolutions were then severally put and carried unanimously:

“ Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of the court be given to lieutenant-general sir T. Graham, lieutenant-general sir R. Hill, lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie, lieutenant-general sir T. Picton, lieutenant-general sir G. L. Cole, and lieutenant-general the honourable W. Stewart; to major-general G. Baron Bock, major-general C. Baron Alten, major-general the honourable C. Colville, major-general G. Anson, major-general J. Oswald, major-general J. O. Vandeleur, major-general G. Murray, major-general F. P. Robinson, major-

major-general lord Aylmer, and to the several other officers of his Majesty's service, for the skill, bravery, and exertions, so eminently displayed on the 21st day of June last, when the French army was completely defeated by the allied forces, under the Marquis of Wellington's command.

“ Resolved unanimously, That the court doth highly admire and gratefully acknowledge the distinguished zeal, valour, and good conduct displayed by the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of the Portuguese and Spanish forces, who served under the command of the marquis of Wellington, in the splendid and decisive victory obtained over the French army on the 21st day of June last, near Vittoria.

“ Resolved unanimously, That this court feeling its inability to bestow any additional testimony of regard, adequate to the exalted sense it entertains of the merits of the marquis of Wellington, do unanimously resolve, that a bust of his lordship be placed in the council chamber of this city, in order that the citizens of London, when assembled in common council, may ever have recalled to their recollection the glorious deeds of the great military hero of their country, when at the same moment they have in view the bust of the immortal Nelson.

“ Resolved unanimously, That the freedom of this city having been voted to lieutenant-general sir T. Graham, on the 4th of April, 1811, and no opportunity having since occurred for the chamberlain to present the same, Resolved, That the said freedom be presented to sir T. Graham, on his return to his country, in a gold box, of the value of one hundred guineas, as an additional testimony of the high sense this court entertains of his eminent public services on the 21st day of June last.

“ Resolved unanimously, That the freedom of this city together with a sword, of the value of one hundred guineas, be presented to lieutenant-general sir R. Hill, as a testimony of the high sense this court entertains of his eminent public service on the 21st day of June last.”

And on the 18th of the same month the right honourable the lord mayor, the aldermen, recorder, sheriffs, and city officers, and common council of the city of London, waited upon the Prince Regent, at Carlton House, with the following address, which was read by John Silvester, esq. the recorder :

“ To

“ To his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, Regent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

“ The dutiful and loyal Address of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons, of the City of London, in Common Council assembled;

“ May it please your Royal Highness,

“ We, his majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the lord mayor, aldermen, and commons, of the city of London, in common council assembled, deeply interested in the late glorious success which has attended his majesty's arms, and warmly participating in the universal triumph felt and expressed on that memorable occasion, beg leave to approach your royal highness with our heartfelt congratulations on the brilliant and decisive victory obtained by field marshal the marquis of Wellington, and the allied armies under his command, over the French forces, in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, on the 21st of June last.

“ Frequent as have been the occasions, on which it has been our duty and delight to approach the throne, with our congratulations on the achievements of the British arms under many illustrious commanders, never have we contemplated an event more grand and auspicious, or more admirably calculated to promote the national glory, and to exhibit the British name and valour to the highest possible advantage.

“ The consummate skill and prudence, the undaunted intrepidity and perseverance, so pre-eminently possessed and exercised by field marshal the marquis of Wellington, and his brave army, and the signal success with which those qualities have been crowned, leave us only those emotions of gratitude and admiration, which, whilst we powerfully feel, it is impossible for the utmost command of language adequately to express.

“ A victory so complete and decisive cannot fail to produce the happiest effects on the liberties and independence of Europe, and while it disappoints the counsels, diminishes the resources, and weakens the energies of the enemy, will, we trust, more than ever unite the efforts, animate the exertions, and inspire the confidence of our allies, in the prosecution of the great cause in which we and they are engaged, and be the means of producing results still more glorious and important.

“ We cannot conclude without expressing our ardent hope, that that Providence which has watched over and supported the interests of Britain, during a series of unexampled difficulties, and which has favoured her so highly in the late conflicts,

fects, may continue to smile upon her exertions, and prosper the counsels of your royal highness, so as to promote and finally to secure an honourable and lasting peace.

“ Signed, by order of court,

“ HENRY WOODTHORPE.”

To which address his royal highness was pleased to return the following most gracious answer :

“ The victory with which it has pleased Almighty God to bless the operations of the allied army under its illustrious commander field marshal the marquis of Wellington, cannot fail to have excited in every part of the united kingdom the strongest emotions of exultation and gratitude ; and it is with the utmost satisfaction that I receive such a testimony of feelings which animate the metropolis of the empire on this most interesting and important occasion.

“ Success so splendid and decisive, so glorious in all respects to the arms of his majesty and of his allies, is calculated to contribute most essentially to the establishment of the independence of the Peninsula on a firm and lasting foundation, and to the improvement of our prospects in all other parts of the world.”

The lord mayor and the citizens of Dublin, the capital of the marquis of Wellington's native land, likewise addressed their noble countryman on this splendid occasion ; which address was transmitted to the noble marquis by the duke of Richmond ; and to which the marquis of Wellington returned the following short but appropriate answer :

“ MY LORD,

Lezaca, Sept. 18, 1813.

“ The duke of Richmond has transmitted the address of the lord mayor, sheriffs, commons, and citizens of Dublin, unanimously agreed to, to be presented to me, at a general assembly, held on Friday, the 18th of July, in which my fellow-citizens have been pleased to express their approbation of my conduct, and that of the troops serving under my command in the late battles of Vittoria.

“ I beg that your lordship and the citizens of Dublin will accept my best thanks for this mark of their favour ; and that you will be assured that nothing can be more gratifying to the brave officers and troops under my command, and myself, than to know that our conduct has been approved of by such high authority.

“ I have the honour to be, my lord,

“ Your lordship's most obedient humble servant,

“ WELLINGTON.”

Having

Having spoken pretty fully on the great and glorious battle of Vittoria, which may be considered as nearly the complete overthrow of the French power in the Peninsula, it is necessary to advert to that part of the management of the war which fell under the direction of the Cortes; and this, by the way, was done in so strange a manner, that their conduct was highly dissatisfactory to the marquis of Wellington, insomuch, that his lordship wrote a severe letter of remonstrance to the members of the Spanish government at Cadiz, respecting the dismissal of general Castanos from the command of the fourth army. In the noble marquis's letter we discover a spirit of manly indignation at the unworthy treatment his lordship had experienced at the hands of the Spanish regency, and shall therefore insert it verbatim:

Letter of Remonstrance from Lord Wellington to Don Juan O'Donoju, Spanish Minister at War.

“ *Head-quarters, Huarti, July 2, 1813.*

“ Most Excellent Sir,—I had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter, dated the 15th ult. acquainting me that the regency had thought proper to remove the captain-general Castanos from the command of the fourth army, in order that he may occupy the place of counsellor of state, because he was not at the head of the fourth army, which the regency had entrusted to him: that general Freire had been appointed captain-general of Estremadura and Castile, and was to command the fourth army; that general Lacy was appointed captain-general of Galicia, and to the command of the troops of that province, independently of the general of the fourth army; and general Giron was to transfer his services to the first army.

“ As the constitution of the Spanish monarchy has declared the ministers responsible for acts which are the measures of government, I trust I may venture to address some observations to your Excellency on this subject, which I beg you to submit to the regency.

“ Justice towards the character of general Castanos, an officer who has served his country in close union with me, during the last three years, without there having been a single difference of opinion between us in any matter of importance, compels me to remind your Excellency, that the local situation of the fourth army, prior to the opening of the cam-

paign, prevented its being formed into a corps, at the head of which the captain-general could be placed with any regard to propriety, considering the dignity of his office. And even when the union of the fourth army would have been locally practicable, the deplorable state of the royal treasury, and of the resources applicable to its subsistence, would have prevented that corps from remaining united for any great length of time.

“ Your excellency well knows, that when money is wanting for the maintenance of troops, it is possible, that in a particular district of the country, provision may be made for the subsistence of a small number without any pay; but that this is impracticable in regard to a large corps of troops: and for this reason, and others relative to the state of discipline and peculiar organization of some corps, I did not deem it proper that more troops of the fourth army should be assembled in one corps, than the two divisions composing the army of Galicia, under the command of general Giron.

“ It would have been unbecoming and improper, considering the rank and situation of general Castanos, besides being inconvenient, to place him at the head of these two divisions, or any other portion of the fourth army; and for this reason, and at my request, he placed his head-quarters with mine and those of the Portuguese army.

“ Not only has your Excellency not attended to these circumstances, in the measure which you have recommended to the government, in regard to general Castanos, but various other considerations have been overlooked.

“ General Castanos, besides commanding the fourth army, was captain-general of Estremadura, Castile, and Galicia; and in that capacity had to perform duties of the greatest importance to the public interest, and particularly to the well-being of the army.

“ It was one of his duties to re-establish the Spanish authorities in the different districts and cities which the enemy was successively evacuating; and considering the nature of the operations of the army, and the peculiar line of march which it pursued, it would have been impossible for him to discharge that obligation, had he been literally at the head of the fourth army, or with the head-quarters, which, from the period of the 24th of May, were almost every day changing place, without ever entering the high road, or any one capital city, excepting Salamanca, where general Castanos left them.

“ It was myself, not general Castanos, who suggested the idea that his Excellency should be employed in this manner; and it is necessary for me to say, that, considering the manner

ner in which general Giron has commanded in the field the divisions of the army of Galicia, we should have neglected the welfare of the state, had we not traced out to general Castanos the very line of conduct which he has followed, and for which he now finds himself persecuted and defamed.

“ With regard to the arrangements made by your Excellency for the purpose of filling the different offices held by general Castanos, and the removal of general Giron (without any complaint alledged, and even without assigning any motive whatever) from the post in which he was placed by general Castanos at my request, and in which he conducted himself to my entire satisfaction, as I have communicated to the government,—I believe, that, besides the inconveniencies and mischiefs which result to the service from this kind of change, especially during military operations, it cannot be denied that they are in direct breach of the contract made with the last regency, and confirmed by the present; an agreement which, as your Excellency knows, was that which induced me to take the command of the Spanish army.

“ Your Excellency also knows, that this is not the first instance in which that contract, formed with so much solemnity, and after such mature deliberation, has been violated; and no one can be more fully aware than yourself of the inconveniencies which thence result to the good of the service. Your excellency is equally well acquainted with my natural disposition, and my wishes to continue to serve the Spanish nation, as far as my abilities extend: but forbearance and submission to injuries so great, have their limits; and I avow that I have been treated by the Spanish government in these matters, in a manner the most improper, even simply as an individual.

“ It does not belong to my character, nor am I inclined to boast of my services to the Spanish nation; but I can at least publicly declare, that I have never abused the powers with which the Cortes and the government have entrusted me, even in the most trivial affairs, nor ever employed them towards any other object than that of producing the good of the service. In confirmation of this truth, I appeal even to your Excellency as a witness: and I believe it will be admitted, that the circumstances which rendered necessary the formation of the contract above-mentioned, equally require its fulfilment, if it is desired that I should be able to retain the command of the army.

“ May God preserve your Excellency many years,

(Signed) “ WELLINGTON, Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo.”

By field-marshal the marquis of Wellington's dispatch, dated Ostiz, July 3, 1813, it appears that general Mina was still following the enemy, and had taken from him two pieces of cannon, and some stores in Tudela, with three hundred prisoners. Lieutenant-general Clinton also took possession of five guns, which the enemy left at Logrono. In the mean time the troops under the command of lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill kept the blockade of Pampeluna, and moved through the mountains to the head of the Bidassoa, the enemy having entirely retired into France on that side.

On the 24th and 25th of June, lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham had actions with the enemy's forces, of which he gave an account in a letter to field-marshal the marquis of Wellington, dated from Tolosa, June 26. Sir Thomas Graham says, it was so late on the 23rd, when he received orders to march by the Puerto St. Adrian to Villa Franca, and the weather and the road were so extremely bad, that but a small part of the column could get over the mountain that day; and it was not till late on the 24th, that he could move from Segura on Villa Franca, with major-general Anson's brigade of light dragoons, the light battalions of the king's German legion, and the two Portuguese brigades, the rest of the troops not being yet come up. The rear of the enemy's column was then just passing on the great road from Villa Real to Villa Franca, and he occupied in considerable force some very strong ground on the right of the great road, and of the river Oria, in front of the village of Olaverria, and about a mile and a half from Villa Franca.

Major-general Bradford's brigade marched by Olaverria, and was employed to dislodge the enemy on the right, while the remainder of the troops advanced by the chaussee, defended by the enemy's tirailleurs on the heights, and a strong body at the village of Veassayn.

As the enemy reinforced the troops on the left, it became necessary to push on by the chaussee, which was done by the light battalion under colonel Halkett, assisted and flanked by some companies of major-general Pack's Portuguese brigade; and these brave troops drove the enemy from the village of Veassayn. The enemy having troops ready, posted on the succession of strong heights on each side of the deep valley; at the bottom of which the road runs, a considerable time became necessary to turn his flanks, during which he evacuated Villa Franca, without further dispute.

The Portuguese troops on the right and left of the valley pushed on their advance to Yehasurido, and the troops assembled at Villa Franca. Here likewise the head of general Giron's corps, and all colonel Longa's, arrived in the course of the evening.

The next morning (the 25th) the enemy evacuated Celequia; and as he had taken up a very strong position between that and Tolosa, covering the Pampe-luna road, the Spanish corps of colonel Longa was marched by Alzo towards Lizarga, to turn his left; while lieutenant-general Mendizabel was requested to dispatch some battalions from Aspeyllia to turn his right, appeared on a high mountain, with an inaccessible ravine in front.

The enemy was driven from the summit of an important hill, lying between the Pampeluna and Vitoria roads, by a very skilful attack of lieutenant-colonel Williams, with two companies of the grenadiers of the 1st regiment, and three of the 4th caçadores belonging to general Pack's brigade. This hill was immediately occupied by major-general Bradford's brigade, supported by the three line battalions of the king's German legion. The rest of the day was chiefly spent in skirmishing with the enemy's tirailleurs, to give time for the Spanish corps arriving at the destination.

A general attack began between six and seven in the evening. Two guns of captain Ramsay's troop, and two

two nine-pounders of captain Dubourdieu's, under an escort of captain Childer's troop of the 16th light dragoons, and of the advance of colonel Halkett's light battalion, were brought rapidly forward on the chaussee, and fired with effect against several bodies of the enemy in the plain near the town; while the column, consisting of the German light battalions, the brigade of guards, and a Spanish division of general Giron's, continued to advance by the chaussee. Two Spanish battalions, and one Portuguese, forming a separate column on the left of the chaussee, passed quickly on the left of the town. General Bradford and the line battalions of the Germans driving in the enemy on their front, by the Pampeluna road, and colonel Longa from the side of the mountains still more on the right, turning and forcing, from very strong positions, all the posted bodies of the enemy on the right of the town.

Still the enemy held possession of the town, which was much more capable of defence than had been represented. The Vittoria gate was barricadoed, and also the Pampeluna gate on the bridge; and both were flanked by convents and other large buildings occupied by the enemy, but the town was open in one part. A nine-pounder was therefore brought up under cover of the fire of the light battalion, close to the gate, which was burst open. By this time it had become dark, and it was impossible to distinguish the troops of the different nations engaged, which gave the enemy, who were flying from every point, an opportunity of escaping with much less loss than he must have suffered, had there been day-light. Besides the defences of the gates, this place had new towers to flank the exterior wall, and a strong wood block-house in the square, which evidently shews the importance the enemy attached to its occupation.

It would be unjust, says Sir Thomas Graham, to the troops employed in this assault, not to mention their exemplary conduct when in possession; there was no excess committed. The German legion and colonel

lonel Longa's corps passed on, and formed immediately beyond the town.

"The enemy," says the marquis of Wellington, "on seeing some of our ships off Deha, evacuated the town and fort of Guitaria on the 1st instant, and the garrison went, by sea, to St. Sebastian. This place is blockaded by a detachment of Spanish troops. They have likewise evacuated Castro, and the garrison have gone by sea to Santona.

"In my former reports," continues the marquis, "I have made your lordship (earl Bathurst) acquainted with the progress of the army of reserve of Andalusia, under general the Conde de Abisbal, to join the army, and he arrived at Burgos on the 25th and 26th ultimo, (June.)"

"When the enemy retired across the Ebro, previous to the battle of Vittoria, they left a garrison of about seven hundred men in the castle of Pancorbo, by which they commanded and rendered it impossible for us to use the great communication from Vittoria to Burgos; I, therefore, requested the Conde de Abisbal, on his march to Miranda, to make himself master of the town and lower works, and to blockade the place as closely as he could." The Conde de Abisbal carried the town and lower fort by assault on the 28th, and the garrison surrendered by capitulation. The decision and dispatch with which this place has been subdued, says the noble marquis, are highly creditable to the Conde de Abisbal, and the officers and troops under his command.

The following is an extract of a letter from captain Sir George Collier to admiral lord Keith, dated from on board the *Surveillante*, off Guitaria, July 1, 1813, relative to the taking of that place.

"I have the honour to report, that Guitaria was evacuated by the enemy this morning (July 1,) at day-break, and soon afterwards occupied by a garrison under baron de Meuglana. The enemy appears to have been so pressed by the appearance of the shipping, after his determination had been taken, that most of the cannon were left serviceable, and all his provisions,

sions, calculated for some months; but it is with regret I mention, that about three o'clock P. M. we witnessed a most awful explosion; which, by a refinement in cruelty, appears to have been intended to destroy all the poorer inhabitants at a blow. The magazine, containing nearly two hundred barrels of gunpowder, and dug in the solid rock connected with the mole, where the fishing-boats lay, had been prepared, and a lighted match left with it; two casks of wine previously broached were also left by the wall, offering a temptation to the lower orders of the inhabitants; but this circumstance most providentially proved their great preservation. The Spanish commandant, on entering, observing the confusion likely to ensue ordered the inhabitants from the mole into the town, and while means were taken to force the door, the explosion took place, and destroyed about twenty of the garrison and fishermen, as well as all the boats in or near the mole.

“ I have the pleasure to acquaint your lordship, that the castle, town, and port of Passages, were recovered yesterday from the enemy, and its garrison of one hundred and thirty-six men, cut off from St. Sebastian, were taken by a part of the Spanish brigade of Longa, under the immediate order of Don Gaspar, attached to Sir Thomas Graham's division. The Spanish loss on this occasion was very trifling.”

It now becomes our province to relate a circumstance of a different nature, namely, the raising of the siege of Tarragona by Sir John Murray; and the marquis of Wellington, in his dispatch, dated July 3, and received at earl Bathurst's office on the 19th following, says, “ I am concerned to inform your lordship, that lieutenant-general Sir John Murray raised the siege of Tarragona, I cannot say on what day, and embarked his troops. A great proportion of the artillery and stores were left in the batteries. It appeared, that marshal Suchet, with a considerable body of troops, had arrived from Valencia by Tortosa, and general Maurice Mathieu, with another corps, from the neighbourhood of Barcelona, for the purpose of impeding Sir John Murray's operations, which he did not think himself sufficiently strong to continue. I have not yet received from Sir John Murray the detailed account of these transactions; lieutenant-general lord William Bentinck, however, who had joined

joined and had taken the command of the army at the Col de Balaguer, on the 17th (of June), had brought it back to Alicant, where he arrived himself on the 23rd, and was proceeding to carry into execution my instructions:—When marshal Suchet marched into Catalonia, the Duke del Parque had advanced, and established his head-quarters at San Felipe de Xativa, and his troops on the Xucar, where he still was on the 24th.

Although the marquis of Wellington had not received any intelligence from Sir John Murray at the time of writing the above, yet his lordship did receive a letter from him on the same day, of which the following is a copy:

“ His Majesty’s Ship Malta, June 14, 1813.

“ MY LORD,

“ Admiral Hallowell has just decided on sending a ship to Alicant, and I have merely time to state to your lordship, and I do it with regret, that I have been under the necessity of raising the siege of Tarragona, and embarking the army under my command. In my private letter of the 7th instant, I mentioned to your lordship, the reports of the assemblage of the French forces at Barcelona, and that marshal Suchet was likewise in march from Valencia: and stated it as my opinion, that should these reports be confirmed, the object your lordship had in view could not be accomplished. Unfortunately these rumours proved true, and reluctantly I resolved upon raising the siege and embarking the army, as the only means of avoiding a general action, which must have been fought under every disadvantage. I cannot at this moment refer to dates, but it is sufficient for the present to state, that the French force at Barcelona was never rated to me at less than eight thousand, and that previous to their march it would amount to ten thousand, with fourteen pieces of artillery. I have, however, no account that it ever exceeded eight, and that is the number on which my calculation was formed. This force upon the evening of the 9th, or morning of the 10th, marched out from Barcelona, and entered Villa Franca, at four o’clock in the evening of the 11th, from whence it was reported to me to march at twelve o’clock at night for Vendrells, distant only eighteen or twenty miles from Tarragona by the great road, and a few miles further by another road, by which cannon can easily pass. On the 9th or 10th the arrival of marshal Suchet at Valencia was made known to me; his

exact force was perfectly ascertained, but from the intelligence received from Valencia, he marched from thence with nine thousand men, and certainly in the rear of that place had the power of drawing great reinforcements to his army.

“ To these corps must be added, a body of one thousand men, which had previously arrived at Tortosa; and another corps, independent of the garrison, of two thousand five hundred men, who had arrived at Lerida. These corps, which I am sure I do not exaggerate, amount to twenty thousand five hundred men, with which, in four or five days, marshal Suchet could attack the allied army, if he thought proper; or avoid an action, if he wished still more to reinforce his army. Your lordship, on the other hand, will observe, that I could scarcely bring into the field twelve thousand men, and that the army of Catalonia was stated to me at eight thousand five hundred, making twenty thousand five hundred, of which two British and two Spanish divisions were at the Col de Balaguer, and could not be withdrawn; and I could not leave less than two thousand five hundred to cover the artillery and stores, and to contain the garrison of Tarragona. The two corps, at least, would amount to upwards of four thousand five hundred men, leaving me sixteen thousand men to meet the best French troops in Spain, amounting to upwards of twenty thousand men.

“ I am sure there is nobody more willing to give full credit to the gallantry of the Spanish troops than I am, but your lordship well knows that they are unable to move, and I could not therefore depend upon the execution of any order which necessarily obliged them to make a movement; and of troops of this description I had about thirteen thousand men: unless, therefore, I could place them in position, which, as the French had the option of fighting when and where they pleased, it was impossible I could place any reliance upon them.—My British and German troops amounted only to four thousand five hundred. Perhaps your lordship may be of opinion, that under these circumstances, I ought to have risked an action, had no other unfavourable objections existed, but when your lordship is informed, that I had no possibility of retreat, if unsuccessful,—that there would have been no hopes of embarkation, if followed,—and that the army must have been unavoidably lost, if beat,—I venture to hope that your lordship will think, however much it is to be regretted, that I have adopted the only means of maintaining entire, or indeed of saving, an army on which so much depends. I feel the greater confidence in this hope, on reverting to the thirteenth paragraph of your lordship’s general instructions for the conduct of the campaign.

“ I am

“ I am fully aware there are many circumstances which may require further information, and upon all parts I shall be happy to give every explanation in my power. Your lordship perhaps may be of opinion, that the place should have been taken; but as it was far too strong to storm, I believe it not only to have been impossible, but that we should not have taken it in eight or ten days: my only regret is, that I continued the siege so long. Induced by the hopes of the reinforcements I expected, I continued it to the last moment, and fortunately the weather proving favourable, the troops were embarked without molestation. On this favourable circumstance I could not depend for another day, and therefore, having taken my post, I immediately put it in execution, and I regret to say, that I was, in consequence, obliged to leave the guns in the most advanced batteries. Had I remained another day, they might have been brought off; but this risk I would not run, when the existence of the army was at stake, not only from unfavourable weather, but from the appearance of an enemy, in whose presence I could not have embarked perhaps at all, certainly not without suffering a great loss, and without the possibility of deriving any advantage.

“ I have only further at this time to add, should blame be attached to the failure of the expedition, no share of it can fall on admiral Hallowell, who conducted the naval branch of it. From that distinguished officer I have met with every assistance and co-operation in his power: and I think it only justice to him to state, that it was his opinion that the cannon in the batteries might have been saved by remaining till the night, and that they then could have been brought off. This, however, was a risk I did not wish to run for so trifling an object, and preferred losing them to the chance of the embarkation being opposed, and of an eventual much more serious loss.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “ J. MURRAY, Lieut. Gen.”

To the Marquis of WELLINGTON, K. G. &c.

As lieutenant-general Sir John Murray's conduct before Tarragona has excited considerable interest in the minds of the public, and as it is expected that it will be investigated by a court-martial, we deem it necessary to insert captain Adam's letter relative to the naval operations, especially as Sir John himself says, that no share of blame can fall on admiral Hallowell, who conducted the naval department of it.

Copy of a Letter from Captain Adam, of his Majesty's Ship the Invincible, transmitted by Rear Admiral Hallowell to J. W. Croker, Esq.

“ *His Majesty's Ship Invincible, off the Col de Balaguer, June 8, 1813.*

“ SIR,

“ In pursuance of your directions to take the ships and vessels, named in the margin *, under my orders, and co-operate with lieutenant-colonel Prevost in the siege of the fort of Col de Balaguer, I have the honour to inform you, that the troops were landed about noon of the 3d instant, and the lieutenant-colonel immediately invested the fort, the riflemen of De Roll's regiment, and other light troops, being pushed close up to the walls.

“ The fort is situated in a most difficult pass, through which the high road from Tortosa to Tarragona winds, and it is absolutely the key of the only road for cannon into this province, from the westward, without going round by Lerida. It is armed with twelve pieces of ordnance, including two ten-inch mortars, and two howitzers; and the surrounding heights are so difficult of access, that it has been a work of the greatest labour to establish the necessary batteries before it.

“ Two six-pounder field-pieces and a howitzer were landed on the evening of the 3d instant, dragged up, and placed on the ridge of a steep and rugged mountain, to the S. E. of the fort; two twelve-pounders were added to the former by noon of the next day. The whole remained under the command of lieutenant Corbyn, first of the *Invincible*, having under his orders a detachment of midshipmen and seamen from this ship, and a most excellent firing was kept up from them, which considerably damaged the defences of the fort, and checked its fire upon our working parties.

“ In the mean time three Spanish twenty-four pounders were landed, and two more guns, of the same calibre, from this ship, to be got up by the high road to the foot of a very steep height, on the crest of which the breaching-battery was to be constructed, at about five hundred yards from the eastern face of the fort.

“ In the afternoon of the 4th instant the fort was summoned to surrender; and the commander answered, that he should defend the place committed to his charge.

“ During the night of the 4th, every exertion was used to bring the guns up the hill, and to complete the breaching-

* Thames, Volcano, Strombolo, Brune, and eight gun-boats.

battery; but as it could be completed by day-light, the men were withdrawn.

“ The seamen and marines were landed early in the afternoon of the 5th, and carried up the stores for the battery, under a brisk fire of shot and shells from the fort.

“ The three Spanish twenty-four pounders, notwithstanding their immense size and weight, were conveyed up to the side of the hill, over the most rugged ground, by the united exertions of the soldiers, seamen, and marines, under the immediate directions of captain Carroll, of the *Volcano*. The two eight-inch mortars were brought as far along the road as was practicable before dark; and the iron twenty-four pounders were conveyed to the foot of the hill as soon as it was dark.

“ The work of the battery advanced rapidly, although it was necessary to fill all the sand-bags at the bottom of the hill, and I was in confident expectation that the battery would be open soon after day-light; but by ten o'clock the rain fell in torrents, attended by the most violent thunder and lightning I almost ever witnessed.

“ The quantity of ammunition which had been brought up for the battery, being in an exposed situation, made it the more awful, and the enemy kept up an incessant fire of shells and grape-shot.

“ In defiance of all these obstacles two of the guns were got high enough up to mount on the platforms, but all our exertion was unequal to place them there, owing to the violence of the rain, and the excessive difficulty of working in the extreme darkness of the night. From the same reason, too, the mortars could not be brought forward, and after a night of the most excessive labour, we had the mortification of being again obliged to retire; the officers and men being quite worn out.

“ The weather continued very bad until the afternoon of the 6th instant, when a party was landed, and the mortars were got forward; before day-light the seamen and marines were on the pile, and all the guns were placed on the battery ready for mounting. The two mortars opened soon after day-light, and the shells were thrown with great precision, by lieutenant James, of the royal marine artillery, landed from the *Strombolo*, who worked the mortars with his party; and the fire from lieutenant Corbyn's battery was resumed with excellent effect. This united force made very considerable impression on the fort; an expensive magazine was blown up, and the enemy's fire was very much slackened.

“ At seven o'clock, just before the breaching-battery was ready to open, a white flag was shewn from the fort. Cap-

tain Stoddart, of the Strombolo, and captain Zehupfenning, were immediately sent to the fort; and the latter returned in a few minutes with an offer from the commandant, to surrender the fort and garrison upon conditions of marching out with the officers and men preserving their private property.

“ This was immediately acceded to by lieutenant-colonel Prevost and myself: the fort was taken possession of by the advance of the troops. The garrison marched out, grounded their arms on the glacis, and were immediately embarked.

“ I have great satisfaction in stating, that during this service, which has so much depended upon the united exertion of the army and navy; the most perfect cordiality has existed among all ranks; and have met, in lieutenant-colonel Prevost, all that openness of communication and confidence which an acquaintance with the character of this excellent officer gave me reason to expect.

“ In an operation where the laborious exertions of the captain, officers, seamen, and marines, under my orders, have been most conspicuous, I hope I shall be excused for having gone so much into detail; but it is my duty, and a most agreeable one, to bring under your view the praiseworthy conduct of all ranks and descriptions. I must particularly draw your attention to the zeal and activity displayed by that valuable officer, captain Carroll, of the Volcano; his conduct was the admiration of every body, and he was ably supported by lieutenant Pidgely, of the Invincible, and the other officers, seamen, and marines under his direction. From the explosion of a shell near him, the night before, captain Carroll was obliged to suspend his service until the morning of the 7th, (but I am happy to state he has perfectly recovered) and captain Stoddart, of the Strombolo, succeeded him in the direction of getting up the guns, &c. for the breaching battery, and deserves every credit for his active services. I am also much obliged to captain Badcock, of the Brune, for the assistance he afforded me, &c.

“ I have enclosed you a list of the garrison of the fort, consisting of two lieutenants, a surgeon, and gardonagazin, sixteen Italian artillerymen, and thirty-eight non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the eleventh French regiment of the line, of whom two were killed and eleven wounded.

“ During the siege of the fort, the gun-boats were stationed in Ampula Bay, to observe the road from Tortosa, as we had constant reports of the enemy being in motion from that quarter.

“ I have the honour to be,

“ CHARLES ADAM, Captain.”

As we have said above, the affair before Tarragona, under the conduct of Sir John Murray, excited considerable emotion in the minds of the English; and, as we have observed, is likely to be made a subject of investigation, we deem it necessary, that the public may be in possession of both sides of the question, to insert the French account of the circumstances which took place in that part of the Peninsula from the landing of lieutenant-general Sir John Murray; which we shall give in a translation from the duke of Albufera's bulletin.

“ *Valencia, June 3, 1813.*

“ I have just this moment (4 p. m.) received a letter from the governor of Tortosa, dated June 3, three quarters past nine o'clock a. m. of which the following is a copy:

“ Monseigneur.—The enemy's fleet was yesterday in sight before Tarragona at five o'clock; it consists of about one hundred and eighty sail; it appears to steer in the direction of Villanova de Sitges.

“ In this state of things I have determined to march with six hundred infantry, and eight hundred horse, into Lower Catalonia, in order to rally the troops of general Decaen, and, if it is possible, to endeavour to fight the English.

(Signed) “ Marshal the Duke of ALBUFERA.”

To the Minister at War.

Extract of a Letter from the same to the same.

“ *Tortosa, June 21, 6 a. m.*

“ Monsieur Le Duc.—I informed your excellency of the embarkation of the Anglo-Sicilian army at Alicant, of its departure from that place on the 21st of May, and of its rapid arrival, on the 2d of June, under Tarragona. The army landed during the night, hastened to invest Fort St. Philippe, as the Col de Balaguer, and the inclosure, without a fosse, which at present constitutes the defence of Tarragona, the forts and extensive fortifications having been razed. A fire from several batteries began on the 3d; during five days Balaguer held out, made an honourable resistance, and killed or wounded of the enemy more than three hundred men. On the morning of the 7th, the explosion of a powder magazine caused the surrender of Fort St. Philippe.

“ The enemy, by a fire kept up from the sea and land, attacked Tarragona. At the departure of the Anglo-Sicilian army, the duke del Parque had arrived from Carabin, to replace

place general Murray in his camp at Castella; Elio, with the second Spanish corps, was close upon our posts.

“ As soon as I was informed that the enemy had sailed from Alicant, I made dispositions upon the coast of Valencia, to receive prompt information, whilst I charged general Decaen to collect troops to fall upon the English.—He eagerly executed that disposition, and on the first information detached, from Gerona, Beurmann’s brigade upon Barcelona, where he arrived the 10th of June. On the 2d of June I had dispatched from before the Xucar, Musnie’s division, and the brigades of Pannetier and Argremont; they proceeded by forced marches towards Tortosa. I learned, at ten leagues from Valencia, that the fort of Balaguer had capitulated. I lost the only cannon-road by which I could act; but it was of importance to stop the enemy’s success, and, on the 10th, I proceeded to Tortosa; I learned,—the head of my column overthrew the English dragoons near Perello; on the 11th my troops arrived; I pushed forward on the 12th upon the Tarragona road; and not being able to act on the high road, I determined to seek a bye-road across impracticable mountains, in order to announce my arrival to the brave garrison of Tarragona, which refused all summonses, and defended itself with high valour. In short, on the 12th I lighted fires on the mountains, and advancing on the 13th beyond the village of Valledellos, my troops could see and be seen from Tarragona.

“ In the mean time, general Maurice Mathieu set out from Barcelona, and pushed forward to Arbos. The resistance of the place, and the march of columns from Barcelona and Valencia, frightened the enemy, and obliged him precipitately to raise the siege, and re-embark the greater part of his troops; abandoning under the place twenty-seven pieces of artillery, and an immense number of bombs, bullets, &c. all of which have been conveyed into Tarragona. The convoy of one hundred and eighty sail left the shore of Saleu, and came to anchor under Balaguer: this mass of vessels presented a fine spectacle. On the 14th, I advanced my troops to reconnoitre the fort; some battalions defended the approaches to it, and the fire of the fleet was more hot than murderous upon us. Near Valledellos the English dragoons were roughly handled by the Westphalian light horse; and the 5th light infantry obliged five English battalions to fall back under Hospitalet, and the fire of the English ships.

“ On the 15th and 16th, there were slight skirmishes, and the report of twenty-five deserters proved to me that the enemy, either covered by the fort of Balaguer, or embarked,
were

were placed out of the reach of any attempt on the part of a land army.

“ Whilst I was acting in Catalonia, I had left general Harispe with the 2nd and 3rd divisions before the Xucar. On leaving him, I directed he should draw in his advanced posts, and establish himself in works, prepared for some time, behind the river: this movement was being executed with precision, when, on the 11th, general Elio, with a numerous cavalry, attempted to press on our rear-guard. General Mesclop, who commanded it, turned, and at the head of a squadron of the fourth hussars, vigorously charged the enemy, killed or wounded fifty men, and brought back sixty horses, and as many prisoners. The Irish colonel Oronan was of the number.

“ On the 13th, in the morning, a double attack was made on the points of Albereque and Alura; general Harispe sustained in a great part of the day, the enemy's demonstrations; a brisk cannonade took place, but the enemy refused to engage. The duke del Parque, with the divisions of the prince d'Anglona, and of the English Roche, attacked in two columns, general Habert, before Careaxente; who did not hesitate to march against the enemy at the head of a squadron of the fourth regiment of hussars, and the whole of the fourteenth and sixteenth of the line; he reached, and broke the enemy, in the streets and garden of Careaxente; more than four hundred Spaniards were killed or wounded, seven hundred soldiers, and thirty officers made prisoners, the colours of the Carmona regiment taken, and the enemy put completely to route. From that time up to the 18th the enemy had undertaken nothing serious against the troops of Valencia.

“ The expeditionary fleet continues at anchor off Balaguer, keeping battalions near Hospitalet and under the fort. My troops being acting in deserts, I decided upon bringing them towards Corapolle, upon the Tarragona road, to procure them water, of which we had been deprived for two days, where I have been informed, that general Mathieu, informed of the raising of the siege of Tarragona, had advanced to that town and to Reus. I however persisted in prolonging my stay in Catalonia, in order to unravel the enemy's projects, when yesterday I learned that the English had resolved to blow up the fort of Balaguer; this resolution, which entirely entered into my projects, proves to me that the enemy will not renew his attacks upon Tarragona, nor seriously act in Catalonia, which sufficiently informs me of what remains to be done.

“ Thus, M. le Duc, the first operation of the English, upon a line of eighty leagues, has been confined to the taking of a fort, and a garrison of eighty-three soldiers, commanded by a lieutenant, whilst they have lost in killed, wounded, prisoners, or deserters, upon the Xucar, or at Tarragona, above one thousand six hundred and sixty men, and a flag: whilst they have raised the siege, and abandoned twenty-seven pieces of cannon, before a dismantled place without fosses, but defended by a small, but a very valiant garrison.”

[Here follows recommendations of different officers and corps who distinguished themselves.]

From the same to the same.

“ Valencia, June 25, 1813.

“ M. le Duc.—By my report of the 21st, I informed your Excellency of the precipitate raising of the siege of Tarragona by the English, and their re-embarkation; the necessity of following the movement of the fleet, has forced me to sacrifice the pleasure I should have had in congratulating the governor, Bartoletti, and his brave garrison, upon his fine and vigorous defence; by going to Tarragona I should have lost six days, whilst so soon as I received a report from general Mathieu, from Reus, and two letters from general Bartoletti, I only thought of returning to Valencia, to prevent the English from anticipating me.

“ The loss of the English at Tarragona has been immense; thirty pieces of heavy calibre mortars, fire-ships, bombs, magazines of rum, salt meat, &c. have been delivered to the flames; but the enemy suffered still more considerable losses on the night between the 20th and 21st; signals, firing of cannon, announced that the immense convoy had decided to quit the coast of Catalonia. At day-break ten large vessels were seen off the mouths of the Ebro, eighteen brigs or large ships had grounded upon the sands at the mouth of the river. Your Excellency will be able to judge of it by the reports of the chef des gardes de la Sante, which I have the honour to enclose. As soon as I was informed of it, I ordered assistance to be given to those vessels, but the great difficulty in arriving prevented their reaching them. Several ships, detached from the grand convoy, returned; they succeeded in saving the greater part of the troops and transports. It appears the enemy lost but five ships, which in general were abandoned.

“ As soon as I was informed the enemy had sailed for the coast of Valencia, I put Musnier's division and Argrement's brigade in march: by an effort worthy of praise, they have

marched fifteen leagues a day, ambitious of anticipating the enemy's fleet at every point. All the declarations of the captures, whose vessel grounded, state the enemy was to have disembarked at Castellán de la Plana, to have separated me from the forces which I had left upon the Xucar. The astonishing rapidity of the march of our troops, and the violence of the winds, have not allowed the enemy to evacuate his projects: he remained three hours in sight of Castellán, the 22nd; and on the same day I arrived there with four thousand men, eight hundred horse, and six pieces of light artillery. The fleet, beaten by contrary winds, appeared before the Gras de Valence; a frigate was detached to take possession of the small privateer, the *Determinee*. She was close in shore, and grounded before Murviedro. General Ronelle proceeded with two companies of grenadiers, and two pieces of cannon, to her assistance. A lively musketry fire took place; the enemy launched several boats filled with troops; they attempted to repulse our people, but were so well received, that they retired with considerable loss.

[The remainder of the dispatch states, that the efforts of the English to again re-kindle the war in Catalonia, have failed.]

(Signed) "The Duke of ALBUFERA."

Such are the accounts which have been given of the affair before Tarragona, both by Sir John Murray himself, and by marshal Suchet, duke of Albufera; and we confess, that, in the whole range of official dispatches which it has been our fortune to peruse, we do not recollect any so completely unsatisfactory as that of Sir John Murray*. In that, however, of marshal Suchet the circumstances are minutely detailed; and though they appear to be of a trifling nature, yet trifling as they are, the gallant resistance of

* The artillery left by lieutenant-general Murray at Tarragona were the identical train with which lord Wellington reduced Badajoz. They were sent back to the Tagus after the capture of Badajoz, and were there embarked for Alicante, from which place they were taken with the expedition under the command of Sir John Murray, being placed under the direction of a distinguished officer of artillery, who had been promoted for his meritorious services at Badajoz. This train was supplied with three hundred rounds to each gun; and it was attended by one company of British, and three of Portuguese artillerymen, in number at least eight hundred.

the duque del Parque rendered them very difficult of attainment. Lord William Bentinck appears to have been dissatisfied with the raising of the siege of Tarragona, and therefore left Sicily and landed at Alicant towards the close of June; when he took the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army from Sir John Murray, and headed the forces himself.

The following is an extract of a letter from a staff officer at Tarragona:

“ The unfortunate business here has withered the laurels which the Alicant army gained at Castella. What will lord Wellington say to us? Seventeen thousand men, well equipped, sailed from Alicant on the 31st of May; they landed near Tarragona on the king's birth-day, and the place was immediately invested.—Fort Felipe, which commands the pass of Col de Balaguer, was also invested, and fell after three days. The possession of this pass secured the left flank of the army against any attempt from Tortosa, near which place Suchet was collecting his force. The landing of the marines from the Toulon fleet in the bay of Rosas drew the attention of De Caen, as well as of the garrisons of Barcelona and Gerona. The army of Copons, and the Guerrillas, were also extremely active and enterprising in that quarter, constantly annoying the enemy and distracting his attention. Every thing seemed favourable to the enterprise; but after the siege had been continued for a fortnight it was suddenly raised, to the surprise of every one in the army. The siege was raised without any enemy being in the rear; and the guns, those with which lord Wellington took Badajoz, abandoned, with all the stores—they were left to any person who chose to take them, and no one appeared at hand when they were left! The army was not molested either in embarking or disembarking; if the enemy was near, he certainly did not shew himself.

“ It was known that Suchet was not within three days march of us, and had he been near us, we had the sea and our ships behind us. However, to complete this extraordinary business, after the troops were embarked a day, they were re-landed, not to regain their guns and stores, for they were safely lodged in Tarragona. When the enemy saw the coast clear, they came down and quietly took possession of the present we had deposited for them.

“ It was said then that the troops were landed to fight the enemy, who, it was found, were not so strong as at first imagined; however, no enemy was yet at hand, they were more
than

than a day's march off, and lord W. Bentinck, who had just arrived at this crisis, ordered the army to re-embark a second time.

“ The loss of a fine battering train—that which wrested one of the strongest fortresses in the country, with a picked garrison, from the French, is severely regretted, even by the private men. The loss of the battering train, of the ammunition, and stores, cannot be readily repaired, and the enemy are in great want of them. Report does say, that the gallant admiral Hallowell offered to embark all the guns and stores in ten hours, and no doubt the Jacks would have done it in less time, if necessary—but the proposition was rejected.”

The following is an extract from another letter, dated Alicant, June 30.

“ We have had a trip to Tarragona, a very strong fortress in the possession of the French, which we besieged and bombarded, from the batteries erected on shore by the troops and shipping in the road, for eight days; and we had every reason to expect its surrender the next day, having effected a breach in the wall, (Tarragona has a strong wall around it,) had not the unfortunate intelligence reached our army, that a French force of nearly thirty thousand strong, were within twelve hours march of the besiegers. The intelligence caused an immediate and confused embarkation—destroying provisions and stores, and spiking the battering train, in number eighteen pieces; and what was more galling, we distinctly saw the French garrison draw the guns into Tarragona the next day, giving us three cheers? It is said the French were not within three days march of us. We proceeded to Balaguer Bay, about forty miles to the westward, and the next day again disembarked the troops to offer them battle; but the French were not to be caught, for, after throwing two thousand men into Tarragona, they retreated into the country.”

By a dispatch from field-marshal the marquis of Wellington, dated Zubieta, July 10, 1813, it appears, that although the enemy had withdrawn their right and left quite into France, they still maintained their centre in the valley of Bastan, of which, by reason of its richness, and the strong position it affords, they appeared determined to keep possession, and had assembled there three divisions of the army of the South, under the command of general Gazan.

Lieutenant-

Lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill, however, having been relieved from the blockade of Pampeluna, dislodged them, successively from all their positions, on the 4th, 5th, and 7th of July, with two brigades of British; and one of Portuguese infantry of the 2nd division, under the command of lieutenant-general the honourable W. Stewart, and with one brigade of Portuguese infantry, of the Conde d'Amarante's division, under the command of the Conde in person. The last post which the enemy occupied in the Puente de Maya, between that village and Urdax, was remarkably strong; and the fog was so thick in the afternoon, that it was impossible for the troops to advance beyond the point at which they found themselves when it came on. The enemy, however, had been pushed so vigorously up to that point, that they were obliged to abandon their post in the night, and retire into France.

By a further dispatch from the noble marquis, dated Lezaca, July 19, it appears, that a battery of four guns opened upon the 14th, against a fortified convent, which was strongly occupied by the enemy in front of St. Sebastian; and, on the morning of the 17th, this post, and another strong work which joined it, were carried by assault. Two columns, commanded by generals Oswald and Hay, were employed upon this service: they were composed chiefly of Portuguese troops, supported by the 8th regiment.

General Mina having been joined near Saragossa by general Duran, they attacked general Paris upon the 8th of July. In the night of the 9th, the enemy retreated towards Jaca, leaving a garrison in a redoubt, which general Duran was ordered to attack, while general Mina and Don Julian pursued the enemy's column. They had taken many prisoners and much baggage; and upon the 11th they captured a convoy.

Marshal Suchet evacuated Valencia on the 5th of July; the garrison of Segorbe was withdrawn; and
general

general Severoli had blown up the fort of Alcaniz, and marched upon Mequinenza.

Saragossa surrendered by capitulation to general Mina on the 30th of July. The garrison consisted of five hundred men, who were of course taken prisoners, with forty-seven pieces of cannon, and a vast quantity of ammunition, arms, cloathing, &c.

As the following dispatch from the marquis of Wellington, dated San Estevan, August 1, 1813, and addressed to earl Bathurst, will better explain the operations of the allied army, under the command of his lordship, before San Sebastian, than any other account we can collect, we shall give it entire, with the exception of the praises bestowed on the officers, &c.

“ MY LORD,

“ Two practicable breaches, having been effected at San Sebastian on the 24th of July, orders were given that they should be attacked on the morning of the 25th. I am concerned to have to report that this attempt to obtain possession of the place failed, and that our loss was very considerable.

“ Marshal Soult had been appointed *Lieutenant de l'Empereur* and commander in chief of the French armies in Spain and the southern provinces of France, by a *Decret Imperial* on the 1st of July, and he joined and took the command of the army on the 13th of July, which having been joined nearly about the same time by the corps which had been in Spain under the command of general Clauzel, and by other reinforcements, was called the army of Spain, and re-formed into nine divisions of infantry, forming the right, centre, and left, under the command of general Reille, comte d'Erlon and general Clauzel, as lieutenant-generals, and a reserve under general Villatte; and two divisions of dragoons and one of light cavalry, the two former under the command of generals Treillard and Tilly, and the latter under the command of general Pierre Soult. There was besides allotted to the army a large proportion of artillery, and a considerable number of guns had already joined.

“ The allied army was posted, as I have already informed your lordship, in the passes of the mountains. Major-general Byng's brigade of British infantry, and general Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, were on the right in the pass of Roncesvalles. Lieutenant-general Sir Lowry Cole was posted at Viscarret, to support those troops; and lieutenant-general

general Sir Thomas Picton, with the third division, at Olague in reserve.

“ Lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill occupied the valley of Bastan with the remainder of the second division, and the Portuguese division, under the Conde de Amarante, detaching general Campbell’s Portuguese brigade to Los Alduides, within the French territory.—The light and seventh divisions occupied the heights of Santa Barbara, and the town of Vera, and the Puerto de Echalar, and kept the communication with the valley of Bastan; and the sixth division was in reserve at San Estevan. General Longa’s division kept the communication between the troops at Vera and those under lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham, and Mariscal del Campo Giron, on the great road.

“ The Conde del Abisbal blockaded Pampeluna.

“ On the 24th, marshal Soult collected the right and left wings of his army, with one division of his centre, and two divisions of cavalry, at St. Jean de Pied de Port, and on the 25th, attacked, with between thirty and forty thousand men, general Byng’s post at Roncesvalles. Lieutenant-general Sir Lowry Cole moved up to his support with the fourth division, and these officers were enabled to maintain their post throughout the day. But the enemy turned it in the afternoon; and lieutenant-general Sir Lowry Cole considered it to be necessary to withdraw in the night; and he marched to the neighbourhood of Zubiri.

“ In the actions which took place on this day, the 20th regiment distinguished themselves.

“ Two divisions of the centre of the enemy’s army attacked Sir Rowland Hill’s position in the Puerto de Maya, at the head of the valley of Bastan, in the afternoon of the same day. The brunt of the action fell upon major-general Pringle’s and major-general Walker’s brigades in the second division, under the command of lieutenant-general the honourable William Stewart. These troops were at first obliged to give away; but having been supported by major-general Barnes’s brigade of the 7th division, they regained that part of their post, which was the key of the whole, and would have enabled them to re-assume it, if circumstances had permitted it. But Rowland Hill having been apprized of the necessity that Sir Lowry Cole should retire, deemed it expedient to withdraw his troops likewise to Irurita; and the enemy did not advance on the following day beyond the Puerto de Maya.

“ Notwithstanding the enemy’s superiority of numbers, they acquired but little advantage over these brave troops during the seven hours they were engaged. All the regi-
ments

ments charged with the bayonet.—The conduct of the eighty-second regiment, which moved up with major-general Barnes's brigade, is particularly reported.

“ Lieutenant-general the honourable William Stewart was slightly wounded.

“ I was not apprized of these events till late in the night of the 25th and 26th; and I adopted immediate measures to concentrate the army to the right, still providing for the siege of San Sebastian, and for the blockade of Pampeluna.

“ This would have been effected early on the 27th, only that lieutenant-general Sir Lowry Cole and lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Picton concurred in thinking their post at Zubiri not tenable for the time during which it would have been necessary to wait in it. They therefore retired early on the 27th, and took up a position to cover the blockade of Pampeluna, having the right, consisting of the third division, in front of Huarte, and extending to the hills beyond Olaz, and the left, consisting of the fourth division, major-general Byng's, and brigadier-general Campbell's Portuguese brigade, on the heights in front of Villalba, having their left at a chapel behind Sorausen, on the high road from Ostiz to Pampeluna, and their right resting upon a height which defended the high road from Zubiri and Roncesvalles. General Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, and that part of the Conde del Abisbal's corps not engaged in the blockade, were in reserve. From the latter, the regiment of Travia, and that of El Principe, were detached to occupy part of the hill on the right of the fourth division, by which the road from Zubiri was defended.

“ The British cavalry under lieutenant-general Sir Stapleton Cotton were placed near Huarte on the right, being the only ground on which it was possible to use the cavalry.

“ The river Lanz runs in the valley which was on the left of the allied, and on the right of the French army, along the road to Ostiz. Beyond this river there is another range of mountains connected with Lizasso and Marcalain, by which places it was now necessary to communicate with the rest of the army.

“ I joined the third and fourth divisions just as they were taking up their ground on the 27th, and shortly afterwards the enemy formed their army on a mountain, the front of which extends from the high road to Ostiz to the high road to Zubiri, and they placed one division on the left of that road on a height, and in some villages in front of the third division. They had here also a large body of cavalry.

“ Shortly after they had taken up their ground, the enemy attacked the hill on the right of the fourth division, which was

then occupied by one battalion of the fourth Portuguese regiment, and by the Spanish regiment of Pravia.

“ These troops defended their ground, and drove the enemy from it with the bayonet. Seeing the importance of this hill to our position, I reinforced it with the fortieth regiment; and this regiment with the Spanish regiments of El Principe and Pravia held it from this time, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the enemy during the 27th and 28th to obtain possession of it. About the same time that the enemy attacked this height on the 27th, they took possession of the village of Sorausen, on the road to Ostiz, by which they acquired the communication by that road; and they kept up a fire of musketry along the line till it was dark.

“ We were joined on the morning of the 28th by the sixth division of infantry, and I directed that the heights should be occupied on the left of the valley of the Lanz; and that the sixth division should form across the valley in rear of the left of the fourth division, resting their right on the heights of Oricain, and their left on the heights above-mentioned.

“ The sixth division had scarcely taken their position when they were attacked by a very large force of the enemy, which had been assembled in the village of Sorausen.

“ Their front was, however, so well defended by the fire of their own light troops from the heights on their left, and by the fire from the heights occupied by the fourth division and brigadier-general Campbell's Portuguese brigade, that the enemy were soon driven back with immense loss, from a fire on their front, both flanks, and rear.

“ In order to extricate their troops from the difficulty in which they found themselves in their situation in the valley of the Lanz, the enemy now attacked the height on which the left of the fourth division stood, which was occupied by the seventh Caçadores, of which they obtained a momentary possession. They were attacked, however, again by the seventh Caçadores, supported by major-general Ross, at the head of his brigade of the fourth division, and were driven down with great loss.

“ The battle now became general along the whole front of the heights occupied by the fourth division, and in every part in our favour, excepting where one battalion of the tenth Portuguese regiment of major-general Campbell's brigade was posted. This battalion having been overpowered, and having been obliged to give away immediately on the right of major-general Ross's brigade, the enemy established themselves on our line, and major-general Ross was obliged to withdraw from his post.

“ I, however,

“ I, however, ordered the twenty-seventh and forty-eighth regiments to charge, first that body of the enemy which had first established themselves on the height, and next those on the left. Both attacks succeeded, and the enemy were driven down with immense loss; and the sixth division having moved forward at the same time to a situation in the valley nearer to the left of the fourth, the attack upon our front ceased entirely, and was continued but faintly on other points of our line.

“ In the course of this contest, the gallant fourth division, which had so frequently been distinguished in this army, surpassed their former good conduct. Every regiment charged with the bayonet; and the fortieth, the seventh, twentieth, and twenty-third, four different times. Their officers set them the example, and major-general Ross had two horses shot under him. The Portuguese troops likewise behaved admirably; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Spanish regiments del Principe and Pravia.

“ I had ordered lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill to march by Lanz upon Liza-so, as soon as I found that lieutenant-generals Sir Thomas Picton and Sir Lowry Cole had moved from Zubiri, and lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie from San Estevan to the same place, where both arrived on the 28th, and the seventh division came to Marcalain.

“ The enemy's force which had been in front of Sir Rowland Hill, followed his march, and arrived at Ostiz on the 29th. The enemy, thus reinforced, and occupying a position in the mountains, which appeared little liable to attack, and finding that they could make no impression on our front, determined to endeavour to turn our left, by an attack on Sir Rowland Hill's corps.

“ They reinforced with one division the troops which had been already opposed to him, still occupying the same points in the mountain, on which was formed their principal force, but they drew into their left the troops which occupied the heights opposite the third division, and they had, during the night of the 29th and 30th occupied in strength the crest of the mountain on our left of the Lanz, opposite to the sixth and seventh divisions; thus connecting their right in the position with the divisions attached to attack lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill.

“ I, however, determined to attack their position, and ordered lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie to possess himself of the top of the mountain in his front, by which the enemy's right would be turned, and lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Picton to cross the heights on which the enemy's left

had stood, and to turn their left on the road to Roncesvalles. All the arrangements were made to attack the front of the enemy's position, as soon as the effect of these movements on their flanks should begin to appear. Major-general the honourable Edward Pakenham, whom I had sent to take the command of the sixth division, major-general Pack having been wounded, turned the village of Sorausen, as soon as the earl of Dalhousie had driven the enemy from the mountain, by which their flank was defended; and the sixth division, and major-general Byng's brigade, which had relieved the fourth division on the left of our position on the road to Ostiz, instantly attacked and carried that village.

“ Lieutenant-general Sir Lowry Cole likewise attacked the front of the enemy's main position with the seventh Caçadores, supported by the eleventh Portuguese regiment, the fortieth, and the battalion under colonel Bingham, consisting of the queen's and fifty-third regiment. All these operations obliged the enemy to abandon a position which is one of the strongest and most difficult of access that I have yet seen occupied by troops.

“ In their retreat from this position the enemy lost a great number of prisoners.

“ I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of all the general officers, officers, and troops throughout these operations. The attack made by lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie was admirably conducted by his lordship, and executed by major-general Inglis and the troops composing his brigade; and that by major-general the honourable Edward Pakenham and major-general Byng, and that by lieutenant-general Sir Lowry Cole; and the movements made by Sir Thomas Picton merit my highest commendation. The latter officer co-operating in the attack of the mountain by detaching troops to his left, in which the honourable lieutenant-colonel Trench was wounded, but I hope not seriously.

“ While these operations were going on, and in proportion as I observed their success, I detached troops to the support of lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill. The enemy appeared in his front late in the morning, and immediately commenced an extended manœuvre upon his left flank, which obliged him to withdraw from the height which he occupied behind the Lizasso to the next range. He there, however, maintained himself, and I enclose his report of the conduct of the troops. I continued the pursuit of the enemy after their retreat from the mountain to Olaque, where I was at sun-set, immediately in the rear of their attack upon lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill. They withdrew from his front in the night, and yesterday took up a strong position;

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with

with two divisions to cover their rear in the pass of Donna Maria.

“ Lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill, and the earl of Dalhousie, attacked and carried the pass, notwithstanding the vigorous resistance of the enemy and the strength of their position. I am concerned to add, that lieutenant-general the honourable William Stewart was wounded on this occasion. I enclose lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill's report.

“ In the mean time I moved with major-general Byng's brigade, and the fourth division under lieutenant-general Sir Lowry Cole, by the pass of Velate upon Irurita, in order to turn the enemy's position on Donna Maria. Major-general Byng took in Elizonde, a large convoy going to the enemy, and made many prisoners.

“ We have this day continued the pursuit of the enemy in the valley of the Bidassoa, and many prisoners and much baggage have been taken. Major-general Byng has possessed himself of the valley of Bastan, and of the position on the Puerto de Maya, and the army will be this night nearly in the same position which they occupied on the 25th of July.

“ I trust that his royal highness the Prince Regent will be satisfied with the conduct of the troops of his majesty and of his allies on this occasion. The enemy having been considerably reinforced and re-equipped after their late retreat, made a most formidable attempt to relieve the blockade of Pampeluna with the whole of their forces, excepting the reserve under general Villatte, which remained in front of our troops on the great road from Irun.

“ This attempt has been entirely frustrated by the operations of a part only of the allied army, and the enemy have sustained a defeat and suffered a severe loss both in officers and men.

“ The enemy's expectations of success, beyond the point of raising the blockade of Pampeluna, were certainly very sanguine. They brought into Spain a large body of cavalry, and a great number of guns, neither of which arms could be used to any great extent by either party in the battle which took place. They sent off the guns to St. Jean de Pied de Port on the evening of the 28th, which thus returned to France in safety.

[As the remainder of the noble marquis's letter relates to the excellent conduct of the several officers, there is no occasion for its insertion in this place.]

“ I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) “ WELLINGTON.”

“ I have

“ I have omitted to inform your lordship in the body of the dispatch, that the troops in the Puerto de Maya lost their four Portuguese guns on the 25th of July. Major general Pringle, who commanded when the attack commenced, had ordered them to retire towards Maya; and when lieutenant-general Stewart came up, he ordered that they might return and retire by the mountain road to Elizondo. In the mean time the enemy were in possession of the pass, and the communication with that road was lost, and they could not reach it.”

Letter from Sir Rowland Hill to the Marquis of Wellington.

“ MY LORD,

“ July 31.

“ I have the satisfaction to acquaint your lordship, that, although from the immense superiority of force which the enemy directed against the position entrusted to my charge, yesterday it became, in my opinion, imperiously necessary for me to retire from that ground; the conduct of the officers and troops, British and Portuguese, was such as to entitle them to my entire approbation, and I could not have wished it to be better.

“ Major-general Pringle, with major-general Walker's brigade, under lieutenant-colonel Fitzgerald, of the sixtieth regiment, supported by the thirty-fourth regiment, and fourteenth Portuguese regiment opposed the ascent of the enemy to the ridge on the left position, in a most gallant style; drove him repeatedly back, and although unable ultimately to prevent him from ascending the ridge, by a more distant movement, our troops kept their ground firmly, and when ordered to retire, performed it under major-general Pringle with the greatest regularity, and with small loss, covered by a battalion of the fourteenth Portuguese regiment, under lieutenant-colonel M'Donald, of the conduct of which officer, and the steadiness of his regiment, the major-general speaks in terms of the greatest praise.

“ Colonel Ashworth's brigade, also attacked in his position by a superior force, met the attack with the greatest steadiness, and drove the enemy before him at the point of the bayonet, and he held his ground as long as I thought it prudent for him to do so; and a battalion of brigadier-general Costa's brigade held the ridge on the right of the position to the last, covering the formation of the troops on the ground they were directed to take up: the enemy attempted to force the point, but were repulsed by brigadier-general Costa, and finally driven down the ridge at the point of the bayonet by that battalion and a part of colonel Ashworth's brigade, and a small detachment of the twenty-eighth regiment. On the whole,

whole, I can assure your lordship that the enemy had nothing to boast of, nor was our loss severe, considering the disparity of our forces.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “ ROWLAND HILL.”

To Field Marshal Marquis of Wellington, K. G.

“ MY LORD,

“ *Elizondo, Aug. 1, 1813.*

“ I have the honour to acquaint your lordship, that, in compliance with the instructions received through major-general Murray, I proceeded yesterday with the columns under my orders, on the road to Donna Maria. On our arrival at the foot of the pass, we found the enemy ascending the hill in great haste, and closely pressed by the first division, moving by a road parallel and to the right of that which my column was on. The rear of the enemy's columns having begun to ascend the hills before our arrival, it was impossible to cut off any part of it. It was, however, considerably annoyed on its march by one nine-pounder and a howitzer. I immediately ordered the second division, under lieutenant-general Stewart, to ascend the hill by the road we were on, whilst the earl of Dalhousie's column ascended by one more to the right. The enemy took up a strong position at the top of the pass, with a cloud of skirmishers in the front.

“ The attack on our side was led by lieutenant-general Stewart, with major-general Walker's brigade, under lieutenant-colonel Fitzgerald of the sixtieth, who forced back the enemy's skirmishers to the summit of the hill; but coming upon their main body, found them so numerous and so strongly posted, that lieutenant-general Stewart was induced to withdraw them until the seventh division should be in closer co-operation with him. About this time the lieutenant-general was wounded, and the command of the division devolved upon major-general Pringle, who, with his own brigade, commanded by colonel O'Callaghan, renewed the attack on our side, whilst the seventh division pressed them on the other, and both divisions gained the height about the same time, the enemy retiring, after sustaining a very considerable loss. The conduct of lieutenant-general Stewart, major-general Pringle, and of the officers and troops in general, was conspicuously good, and I regret that the very thick fog prevented our taking that advantage of the situation of the enemy which it might otherwise have done. A part of each division pursued them some distance down the hill, and occasioned them a considerable loss. Having thus far

far performed your lordship's instructions, I withdrew my column from the pass, and moved it upon Almandos.

"I have, &c.

(Signed) "ROWLAND HILL, Lieut. Gen."

"MY LORD,

"Lezaco, 4th Aug. 1813.

"The prince of Orange having been detained till this day for the returns, I have to inform your lordship that the enemy still continued posted in the morning of the 2d with a force of the divisions on the Puerto de Echalar, and nearly the whole army behind the Puerto, when the fourth, seventh, and light divisions advanced by the valley of the Bidassoa to the frontier, and I had determined to dislodge them by a combined attack and movement of the three divisions.

"The seventh division, however, having crossed the mountains from Sumbilla, and having necessarily preceded the arrival of the fourth, major-general Barnes' brigade was formed for the attack, and advanced, before the fourth and light divisions could co-operate, with a regularity and gallantry which I have seldom seen equalled, and actually drove the two divisions of the enemy, notwithstanding the resistance opposed to them, from those formidable heights. It is impossible that I can extol too highly the conduct of major-general Barnes, and these brave troops, which was the admiration of all who were witnesses of it.—Major-general Kempt's brigade of the light division likewise drove a very considerable force from the rock which forms the left of the Puerto. There is now no enemy in the field within this part of the Spanish frontiers.

"I have the honour to inclose lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham's report of the assault of San Sebastian.

"While the troops were engaged in the neighbourhood of Pampeluna, as reported in my dispatch of the 1st instant, brigadier-general Longa occupied with his division this part of the Bidassoa, including the town of Vera. That part of the enemy's army which had been left in observation of the allied troops on the great road from Irun, attacked him on the 28th; but were repulsed with considerable loss.

"I have great pleasure in reporting the good conduct of these troops on all occasions; and likewise of a battalion of the Spanish Cazadores, in general Barceña's division of the Gallician army, which had been sent to the bridge of Yansi, on the enemy's retreat on the 1st instant, which it held against very superior numbers during a great part of the day.

"Nothing of importance has occurred in Arragon since my dispatch of the 9th July.

"I have

“ I have a report from lieutenant-general lord W. Bentinck, from Binaroz on the 21st July; and he was making preparations to cross the Ebro.

“ I have, &c.

(Signed) “ WELLINGTON.”

Earl Bathurst, &c. &c. &c.

“ MY LORD,

Ernani, June 27, 1813.

“ The attack of the breach in the line wall on the flank of St. Sebastian's took place on the morning of the 25th, when the fall of the tide left the foot of the wall dry, which was soon after day-light.—I am sorry to say, that notwithstanding the distinguished gallantry of the troops employed, some of whom did force their way in the town, the attack did not succeed. The enemy occupied in force all the defences of the place which looked that way, and from which, and from all round the breach, they were enabled to bring so destructive a fire of grape and musketry, flanking and enfilading the column, and to throw over so many hand grenades on the troops, that it became necessary to desist from the assault.

“ The loss sustained was therefore severe, especially by the third battalion of the royal Scots, the leading one of major-general Hay's brigade, which being on duty in the trenches, formed the column of attack.—Major-general Spry's Portuguese brigade, that of major-general Robinson, and the fourth Cazadores of brigadier-general Wilson's being in reserve in the trenches; the whole under the direction of major-general Oswald, commanding the fifth division.

“ Though this attack has failed, it would be great injustice not to assure your lordship, that the troops conducted themselves with their usual gallantry, and only retired when I thought a further perseverance in the attack would have occasioned a useless sacrifice of brave men. Major-general Hay, major Frazer, colonel the honourable C. F. Greville, and colonel Cameron, commanding the royal Scotch, thirty-eighth and ninth regiments, greatly distinguished themselves. Major Frazer lost his life on the breach, with many of his brave comrades.

“ The conduct throughout the whole of the operations of the siege hitherto, of the officers and men of the royal artillery and engineers, never was exceeded in indefatigable zeal, activity, and gallantry. The three officers of this corps, employed to conduct different parts of the column of attack, behaved admirably, but suffered severely.

“ I have the greatest satisfaction too in assuring your lordship of the most cordial support and assistance, afforded by

Sir George Collier, commanding his majesty's ships on this coast, and of all the officers and seamen of the squadron employed on shore.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “ T. GRAHAM.”

To Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K. G.

General abstract of the loss sustained in the action from the 25th of July to the 2d of August, 1813.—British, officers and men, five hundred and forty killed, three thousand five hundred and sixteen wounded, and five hundred missing.—Portuguese, officers and men, three hundred and twenty-two killed, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and one missing. Grand total of killed, wounded, and missing, six thousand nine hundred and forty-three. By a supplementary account two hundred and ten were added to the number.—No mention is made of the Spanish loss.

In the above unfortunate assault on St. Sebastian, as fast as our troops came up they were knocked down by the dreadful fire from the defences which bore upon the breaches; and when a few got into them they were unable to effect any thing from their weakness. In short, it is said, that the carnage was so great, that the French themselves called to our officers, to draw the men off, and actually ceased firing upon them.

The marquis of Wellington, in a dispatch dated Lezaca, Aug. 25, informs us, that no movement of importance had been made by the enemy, or by the allies, since he transmitted the above report of the attack on San Sebastian. He likewise acquaints us, that he received reports from lieutenant-general lord William Bentinck (who succeeded general Murray in the command of the army) to the 19th of August, copies and extracts of which he transmitted to England; and says, “ I entirely approve of lieutenant-general lord William Bentinck's having retired, as he had not been able to collect his whole force, and did not consider himself sufficiently strong to fight a general action with the enemy.”

By

By lord William Bentinck's report to the marquis of Wellington, dated Cambrilla, August 16, 1813, it appears, that on the 3rd of that month the Duque del Parque's corps came up to Tarragona, as did the division of general Sarsfield on the 11th. General Elio could not spare the three regiments of the division of Migares, which lord W. Bentinck had requested him to send. On the 10th, lord Bentinck received information, that marshal Suchet had returned to Villa Franca from Barcelona, and had brought with him five thousand men. The reports of the succeeding days left no doubt of its being his intention to move forward; and on the 14th, his lordship learned from the baron d'Eroles and colonel Manzo, that besides collecting all he could from the garrisons, he had been joined by Decaen with six thousand men. In consequence of this intelligence his lordship suspended all operations for the siege of Tarragona, except the making of fascines, and landed neither artillery nor stores. His lordship intended to have pushed on to the Llobregat, Suchet's army being at one time divided between Barcelona and Villa Franca and its environs: a rapid movement, he says, might possibly have enabled him to fall separately upon his advanced corps, and to obtain possession of the ridge of mountains on the hither side of the Llobregat, before Suchet could have time to bring up his troops from Barcelona; but his lordship could not execute this movement before he was joined by general Sarsfield, and previously Suchet had concentrated his forces in Villa Franca and its neighbourhood. Suchet's force, his lordship says, had been variously reported, from twenty to twenty-five thousand men. The immediate vicinity of Tarragona offered a very good position in itself, but it might have been completely turned by an enemy who, crossing the Cols, should approach Tarragona by Valls and Reus. On the 14th, Suchet moved a large corps upon Alla Fulla, but the road being close to the beach, the gun-boats prevented him from passing, if such were

his intention. On the 15th, he drove back the posts on the Cols of San Christina and Llebra, and afterwards forced the corps at Brafia, by which they were supplied, to retire. His whole army marched by this route. Upon Suchet's continuing to advance upon Tarragona, lord Bentinck resolved upon retiring in the night; and the army arrived at Cambrilla on the morning of the 16th, without any loss, and without receiving any molestation from the enemy. "If there had been any fair chance of success," his lordship says, "I would have given them battle." The French blew up Tarragona on the night of the 18th of August.

We now return to St. Sebastian; and by dispatches which were received at the Admiralty from captain Sir G. Collier, off that fortress, it appears that the re-opening of the batteries against that place commenced on the morning of the 26th of August, and that they continued to fire with great effect. On the morning of the 27th, Sir George says, the seamen and marines, with a party of soldiers, in the boats of the squadron, attacked and took the important island of Santa Clara, at the entrance of the harbour; three seamen were killed, and two officers and sixteen seamen and marines wounded, in this gallant and useful exploit.

The marquis of Wellington in his official dispatch, dated Lezaca, Sept. 2, 1813, says, the fire against the fortress of San Sebastian was opened on the 26th of August, and directed against the towers which flanked the curtain on the eastern face, against the demy-bastion on the south-eastern angle, and the termination of the curtain of the northern face, Lieutenant Sir Thomas Graham had directed that an establishment should be formed on the island of Santa Clara, which was effected on the night of the 26th; and the enemy's detachment on that island were made prisoners. Captain Cameron, of the ninth, had the command of the detachment which effected this operation; lieutenant the honourable James Arbuthnot,
of

of the royal navy, commanded the boats of the squadron; and lieutenant Bell commanded the marines.

All that was deemed practicable to carry into execution, in order to facilitate the approach to the breaches before made in the wall of the town, having been effected on the 30th of August, and another breach having been made at the termination of the curtain, the place was stormed at eleven o'clock in the day of the 31st, and carried. The loss on the side of the English was very severe. Lieutenant-general Sir James Leith, who had joined the army only two days before, and major-generals Oswald and Robinson, were unfortunately wounded in the breach; and colonel Sir Richard Fletcher of the royal engineers, was killed by a musket-ball at the mouth of the trenches. In this officer, and in lieutenant-colonel Crawford, of the ninth regiment, this service sustained a severe loss.

Lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham's report of this operation, which we shall presently advert to, affords another instance of the distinguished gallantry, bravery, and perseverance of the British officers and troops, under the most trying difficulties. The tenth Portuguese brigade, under major Snodgrass, crossed the river Urumea, and stormed the breach on the right, in the most undaunted manner, under the most tremendous fire which could be directed against them from the castle and town. The garrison then retired to the castle, leaving about six hundred and seventy*, who fell into the hands of the allies.

Since the fire against Saint Sebastian had been recommenced, the enemy drew the greater part of their force to the camp of Urogne, and there was every reason to believe that they would have made an attempt to relieve the place.

* The marquis of Wellington had said in his dispatch, dated Lezaca, Sept. 2, that two hundred and seventy only were taken, but this his lordship corrected in a subsequent dispatch, which was dated Sept. 4.

Three divisions of the fourth Spanish army, commanded by general Don Manuel Freyre, occupied the heights of San Marcial, and the town of Irun, by which the approach to San Sebastian, by the high road, was covered and protected, and they were supported by the first division of the British infantry, under major-general Howard, and major-general lord Aylmer's brigade, on their left, and in the rear of Irun; and by general Longa's division encamped near the Sierra de Aya, in rear of their right. In order to secure them still further, the marquis of Wellington moved two brigades of the fourth division, on the 30th of the same month, to the convent of San Antonio, one of which (general Ross's) under lieutenant-general the honourable Sir Lowry Cole, moved up the same day to the Sierra de Aya, and the other, on the morning of the 31st, leaving the ninth Portuguese brigade on the heights between the convent and Vera, and Lezaca.

Major-general Inglis's brigade of the seventh division was moved on the 30th to the bridge of Lezaca; and the marquis gave orders for the troops in the Puertos of Echalar, Zugarmardi, and Maya, to attack the enemy's weakened posts in front of those positions.

The enemy crossed the Bidassoa by the fords between Andara and the destroyed bridge on the high road, before day-light on the morning of the 31st, with a very large force, with which they made a most desperate attack along the whole front of the position of the Spanish troops on the heights of San Marcial. They were bravely driven back, some of them even across the river, by the Spanish troops, whose conduct, says the noble marquis, was equal to that of any troops that he had ever seen engaged; and the attack having been frequently repeated, was upon every occasion defeated with the same gallantry and determination. The course of the river being immediately under the heights on the French side, on which the enemy had placed a considerable quantity of cannon,

non, they were enabled to throw a bridge across the river, about three quarters of a mile above the high road, over which in the afternoon they marched again a considerable body, which, with those who had crossed the fords, made another desperate attack upon the Spanish positions. This was likewise beat back; and at length finding all their efforts on that side fruitless, they took advantage of the darkness of a violent storm to retire their troops from this front entirely.

Although the marquis of Wellington had a British division on each flank of the fourth Spanish army, the conduct of the latter was so conspicuously good, and their defence so masterly, that they did not stand in need of his lordship's assistance, notwithstanding the desperate efforts of the enemy to carry it.

Nearly at the same time that the enemy crossed the Bidassoa in front of the heights of San Marcial, they likewise crossed that river with about three divisions of infantry in two columns, by the fords below Salin, in front of the position occupied by the ninth Portuguese brigade. The noble marquis ordered major-general Inglis to support this brigade with that of the seventh division under his command; and so soon as he was informed of the course of the enemy's attack, he sent to lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie, to request that he would likewise move towards the Bidassoa, with the seventh division; and to the light division, to support major-general Inglis by every means in their power. Major-general Inglis found it impossible to maintain the heights between Lezaca and the Bidassoa, and he withdrew to those in front of the convent of San Antonia, which he maintained. In the mean time major-general Kempt moved one brigade of the light division to Lezaca, by which he kept the enemy in check, and covered the march of the earl of Dalhousie to join major-general Inglis.

The enemy, however, having completely failed in their attempt upon the position of the Spanish army on the heights of San Marcial; and finding that

major-

major-general Inglis had taken a position from which they could not drive him; at the same time that it covered and protected the right of the Spanish army, and the approaches to San Sebastian by Oyarzun, and that their situation on the left of the Bidassoa was becoming every moment more critical, retired during the night.

The fall of rain during the evening and night had so swollen the Bidassoa, that the rear of their column was obliged to cross at the bridge of Vera. In order to effect which, they attacked the posts of major-general Skerret's brigade of the light division, at about three in the morning, both from the Puerto de Vera and from the left of the Bidassoa. Although the nature of the ground rendered it impossible to prevent entirely the passage of the bridge after day-light, it was made under the fire of a great part of major-general Skerret's brigade, and the enemy's loss in the operation was very considerable. While this was carrying on upon the left of the army, Mariscal del Campo Don Pedro Giron attacked the enemy's posts in front of the pass of Echalar, on the 30th and 31st. Lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie made general Le Cor attack those in front of Zuzarrimardi, with the 6th Portuguese brigade, on the 31st; and the honourable major-general Colville made colonel Douglas attack the enemy's post in front of the pass of Maya, on the same day, with the 7th Portuguese brigade. The attack made by the earl of Dalhousie delayed his march till late in the afternoon of the 31st, but he was in the evening in a favourable situation for his farther progress; and in the morning of the 1st of September in that allotted for him.

"In these operations," says the Marquis of Wellington, "in which a second attempt by the enemy to prevent the establishment of the allies upon the frontiers had been defeated by the operations of a part only of the allied army, at the very moment at which the town of St. Sebastian was taken by storm, I have had great satisfaction in observing the zeal and ability of

the officers, and the gallantry and discipline of the soldiers. The different reports which I have transmitted from lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham, will have shewn the ability and perseverance with which he has conducted the arduous enterprise entrusted to his direction, and the zeal and exertion of all the officers employed under him."

The following extract from Sir Thomas Graham's letter to the marquis of Wellington, concerning the storming of San Sebastian, is highly honourable to the British forces under his command:

" MY LORD, " *Oyarzun, Sept. 1, 1813.*

" In obedience to your lordship's orders of the preceding day, to attack and form a lodgement on the breach of San Sebastian, which now extended to the left, so as to embrace the outermost tower, the end and front of the curtain immediately over the left bastion, as well as the faces of the bastion itself, the assault took place at eleven o'clock A. M. yesterday; and I have the honour to inform your lordship, that the heroic perseverance of all the troops concerned was at last crowned with success.

" The column of attack was formed of the second brigade of the fifth division commanded by major-general Robinson, with an immediate support of detachments *as per margin**; and having in reserve the remainder of the fifth division, consisting of major-general Sprye's Portuguese brigade, and the first brigade under major-general Hay; as also the fifth battalion of Caçadores of general Bradford's brigade, under major Hill; the whole under the direction of lieutenant-general Sir James Leith commanding the fifth division.

" Having arranged every thing with Sir J. Leith, I crossed the Urumia to the batteries of the right attack, where every thing could be most distinctly seen, and from whence the orders for the fire of the batteries, according to circumstances, could be immediately given.

* One hundred and fifty volunteers of the light division, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Hunt, of the fifty-second regiment; four hundred of the first division (consisting of two hundred of the brigades of guards, under lieutenant-colonel Cooke; of one hundred of the light battalion, and one hundred of the line battalions of the king's German legion,) under major Robinson; and two hundred of the fourth division, under major Rose, of the twenty-ninth foot.

“ The column, in filing out of the right of the trenches, was, as before, exposed to a heavy fire of shells and grape shot; and a mine was exploded in the left angle of the counter-scarp of the horn work, which did great damage, but did not check the ardour of the troops in advancing to the attack. There was never any thing so fallacious as the external appearance of the breach; without some description, the almost insuperable difficulties of the breach cannot be estimated. Notwithstanding its great extent, there was but one point where it was possible to enter, and there by single files. All the inside of the wall to the right of the curtain formed a perpendicular scarp, of at least twenty feet to the level of the streets: so that the narrow ridge of the curtain itself, formed by the breaching of its end and front, was the only accessible point. During the suspension of the operations of the siege, from the want of ammunition, the enemy had prepared every means of defence which art could devise, so that great numbers of men were covered by intrenchments and traverses, in the horn-work, on the ramparts of the curtain, and inside of the town opposite to the breach, and ready to pour a most destructive fire of musketry on both sides of the approach to the top of the narrow ridge of the curtain.

“ Every thing that the most determined bravery could attempt was repeatedly tried in vain by the troops, who were brought forward from the trenches in succession. No man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge; and though the slope of the breach afforded shelter from the enemy’s musketry, yet still the nature of the stone rubbish prevented the great exertions of the engineers and working parties from being able to form a lodgement for the troops, exposed to the shells and grape from the batteries of the castle, as was peculiarly directed in obedience to your lordship’s instructions: and, at all events, a secure lodgement could never have been obtained without occupying a part of the curtain.

“ In this almost desperate state of attack, after consulting with colonel Dickson, commanding the royal artillery, I ventured to order the guns to be turned against the curtain. A heavy fire of artillery was directed against it; passing a few feet only over the heads of our troops on the breach, and was kept up with a precision of practice beyond all example. Meanwhile I accepted the offer of part of major-general Bradford’s Portuguese brigade to ford the river near its mouth. The advance of the first battalion, thirteenth regiment, under major Snodgrass, over the open beach, and across the river; and of a detachment of the twenty-fourth regiment, under lieutenant-colonel M’Bean, in support, was
made

made in the handsomest style, under a very severe fire of grape. Major Snodgrass attacked and finally carried the small breach on the right of the great one, and lieutenant-colonel M'Bean's detachment occupied the right of the great breach. I ought not to forget to mention, that similar offers was made by the first Portuguese regiment of brigadier-general Wilson's brigade, under lieutenant-colonel Fearon; and that both major-general Bradford, and brigadier-general Wilson, had, from the beginning, urged most anxiously the employment of their respective brigades in the attack, as they had so large a share in the labour and fatigues of the right attack.

" Observing now the effect of the admirable fire of the batteries against the curtain, though the enemy was so much covered, a great effort was ordered to be made to gain the high ridge at all hazards, at the same time that an attempt should be made to storm the horn-work.

" It fell to the lot of the second brigade of the fifth division, under the command of colonel the honourable Charles Greville, to move out of the trenches for this purpose, and the third battalion of the royal Scots, under lieutenant-colonel Barnes, supported by the thirty-eighth, under lieutenant-colonel Miles, fortunately arrived to assault the breach of the curtain, about the time when an explosion on the rampart of the curtain (occasioned by the fire of the artillery) created some confusion among the enemy. The narrow pass was gained, and was maintained, after a severe conflict, and the troops on the right of the breach having about this time succeeded in forcing the barricades on the top of the narrow line wall, found their way into the houses that joined it. Thus, after an assault which lasted above two hours under the most trying circumstances, a firm footing was obtained.

" It was impossible to restrain the impetuosity of the troops, and in an hour more the enemy were driven from all the complication of defences prepared in the streets, and leaving the whole town in our possession, &c.

" I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) " T. GRAHAM."

The following is a distinct abstract of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the assault of Fort St. Sebastian, and also in the actions on the frontier :

BEFORE ST. SEBASTIAN'S.

British, killed	-	-	-	-571
Portuguese	-	-	-	- 189

 IN THE ACTIONS.

British, killed	-	-	-	-	51
Portuguese	-	-	-	-	88
Spanish	-	-	-	-	261
Total killed					<hr/> 1160

Wounded British at St. Sebastian	-	-	-	-	1003
Portuguese	-	-	-	-	594

 IN THE ACTIONS.

British, wounded	-	-	-	-	334
Portuguese	-	-	-	-	386
Spanish	-	-	-	-	1347
Total wounded					<hr/> 3664

Total killed and wounded					<hr/> 4824
Missing	-	-	-	-	<hr/> 130

Total killed, wounded, and missing					<hr/> 4954
Missing Spaniards	-	-	-	-	<hr/> 71

 5025

From accounts given by several officers who arrived from the Peninsula, it appears, that the army under the command of field-marshal the marquis of Wellington at this period, amounted to about one hundred and twenty thousand men, of whom forty thousand were British, thirty thousand Portuguese, and fifty thousand Spaniards. It is said, that the garrison had no meat, but little wine, and plenty of bread.

The following is an extract of a letter from an officer, dated St. Sebastian, Sept, 2.

“ The enemy made a desperate push on the day of the assault on this place, with the apparent determination of relieving it at all hazards. Soult crossed the Bidassoa river, and made good his way to within about six miles of our besieging army, then turned towards Irun, and concluding he should easily make them give ground; but to his astonishment, he got by these troops, unassisted, a very complete repulse.

“ The assault of this place was the most murderous that can be conceived, and as brave as English history ever told. Nothing could surpass the determined resolution of the British on the attack. The enemy, from traverses on the curtain, and a bastion commanding the breach, opened a most destructive

destructive fire of musketry, and the fifty-ninth regiment had half its officers killed or wounded. For three hours we held the breach, where, notwithstanding all possible efforts of the enemy, we maintained our ground. The enemy being at last flanked on the curtain, sprung a mine, by which themselves lost above two hundred men, and we nearly as many: it was a sight that would have disturbed the nerves of a man who never felt before. The enemy after this fell back at all points, and the walls were swept by the British bayonet. The town was now taken step by step, and at this moment presents a scene of misery language cannot picture. To the everlasting honour of the troops, I do not believe that a man has been put to death in a wanton manner, or who had resigned his arms."

Another letter from Ayarzun, dated September 4, says,

" You will have heard ere this of the fall of St. Sebastian; it cost us dear, but it is worth every thing we have sacrificed; and being aware that the place was very strong, and that the enemy intended defending it to the last, we were but too happy to hear of its fall. It became indispensibly necessary that we should possess it, in order to carry on any further movements. The castle still holds out, but it will not afford cover for a large number of men, and must shortly follow the fate of the town."

The following extract from a letter from an officer at St. Sebastian's, dated Sept. 6, paints the horrors which the ravages of war carried into that ill-fated city; and we lament with him, and every honest mind, that this war of ambition should have desolated so many fine places in the countries of Spain and Portugal for a series of years, and hope it will shortly be terminated:

" Since the battle which took place near Pampeluna, nothing of any consequence has occurred at the army, (the siege of St. Sebastian going on very slowly,) until a few days ago, when the French attempted to relieve it; and, for that purpose Soult made a rapid march, with about forty-five thousand men. Lord Wellington retired from his head quarters at Lezaca, and after a most desperate fight, gave Soult another compleat defeat; the Spaniards behaved with the most noble and determined bravery, and had three generals killed. In the mean time, fifty-three forty-eight pounders completed

completed the breach in St. Sebastian, and a general assault was given, in which we succeeded, after a considerable slaughter on both sides. Never did British soldiers act with more spirit and gallantry, overcoming obstacles which, perhaps, to any other troops would have appeared insurmountable. That part of the garrison which had reached the castle, immediately on finding our troops in full possession of the town, fired shells on it from the citadel, and in a few moments this beautiful city was in flames. A few days after, it was a heap of ruins; and there is nothing now remaining of one of the handsomest towns in Spain to mark the spot where it once stood, but a pile of ruins; the church alone, it was thought, would have escaped, but the flames, which still continue, are fast approaching it. The castle still holds out, and is now being bombarded. It is supplied with water by only one well: yesterday our batteries directed their shot to that part, when the French officer commanding resorted to a method of stopping our fire, unheard of in war:—he placed our men which he had taken prisoners round the well: of course our firing ceased. Only conceive the cruelty of such a proceeding! The plunder taken at St. Sebastian is said to be very great.”

At length the castle of St. Sebastian* was terminated, by its capitulation, and the terms were equally

* St. Sebastian is a handsome, populous, and strong town of Spain, in the province of Guipuscoa, with a good and well frequented harbour. It is seated at the foot of a mountain, and the harbour secured by two moles, and a narrow entrance for the ships. The town is surrounded with a double wall, and to the sea side it is fortified with bastions and half-moons. The streets are long, broad, and strait, and paved with white flag-stones. The houses are pretty handsome, the churches neat, and the environs are very pleasant. It carries on a great trade, and is so populous, that several families are obliged to live in the same house. At the top of the mountain is an exceedingly strong citadel, well furnished with cannon. Their greatest trade consists of iron and steel, which some take to be the best in Europe; they also deal in wool, which comes from Old Castile. The possession of St. Sebastian by the English, merely as a naval station, during the continuance of the war in the north of Spain, is invaluable. It is the only port on that part of the coast, by which a safe communication with the British army can be maintained during the winter months, which on and about the Pyrenees are very cold. The lords of the Admiralty seem to have entertained the same opinion; for the guards and other reinforcements which were about to embark to join lord Wellington, were ordered to land at that port. St. Sebastian is fifty miles E. of Bilboa, fifty N. W. of Pampeluna, and twenty-five S. W. of Bayonne.

honourable

honourable both to the conquerors and the conquered. Field-marshal the marquis of Wellington, in his dispatch, dated Lezaca, Sept. 10, encloses a letter from lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham, dated Ernani, Sept. 9, of which the following is an extract:

“ I have the satisfaction to report to your lordship, that the castle of San Sebastian has surrendered; and I have the honour to transmit the capitulation, which, under all the circumstances of the case, I trust your lordship will think I did right to grant to a garrison, which certainly made a very gallant defence.

“ Ever since the assault of the 31st ultimo, the vertical fire of the mortars, &c. of the right attack was occasionally kept up against the castle, occasioning a very severe loss to the enemy; and yesterday morning a battery of seventeen twenty-four pounders in the horn-work, another of three eighteen-pounders, still more on the left, having been completed by the extraordinary exertions of the officers of artillery and engineers, aided by the indefatigable zeal of all the troops; the whole of the ordnance, amounting to fifty-four pieces, including two twenty-four pounders, and one howitzer on the island, opened at ten A. M. against the castle, and with such effect, that before one P. M. a flag of truce was hoisted at the Mirador battery by the enemy; and after some discussion, the terms of the surrender were agreed on. Thus, giving your lordship another great result of the campaign, in the acquisition to the allied armies of this interesting point on the coast, and near the frontier.

“ Captain Stewart, of the royals, aid-de-camp to major-general Hay, who had so greatly distinguished himself during the siege, is unfortunately among the killed since the last return.

“ I omitted in my last report to mention my obligation to the great zeal of captain Smith of the royal navy, who undertook and executed the difficult task of getting guns up the steep scarp of the island into a battery, which was manned by seamen under his command, and which was of much service. Captain Bloye, of the *Lyra*, has been from the beginning constantly and most actively employed on shore, and I feel greatly indebted to his services, &c.

“ Convention proposed for the Capitulation of Fort La Motte of San Sebastian, by the Adjutant-commandant Chevalier de Songeon, Chief of the Staff to the Troops stationed in the Fort, charged with full Powers by General Rey, commanding the said Troops, on the one side;

side; and by Colonel De Lancey, Deputy Quarter-master General, Lieutenant-colonel Dickson, commanding the artillery; and Lieutenant-colonel Bouverie, charged with full Powers by Lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham, on the other side.

“ The above-named having exchanged their full powers, as follows :

“ Art. 1. The French troops forming the garrison of Fort La Motte shall be prisoners of war to his majesty’s troops and their allies.—Answer: Agreed.

“ Art. 2. They shall be embarked in his Britannic majesty’s ships, and conveyed to England direct, without being obliged to go farther by land than to the port of Passages.—Answer: Agreed.

“ Art. 3. The general and other superior officers, and the officers of regiments and of the staff, as well as medical officers, shall preserve their swords and their private baggage, and the non-commissioned officers and soldiers shall preserve their knapsacks.—Answer: Agreed.

“ Art. 4. The women, the children, and the old men, not being military, shall be sent back to France, as well as the other non-combatants, preserving their private baggage.—Answer: Granted for the women and children. The old men and non-combatants must be examined.

“ Art. 5. The Commissarie de Guerre, Barbier de Guilly, having with him the wife and the two daughters of his brother, who died at Pampeluna, requests Sir Thomas Graham to authorize his return to France, with the three above-named ladies, as he is their chief support. He is not a military man.—Answer: This article shall be submitted to the marquiss of Wellington by Sir Thomas Graham.

“ Art. 6. The sick and wounded shall be treated according to their rank, and taken care of as English officers and soldiers.—Answer: Agreed.

“ Art. 7. The French troops shall file out to-morrow morning, by the gate of Mirador, with all the honours of war, with arms and baggage, and drums beating, to the outside, where they will lay down their arms; the officers preserving their swords, their servants, horses, and baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks, as mentioned in the third article.—Answer: Agreed.

“ Art. 8. A detachment of the allied army, consisting of one hundred men, shall occupy in the evening the gate of the Mirador; a like detachment shall occupy the gate of the Governor’s Battery. These two posts shall be evacuated by the French troops, as soon as the present capitulation shall be accepted and ratified by the commanding generals.—Answer: Agreed.

“ Art.

“ Art. 9. The plans and all the papers regarding the fortifications, shall be given over to an English officer, and officers shall be named equally on each side, to regulate all that concerns the artillery, engineer, and commissariat department.—Answer: Agreed.

“ Art. 10. The general commanding the French troops shall be authorized to send to his Excellency Marshal Soult, an officer of the staff, who shall sign his parole of honour, for his exchange with a British officer of his rank. This officer shall be the bearer of a copy of the present capitulation.—Answer: Submitted for the decision of Lord Wellington. The officer to be sent to Marshal Soult shall be chosen by the commanding officer of the French troops.

“ Art. 11. If any difficulties or misunderstandings shall arise in the execution of the articles of this capitulation, they shall be always decided in favour of the French garrison.—Answer: Agreed.

“ Made and concluded this 8th day of September, 1813.

(Signed) “ Adjutant-Commandant Chevalier SOUGEON.

(Signed) “ W. DE LANCEY, Colonel.

(Signed) “ A. DICKSON, Lieutenant-Colonel commanding Artillery.

(Signed) “ H. BOUVERIE, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Approved, (Signed) “ Le General-Gouverneur REY.

(Signed) “ THOMAS GRAHAM, Lieut.-General.

Approved on the part of the Royal Navy.

(Signed) “ GEO. COLLIER, commanding the Squadron of his Majesty's Ships off St Sebastian.

Returns of the French Garrison made Prisoners of War by Capitulation in the Castle of St. Sebastian, on the 8th of September, 1813.

“ Eighty officers, one thousand seven hundred and fifty-six serjeants, drummers, and rank and file.—Grand total one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six.

“ N. B. Twenty-three officers, and five hundred and twelve men, out of the above number, are sick and wounded in the hospital.

(Signed) “ ED. PAKENHAM, Adj.-Gen.”

No act of Sir Thomas Graham's military life has reflected greater lustre on his genius and talents as a commander, than the manner in which the town of St. Sebastian was at length taken by storm. The almost insuperable difficulties which impeded the pro-

gress of the assailants, called in a peculiar degree for all the promptitude and presence of mind of their general, and his resources fully answered the exigencies of the occasion. His ordering the guns to be turned against the curtain, aided by the precision of the artillery in firing a few feet only over the heads of our troops in the breach, it is evident was the sole means, at the critical moment which had occurred, of carrying the place. The state of the attack, from the skilful defences prepared by the enemy, was almost desperate, and but for this new expedient adopted at the moment, and instantly carried into effect, there is every reason to believe that the assault must have failed, or at least could only have succeeded at the price of a loss of life infinitely greater than that actually sustained. The promptitude of the general was undoubtedly most gallantly supported by the skill and the courage of the officers, and the bravery and discipline of the troops under his command, and whilst we lament the severe loss at which the possession of the fortress was purchased, we admit the importance of the achievement.

There appeared, shortly after the reduction of St. Sebastian, in a newspaper published at Cadiz, called "El Duende de les Cafires," or "The Lounge of the Coffee Houses," a most severe accusation against the British troops lately employed in the siege of that town. In this paper our men are taxed with the most horrible cruelties—murder, rape, and rapine; and that against the unfortunate inhabitants, who are Spaniards. Neither sex nor age, it is said, were spared; but the matron of sixty, or the infant of ten years of age, fell alike victims to the brutal passions of our soldiers! Now it must be remembered that the paper in which the accusation is inserted, is not the publication of an enemy, but that of a friend—of an ally whose cause we have espoused, and for whose deliverance from the tyranny of an invader we have sacrificed many thousands of our youth, and many millions of our money. If such accusations as these
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can be published under the eye of the Cortez, without truth, we must either suppose them to be without power or without principle. If the statement be genuine, we ought to hide our heads in shame; but we could hardly think so ill of Englishmen, as to suppose them capable of committing such acts of atrocity, at which even cossacks and pandours must shudder.

For a long time we were unwilling to give the least credence to the above accusation, and we were strengthened in our unbelief of those atrocities, by the circumstance of an English officer of the name of Smith, who was personally engaged in the assault on St. Sebastian, having publicly contradicted the charge respecting the conduct of the British troops, which appeared in the Spanish newspaper. But the following extract from "The West Briton," a Cornwall paper, accompanied by a letter from one actually concerned in those villainies, places the matter in a different point of view: "The account given in a Spanish paper of the conduct of the allied troops towards the unfortunate inhabitants of St. Sebastian, has caused a lively sensation in this country. For the honour of the British character, we wish to discredit the shocking description, so much calculated to implant feelings of rancour towards us in the minds of the Spanish people. No time should be lost in repelling charges of enormities so horrible, if they can be repelled; and if unfortunately they should be well founded, their public reprobation by the press and people of this country is an imperative duty, which forms all the reparation that can now be made to the cause of humanity. Indeed we believe the most effectual mode of checking a conduct so disgraceful to the character of our army, and so injurious to the great cause in which we are engaged, in this exposure, the necessity of which, we should hope, every officer, if not every private of the British army in Spain must feel himself bound, in future, to prevent. It is from these considerations, that we give publicity

to the following extract of a letter, written by a soldier in the fourth company of the fourth division of the second or queen's regiment, to his father and mother, who reside a few miles from this place. We pledge ourselves for its authenticity." Although we insert the letter, we hope it will be the last time we shall ever have to notice any thing of a similar nature; and that British soldiers will adopt a different line of conduct.

" Eskelar, Spain, Sept. 16, 1813.

" Dear Father and Mother,

" I received your letter last July,—I then sent you a few lines.—We commenced our advance on the 17th of May, and ever since we have been marching up and down the country. I suppose by this time you have heard of all our hard fighting; but, thank God, I have escaped all misfortune. From the 25th to the 31st of August we were constantly engaged before St. Sebastian's. On the 27th, a number of men from every regiment volunteered their services to storm the place: there were fourteen of our battalion that offered, and I was amongst them. On the 31st, we lay in ambush until twelve o'clock in the day, and all the time thirty twenty-four pounders were playing on the place.—About one o'clock we made a push for the town walls, whilst the grape, cannister, and musket shot flew about us like corn sowing in a field. I believe there was not one out of three that escaped; thank God, I was of the lucky number. The left brigade of the fifth division was ordered in front, but that gave way; but when they saw the volunteers of the fourth division coming up close to their heels, they wanted to know what we were about; we called out that we were come to shew them the road into the town, if they had no objection. The first salute I got, was to have my canteen shot from my side, which prevented me from getting it full of French brandy; next the bayonet was knocked off my firelock, and I had no sooner turned round, than the firelock was knocked out of my hand. Then I began to think it sharp work: but I quickly replaced my arms by others, and was not the least dismayed. We directly gave three cheers, and got to the top of the breach, and there we were obliged to stay; for it was three or four hours before we were able to enter the town. By that time some hundreds of British and Portuguese were laid under the walls. As soon as we entered the enemy sprung a mine, which blew up a great number of their own men. There were pieces of cannon planted at all the corners of the streets,

streets, and many parts undermined; but we pushed on so rapidly, that they had not time to blow them up. We were fired on from the windows of the houses, and we were obliged to fire into them in return. *Some of our men killed all before them as they went, but I thought it cruel murder to kill women and the innocent babes sucking at their breasts.*—I was almost the first that entered the town, and every one that begged for mercy I did not hurt. We were in the town that day and night, and the next day. About fifty or sixty of us *had the choice of ALL the ladies in the town*; the remainder of the troops were under arms. We had the plundering of all the town, but the money was mostly hid. For my part, I was employed most of my time *amongst the young ladies, some of them noblemen's daughters, in searching them for money*; but very little could be found about them but a few gold rings. The few that is left of us are returned with flying colours."

That the atrocities said to have been committed at St. Sebastian's actually took place is completely established, and the following official article on the subject appeared in the supplement to the Madrid Gazette of November 4.

" *Isla de Leon, Oct. 20.*

" When the Regency of the kingdom was informed of the reports circulated relative to disorders committed in the town of St. Sebastian by the English and Portuguese troops, after the assault given on the 31st of August last, they made an earnest representation to the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, through the minister at war, requesting that he would inform himself of every particular. This mode of proceeding by the Regency does credit to their frankness, and the confidence which they have in the illustrious chief who has gained victories so glorious and so signal; for his known prudence, his love for strict discipline, and his affection for the Spanish people, will not permit us to doubt that he has not taken the most effectual means to punish the authors of the mischiefs and atrocities which are alledged to have been committed.

" The duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, considering himself in this affair not so much a general of his Catholic majesty, as a subject of Great Britain, since they were the troops of that country which entered St. Sebastian, replied to the minister at war, requesting that he might communicate relative to those events with the ambassador of his Britannic majesty, to whom he accordingly transmitted an answer in the most satisfactory terms to the complaints against the conduct of the
British

British and Portuguese troops, having received the periodical papers which contained the charges against the army. He says, then, that he could wish to be able to adopt other means to vindicate the officers implicated; but as he has them not, he must make use of those in his power. He begins with the charge, in which it is imputed to lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham, that he intended to burn the town. The charge is reduced to this, that the town of St. Sebastian was ill-treated on account of its anterior and exclusive commerce with the French nation, to the disadvantage of Great Britain; a charge which cannot be made against the soldiers, who cannot be supposed to have had any idea, or, at least, to have reflected much on what happened before the attack of the place: and, therefore, that infamous imputation must fall exclusively on the principal officers, who, from motives not of commercial policy, but of commercial vengeance, are supposed to have so far forgotten their duty as to have given orders for, or permitted the sacking of that unfortunate town; thus risking the loss of all they had acquired by their fatigues and gallantry. It is not necessary, therefore, to say that this charge is evidently false. He proceeds, with just indignation, to vindicate the general and officers of the army, against the accusation which attributes to them the design of plundering and burning the city. "Every thing possible," says he, "was done to preserve it, though many pressed me strongly to bombard it, as the most certain means of forcing the enemy to abandon it. I constantly refused, for the same reasons I did at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz; and if I had entertained the infamous desire of destroying St. Sebastian from mercantile vengeance, or any other similar motive, I certainly could not have taken a more effectual method than to have permitted it to be bombarded. It is not certain that the city was set fire to by either the English or Portuguese troops; but to have done so was a part of the defence of the enemy. They set it on fire on the 22d of July, before the first attack for the assault; and it is certain that the fire was so violent on the 24th, that it was necessary to suspend the assault intended for that day, and that it afterwards failed. I was at the siege of St. Sebastian on the 30th of August, and I assert, that the city was then on fire, and that it was certain that it had been set on fire by the enemy; for, I repeat, that our batteries, by express orders, had thrown no bombs into the place, which I saw burning on the morning of the 31st, before the assault. It was likewise known that the enemy had prepared for a serious resistance, not only on the ramparts, but in the streets of the city, filling them in various places with combustibles ready to be set
fire

fire to and explode. It is also known, that the fighting in the streets between the besiegers and the enemy was terrible; and that the combustibles collected in them being set fire to, killed a great number on both sides when they exploded, and set many buildings in flames." He adds, "that the fire was the greatest misfortune that could happen to the assailants, and that they did every thing in their power to extinguish it; and that from the difficulty and danger of the communication through the fire with the advanced posts in the city, it was found necessary to call them all in. With respect to the sacking of the city by the soldiers, he says, "I am the first to confess it, because I know that it is true; and I must add, that it has fallen to my lot to take many cities by assault, and I never saw nor heard of any taken in that manner by any troops whatever, without being sacked; it is one of the pernicious consequences which attends the necessity of an assault,—a necessity which every officer laments, not only from the mischiefs which it occasions to the unfortunate inhabitants, but from the relaxations of discipline, and the risk which is run of losing all the advantages of victory in the very moment in which it is gained."

"He then proceeds to complain, that it is hard that he and his officers should be treated in the manner they have been by the author of this groundless libel, only because an unavoidable evil had happened in the discharge of a great service, and the acquisition of a great advantage; since, notwithstanding he is convinced that it was impossible to hinder the sacking of a city in such circumstances, he can prove that the utmost care was taken to prevent it, had it been possible. The most positive orders were given to that effect, and had it not been for the fire, which certainly increased the confusion, and the number of officers who fell, or were wounded in the assault or the breach, amounting to one hundred and seventy out of two hundred and fifty, it would have been in a great measure, though not entirely, prevented. One of the grounds of the complaint, which is, that sentinels were placed in all the houses, shews the wish of the officers to maintain order; for these sentinels must have been placed there by order of the officers; and unless it is supposed that the officers intended that the city should be sacked and burnt, and placed the sentinels there for that purpose, the propriety of placing them must necessarily be admitted. Unfortunately, it happened that the troops which made the assault on the city could not be relieved till the 2d, instead of its being done immediately after they had obtained possession of the place. It is to be observed, that the authors of the complaints forget that on the 31st of August, when the assault

was made, the whole left of the army was attacked; and they would have received no thanks for having successfully performed their duty on this occasion, if they had risked the blockade of Pampeluna, and the loss of the battle of the 31st, as would have been requisite, had troops been kept in readiness to relieve those that assaulted St. Sebastian's in order that its inhabitants might have suffered less from their disorders.

“ With respect to the injuries done to the inhabitants by the soldiers with their fire-arms and bayonets, in return for their plaudits and *vivats*, it appears very extraordinary, that it should not occur to these complainants, that these injuries, if they were real, happened rather from accident during the contest in the streets, than deliberately.” As to the charge of lenity to the enemy's garrison, he admits that it is well founded; but observes, “ that notwithstanding the French decree, that all the troops of an enemy found in a town taken by assault, should be put to the sword, it would be difficult to prevent British officers and soldiers from treating with lenity an enemy who had surrendered.”

“ The duke of Ciudad Rodrigo adds, “ that he could have wished that a person so respectable, and of so high a character as Sir Thomas Graham, should not have been charged with not having applied for assistance to extinguish the flames till the city was entirely consumed, giving occasions to infer, that he desired its destruction. Every thing was certainly done by the British troops to extinguish the fire; and the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo himself applied for every assistance, not only to extinguish the flames, but to bury the dead around the city, and on the ramparts, which had not been done before, because the necessity of it had not been so well known.”

“ I,” says he, “ certainly lament the evils suffered by the inhabitants of this unfortunate city, who with reason complain of their fate, and deserve to be assisted by the government.” He concludes by saying, that many of the offending soldiers have been punished, but he cannot say at present how many

“ In a postscript, he adds, that he had forgotten to say, that in the relation to the French government of the assault of St. Sebastian, general Rey states, that when the assault began, the city was on fire in six different places: “ I therefore believe, that as it is known that many houses took fire by the different explosions, and during that contest in the city, it will be admitted that it was not set on fire by the British soldiers.”

“ The Regency of the kingdom hasten to publish this explanation of the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, to remove the unfavourable impressions which may have been made by the false or exaggerated relations published by the indiscreet zeal, the ignorance, or the malignity of some periodical writers, who unjustly endeavour to degrade the noble and generous conduct of the distinguished chiefs of the allied army.”

Thus are we happy to perceive that the marquis of Wellington did every thing in his power to discover the authors of the enormities committed at St. Sebastian's, and that he brought to punishment those who were concerned.

We must now turn our attention from the series of success which the allied armies had been accustomed to obtain, and give an account of the defeat of the Alicant army under lord William Bentinck, by marshal Suchet, duke of Albufera. The following is the British governments' description of this affair:

“ War Department, Oct. 6.

“ Dispatches have been received from field marshal the marquis of Wellington, dated the 27th ult. enclosing reports from lord William Bentinck of the 15th and 17th of September.

“ From thence it appears that the enemy, having collected a very considerable force in front of his lordship's army, made an attack early on the morning of the 13th ult. upon the advanced guard posted at the pass of Ordal.

“ The advance consisted of the second battalion of the twenty-seventh regiment, the Calabrian free corps, four rifle companies of the king's German legion, a brigade of Portuguese artillery, amounting altogether to one thousand one hundred men, and three Spanish regiments, who, for several hours, made a most gallant and successful resistance; but being overpowered by the numbers opposed to them, were forced to give way. The loss sustained will, it is believed, not prove ultimately very considerable, as many of those men who had been compelled to shelter themselves in the mountains, had since rejoined the army. The rapid advance of the enemy rendered it necessary to abandon two field-pieces and two mountain guns.

“ On the the 11th, lord W. Bentinck deemed it advisable to retire the army to Vendrells, and from thence to the neighbourhood of Tarragona. The retreat was effected

without any loss, notwithstanding the attempts of the enemy's superior cavalry, which were uniformly repulsed by the charges made by the twentieth light dragoons and the hussars of the king's German legion. The enemy, finding that no impression could be made, retired on the 17th behind the Llobregat."

Such is the meagre account which the British ministry thought fit to publish of the defeat of the Anglo-Spanish army, under the command of lord William Bentinck; but since, by its unexampled brevity, it cannot be supposed to convey a fair and impartial description of that defeat, we shall, that the reader may be enabled to develop the extent of this affair, insert a translation of the French account, from a letter by the marshal the duke of Albufera to his excellency the minister at war, as follows:

“ *Villa Franca, Sept. 16, 1813.*

“ Monseigneur.—In the beginning of September, lord Bentinck, removing from the sea and the banks of the Ebro, established the Anglo-Spanish army at Villa Franca, occupying the Col d'Ordal, forming magazines at Villa Nova, and making the corps d'armée of general Copons, and Whittingham and Sarsfield's divisions, manœuvre upon the Upper Llobregat, towards Manresa, Esperaguera, and Martovell. The collecting of thirty pieces of cannon at one march from my line, all those dispositions and manœuvres in formation, announced to me a speedy attack. I resolved to anticipate it, and prevent my movements from being pressed and cramped to the gates of Barcelona.

“ On the 12th, the army of Arragon was assembled upon the Llobregat, whilst the general in chief, count Decaen, on my invitation, brought part of the army of Catalonia. I ordered him to restrain and keep from my right general Copons' troops; afterwards to march to Saint Saturni upon Villa Franca, and co-operate in my attack by the high road.

“ At eight in the evening, I passed the bridge of Molins-del-Rey, with a fine clear moon, which favoured my march; and Harispe's division, which led, marched upon Ordal.

“ That position, very difficult and very rugged, at which one can only arrive after passing a defile of three leagues, was occupied by an advanced guard of nine thousand eight hundred men, under the orders of general Frederick Adam, composed of English troops, Calabrians, and the picked men from Sarsfield's division.

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" The general-in-chief lord Bentinck had arrived there the same evening, with admiral Hallowell, either to prepare his dispositions for a speedy attack, or upon some advice of my movement, to reinforce the defence of that important point: the infantry in position was supported by cannon, and a reserve of cavalry.

" On the first musket-shots, general Meselop, commanding the advanced guard, briskly pushed forward the voltigeurs of the seventh of the line, overthrew the posts, and formed his brigade in front of the redoubts. The enemy's cavalry were seen descending in columns upon the road, with the intention of repulsing what they undoubtedly took for a reconnoissance; but our light artillery quickly made them disappear, and the voltigeurs rushed upon the mountain. The vivacity and extent of the fire which the enemy immediately commenced along his whole front shewed us his force. General Meselop ordered the first battalion of the seventh to advance, which he quickly supported himself with the second, whilst the forty-fourth on its side mounted the redoubts; he re-formed,—he repulsed the tirailleurs,—and, sword in hand, at the head of his column, directed the charge to be beat, and the enemy's first position to be carried by force.

" A most obstinate combat took place upon this point: the enemy in a rage, and with great cries, twice returned, with fresh reserves to obtain possession of it, and was again twice driven to his second position, from whence he crushed us with his fire.

" Our infantry, accustomed to assaults, knew how to rally, and return to the charge with constancy; a platoon of sappers, which had marched with the advanced guard, covered itself with glory: the chief of battalion Feuchere, of the forty-fourth, was wounded in leading his troop: I ordered Herbert's division to advance, which I formed on the left of the road, whilst general Harispe marched, with his reserve, the one hundred and sixteenth regiment of the line, to the support of the first brigade. A last general effort was combined, and the second battalion of the one hundred and sixteenth was ordered to the left to turn the second redoubt. Its commandant Bugeaud, executed the movement with equal skill and vigour: Meselop's brigade rushed forward at the same time with irresistible fury, and we every where remained masters of the field of battle. It was in an instant covered with killed and wounded; the Spaniards and Calabrians fled in disorder by the woods and mountains.

" As soon as the troops were rallied, I made general Delort, commanding the cavalry, advance to follow the English,

who precipitately retired by the high road. I hoped to reach their artillery, which they had succeeded in putting in retreat. The fourth hussars defeated the Brunswick hussars, and notwithstanding some discharges from infantry, succeeded in taking four pieces of English cannon, which they brought me with their horses, and two caissons: and also took much baggage and three hundred prisoners, to add to one thousand two hundred killed and wounded. The English twenty-seventh regiment of the line was almost destroyed; its colonel and general Frederick Adam, aid de-camp to the prince regent, were wounded; a great number of officers fell in the action: our loss was very trifling in comparison.

“ A part of the garrison of Barcelona, commanded by general Maurice Mathieu, and a division of the army of Catalonia, with four Italian battalions, had marched, during the night, under the orders of the general in chief Decaen, to pass the Llobregat and the Noya. Before arriving at Martoreil, general Mathieu had to fight and dislodge three of Erolles' battalions in very difficult positions. In the evening he made some prisoners, and again set out for Saint Estevan and Saint Saturni. In the morning, he saw Monso's corps and some Calabrians in order of battle; he ordered them to be attacked by general Ordonneau, who, with some horse, and only his advanced guard of the eighteenth light, under the orders of the chief of battalion Pellegrin, overthrew the two first battalions. The enemy dispersed, leaving thirty prisoners, and fifty killed or wounded. The general in chief, Decaen, followed general M. Mathieu with all possible rapidity; but in consequence of the infinite difficulties, after a very long march, by roads the most impracticable, the cavalry, and even the infantry, only being able to advance one by one, at a distance, day advanced before they were able to take a position at Saint Saturni.

“ The attack of the Col d'Ordal, which did not finish till two in the morning, by slackening the march of the army of Arragon, favoured my design for the remainder of the day. The infantry followed at the break of day. General Delort, who marched in advance the cavalry, and the battalion of the commander Bugeaud: I ordered him to halt a league on this side of Villa Franca, behind the heights, from whence the enemy's army was discovered in order of battle in three lines. A great ravine, the road, and a bridge intersected, covered the front; his left approached the village of St. Cugat, in which our tirailleurs anticipated him. I had for an instant a hope that this army deployed, would have given time for our movement being completed; but lord William Bentinck, no doubt aware of what there was dangerous in his position, only wished

wished to make an appearance for a moment ; he broke up, and made a passage by lines. The retreat immediately commenced, in good order, for Villa Franca. I made the artillery and cavalry advance ; the cannon quickly caused some disorder in the enemy's columns.

“ Whilst we passed the ravine, and my infantry debouched to follow without delay, the movement, the enemy left Villa Franca, and reformed in the rear. With an honourable confidence, which was not deceived, all the inhabitants remained in their houses, and saw their property and their persons respected, in the midst of one of the most lively actions. The cavalry began reaching the rear-guard on leaving the town ; colonel Christophe, at the head of the hussars, and a squadron of cuirassiers, briskly pressed upon what the cannon had disordered ; a fire from infantry in ambush, and the Brunswick hussars covered the enemy's movement ; charges were made on both sides with great vigour. The brigade of the twenty-fourth dragoons, and the Westphalian light horse manœuvred at the same time upon the right ; General Meyer who conducted it, met the twentieth English light horse, and some black hussars : he charged them with two squadrons. The first at the head of the troop, he found himself opposed to colonel Bentinck, commanding the enemy's cavalry ; they exchanged several sabre cuts.

“ Whilst thus mixed, a battalion concealed in some woods and vineyards, suddenly opened a most lively fire ; the remainder of the twenty-fourth dragoons proceeded, followed by the battalion commanded by M. Bugeaud, which all the day formed the advanced guard of the army. The enemy, by favour of this last effort, passed a second ravine, and burnt the bridge upon the road, leaving more than one hundred and fifty horses taken, and a still greater number of men killed, wounded, or prisoners. The black, or duke of Brunswick's hussars, have particularly suffered in these last engagements ; from that moment deserters have arrived in considerable numbers. The English army occupied for a moment the position of Arbos and of La Vendrill, from whence it gained in the night the Allafulla road, which is a continual defile upon the sea-coast. It appears it is going to take a position towards Cambrils and Hospitallet : the sick have been withdrawn from Tarragona, and the whole fleet has presented itself to cover the retreat. We have pushed forward to Vendrill, where I have established General Meyer with an advanced guard. A part of the Spaniards having retired upon the road to Igualada, the Westphalian light horse charged them with their usual bravery, and brought back some men
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and horses belonging to the Mancha dragoons, a troop perfectly well mounted, and of good appearance.

“General Bentinck, on the 15th, asked me, by writing, permission to pay the last honours to the captain of dragoons, Hanson, a man of the greatest distinction for valour; I hastened to permit that an English officer should assist at them.

“The enemy has lost more than three thousand five hundred men, not only in killed and wounded, but in prisoners and deserters, without including the loss of his baggage and artillery. The troops which have fought, merit the greatest eulogiums: the artillery served with the greatest distinction, and every arm evinced an unbounded ardour and devotion. I pray your Excellency to receive the list of the different soldiers who have deserved rewards, and to submit it to his majesty.

(Signed) “The marshal duke of ALBUFERA.

“P. S. All the accounts which I receive from the fortresses of Denia, Sagunto, Peniscola, Morella, Lerida, Tortosa, and Mequinenza, are satisfactory; the garrisons in them are in good condition; they have beaten the enemy whenever he has made movements too near them.

“General baron Robert, who commands at Tortosa, has burnt all the boats they had collected upon the Lower Ebro, and gained brilliant advantages.”

By the English account of this unfortunate affair, it appears that lord William Bentinck had only eleven hundred men, and three Spanish regiments; but marshal Suchet tells his government that the advanced guard only of the allies amounted to nine thousand men; that the allies lost upwards of three thousand five hundred men in killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters; and that he took the baggage and artillery from their army. Without doubt, both these accounts are defective, but it is impossible for us to state the exact truth: we can, however, have no hesitation in saying, that part of the truth only has been published by the English ministry, and that the French account has the appearance of exaggeration. But it is certain that lord William Bentinck, after his defeat, embarked for Sicily on the 22d of September.

From this disastrous affair, however, we have to direct our attention to a dispatch from field-marshal

the marquis of Wellington, dated Lezaca, October 9, in which his lordship informs us of his entry with the allied forces into the territories of France. On the morning of the 18th of October, captain the earl of March, arrived with a dispatch from the noble marquis, addressed to earl Bathurst, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, of which the following is a copy :

“ MY LORD,

Lezaca, October 9.

“ Having deemed it expedient to cross the Bidassoa with the left of the army, I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that that object was effected on the 7th instant.

“ Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham directed the first and fifth divisions, and the first Portuguese brigade, under Brigadier General Wilson, to cross that river in three columns below, and in one above the site of the bridge, under the command of major-general Hay, the honourable colonel Greville, major-general the honourable Edward Stopford, and major-general Howard; and lieutenant-general Don Manuel Freyre, directed that part of the sixth Spanish army, under his immediate command, to cross in three columns, at fords above those at which the allied British and Portuguese troops passed. The former were destined to carry the enemy's entrenchments about and above Andaye, while the latter should carry those on the Montagne Verte and on the height of Mandale, by which they were to turn the enemy's left.

“ The operations of both bodies of troops succeeded in every point. The British and Portuguese troops took seven pieces of cannon in the redoubts and batteries which they carried, and the Spanish troops one piece of cannon in those by them.

“ I had particular satisfaction in observing the steadiness and gallantry of all the troops. The ninth British regiment were very strongly opposed, charged with bayonets more than once, and have suffered; but I am happy to add, that in other parts of these corps our loss has not been severe.

“ The Spanish troops under lieutenant-general Don Manuel Freyre behaved admirably, and turned and carried the enemy's entrenchments in the hill, with great dexterity and gallantry; and I am much indebted to the lieutenant-general, and to lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham, and to the general and staff-officers of both corps, for the execution of the arrangements for this operation.

“ Lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham having thus
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established, within the French territory, the troops of the allied British and Portuguese army, which had been so frequently distinguished under his command, resigned the command to lieutenant-general Sir John Hope, who had arrived from Ireland the preceding day.

“ While this was going on upon the left, major-general C. Baron Alten attacked, with the light division, the enemy’s entrenchments in the Puerto de Vera, supported by the Spanish division under brigadier-general Longa ; and the mareschal del campo Don Pedro Giron attacked the enemy’s entrenchments and posts on the mountain, called La Rhune immediately on the right of the light division, with the army of reserve of Andalusia.

“ Colonel Colborne, of the fifty-second regiment, who commanded major general Skerret’s brigade, in the absence of the major-general, on account of his health, attacked the enemy’s right in a camp which they had strongly entrenched ; and the fifty-second regiment, under the command of Major Mein, charged in a most gallant style, and carried the entrenchment with the bayonet. The first and third Caçadores, and the second battalion ninety-fifth regiment, as well as the fifty-second, distinguished themselves in this attack.

“ Major-general Kempt’s brigade attacked by the Puerto where the opposition was not so severe ; and major-general, Charles Alten has reported his sense of the judgement displayed both by the major-general and by colonel Colborne in these attacks ; and I am particularly indebted to major-general Charles Alten for the manner in which he executed this service : the light division took twenty-two officers, and four hundred men prisoners, and three pieces of cannon.

“ These troops carried every thing before them in the most gallant style, till they arrived at the foot of the rock on which the Hermitage stands ; and they made repeated attempts to take even that post by storm ; but it was impossible to get up, and the enemy remained during the night in possession of the Hermitage, and on a rock on the same range of the mountain with the right of the Spanish troops. Some time elapsed yesterday morning before the fog cleared away sufficiently to enable me to reconnoitre the mountain, which I found to be least inaccessible by its right, and that the attack of it might be connected with advantage with the attack of the enemy’s works in front of the camp of Sarre. I accordingly ordered the army of reserve to concentrate to their right ; and as soon as the concentration commenced, mareschal del Campo Don Pedro Giron, ordered the battalion de las Ordenes to attack the enemy’s post on the rock on the right of the position occupied by his troops, which was instantly carried in the
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most gallant style. Those troops followed up their success, and carried an entrenchment on a hill, which protected the right of the camp of Sarre, and the enemy immediately evacuated all their works, to defend the approaches to the camp, which were taken possession of by the detachments sent from the seventh division, sent by lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie, through the Puerto de Eschalar, for this purpose.

“ Don P. Giron then established a battalion on the enemy’s left, on the rock of the Hermitage. It was too late to proceed farther last night, and the enemy withdrew from their post at the Hermitage, and from the camp of Sarre during the night.

“ It gives me singular satisfaction to report the good conduct of the officers and troops of the army of reserve of Andalusia, as well in the operations of the 7th inst., as in those of yesterday. The attack was made by the battalion of Las Ordenes, under the command of colonel Hore yesterday, and made in as good order, and with as much spirit, as any that I have seen made by any troops! and I was much satisfied with the spirit and discipline of the whole of this corps.

“ I cannot applaud too highly the execution of the arrangements for the attacks, by the *mareschal del campo* Don Pedro Giron, and the general and staff-officers under his directions.

“ I omitted to report to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 4th instant, that upon my way to Roncesvalles, on the 1st instant, I directed brigadier-general Campbell to endeavour to carry off the enemy’s pickets in his front, which he attacked on that night, and completely succeeded, with the Portuguese troops under his command, in carrying the whole of one picket, consisting of seventy men; a fortified post on the mountain of Arolla was likewise stormed, and the whole garrison put to the sword.

“ Since I addressed your lordship last, I have received dispatches from lieutenant-general Clinton, in Catalonia, to the 3d instant. The general was still at Tarragona, and the enemy were in their old position on the Llobregat.

“ Lieutenant-general lord William Bentinck had embarked for Sicily on the 22d of September.

“ I send this dispatch by my aid-de-camp, captain the earl of March, whom I beg to recommend to your lordship’s protection.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “ WELLINGTON.

“ I inclose a return of the loss incurred in the late operations; and a return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army under lieutenant-general lord William Bentinck, in the affairs at Ordal, on the 12th and 13th ultimo.

“ Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of his Excellency Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K. G. in the Passage of the Bidassoa, and forcing the Enemy's Lines, on the 7th and 9th October, 1813.

“ Total British loss.—One captain, three lieutenants, five serjeants, one drummer, sixty-nine rank and file, killed ; one major, twelve captains, twenty-two lieutenants, four ensigns, one staff, thirty-eight serjeants, three drummers, four hundred and nineteen rank and file, wounded ; five rank and file missing.

“ Total Portuguese loss.—One lieutenant-colonel, one captain, one lieutenant, two ensigns, two serjeants, forty-one rank and file, killed ; one major, one captain, two lieutenants, seven ensigns, fifteen serjeants, one drummer, one hundred and fifty-two rank and file, wounded ; eight rank and file, missing.

“ General total.—One lieutenant-colonel, two captains, four lieutenants, two ensigns, seven serjeants, one drummer, one hundred and ten rank and file, killed ; two majors, thirteen captains, twenty-four lieutenants, eleven ensigns, one staff, forty-eight serjeants, four drummers, five hundred and seventy-one rank and file, wounded ; thirteen rank and file, missing.

“ Accurate returns have not been received of the Spanish loss, but it is estimated at seven hundred and fifty killed, wounded, and missing.

(Signed) “ E. M. PAKENHAM, Adj.-Gen.”

Thus by the marquis of Wellington's dispatch it appears that the allied forces entered the French territory. It is, therefore, now upwards of two hundred and sixty years, reckoning from the loss of Calais, since the British, with hostile intent, occupied a portion of ground in what may be called Old France. By Old France we mean France as it was before the accession of the great feudatories of Burgundy, Brittany, &c. to its domain. The singularity of this event naturally called forth in the minds of the English a number of speculations as to its consequences. The triumphs of Poitiers—of Cressy—and of Azincour—were called to recollection, and once more fondly anticipated ; for, under lord Wellington, in the idea of such speculatists, nothing appeared too difficult to be achieved, nor any thing too sanguine
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to be expected. But although we esteem the marquis of Wellington to be one of the greatest generals this country ever produced, yet we cannot suppose, at present, that England is to France what she was in the days of our Edwards and our Henries.

It is very significantly and truly observed by Mons. Mirabeau, that "words are things," and every person must be acquainted with the impassioned influence which words dexterously applied will produce. History is full of examples; but while history furnishes us with the facts, it also supplies us with the comment. It is now exultingly asserted that lord Wellington has entered France: truly he has, and we rejoice at the event; not only as it is honourable to ourselves, but as it exhibits a more interesting truth, the Spaniards have at length roused themselves in earnest to the conflict. Like the rest of our countrymen, we hope every thing from the talents and exertions of the noble marquis; but still we are apprehensive that this invasion of France may accomplish for Napoleon an advantage which may counterbalance the evil. We do not apprehend, that the progress of the allies can be very rapid in the enemy's territory: we have seen in other countries what invasions have produced; and though we have no doubt the marquis of Wellington will do every thing in his power to assist the cause in which he is engaged, yet on the present occasion a few observations are naturally requisite. The invasion of Spain by the French forces awoke the Spanish people from that death-like slumber in which they were before plunged, and to punish the French for the invasion of their country, we now see them triumphantly treading the soil of France. It was invasion that called forth the desperate heroism of the Russian nation, which made her hordes throng to battle in the heart of their country, till at length we see the invader repelled, and the war which was kindled by his ambition raging beyond his controul. In the revolutionary war, it was invasion, and the threat of invasion, that fired with one common feel-

ing of indignant hostility the unarmed, the undisciplined, the almost unclothed population of France: her armies first fought for safety, and afterwards for conquest. Confederated Europe roused the power which successively beat down that confederation, and for a time established its own dominion on the ruin it had accomplished. And we all know what the menace of invasion produced in this country in 1803.

The history of mankind proclaims in every page this eternal truth, that nations, as well as individuals, abhor the violence of aggression; and we must suppose France sunk beneath the ordinary level of human nature, if we believe that she cannot be quickened into active enthusiasm by the approach of visible and imminent peril. Wars that are merely political are, to the mass of any nation, matters of remote interest; but when they are brought home to our doors, they change their character at once, and every man is interested in their progress. In the moment of alarm, the people of France, we may readily imagine, will not pause to remember by what series of events they have been brought into their perilous situation; they will not, while their lands are in danger of devastation, their property of plunder, their houses of violation, stop to upbraid their ruler with his ambition or his crimes: they will rally round his standard, in the hour of battle, the difference between the soldier who fights for his hire, and he who contends for his home, may be easily appreciated.

And that the French are gaining strength in the south of France is very evident from the bulletin which was issued by the English government, which states, that on the night of the 12th of October, the French attacked and carried the redoubt in the camp of Sarre, and made one hundred and forty prisoners, and that on the morning of the 13th, the enemy made an attack on the advanced posts of the army of Andalusia. The same bulletin likewise asserts, that the French army had been considerably reinforced by bodies of recruits raised by the recent conscriptions.

tions*. Of this, however, we shall have occasion to speak more fully hereafter.

But to return. About a week, (says an officer who was an eye witness of the fact, and who has favoured us with the account) before marshal Soult made his last attack on our position in the Pyrennees†, in which he was completely repulsed, we observed conscripts daily arriving by hundreds, in coloured clothes: these men were then taken to the river between the two armies, washed, and then dressed in regimentals: they immediately proceeded to be drilled, and practised in firing. With these raw soldiers, after the short period mentioned, the assault on the lines was made, and the marshal was distinctly seen, in person, rallying them on, until they plainly refused to advance. The retreat commenced accordingly. It is to be observed, that it was in this attack the Spaniards alone repulsed the assailants.

We have likewise been favoured with a letter, dated Left Column, Camp near Andaye in France, Oct. 9, 1813, from which the following passage is an extract: "The passage of the Bidassoa was one of the most gallant feats, and one of the finest sights ever seen. The allied forces entered the stream at the different fords assigned to them, with their muskets slung at their backs, regardless of a galling fire of musketry, with which the enemy peppered them all the time; and in return only looking up occasionally at the Frenchmen, when the bullets rippled the waters near them, with the most perfect contempt and coolness, saying, in a good-humoured way, among themselves, 'only wait a little while, good friends, and we will be with you presently.' In this manner, holding each other's hands, to make their footing more secure, they made their way through the waters, which were almost breast high, till they gained

* This conscription was for two hundred and eighty thousand men, which it seems was readily obeyed.

† See an account of the Pyrenean mountains in the Introduction, above, p. 13.

the French bank, where they formed themselves with astonishing quickness, and with the utmost order, as fast as they came up, without waiting for any word of command; and as soon as they were formed moved forward to the several points of attack, which they carried in the most gallant style. Soult, who commanded the French on this occasion, was very conspicuous, being splendidly dressed and mounted, and decorated with all his orders. He was extremely active, but all to no purpose. All that he or his men could do had not the least effect in keeping back ours. Lord Wellington, who attended merely as a spectator, to see the execution of his orders under the direction of general Graham, was dressed in a plain brown great coat. He had the gratification of seeing every thing done to his utmost wishes, without finding it necessary in the least degree to interfere personally. He wished to let Sir Thomas Graham*, whose services had been so great at St. Sebastian, have all the credit of fixing the British standard on French ground."

The marquis of Wellington continued amazingly active, with the forces under his command, but being now on the French side of the Bidassoa, the French general was likewise on the alert; and by the marquis's dispatch, which is dated Vera, October 18, 1813, it appears, that the enemy moved general Paris's division from Oleron to the neighbourhood of St. Jean de Pie de Port, as soon as the left of the allies made its movement on the 7th instant.

On the night of the 12th the enemy attacked and carried the redoubt in the camp of Sarre, which was

* Lieutenant-general Sir Thomas Graham, after having established himself in France, returned to England on account of ill-health, and was succeeded in his command by Sir John Hope, whose expedition to the army was extraordinary; for he dined at Dublin on the 25th of September, sailed from Cork on the 27th, arrived at Corunna on the 2nd of October, joined the head quarters on the 3rd, and tasted victory on French ground on the 7th. Sir Thomas Graham brought to England with him the French flag which was hoisted at the castle of St. Sebastian.

held by a picket of forty men of the army of reserve of Andalusia, who were taken, as well as one hundred pioneers. There is reason to believe that they were surprised, as the reserve for the support of the redoubt had not time to give the picket assistance. This redoubt was certainly more distant from the line, and from the ground from which it could be supported, than lord Wellington had imagined it to be when he directed that it should be occupied; and as it was so near to the houses of the village of Sarre as always to be liable to an attack by surprise, he therefore did not allow it to be re-occupied. After having possession of the redoubt, the enemy made an attack on the morning of the 13th, upon the advanced posts of the army of Andalusia, under the command of Marischal del Campo Don Pedro Giron, with a view to regain possession of those works which they had lost on the 8th, which they constructed in front of the camp of Sarre. It was at first imagined and reported, that the real attack was on the side of the Hermitage of La Rhume, but it was confined entirely to the advanced posts of the army of Andalusia, and was repulsed by them without difficulty.

“ I had every reason,” says the noble marquis, “ to be satisfied with the conduct of Marischal del Campo Don P. Giron, and the general staff and other officers, and the soldiers under his command upon this occasion. I had again occasion to observe particularly the steadiness of the regiment of Ordenes, under the command of colonel Hore. Nothing of importance has occurred on any part of the line, but it appears that the enemy have been reinforced by considerable bodies of recruits, raised by the recent conscriptions.” His lordship concludes his dispatch by saying, that he had received no reports from Catalonia since he sent his last dispatch.

The attention of the marquis of Wellington was now turned towards Pampeluna, and from the distressed state of the garrison, it was expected that it could not be long before it surrendered to the allies.

So

So great, indeed, were the distresses of the town, that it was confidently asserted, that the governor of Pampeluna sent a messenger to the Spanish army, demanding food for their countrymen within the walls, saying, "that they had no more than sufficient to serve them to the 25th of October." This request was refused, and the governor was informed, that a French soldier should be put to death for every native who might die of famine after the 26th, if the garrison had rations. On the reply being communicated to the governor, a second messenger was dispatched, who was sent by the Spanish commander to lord Wellington, and the dispatch from his Lordship, to earl Bathurst, dated Vera, November 1, announces the surrender of that important fortress; from which we shall take the following extracts:

" Vera, Nov. 1, 1813.

" Nothing of importance has occurred in the line since I addressed your lordship last.

" The enemy's garrison of Pampeluna made proposals to Don Carlos de Espana, to surrender the place on the 26th of October, on condition, first, that they should be allowed to march to France with six pieces of cannon; secondly, that they should be allowed to march to France under an engagement not to serve against the allies for a year and a day. Both these conditions were rejected by Don Carlos de Espana, and they were told that he had orders not to give them a capitulation on any terms excepting that they should be prisoners of war; to which they declared they would never submit."

" Vera, Nov. 1, 1813.

" Since I wrote to your lordship this morning, I have received a letter, of which I enclose a copy, from marischal del campo, Don Carlos de Espana, in which he announces the surrender by capitulation of the fortress of Pampeluna, the garrison being prisoners of war; upon which event I beg leave to congratulate your lordship.

" I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of Don Carlos de Espana, and that of the troops under his command, during the period that he has commanded the blockade, that is, since the beginning of August.

" In every sortie which the enemy have made, they have been repulsed with loss, and the general and the troops have,

on every occasion conducted themselves well. Don Carlos de Espana was severely wounded on the 10th of September, as reported in my dispatch of the 19th of that month; but having reported that he was able to continue to perform his duty, I considered it but justice to allow him to continue in a command of which he had to that moment performed the duties in so satisfactory a manner; and I am happy that it has fallen to his lot to be the instrument of restoring to the Spanish monarchy so important a fortress as that of Pampeluna.

TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER MENTIONED ABOVE.

"Most excellent Sir,—Glory be to God, and honour to the triumphs of your excellency in this ever-memorable campaign.

"I have the honour and the great satisfaction of congratulating your excellency on the surrender of the important fortress of Pampeluna, the capitulation of which having been signed by the superior officers entrusted with my powers, and by those delegated by the general commanding the place, I have, by virtue of the authority which you conferred upon me, just ratified. The garrison remain prisoners of war, as your excellency had determined from the beginning that they should, and will march out to-morrow, at two in the afternoon, in order to be conducted to the port of Passages.

"Our troops occupy one of the gates of the citadel, and those of France the place.

"May God guard the precious life of your Excellency.

"Dated from the Camp in front of
Pampeluna, 31st October, 1813.

(Signed)

"CHARLES ESPANA."

"His Excellency Field Marshal the
Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo."

Thus, after a blockade of nearly three months, the important and strong fortress of Pampeluna fell into the hands of the allies, the garrison, amounting to about four thousand men, being made prisoners of war.

A few days before Pampeluna surrendered, Don Carlos De Espana was informed by deserters that it was the intention of the French garrison to blow up the place. Don Carlos immediately, upon becoming acquainted with this intention, sent a messenger with the intelligence to the marquis of Wellington, and received instructions from his lordship to put the com-

mandant and his troops to the sword, if such were the conduct of the enemy.

When the *Voluntaire* frigate, which arrived at Portsmouth on the 11th of November, left St. Sebastian's, which was on the 6th of that month, no forward movement had taken place in our army on the frontier of France. This circumstance, however, was attributed to the weather, which had been very bad, and was supposed to have been the only cause that prevented it. Be this as it may, the intentions of the noble marquis at the head of our forces, are very properly kept within his own breast, but from the appearance of things, as suggested in a letter we received from an officer in the army, it was expected that his lordship would endeavour to take possession of St. Jean de Luz,* now occupied by the French, but where he intended to fix his head-quarters.

At the period we are now speaking of, the left of our army was under the command of Sir John Hope; the right under Sir Rowland Hill; and the centre was commanded by marshal Beresford, who had lately joined. The allied army was very strong, and in the highest order; the cavalry especially an arm of great importance to an invading force, was in perfect condition, and fit for service.

In the *London Gazette*, of the 9th of November, was inserted a letter from captain Scriven, of his majesty's schooner *Telegraph*, giving an account of a very gallant action between that vessel, and the French national brig *Flibustier*. The latter had been waiting an opportunity to steal out of St Jean de Luz for some months, and a dark and stormy night being considered to afford a favourable opportunity, she sailed at daylight on the 13th of October. She was immediately chased by the *Telegraph*, and an action took place, witnessed by several thousands of both armies, which lasted three-quarters of an hour, when the *Flibustier's* crew quitted her, and escaped on shore, after having set her on fire. The *Telegraph* did not lose a man.

* St. Jean de Luz is about ten miles south-west of Bayonne.

On Monday, the 8th of November, on the motion of earl Bathurst in the House of Lords, the thanks of the house were voted to field-marshal the marquis of Wellington. A separate motion of thanks was also made in favour of Sir Thomas Graham; and another thanking the general officers under the command of lord Wellington, the officers, British, Spanish, and Portuguese; and highly acknowledging and approving the services of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers, British, Spanish, and Portuguese. The lord Chancellor was appointed to communicate them to the noble marquis. On the same day similar motions of thanks were agreed to in the House of Commons.

The marquis of Wellington continued on the alert, and having made a favourable disposition of his forces, attacked the enemy again on the 10th of November, of which action, and its fortunate result, the following extract from his lordship's dispatch will give an ample account:

*" St. P , * Nov. 13, 1813.*

" MY LORD,—The enemy have, since the beginning of August, occupied a position with their right upon the sea, in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the left of the Nivelle, their centre on La Petite La Rhune in Sarre, and on the heights behind the village; and their left, consisting of two divisions of infantry, under the Comte D'Erl n, on the right of that river, on a strong height in rear of Anhoue, and on the mountain of Mondarin, which protected the approach to that village; they had had one division under General Foix, at St. Jean Pied de Port, which was joined by one of the army of Arragon, under General Paris, at the time the left of the allied army crossed the Bidassoa on the 7th October; General Foix's division joined those on the heights behind Anhoue, when lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill moved into the valley of Bastan.

" The enemy, not satisfied with the natural strength of this position, had the whole of it fortified, and their right, in particular, had been made so strong, that I did not deem it expedient to attack it in front.

* This place was supposed to be St. Jean Pied de Port, which is a considerable town on the river Nive, about twenty miles south-east of Bayonne, and thirty north-east of Pampeluna; but we apprehend it was only the small village of St. F , not far from St. Jean de Luz.

“ Pampeluna having been surrendered on the 31st of October, and the right of the army having been disengaged from covering the blockade of that place, I moved Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill, on the 6th and 7th, into the valley of Bastan, as soon as the state of the roads, after the recent rains, would permit, intending to attack the enemy on the 8th instant; but the rain which fell on the 7th instant having again rendered the roads impracticable, I was obliged to defer the attack till the 10th; when we completely succeeded in carrying all the positions on the enemy's left and centre, in separating the former from the latter, and by these means turning the enemy's strong positions occupied by their right on the Lower Nivelle, which they were obliged to evacuate during the night, having taken fifty-one pieces of cannon, and fourteen hundred prisoners.

“ The object of the attack being to force the enemy's centre and to establish our army in rear of their right, the attack was made in columns of division, each led by the general officer commanding it, and each forming its own reserve. Lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill directed the movement of the right, consisting of the second division, under lieutenant-general the honourable Sir William Stewart, the sixth division, under lieutenant-general Sir H. Clinton, a Portuguese division, under lieutenant-general Sir John Hamilton, and a Spanish division, under general Morillo, and colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry, and a brigade of Portuguese artillery, under lieutenant-colonel Tulloh, and three mountain guns, under lieutenant Robe, which attacked the positions of the enemy behind Anhoue.

“ Marshal Sir William Beresford directed the movements of the right of the centre, consisting of the third division under major-general the honourable Charles Colville, the seventh division under marischal del campo Le Cor, and the fourth division under lieutenant-general the honourable Sir Lowry Cole. The latter attacked the redoubts in front of Sarre, that village and the heights behind it, supported on their left by the army of reserve of Andalusia, under the command of the marischal del campo Don Pedro Giron, which attacked the enemy's positions on their right of Sarre, on the slopes of La Petite La Rhune, and the heights beyond the village, on the left of the fourth division. Major-general Charles Baron Alten, attacked with the light division and general Louga's Spanish division, the enemy's positions on La Petite La Rhune, and having carried them, co-operated with the right of the centre on the attack of the heights behind Sarre.

“ General Alten's brigade of cavalry, under the direction of lieutenant-general Sir Stapleton Cotton, followed the movements

movements of the centre, and there were three brigades of British artillery with this part of the army, and three mountain guns with general Giron, and three with major-general Charles Alten.

“ Lieutenant-general Don Manuel Freyre moved, in two columns, from the heights of Mandale towards Ascain, in order to take advantage of any movements the enemy might make from the right of his position towards his centre; and lieutenant-general Sir John Hope, with the left of the army, drove in the enemy's outposts in front of their entrenchments on the Lower Nivelles, carried the redoubt above Orogne, and established himself on the heights immediately opposite Sibour, in readiness to take advantage of any movement made by the enemy's right.

“ The attack began at daylight, and lieutenant-general the honourable Sir Lowry Cole having obliged the enemy to evacuate the redoubt on their right, in front of Sarre, by a cannonade, and that in front of the left of the village having been likewise evacuated on the approach of the seventh division under general Le Cor, to attack it, lieutenant-general Sir Lowry Cole attacked and possessed himself of the village, which was turned, on its left, by the third division, under major-general the honourable Charles Colville, and on its right by the reserve of Andalusia, under Don Pedro Giron, and major-general Charles Baron Alten carried the positions of La Petite La Rhune.

“ The whole then co-operated in the attack of the enemy's main position behind the village. The third and seventh divisions immediately carried the redoubts on the left of the enemy's centre, and the light division those on the right, while the fourth division, with the reserve of Andalusia on the left, attacked their positions in their centre. By these attacks, the enemy were obliged to abandon their strong positions, which they had fortified with much care and labour; and they left in the principal redoubt on the height, the first battalion eighty-eighth regiment, which immediately surrendered.

“ While these operations were going on in the centre I had the pleasure of seeing the sixth division, under lieutenant-general Sir Henry Clinton, after having crossed the Nivelles, and having driven in the enemy's pickets on both banks, and having covered the passage of the Portuguese division, under lieutenant-general Sir John Hamilton, on its right, make a most handsome attack upon the right of the enemy's position behind Anhone, and on the right of the Nivelles, and carry all the intrenchments, and the redoubt on that flank, lieutenant-general Sir John Hamilton, supported with the Portuguese

Portuguese division, the sixth division on its right, and both co-operated in the attack of the second redoubt, which was immediately carried.

“ Major-general Pringle’s brigade of the second division, under lieutenant-general the honourable Sir William Stewart, drove in the enemy’s pickets on the Nivelles and in front of Anhoue, and then major-general Byng’s brigade of the second division carried the intrenchments and a redoubt further on the enemy’s left, in which attack the major-general and these troops distinguished themselves.—Major-general Morillo covered the advance of the whole to the heights behind Anhoue, by attacking the enemy’s posts on the slopes of Mondarin, and following them towards Itzatce. The troops on the heights behind Anhoue were, by these operations, under the direction of lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill, forced to retire towards the bridge of Cambo, on the Nive; with the exception of the division in Mondarin which, by the march of a part of the second division, under lieutenant-general the honourable Sir William Stewart, was pushed into the mountains towards Baygory.

“ As soon as the heights were carried on both banks of the Nivelles, I directed the third and seventh divisions, being the right of our centre, to move by the left of that river upon St. Pé, and the sixth division by the right of that river, on the same place, while the fourth and light divisions and general Giron’s reserve, held the heights above Ascain, and covered this movement on that side, and lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill covered it on the other. A part of the enemy’s troops had retired from their centre, and had crossed the Nivelles at St. Pé; and as soon as the sixth division approached the third division, under major-general the honourable Charles Colville, and the seventh division under general Le Cor, crossed that river and attacked, and immediately gained possession of the heights beyond it.

“ We were thus established in the rear of the enemy’s right; but so much of the day was now spent, that it was impossible to make any further movement; and I was obliged to defer our further operations till the following morning.

“ The enemy evacuated Ascain in the afternoon, of which village lieutenant-general Don Manuel Freyre took possession; and quitted all their works and positions in front of St. Jean de Luz during the night, and retired upon Bidart, destroying all the bridges on the Lower Nivelles. Lieutenant-general the honourable Sir John Hope followed them with the left of the army, as soon as he could cross the river; and marshal Sir William Beresford moved the centre of the army as far as the state of the roads after a violent fall of rain would

would allow; and the enemy retired again on the night of the 11th, into an entrenched camp in front of Bayonne*.

“ In the course of the operations of which I have given your lordship an outline, in which we have driven the enemy from positions which they had been fortifying with great labour and care for three months, in which we have taken fifty-one pieces of cannon, six tumbrils of ammunition, and fourteen hundred prisoners, I have great satisfaction in reporting the good conduct of all the officers and troops.

“ Our loss, although severe, has not been so great as might have been expected, considering the strength of the positions attacked, and the length of time (from daylight till dark), during which the troops were engaged: but I am concerned to add, that colonel Barnard, of the ninety-fifth, has been severely, though I hope, not dangerously wounded; and that we have lost in lieutenant-colonel Lloyd, of the ninety-fourth, an officer who had frequently distinguished himself, and was of great promise.

“ I received the greatest assistance in forming the plan for this attack, and throughout the operations, from the quartermaster general Sir George Murray, and the adjutant-general

* Bayonne is the capital of the department of the Lower Pyrennees, in France. It is the see of a bishop, and is seated three miles from the sea, at the confluence of the rivers Nive and Adour; the first washes its walls, and the second divides it into two unequal parts; an excellent harbour renders this town a place of great trade. In the suburbs of St. Esprit is a bridge leading to the smaller part of the town, called Little Bayonne, separated from the other by the Nive, by which vessels come up to the middle of the town. There are chains that shut up the avenues. The new castle that defends the harbour is seated at the mouth of the Nive, and flanked with six large round towers: near it is the college, and in the high-street of Little Bayonne the Capuchins and Dominicans have their convents. There is also a castle in Great Bayonne, which consists of four low round towers, but very thick, with ditches full of water, and the walls mounted with a great number of cannon. The fortifications of Bayonne are strong both by nature and art. Those of the latter kind were originally planned by the celebrated Marshal Boufflers, and executed under his immediate inspection. He resided at Bayonne during their progress, and one of the public walks near the city still bears his name. Many new works have been subsequently added, particularly since the year 1810, and it is now considered as one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. The Dutch take a great quantity of wine every year in exchange for spices. Bayonne is twenty-five miles S. W. of Dax, twenty-five N. E. of St. Sebastian, and four hundred and twenty-five S. by W. of Paris.

the honourable Sir Edward Pakenham; and from lieutenant-colonel lord Fitzroy Somerset, lieutenant-colonel Campbell, and all the officers of my personal staff, and his serene highness the prince of Orange.

“ The artillery which was in the field was of great use to us; and I cannot sufficiently acknowledge the intelligence and activity with which it was brought to the point of attack, under the direction of colonel Dickson, over the bad roads through the mountains, at this season of the year.

“ I am, &c.

(Signed) “ WELLINGTON.”

“ Since the returns of the enemy’s loss were received, we have taken one hundred more prisoners, and four hundred wounded.”

In the above action the British and Portuguese loss, in killed and wounded, amounted to two thousand six hundred and ninety-four officers and privates; but there is no mention of the loss sustained by the Spaniards, who co-operated with the British and Portuguese; so that the loss on the part of the allies must have been considerably greater than what has reached us. There were upwards of one hundred and fifty British and Portuguese officers killed and wounded.

As much information relative to the operations of our armies is contained in private letters from the seat of war, we select the following extract from a letter written by an officer to his relations:

“ *Head-quarters of the Allied Army in France,*
Nov. 13, 1813.

“ Lord Wellington’s grand attack upon the enemy’s second strong line of position, upon the 10th, has proved equal, in brilliant and complete success, to the former one upon the 7th ultimo. The enemy had taken considerable pains to make the village of Zaca formidable. It was covered by cannon; the avenues to the streets were blocked in, and the houses barricadoed. The British artillery soon drove them from the first redoubts, and the other positions were carried at the point of the bayonet. It is impossible to do justice to the splendid career of the British troops—I should think them superior in every respect to any others in the world. The enemy, being driven from the arm of his strength, has continued to retreat, and lord Wellington has ordered the Spanish army of reserve (Giron’s), into cantonments on the Spanish

Spanish frontier; he feels therefore his superiority in numerical strength, and will perhaps continue his route to Bayonne, on which place the whole enemy has fallen back. Our pickets are on the banks of the Nive. God only knows if lord Wellington will cross that river. His lordship has made dreadful examples of some of those misguided wretches in the allied army, who have dared to outrage his orders against pillage, and wanton destruction of individual property. The greater part of the inhabitants, therefore, continue in their houses, although their countrymen robbed them even of the personal linen during their nocturnal retreat on the 10th.

“ We hear that a column of Spaniards, under brigadier-general Sir John Downie, on the 10th carried a very strong position in a remarkably handsome style, the general following his former plan, of putting himself in front with the national colours of a regiment in his hand; by his report, it appears his aid-de-camp (captain Steele) had his horse shot under him three times during the action.”

In another letter, dated November 14, it is said, “ The weather still continues extremely violent and unfavourable; several Spanish regiments are marching to the rear to recruit. We have now excellent forage for our horses, which is a welcome supply. Colonel O’Neil is going to Cadiz with the eagle which was taken at Pampeluna.”

The great and unparalleled successes of the marquis of Wellington have been so astonishing, that the mind can scarcely keep pace with the rapid motion of events. The reality indeed exceeds all the fictions of romance, and the occurrences of an age are compressed within the period of a month. The noble marquis not only merely entered France, but in one glorious day he overthrew the strong labours of the French. It was supposed by some that lord Wellington would stop to besiege Bayonne, which by its position, as well as by its works, is very strong; but others apprehended that his lordship would advance to Bourdeaux. The latter opinion was so prevalent in the country, that dispatches were immediately sent off to Paris, and a decree was instantly made for the formation of two armies of one hundred thousand men

each, one for Bourdeaux and another for Turin: this decree was dated on the 19th of November; and as Bayonne is only four hundred and twenty-five miles distant from Paris, there is little doubt but the defeat of Soult, and the capture of his posts must have been known to the French government at the time the decree was issued. Lord Wellington, however, shews great sagacity in not suffering his plans to transpire, and whether he besiege Bayonne, or proceed toward Bourdeaux, he will, no doubt, act with great caution. But whatever may be his determination, the above victory at St. Pé, was certainly a proud one, and promises to be followed by events not less brilliant, and of still greater advantage.

As Pampeluna is the capital of Spanish Navarre, and St. Jean Pié de Port is the capital of French Navarre, it may not be amiss to present our readers with a description of that province.

The province of Navarre, then, forms an irregular quadrilateral figure; the angles of which, north and south, are a little prolonged, and distant about seventy-five miles from each other, though it is generally reckoned but sixty-three. Its mean length is fifty-four miles from east to west, and its mean breadth forty-two miles from north to south. It is bounded on the east and south by Arragon; on the south-west by Old Castile; on the north-west by Biscay; and on the north by French, or Lower Navarre, which lord Wellington entered on passing the Bidassoa.

Navarre is a rough country, abounding in steep mountains intermixed with valleys, and some small plains, which are exceedingly fertile. These mountains are that part of the Pyrenees which forms the western extremity of that grand chain; they are very lofty, and take different names. The most important of the vallies are those of Roncesvalles, Lescou, Bastan, and Roncal. This last place is in the middle of the Pyrenees, and is consequently surrounded by steep and lofty mountains: it has been able to pre-serve

serve a government of its own, which excludes all inequality amongst the inhabitants, who all pretend to an ancestral nobility; as do those of the valley of Bastan, which borders on the country of Labour, and is thirty miles in length, and fifteen broad: Elizonda is the principal town, and it contains fourteen villages.

Navarre is watered by the Ebro, which forms its western boundary for the principal part, and eight small rivers, viz. the Queilas, the Arragon, the Irati, the Cidaco, the Arga, the Ega, the Bidassoa, (which separates it from the territory of France,) and the Albema. It has two bishoprics, one at Pampeluna, and the other at Tudela; two cathedral chapters, five collegiate chapters, seven hundred and fifty-three parishes, seventy religious houses, twelve hospitals, two asylums, a grand military government under the administration of a viceroy; a particular military government, a royal council, a chamber of accounts, an university, four colleges for the education of youth; nine cities, one hundred and fifty-four towns, and six hundred and thirty-eight villages.

In giving our account of this province we shall describe its principal roads. The first of these is the road from the frontiers of France by Bayonne to Pampeluna. This road is as follows: From the Bidassoa, a river which separates France from Spain, to the Venta de Belate, is ten miles and a half; thence to Pampeluna, ten miles and a half: total twenty-one English miles.

The river Bidassoa, which divides France from Spain, gave occasion formerly to many contests between the sovereigns of these two kingdoms, each wanting to be the proprietor of it: a treaty between Louis XII. and Ferdinand V. terminated these differences. It was therein stipulated that the river should be common to both monarchs; and that they should receive the tolls equally; the king of France, on whatever came from Spain into his kingdom, and the king of Spain, on whatever passed from France

into his states. This river became celebrated in the seventeenth century by the conferences which were held between the ministers of France and Spain, Cardinal Mazarin, and Don Luis de Haro, who signed the treaty of the Pyrenees, which restored peace to the two kingdoms in 1659; and by the interview of the two monarchs, when the marriage of Louis XIV. with the infanta, Anne of Austria, was determined upon. The conferences were held in an island of this river, not far from the place where we pass it. Previously to this it was called the Isle of Pheasants, but has since taken the name of the Isle of Conference.

After having passed the Bidassoa, we find a Carthusian monastery, situated at the foot of a high mountain of rocks of slate and quartz. Soon after this we go through the village of Maya, at the foot of the same mountain: it is the first village in Spain. We immediately enter the valley of Bastan, or Vastan, in which is situated the town of Elizonda, which we pass through. The valley of Bastan is fertile in maize, turnips, &c.; and leads to the foot of a high mountain of calcareous rocks, covered with trees and shrubs. To the top of this we climb by a winding difficult road, a little below which we find the Venta de Belate, a very bad inn, which scarcely affords shelter from bad weather; but there is no other here. We descend the same mountain by a gentle declivity, and come to a vale formed of small hillocks, composed of earth and calcareous stones, sown with grain, and planted with vines. We soon after come to a fine wood of oaks, which we cross, to return again to the vale, by going along the side of a little river; we pass on to a circular plain of small extent, bounded by detached hills, which terminate this vale. We then perceive the town of Pampeluna, to which the distance is, however, considerable.

Pampeluna, the capital, is moderately large, and is partly situated on a little eminence, and partly on a fertile plain, on the bank of the Arga, which washes a portion of its walls. Lofly mountains surround it
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on all sides, at seven or eight miles distance. It is said to have been built by Pompey, after the defeat of Sertorius, whence it derived the name of Pompeiopolis. This is a fortified town; yet its fortifications are not very considerable, though strong. It is likewise defended by two castles, one of which is in the town, and the other contiguous, though without the walls. This last place, which was the citadel, was built by Philip the Second; it is strong from its situation on the rock; it has five bastions covered with stone, and good fosses: a deep marsh, of considerable extent, renders the approaches to it difficult towards the side on which it could be attacked. This citadel has a handsome tower, several magazines, a square ornamented with trees, and an armoury in the very centre of the fortress; which is round, and opens by five grand and straight streets, which leads to the five bastions. There is a hand-mill preserved here, of rather an ingenious construction, and which would prove extremely useful in case of a siege: it is a large machine, composed of several wheels, which turn five grinding-stones, with as many hoppers. One hundred and twenty loads, or three hundred and sixty quintals of wheat, may be ground with it daily: it is turned with the hand, and may be worked by horses.

A second road is from Pampeluna to St. Jean Pié de Port, the capital of French Navarre, by Roncesvalles. The route is as follows: From Pampeluna to the village of Zubiar is twelve miles; thence to the village of Bourguette, 15 miles; thence to the abbey of Roncesvalles one mile and a half; thence to the town of St. Jean Pié de Port, twenty one miles: total, forty-nine English miles and a half.

From Pampeluna we proceed then to the village of Zubia, for four or five hours, by a gentle, and not toilsome ascent. The land we pass over is full of wood and furze. After having passed the village of Zubiar, we ascend again; and although this ascent takes from five to six hours to accomplish, yet it is pleasant enough at first, over a country planted with
oak,

oak, and wild pears ; but shortly afterwards it becomes rough and fatiguing, as far as the village of Bourguette. In this manner we climb very lofty mountains, fertile in pastures, and the hills are covered with fern. On this road we leave on the left the beautiful valley of Bastan, which is of immense extent, and very fertile in fruit and maize. It abounds in meadows, and is covered with flocks and herds. We scarcely pass Bourguette, when we enter on a very large, spacious, and beautiful plain, surrounded by high mountains, and called Playa de Andres Zaro. This place is rendered famous by the battle which is said to have been fought there, in which Charlemagne was defeated in 778, and where the twelve peers of France sacrificed their lives. This battle, so celebrated by the old Spanish romance writers, has been contradicted by the historians of other nations, who have proved, that this monarch had never been in Spain.

The town and abbey of Roncesvalles are situated in this plain, which we reach in half an hour after leaving Bourguette. There is a monastery of regular canons here, and several inns of a middling description.

We soon after reach the foot of Mount Altobiscar, which is formed by a rock, somewhat resembling that of the Sierra Morena, in the kingdom of Granada : it divides Spain from France. We proceed for two hours before we attain the summit of Altobiscar : we then descend by a steep and difficult road to the valley of Cise in Lower Navarre ; of which St. Jean Pié de Port is the principal place. The journey we have just described cannot be performed in carriages : we must walk or ride on horseback.

A third road in this province is from Pampeluna to Old Castile. This road is as follows : From Pampeluna to the town of Tafalla is eighteen miles ; thence to the village of Capparosso, fifteen miles ; thence to Venta, twelve miles ; thence to the village of Valtierra, six miles ; thence to the frontiers of Old Castile, between

tween Valtierra and Agreda, six miles: total fifty-seven English miles.

On leaving Pampeluna, we proceed on an uneven plain for two hours and a half: it is full of loose stones, and leads to the foot of a mountain, which we ascend, and pass over; after which we enter on a vale covered with calcareous stones, where the little town of Tafalla is situated, through which we pass.

Tafalla is rather a handsome little town, and was formerly one of the principal in Navarre, and for some time the residence of the monarchs. It had a palace built in the fifteenth century, by king Charles the Third of the house of Evreux. It had an university, and the states of Navarre were held there in 1473, by Eleonora, the daughter and heiress of king John the Second. Philip the Fourth gave it the title of City. Nothing of its former grandeur remains, but the enclosure of the walls with which it is surrounded, and the ruins of its castle. The territory in which it stands produces good wine, near the little town of Cidaco, which increases in fertility. The climate of this town is remarkable for its salubrity; and there is a tradition that epidemic disorders have never been known here.

A vast plain presents itself on leaving Tafalla; which at first appears covered with olive trees, then planted with vines, to which wheat and barley succeed. At length it becomes absolutely uncultivated. We are thus led on for fifteen miles, to the village of Caparosso, where it is crossed by a hill. A vast desert succeeds this plain, where we cannot perceive any kind of habitation, or any trace of cultivation. A lofty and unequal hill, filled with shallow veins of whitish gypsum, presents itself, and leads to a plain, parched, bare, and barren, and we proceed along some hills equally uncultivated. The traveller goes on with ennui for three long hours through these tiresome roads, but soon afterwards finds himself recompensed by the rural scenery which presents itself to his view. A plain, beautiful from culture, at once smiling

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ing and fertile, displays itself on a sudden: the land is shaded by numerous trees; and various canals wind on all sides, proceeding from the Ebro, which we cross to reach a Venta, situated on its opposite bank. From this Venta we ascend hills, which united form a chain, on the top of which is the village of Valtierra, which we pass. Ascending still, for nearly two hours, we come to the limits which separate Old Castile from Navarre, about midway between Valtierra and Agreda. From this place we distinctly perceive a very abundant mine of rock salt, near Valtierra.

Besides these different roads, there is a very bad one, which leads to Tudela, a town forty-eight miles distant from Pampeluna. It is the second town of Navarre, and its population amounts to about seven thousand three hundred inhabitants. This place has been ranked with episcopal towns since 1783. Its fine bridge, and its situation, at the confluence of the Ebro and Queilas, surrounded by handsome walks, and tolerably fine environs, give it a very picturesque appearance. Its territory is good and productive, and raises upwards of seven thousand lambs annually.

Having described Spanish Navarre, it remains that we say a few words concerning French Navarre. Bayonne is the capital of this part of France, on the supposition that Lower Navarre be a part of Gascony, though St Jean Pied de Port is the capital of that district which is generally called French or Lower Navarre. It comprehends but one merindale or district, and is a mountainous and rather barren country, being only about twenty miles long, and twelve broad. The late kings of France took their title of king of Navarre from this province. But as Bayonne is the largest town in the vicinity, and the place of greatest importance, whence the road branches off to the different parts of Navarre and the frontiers of Spain, we shall accordingly describe the towns as they lie upon the roads.

Bayonne, which we have described above, p. 591, stands on the river Adour, which rises in the mountains

ains of Bigorre, and running northerly by Tarbes, through Gascony, afterwards turns westerly, and passing by Dax, falls into the Bay of Biscay below Bayonne. The allied army under lord Wellington, soon after his passing the Bidassoa, which separates France from Spain, was distributed in the district between the Adour and that river; but at the time when the rains set in the whole of the low lands on the south of the Adour are laid under water, and become extremely unwholesome. The rains, it seems, by letters received from that country, have continued from the 10th to the 22nd of November, without intermission, insomuch that it was confidently said lord Wellington found it necessary to abandon all thoughts of advancing further into France; and as the soldiery were greatly annoyed by the cold and the wet, it was the intention of his lordship to return into Spain. By a letter, dated St. Jean de Luz, November 29, we find that the head-quarters of the allied army were established at that place. Many of the French inhabitants of St. Jean de Luz continued to abide there, notwithstanding the positive orders of their own government to quit it; and, say the British officers, they have treated us more like friends than foes. By the same accounts it appears, that the rains, until within four or five days, that is, till the 25th of November, were incessant, and the country on the shores of the Adour, was completely under water; so that whatever might have been the intention of the commander-in-chief as to a further progress in France, it cannot for the present be fulfilled.

From Bayonne on the west to the village of Anglett is two miles; the road then turns to the south-west, and we proceed to the village of Biaritz, which is two miles from Anglett; from Biaritz to the village of Bidart is three miles; from Bidart to the village of Gattary is two miles; and from Gattary to St. Jean de Luz is three miles; total from Bayonne to St. Jean de Luz, twelve miles. St. Jean de Luz is a town situated at the eastern shore of a harbour at the mouth of

the Sarre ; and on the western coast of the harbour, at the distance of about a mile, is Fort Socoa. St. Jean de Luz is eight miles from the Bidassoa, and ten north-east from Fontarabia in Guipuscoa, on the Spanish side of the Bidassoa.

On the French side of the Bidassoa, opposite to Fontarabia, is the town of Andaye, and a little north of it the fort of Labord. This large village or town of Andaye is situated at the mouth of the river Bidassoa, and is not more than a mile east of Fontarabia. It is about six miles distant from St. Jean de Luz, and seventeen from Bayonne. As this town stands on the borders of Spain, the French have built a fort here, in order to keep that of Fontarabia in awe. From Andaye is exported very fine brandy.

Fontarabia is a sea-port town of Guipuscoa, in Spain, it being on the Spanish side of the Bidassoa, near the Pyrenees. It has a pretty good harbour at the mouth of the Bidassoa, or Idazo, which river is here pretty broad, but the water is very shallow at low tide. The town, though small, is well fortified both by nature and art, and does not contain above two hundred houses, which are comprized in one parish. It is built in the form of an amphitheatre, on the declivity of a hill. This place is accounted the key of Spain on that side. By the river is here formed the Isle of Pheasants, which we have mentioned before, as being now called the Isle of Conference. In the year 1638, Fontarabia held out a long time, when it was besieged by the French ; but in 1718 they took it, and restored it to the Spaniards the following year. Fontarabia is about twenty miles south-west of Bayonne.

Three miles south-east of Fontarabia is the village of Irun, which is in Spain on the western bank of the Bidassoa, on the road from France to Fontarabia.

From Bayonne a road goes in a south-easterly direction to St. Jean Pied de Port. From Bayonne to Villefranc is five miles ; from Villefranc to the village of Horcena is five miles ; thence to Olla Soura is three

three miles ; from Olla Soura to Galusdu is six miles ; and from thence to St. Jean Pied de Port is nine miles.

We may observe here that the word *Port* means *Pass* ; so that St. Jean Pied de Port, means St. John at the Foot of the Pass ; so also, the Port de Maya, means the Pass of Maya ; and the Port d'Ariete, the Pass of Ariete.

The Bidassoa rises in the Pyrenees, in the district of Bastan, belonging to France, about four miles from the village of Ariscou, and five from the Port de Maya. After a westerly direction for about four miles it turns to the south, and passing Ilisonde takes a south-westerly direction, entering Spain about three miles east of San Estevan, where it takes a north-westerly direction, and passing by Biriarte in France, and Irun in Spain, falls into the bay of Biscay between Fontarabia in Spain and Andaye in France.

The river Nive rises among the Pyrenees, from several sources, about eight miles south-east of St. Jean Pied de Port, and takes a north-westerly direction, receiving several small streams in its course, and passing by Olla Soura glides on to Ustaris, a large village on its western bank, after which it passes Villefranc, which is about two miles north of Ustaris, and then proceeds to Bayonne, through which it runs till it falls into the Adour, near the middle of that town : so that Bayonne is divided into three parts by the Adour and the Nive.

We must, however, resume our account of the operations on the French side of the Bidassoa, which have indeed been very trifling since the dispatches given above ; for the principal part of the country between the Adour and the Nive, and the Nive and the Bidassoa, appear to have operated against any active measures on the part of the allies ; and the accounts from France go so far as to say, that lord Wellington had found it necessary to send a great part of his artillery across the Bidassoa, whence it

was confidently expected that he would shortly order the army to return to Spain; and that for two reasons: first, because the climate at this season of the year, and the incessant rains which had fell for some time, had occasioned sickness among his forces, and many of them had died through the inclemency of the weather; and, secondly, because the French army under marshal Soult was gaining great strength, from the innumerable bodies of conscripts which were continually marching to join him, in bodies of two and three hundred at a time; from which it was calculated that his army would, in the course of a few days be increased upwards of twenty thousand men.

In the accounts received at Paris from Pau, dated Nov. 27, is the following: "General Harispe has just entered the town of Pau with a strong division of troops, coming from Catalonia. These brave troops, who have grown old under the banners of victory, have been welcomed with cries of *Vive l'Empereur* at St. Gaudens, at Tarber, and on the whole of their route they have been received as on a festival; every one has been eager to provide them with the best lodgings and food. At Pau we have readily followed this example. The arrival of general Harispe, who is a Basque, has excited a noble enthusiasm in this country, and a crowd of volunteers are come to place themselves under his standards to serve the emperor, and defend their country and their property. This generous ardour has, no doubt, not a little contributed to the retrograde motion of the enemy. Almost all his artillery is repassing the Bidassoa."—Although some part of the above account may be exaggerated, there was, no doubt, truth in some of the particulars; for, by our accounts it is said, the army of Galicia, which has been so long in movement, has arrived at Medina de Pomar on the Ebro, and some strong detachments from the Spanish forces have been sent in the direction of Catalonia; which, we apprehend,

hend, may have been done in consequence of general Harispe's arrival at Pau*.

By a letter from a gentleman of the Commissariat, on the accuracy of whose communication we completely rely, it appears, that flags of truce have been frequently passing to and from the British and French head-quarters on the Spanish frontiers. Sir George Collier, who had been some time on shore serving with the army, was the bearer of the flag of truce from lord Wellington. He was not upon any of these occasions, favoured with an interview with marshal Soult, but delivered his communications to one or other of the marshal's aides-de-camp. It is said, that the last time he went, the aide-de-camp who received him, entertained him with a flippant harangue upon the great resources of France, and loudly vaunted, that as soon as the new conscripts were completely organized and disciplined, Napoleon would resume his former ascendancy at every point.

Corunna papers to the 19th of November reached town on the night of the 13th of December, and contained the following Proclamation, addressed to the people of France by the marquis of Wellington, on entering the French territory, assuring them of protection for their persons and property, and confirming that promise by the orders subjoined, which documents have not been before published in this country.

Proclamation from Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington; to the French People.

“ Upon entering your country, know that I have given the most positive orders (a translation of which is joined to this)

* Pau is a handsome town of the territory of Bearn, in the province of Gascony, in France. It is a strong town, having a good castle; and is seated on an eminence, at the foot of which the river Gave takes its course. Here Henry the Fourth of France was born; and here also Charles Bernadotte, the crown prince of Sweden was born. It is said, that out of respect to Bernadotte, the prince regent has given directions, that if the town of Pau should fall into the hands of the allies, it should be spared, and no violence committed. Pau is twenty-five miles W. of Tarbe, and ninety-seven S. of Bourdeaux.

to prevent those evils which are the ordinary consequences of the invasion, which you know is the result of that which your government made into Spain, and of the triumphs of the allied army under my command.

“ You may be certain that I will carry these orders into execution, and I request of you to cause to be arrested, and conveyed to my head-quarters, all those who, contrary to these dispositions, do you any injury. But it is required that you should remain in your houses, and take no part whatever in the operations of the war, of which your country is going to become the theatre.

(Signed)

“ WELLINGTON.”

ORDERS.

“ Although the country which is in front of the army be an hostile one, the general-in-chief anxiously desires that the inhabitants should be well treated, and properly respected, as has hitherto been the case.

“ The officers and soldiers must remember that their nations are at war with France, only because he who is at the head of the government of the French nation, will not permit them to be at peace, and wishes to oblige them to submit to his yoke; they must not forget that the greatest evils which the enemy has suffered in his shameful invasion of Spain and Portugal, have proceeded from the disorders and cruelties, which the soldiers, authorised, and even encouraged by their chief, committed upon the unfortunate and peaceable inhabitants of the country.

“ It would be inhuman and unworthy of the nations to which the general-in-chief alludes, to revenge that conduct upon the peaceable inhabitants of France, and this vengeance would in every case cause the army evils similar, or even greater, than the enemy has suffered in the Peninsula, and would be very opposite to the public interests.

“ The same regulations must therefore be observed in the cities and villages of France, as have hitherto been practised in the requisitions and receipts for provisions, which may be drawn from the country, and the commissaries belonging to each army of the different nations will receive from their respective general-in-chief orders relative to the mode of payment for the provisions, and the time within which the payment must be made.”

It must be in the recollection of our readers, that general Ballasteros refused some time ago to act under the orders of lord Wellington, and consequently re-
signed

signed his command; for which that indefatigable general was arrested, and committed to prison. It appears, however, that his partizans in Spain have been extremely dissatisfied, and that disturbances have occasionally taken place in consequence of the treatment that general received from the Cortes. The following extract may serve to throw some light upon this affair :

Extract of a Letter from Cadiz, Nov. 20, 1813.

“ A detachment of the army of Andalusia, consisting of about three thousand men, arrived here yesterday. This force has been judged sufficient to keep in check the populace, who, since the late events, can no longer endure the sight of the English. The officer commanding the detachment is Don Pedro d’Agui-
lar, an old officer of rank, who has served under Bal-
lasteros.

“ This latter is still confined in the fortress of Ceuta, where he atones for the crime of having refused to acknowledge lord Wellington as supreme head.

“ Ballasteros is a true Spaniard, who has shewn a decisiveness of character, and who has still numerous friends in Spain, particularly in the Castiles, and in Andalusia. A letter is circulated among the public, from this general, to the president of the Cortes, which has made a great impression on people’s minds, and in which is the following passage :

“ ‘ After having served the common cause with some success, I am deprived of my liberty ; and yet I cannot be charged but with having refused to disgrace the Spanish character, and not having chosen to submit to the humiliating orders of an Englishman. Shall Spain be like Portugal, only an English colony ? I have too good an opinion of my countrymen, to conceive that they can thus sacrifice their honour and their independence, and submit to the yoke which England desires to impose on them.’

“ They say that it is intended to send General Bal-
lasteros to London.”

That

That there is a sort of disagreement between the Spaniards and the English appears probable; for even the French papers take notice of it. By accounts from Bourdeaux*, dated December 3, it appears that
intelligence

* As the town of Bourdeaux has lately been much talked of as the place it is probable lord Wellington would attempt, the following account of it may not be unacceptable :

Bourdeaux, anciently called Burgdigala, is the capital of Guienne, (as that part of France was designated at the beginning of the French Revolution, but is now the capital of the department of the Gironde) and part of the government of the same name and Gascony. It was the seat of an archbishop, a parliament, intendency, and collection, a chamber of imposts, provincial courts, country bailiwick, admiralty, election, marshalsea, &c. It was originally built by the Romans, and is situated on the western shore of the Garonne, in the form of a half-moon: it is a pretty large and populous place, and has a considerable quantity of spacious and costly stone houses, but antique; but the streets are rather narrow. Bourdeaux is the seat of an university, which was founded in the year 1441; and here is an academy of sciences and belles-lettres, established in 1712; a public library, a large hospital, in which are several manufactories, &c. Its form may be compared to that of a bow, of which the river Garonne is the string. This river is bordered by a noble quay, and the water rises four yards at full tide, so that the largest vessels can come up to discharge and take in their lading. The finest, and withal, the newest part of the town, is the royal square facing the harbour; where is a noble warehouse, the exchange, and a bronze statue of Louis the Fourteenth. The public edifices are very noble, and the streets in general handsome and regular, though some of them, as abovementioned, are rather narrow. The quays are four miles in length, and the river is considerably broader than the Thames at London-bridge. Four or five hundred merchant-ships are often assembled here at one time, importing woollen stuffs, tin, copper, coals, herrings, leather, salted beef, tallow, drugs, deals, masts for ships, hemp, pitch, and tar, &c.; and returning laden with cargoes of wine and brandy: they frequently ship in the course of a season a hundred thousand tons of wine and brandy. They likewise export vast quantities of vinegar, fruit, resin, paper, honey, cork, &c. They bring from the West Indies, sugar, cotton, indigo, and other articles. The whale and cod fishery form likewise a considerable branch of the trade of this city. It contains about ten thousand houses, and a hundred and thirty thousand inhabitants. The beauty of the river, and the amazing fertility of the adjoining country, were probably the reasons which induced the Romans to lay the foundations of this city, and the situation

intelligence had been received, which spake of the misunderstanding that subsisted between the English and the Spaniards. It was likewise asserted that a Madrid Gazette had been received at Bayonne, containing a decree of the Cortes, ordering the Spanish troops to obey only their own generals, and to take no orders from the English commanders. The Spaniards rank apart in the army, and do not mix either with the English or the Portuguese.

The

tuation is certainly a very good one. The suburb of Chartron, or Chartreux, is a fine place. Three forts serve to defend the town and harbour, which were fortified by the celebrated Vauban. The Chateau Trompette is a citadel which partly serves to cover the harbour, and partly to keep the town in awe, having been put into its present condition by Louis the Fourteenth. This castle is magnificently built of entire pieces of square free-stone; and, as the ramparts are not made of earth, but arched over, one may walk quite round them. In the arsenal are arms for about seven thousand men. The other two forts, Le Chateau de Haas, and St. Louis, or St. Croix, are not so considerable. The archbishop has nine suffragan prelates under his jurisdiction: his diocese consists of four hundred and fifty parishes, besides fifty chapels of ease; and he has a yearly revenue of fifty-five thousand livres. To him belong the districts of Montravel, Belvez, Bigaroque, &c. The cathedral is a Gothic structure, very large, but waste and empty. Its vestry treasure was but moderate, and only the large silver casket for reliques on the high altar was worth seeing: trifling, however, as they were, they were seized by the Revolutionists in the early part of the disturbances in France. The Dominican church and convent are modern and beautiful buildings. Both these belong to the Carthusians, and there is not a finer Chartreuse in any part of the world. Here is also a Benedictine Abbey of the congregation of St. Maur. The Jesuits had here a beautiful college, till their expulsion from France. In January 1731, forty monks, who had been regaling themselves with wine, died in one night; a dead viper being found in the cask from whence the wine was taken. At Bourdeaux are still to be seen several remains of Roman antiquities, particularly the amphitheatre of the emperor Galienas, the two principal entries to which are at present standing; and here are several aqueducts of Roman construction. The tower gate is said to have been erected in the time of Augustus. During the irruptions of the barbarous nations, Bourdeaux was ravaged, burnt, and almost entirely destroyed. It only began to recover under Henry the Second, king of England, who having united it to his crown by his marriage

The French papers likewise contain letters from the army of Arragon and Catalonia, of which the following are copies :

Paris, Dec. 10.

WAR DEPARTMENT.—ARMY OF ARRAGON AND CATALONIA.

Copy of a Letter to his Excellency the Minister at War, from the Marshal Duke of Albufera, commanding the Army of Arragon and Catalonia.

“ Barcelona, Nov. 25.

“ SIR—I have the honour to submit to your Excellency a copy of a letter from the commandant of Peniscola. The situation of that place is very satisfactory. Its stock of provisions cannot be estimated, because it has been much increased by the successive arrivals of privateers.

“ Your Excellency will observe that the garrison of Tortosa had on the 16th a new advantage over the enemy. I have no other information than that of the commandant Bardout, but I believe it correct.

“ I have news from Lerida of the 14th, which leave nothing to wish respecting the state of the place, the troops, and provisions.

“ I am, &c.

(Signed) “ The Marshal Duke of ALBUFERA.”

with Eleanor of Aquitaine, rebuilt it, and made it a principal object of his policy, to restore the city to the lustre from whence it had fallen. Edward the Black Prince received all Guienne, Gascony, and other inferior provinces, in full sovereignty, from his father, Edward the Third. He brought his royal captive, John king of France to this city after the battle of Poitiers, in the year 1356; and held his court and residence here during eleven years. His exalted character, his uninterrupted series of good fortune, his victories, his modesty, his affability, and his munificence, drew strangers to Bourdeaux from every part of Europe. This was the birth-place of Richard the Second, king of England, who was the son of Edward the Black Prince. In the year 1453, Charles the Seventh, king of France, re-entered the city, and subjected the whole province of Guienne, which had been for centuries under the English government. Conscious of the importance of such a conquest, he ordered the Chateau Trompette to be built, to defend the passage of the river. The adjacent country, more particularly the Pays de Medoc, which produces the finest clarets, is exceedingly pleasant, and, at the season of the vintage, forms one of the most delicious landscapes in the world. Bourdeaux is eighty-seven miles south of Rochelle, and three hundred and twenty-five south-west of Paris.

Letter

Letter from M. Bardout, Commandant of Peniscola, to General St. Cyr Niegues, Chief of the Etat-Major of the Army of Arragon and Catalonia, Nov. 20.

“ Since the 9th we have had two engagements of out posts with the enemy, who was so well received, that he has not fired a shot since. The troops are employed in works useful to the place, which might be dispensed with indeed, but which it is prudent to do when there is time.

“ On the 16th the garrison of Tortosa made a sally on the side of Amposta, and did much injury to the enemy. On the 17th several waggons with wounded passed La Rapitta. The head-quarters, which were at Uldecona, are now at Vinaroy.

“ BARDOUT.”

Dispatches, of which the following are extracts, were received at earl Bathurst's office, on the 14th of December, from the marquis of Wellington, dated St. Jean de Luz, the 22d and 28th of November:

Nov. 22.

“ The rain which commenced on the 11th instant, continued, almost without interruption, till the 19th at night, and has left the roads and country in such a state as to be at this moment impracticable for any general movement of the army.

“ Lieutenant-general Sir Rowland Hill reconnoitred the enemy's posts at the *tête-de-pont* at Cambo, on the 12th, and again on the 16th; the enemy withdrew from it on the latter day, having blown up the bridge.

“ Nothing of importance has occurred since, excepting that on the 18th instant the enemy reconnoitred lieutenant-general Sir John Hope's advanced posts, on which occasion brigadier-general Wilson was unfortunately wounded.

“ Marshal Sir William Beresford, on the same day, drove the enemy's posts across the bridge of Urdains, and established his there. On the following morning before day-light, the enemy made an attempt to drive them in, and destroy the bridge; they failed in both attempts; and the marshal praises the conduct of the ninth Portuguese regiment, under colonel Sutton, in the first operation, and that of the eleventh Caçadores, under colonel Duersbach, in both.

“ My last reports from Catalonia are dated the 3d of November, and nothing of importance had occurred.”

Nov. 28, 1813.

“ Nothing of importance has occurred since I addressed your lordship on the 22d instant.

“ The situation of our line required that the advanced posts of the light division should be pushed more forward than they

were, which was effected on the 23d ; but the troops having gone rather more forward than was intended, and having got under the fire of the entrenched camp near Bayonne, it was necessary to withdraw them, in doing which some loss, of which I enclose a return, was incurred, and Captain Hobkirk, of the forty-third, was made prisoner.

“ My last reports from Catalonia are of the 18th, at which period no change had taken place.”

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the Command of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K. G. on the 23d of November, 1813.

Total British loss—One lieutenant, one serjeant, fifteen rank and file killed ; two lieutenants, nine serjeants, forty-five rank and file, wounded ; one captain, fourteen rank and file, missing.

Total Portuguese loss—one rank and file killed.

By the Madrid Gazette it appears, however, that the French still have possession of several places in the different provinces of Spain, and that the defence they make is so obstinate as to border almost upon desperation ; and it is well known, that if an enemy once become desperate, however small his numbers may be, that, in such a case, he becomes as it were equal to an host.

From Valencia accounts were received at Madrid, bearing date November 23, which state, that the enemy, who are still in possession of the castle of Denia, defend it with an obstinacy which approaches to brutal tenacity. Their hopes, however, can continue no longer, than till the provisions they had collected are expended, and the commandant of the French engineers on being summoned had the audacity to reply, that he cannot be expected to surrender till that resource shall fail him. The castle has been battered for eight days with nineteen pieces of artillery, and a breach has been effected, but it was not practicable when the accounts came away.

But nothing new of importance had occurred relative to the siege of the other places which the enemy still had in their possession in the province of Valencia ; but the glorious advance of our triumphant
armies

armies into the interior of France, and the decisive success in favour of the good cause, obtained in Germany on the 19th of October, cannot but deprive the enemy who remain in Spain of all hope, and who must now look upon it as their sepulchre. Of this, however, there may be some doubt, because they have hitherto maintained themselves in Spain, notwithstanding the allied forces have entered the borders of France.

And by the accounts from Madrid, dated November 29, it appears that they had received a letter from Xerta of the date of the 19th, which stated, that the enemy in Tortosa began to be in great want, and had diminished the rations of the soldiers, by reason of their provisions beginning to run short.

Private letters have been received in town from several officers belonging to lord Wellington's army, from which it would appear, notwithstanding the assertions of the French to the contrary, that our army is in good condition, and that it would not be a very difficult matter, under proper management, to come to a good understanding with the inhabitants of the parts where the British forces had taken up their quarters. The British troops appear to be greatly elated by their various successes; but the country in which they are situated at present is very uncomfortable, since it is no uncommon thing for the ground to be overflowed five or six inches deep in the course of two or three hours, so that the men are very liable to be attacked by dysenteries.

The following is an extract of a letter which has been received from the neighbourhood of the headquarters of lord Wellington's army; which we shall give verbatim:

“ Arbonne, near St. Jean de Luz, France, Nov. 27.

“ I suppose you have had a flaming dispatch of our brilliant entrée into France; we have not gone far, and it is supposed we are now in our winter-quarters. The inhabitants are of the same description as on the other

other side of the Pyrenees. Very few speak French, but a language called Basque, the ancient language of Spain, as Welch is with us, and equally unintelligible. These people are infinitely superior to the Spaniards both in appearance and character; they extend nearly to the Ebro on one side, and beyond Bayonne on the other. The part of France we are in is extremely abundant, but the roads are the worst I ever saw. Geese, ducks, fowls, &c. which had been long banished from an officer's table, are now by no means rare, which is a good thing, as the beef distributed by the commissaries is so bad, of necessity, as not to make soups and boullis—the standing dish heretofore.” The rumour that Bonaparte would soon join, and take command of the French army, coming to the ears of a Portuguese soldier, he replied—“Let him come within sight, and the shadow of lord Wellington's nose will frighten him back again.”

That various rumours were circulated among the soldiery it is natural to expect, and notwithstanding what may be advanced by officers or individuals writing to their friends concerning the intentions of the commander-in-chief, we do not apprehend, from his lordship's former conduct, that he will suffer his views to transpire, even to the principal officers under him: some interesting particulars, however, are frequently to be found in the private letters which we receive from the army, and that being the case, we shall here insert an extract from another letter, of a later date than that above mentioned; but, however sanguine our soldiers, owing to their late successes may be, with respect to their future victories over the French army under marshal Soult, or to their taking possession of Bayonne, we believe that the day they so proudly anticipate is not so near as they would lead us to expect.

The following is an extract of a private letter from an officer of lord Wellington's army.

“*Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, Nov 29,*

“Lord Wellington is here, and the first and second brigades of guards are quartered in the town. The rest

rest of the troops are more in advance, along the banks of the Nive. The weather is now pretty fair, and if it continue so, it is expected that we shall advance, and attack Bayonne and the camp adjoining, as soon as the roads become fit for moving. We have been doing all that we can to obtain good intelligence of the state of the country, and to come to some understanding with the inhabitants, which we have reason to think would not be difficult, if we could once fairly open a communication with them. The inhabitants of this town, who were, in the first instance, forced away by the enemy on our approach, are returning in numbers, as they find that the first comers were well treated, and give good report of us. Lord Wellington is very strict in keeping the army to the discipline enjoined in his General Orders*; persons and property are respected as much as if we were in England. The guards are stationed in this town, as being most accustomed to town duty, and most orderly in their quarters. The port of St. Jean de Luz has been declared free by lord Wellington; and in consequence of the protection thus insured, a number of merchants, contractors, and suttlers, are collecting from all quarters. It is quite a fair for the army; every necessary, indeed almost every luxury can be had,—and, considering all circumstances, the prices are very moderate. We have reports from the front, which state, that the inhabitants of Bayonne, as well as those of Bourdeaux, have actually refused to pay the heavy taxes and contributions lately imposed by the French senate. Another report gives us to understand, that Bonaparte in person is expected to arrive speedily at Bayonne, to take the command against lord Wellington. We wish most earnestly that this may be true; for I am sure there is not a man in this army, from lord Wellington himself, to the lowest soldier, that would not think it the happiest day of their lives to be placed fairly in front of the French,

* Which we have inserted above, p. 606.

with Bonaparte at their head. If ever there was a day when British soldiers would be more than themselves, that day would certainly be the one. I should not omit to tell you, that there is a very general idea in the French lines, and in our's also, that we shall have a peace."

The British ministry received dispatches from the marquis of Wellington, dated the 5th of December, which, however, they have not deemed necessary to publish: they are said to contain no matter of importance respecting the army; but it is confidently asserted, that his lordship states, that, owing to the nature of the country at this season of the year, it will be impossible for his lordship to resume offensive operations till the month of March.

By the advices, however, which were brought by the Nimrod cutter, which sailed from Passages (a sea-port town between Fontarabia and St. Sebastian, in Guipuscoa, a province at the north-east corner of Spain, bordering on the confines of France,) on the 9th of December, and arrived at Plymouth on the 16th, it appears that lord Wellington had ordered an advanced position to be taken up by a part of the line of his lordship's forces.

It is likewise asserted, and no doubt there is some colour of truth in the assertion, that these dispatches contain a strong intimation of a serious disagreement having taken place between the noble commander-in-chief and the Spanish general Alina. At present, however, we cannot say much on the subject, but must leave it till we are in possession of the particulars.

The following is an extract from a letter dated

St. Jean de Luz, Dec. 8.

"My next letter will probably tell you of a move in advance. Lord Wellington is getting all his forces together. The surgeons of hospitals are ordered not to keep a man a day beyond his being fit for duty. The Spaniards form our rear. Lord Wellington has made the most strenuous efforts to preserve the exactest discipline."

MR Readers will be pleased to observe, that the HISTORY of the
in the PENINSULA has been brought to the latest possible period
e 616.

